THE NATIONAL INTEREST

Double Issue

The Empire's New Clothes

Moscow and the Third World After Afghanistan

George W. Breslauer, Zbigniew Brzezinski, Steven R. David, Graham E. Fuller, Zalmay Khalilzad, Charles Krauthammer, Ilya Prizel, Peter W. Rodman, Stephen Sestanovich, Paul Wolfowitz

FOREIGN POLICY AND THE ELECTION *by Norman J. Ornstein and Mark Schmitt*

THE IKLÉ-WOHLSTETTER REPORT: EUROPEAN RESPONSES *from Christoph Bertram, Pierre Lellouche, and Laurence Martin*

STRATEGY AND "FREEDOM OF NAVIGATION" *by William R. Hawkins*

BURDEN-SHARING DEBATED *by Richard Perle and Michael Legge*

OBITUARY FOR AN AGENDA *by Mary Tedeschi Eberstadt*

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Essays & Comments:

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THE NATIONAL INTEREST

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Foreign Policy and the Election

Norman J. Ornstein and Mark Schmitt

IT IS NOT EASY to define the role foreign policy plays in an American election campaign. Foreign policy is everywhere: Candidates raise it themselves and ideological groups set up "litmus tests" for them; events during the year—hostage seizures, trade deficit jumps, dollar drops, or armed conflict—shape the campaign; campaign commercials and partisan attacks focus on foreign affairs. In many respects, foreign policy defines and delimits presidential elections, as it defines and delimits the presidency. And yet few professional political observers would disagree with the observation made by Richard Nixon earlier this year: "Foreign policy isn't what the public cares about." In American elections, foreign policy is *consequential* but not critical, ubiquitous but insufficient.

A good place to start considering foreign policy in the election campaign is with two of the most effective and notorious political commercials ever put on the television screen:

The Daisy commercial, 1964. It ran only once, but reverberated throughout the campaign and afterward. It opened on a little girl in a field, picking petals from a daisy and counting, "One, two, three. . . . " The girl looked up, startled, as a loud voice began the countdown: "Ten, nine, eight. . . . " After a shot of the mushroom cloud, President Lyndon Johnson intoned, "These are the stakes—to make a world in which all of God's children can live, or to go into the dark. We must either love each other, or we must die."

The Bear in the Woods ad, 1984. Two decades later, President Ronald Reagan topped the Daisy ad. Visually uncomplicated, it showed a bear stalking in the forest, while a voice warned, "There is a bear in the woods. For some people, the bear is easy to see. Others don't see it at all. Some people say the bear is tame; others say it is vicious and dangerous. Since no one can really be sure who is right, isn't it smart to be as strong as the bear—if there is a bear." Then, with the image of a hunter with a rifle facing the bear, the tag line "President Reagan. Prepared for Peace" crossed the screen.

The ads define a central approach to foreign affairs in presidential campaigns by both parties. Democrats try to portray the Republicans as recklessly aggressive; Republicans try to paint Democrats as dangerously naive. But the portrayals occur in the context described by Nixon—an electorate that is not driven by foreign policy. To understand foreign policy in American elections requires a recognition of these two seemingly incompatible facts.

The "Daisy" and "Bear" ads, in a way, fit this context. Neither treats foreign policy questions in a sophisticated or substantive fashion; neither mentions a foreign country, a foreign policy, or an accomplishment of the incumbent president sponsoring the commercial, as domestically-oriented ads frequently

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or usually do. These are foreign policy ads for a public that does not care much about the substance of foreign policy.

And, of course, these ads tell us about something more than the role that foreign policy plays in election campaigns; they also hint at the limited impact campaigns may have on subsequent foreign policy—with promises or pledges ignored or reversed, often leading to disillusionment and cynicism in the electorate. When each incumbent, after his election, confronted reality, he responded without feeling particularly constrained by the promises implicit in his advertising. After his 1964 election landslide, Lyndon Johnson gradually but massively escalated American involvement in Vietnam; after his equally impressive re-election triumph, Ronald Reagan moved swiftly towards sweeping arms control with the "bear," suggested that Gorbachev was truly different from his predecessors, and presided quietly over plans for budget-driven cutbacks that signalled the end of the defense build-up that had marked his first term.

A Metaphor for Temperament

ADS AND THEMES aside, presidential elections in peacetime—general elections, especially—do not revolve around foreign policy issues. Signs of economic turmoil will "crowd out" anything else. If an election is not a referendum on the current state of the economy, or a broader referendum on the incumbent's performance (including foreign policy performance) in office, it is a contest that focuses on the individual candidate's character and leadership abilities. True, candidates with foreign policy backgrounds—Richard Nixon and George Bush, for example—will play the foreign policy card, brandishing their resumes and general expertise; but their focus is rarely specific accomplishments, specific promises, or specific policies. (Wartime elections, of course, can be different.)

But as the ads suggest, foreign policy is always a thematic centerpiece of a presidential campaign. In primaries, some specific foreign policy issues may serve as litmus tests for candidates because they motivate activists—who participate and vote in larger numbers than others in the primaries—in deep and emotional ways that do not move the broader public. This is the case with Nicaragua and SDI in 1988. For Democrats, it was also the case with the nuclear test ban pushed by the liberal activist group STARPAC in the Democratic caucus in Iowa; as dissenter Albert Gore, Jr. frequently pointed out, the other Democratic candidates rushed to accommodate STARPAC, taking positions on test bans that went well to the left of mainstream doctrine to accommodate a group that demonstrated influence well beyond its overall numbers in a pivotal caucus state.

In the general election campaign, foreign policy issues can serve as a metaphor for the ability to govern, or the temperament to lead the West. Recall, for example, the debate in 1976 between challenger Jimmy Carter and (appointed) incumbent Gerald Ford, in which Ford misspoke about the freedom of Poland. Very few Americans would decide their votes for president on the basis of candidates' positions on the Poland issue. But the Ford "gaffe" proved pivotal; it hurt Ford by taking away his leverage as incumbent to challenge Carter's inexperience and naivete on foreign policy.

Foreign policy as an issue of temperament came up again in 1980 with Jimmy Carter, as incumbent, suggesting over and over that Reagan lacked the personal and ideological moderation necessary to deal rationally and realistically with the Soviets. This "Reagan the Bombthrower" characterization clearly had some resonance in the electorate, until the only general election presidential candidate debate—when the stereotype was effectively countered by a mild, reasonable, and rational Reagan.

Broad Shifts of Opinion

TO ASSERT that foreign policy shapes an election campaign only to motivate (and satisfy) issue activists in primaries, or to use as a thematic, metaphoric

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lever by one candidate against the other in a general campaign, is not to say that public opinion about foreign policy is nonexistent, static, or shallow. It can move in broad shifts that occasionally burst forth in an election year. By 1980, for example, the underlying sense of national weakness building since the Vietnam War had peaked, even as the isolationism induced by the war faded. President Jimmy Carter's heavy emphasis on human rights as the primary focus of American foreign policy became less palatable, and the sight of jeering Iranians holding 52 Americans hostage in, of all places, our own embassy, became a potent model for our misgivings. Out of this emerged a palpable public desire for a stronger defense and a more assertive America. But even in this situation, the clear turning point in the campaign was not challenger Ronald Reagan's criticism of Carter's Iranian policy or his foreign policy position papers; it was his question in the presidential candidate debate: "Are you better off now than you were four years ago?"

Eight years after the end of the Carter era, many signs suggest that another broad shift of opinion is in the offing. The policy world has changed in important ways. Ronald Reagan still has some hope of signing a second, sweeping arms control agreement with a new and different Soviet leader before his presidency ends. The Iran-*contra* affair—at root, a botched and misguided attempt to free hostages in the Middle East—resulted in an embarrassing scandal that made Carter's approach look good in comparison and eroded Reagan's popular base of support. And some key public attitudes have changed as well. The desire for a sharp defense build-up has virtually disappeared, replaced by growing public discontent with Pentagon waste and fraud. But these changes do not in and of themselves tell us whether foreign policy will play a major role in the coming election, or lead to the broad opinion currents and policy consequences that would then flow. For that, one must look more closely at the shifting ground of public opinion and at the current political landscape.

Probably for most of American history, and certainly in the time since we have been systematically measuring these things, American public opinion has divided into two levels when it comes to foreign policy: opinion leaders—elites—who are sophisticated, knowledgeable, involved; and mass voters, who are detached, uninterested, and disengaged.

Serious analyses of American public opinion and foreign policy echo with the lament about the mass public expressed by Gabriel Almond when he undertook the classic examination of the subject in 1950. "Americans tend to exhaust their emotional and intellectual energies in private pursuits," he wrote. "On questions of a more remote nature, such as foreign policy, they tend to react in more undifferentiated ways, with formless and plastic moods which undergo frequent alteration in response to changes in events."

Public involvement in foreign policy tends to be episodic and erratic. George Kennan elaborated upon Almond's analysis in 1959, but added a further point, with a characteristic (and somewhat overblown) rhetorical flourish. To Kennan, the American electorate resembled

> one of those prehistoric monsters with a body as long as this room and the brain the size of a pin: He lies there in his comfortable primeval mud and pays little attention to his environment. He is slow to wrath—in fact you practically have to whack his tail off to make him aware that his interests are being disturbed; but, once he grasps this, he lays about him with such blind determination that he not only destroys his adversary but largely wrecks his native habitat.

At the time Kennan wrote, the public was in its quiescent stage. Public opinion about foreign policy largely followed the model outlined some years later by political scientist John Mueller: Knowledgeable elites generally followed the internationalist and interventionist lead of the foreign policy establishment, while the majority of voters

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remained, at a gut level, isolationist but knew little and cared less about the policies debated and set in Washington.

The Effects of Vietnam

UNTIL THE LATE 1960s, in fact, the broad public was willing to follow, at least for extended periods of time, most presidential initiatives on foreign policy, and support for the president depended far more clearly on economic performance and prospects, and on presidential character. And before 1968 there were no sharp partisan divisions on overall American foreign policy along hawk/dove lines. Disputes in the 1960 campaign, for example over what to do in Cuba, did not have Democrats arguing against intervention and Republicans for anti-communist activism; the question was which candidate would do more to combat Castro in Cuba. In the jargon of social science, Cuba, like most foreign policy issues at the time, was a valence issue, not a position issue.

With Vietnam things began to change. The public trust in elites and government observed by Mueller—a trust that held in check both voters' historic isolationism and any sharp division between hawks and doves—broke apart during and after 1968, when public opposition to U.S. policy mushroomed and public divisions broke into the open, along with riots in the streets and mass demonstrations outside the White House.

Despite the sharp and defined clashes and policy differences, the 1968 election was not really the sharply etched party choice on the key foreign policy issue that the public preoccupation would have suggested. After the disaster at the Democratic party convention in Chicago, Democratic standard bearer Vice President Hubert Humphrey stood as unacceptable to the dovish wing of his party. Republican Richard Nixon, with his frequent hints at a secret plan to end the Vietnam war, adopted a policy that columnists Rowland Evans and Robert Novak called "not dovish and not hawkish but very Delphic, susceptible to favorable interpretation by hawk and dove alike." With his running mate, Spiro Agnew, lashing out at the lawlessness of anti-war demonstrators, Nixon addressed and exploited frontally the domestic politics of Vietnam, while asking voters to accept, essentially on faith, his assurances that his secret plan would work.

Nineteen sixty-eight also saw internal stress, precipitated by Vietnam, nearly break apart the Democratic Party, starting with the riotous party convention in Chicago and leading to the creation of the McGovern-Fraser Commission to reform the presidential nominating process. Four years later, operating under rules drafted by the commission that opened up the party process and created a new set of primaries as the fundamental method for choosing delegates, George McGovern mobilized a cadre of issue activists committed to end America's role in Vietnam and captured the Democratic nomination, wresting control of the party from the internationalist, anti-communist elite that had nominated Roosevelt, Truman, Stevenson, Kennedy, and Humphrey before him.

Despite McGovern's landslide defeat in the fall of 1972, the party rules that his commission drafted basically remained, leaving a permanently shifted balance in the nominating process and giving a major role to issue activists. This in turn shifted the balance in the party toward a more dovish, anti-war foreign policy focus, which contenders for the nomination would have to address before moving back to the center in the general election campaign.

The rule changes begun by the McGovern Commission did not affect only the Democrats. Many of them brought changes in state laws, creating primaries and new-style, open caucuses for both parties. The Republican Party had seen its balance of power in nominating politics shift a bit earlier, with the Goldwater insurgency in 1964 giving the conservative wing of the party a nomination after earlier near misses under Robert Taft. But while Goldwater's disastrous defeat to Lyndon Johnson left the Republican right off balance for a while, the new

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primaries carved out an important role for them as well. Republican contenders also found themselves forced to move right early, then adjust to the center for the general election.

One result of these changes has been to sharpen, at times, the perceived foreign policy cleavages within and between the parties. Since 1968, we have seen frequent deep divisions between the parties and the presidential candidates on foreign policy, often precipitating fluctuations in broader public opinion.

THE WIDE SWINGS that we have seen are partly cyclical and partly a result of the nature of presidential campaigning in this area. In their 1984 book, *Our Own Worst Enemy: The Unmaking of American Foreign Policy*, I.M. Destler, Leslie Gelb, and Anthony Lake describe a contemporary pattern in which a candidate makes broad but overreaching promises in order to exploit policy failure and ideological divisions. But his success brings its own cycle of problems—the inevitable public disillusionment that comes when the promises go unfulfilled intensifies the opposition and generates the resulting swings in public opinion.

In 1976, for example, responding to the backlash against American "immorality" in Vietnam and amorality in our dealings with the Greek and Argentine juntas, Jimmy Carter used human rights as his campaign theme in foreign policy, a position that meshed perfectly with his domestic, post-Watergate theme of restoring morality to government in Washington. But in Carter's presidency, the campaign theme, etched in clear black-and-white, soon came up against the shades of gray that color Realpolitik. Within a few months of assuming office, Carter saw the Pentagon block his plan to withdraw nuclear weapons from South Korea. By the end of his term, Carter's strongly expressed moralism, out of sync with the intractable Iranian hostage problem and a growing feeling of American impotence, was an easy target for Ronald Reagan and the GOP.

Reagan's campaign promise to make America again the indisputable number one was potentially every bit as overreaching as Carter's promise to base American foreign policy first and foremost on human rights. Indeed, it would be hard to make the case that the Reagan era has led to U.S. military superiority over the Russians, to greater control over events in the Middle East or Central America, or to an unchallenged leadership for the U.S. in international economic affairs. But, because Reagan understood the limitations of his promises and acted accordingly, not letting a rigid adherence to his rhetoric dominate his behavior, the letdown from his overreaching has been less severe. Reagan was prudent in picking his opportunities to show strength—Grenada and Libya, not Cuba and Syria—and he readily cut his losses to avoid greater disaster in Lebanon.

The Carter/Reagan difference described above reflects a basic contemporary reality: Republicans have an easier time exploiting unease and discontent in foreign policy. "Democrats don't get elected on foreign policy, but they get beat on it," said Arkansas Democratic Governor Bill Clinton, commenting after the New York primary on his concerns about Michael Dukakis. The Democratic Party problem starts with party image. When asked which party does a better job maintaining a strong national defense, Americans respond by clearly choosing the Republicans (52 percent to 24 percent in one recent major survey by The Daniel Yankelovich Group). Republicans also do better than Democrats when it comes to dealing with terrorism (41 percent to 30 percent, even after Iran-*contra*), and handling relations with the Soviet Union (44 percent to 31 percent). Democrats, in other words, have an image of weakness with large numbers of Americans, an image that has been reinforced by a candidate selection process that skews dialogue to the left (as with the STARPAC example).

Will this hurt the Democratic Party, costing it the White House for the third consecutive time? Will foreign policy be the

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major thematic highlight of the 1988 campaign, used by George Bush to keep the inexperienced Michael Dukakis on the defensive? Will the Iran-*contra* affair turn the tables on foreign policy, keeping Vice President Bush on the defensive, and like the Poland gaffe in 1976 take an issue away from the GOP? Will foreign policy be more than thematic, with specific issue positions and differences between the candidates and the parties making a significant difference in the campaign—in other words, will there be foreign policy position issues, not just valence issues this time? Having set a context, we may now address these questions about foreign policy in the 1988 elections.

1988: Issues and Strategies

THE FIRST and most significant thing to remember about the 1988 election is that it is an open contest. In this respect 1988 resembles 1960, the only previous election where a successful and popular two-term incumbent president, ineligible to run for a third term, left the Oval Office vacant to a newcomer. An open presidential contest means that we have no referendum on an incumbent; his performance in office, always a factor, is a lesser one, and issues that might work to his political advantage (for example, an arms agreement) or disadvantage (say, a scandal) become diluted, unless they can be tied directly to his party's candidate.

Thus, in the 1960 election cycle we had a foreign policy scandal in which the president lied to the American public, was found out, and forced to his chagrin and embarrassment to admit it. But the U-2 scandal, while it gave the Democrats an issue to keep the "in" party on the defensive, proved to be a minor problem for the GOP standard-bearer, Vice President Nixon; he, after all, did not make the policy or transmit the lie.

In an open election, the contest usually turns on the two candidates' personalities, with their character, abilities, experience and limitations all important factors. Foreign policy issues matter in this context if they motivate or alienate partisan or ideological activists; if they bear on the character, abilities, experience or limitations of one or both of the candidates; if they reinforce or contradict the voters' images of the parties; if they can be used to put the opposition on the defensive.

Nicaragua and Mozambique/South Africa are examples for both parties of the first type: issues that motivate activists. For Republican and Democratic activists, aid to the *contras* has become a key litmus test, one passed on opposite sides by both standard-bearers. Michael Dukakis ran emotional commercials during the early primaries and caucuses on the killing in Central America to show his personal warmth and concern and to win over activists; George Bush frequently railed against congressional Democrats early on to show his partisan and ideological credentials to the Republican right. Nicaragua in 1988 is clearly unlike Cuba in 1960; the party differences are much more distinct. But it may also be the case in the Fall campaign that the continuing negotiations between Sandinistas and *contras* defuse the Central American issue, even for partisan and issue activists.

Mozambique was an issue raised early in the Republican nominating process when Robert Dole, in a bid for conservative activist support, took a strong and visible position supporting the Renamo insurgents, in opposition to Reagan Administration policy. George Bush, in contrast, continued stolidly to stand behind the official policy. Conservative activists will clearly pressure Bush, and the writers of the Republican party platform, to take a stand in favor of Renamo and against the communist government of Mozambique.

But this issue has become considerably more salient in the Democratic Party, particularly among black activists led by Jesse Jackson. In late April, just before the Pennsylvania primary, Jackson went to the State Department and Capitol Hill to protest atrocities against Mozambican civilians carried out by the South African-backed Renamo

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rebels. Jackson wanted State and Congress to label South Africa a terrorist state for its part in the civilian deaths; a strong position on this question will be an important test, for Jackson, of Dukakis's sensitivities and the Democratic Party's willingness to accommodate his interests and issues.

Character and Leadership

PERHAPS THE greatest significance of foreign policy in 1988 will be in terms of how the issues reflect on the character and leadership potential of the candidates. For George Bush, foreign policy is both his protective armor and his Achilles heel. Despite nearly thirty years in the public eye, Bush is not sharply defined as a leader to most Americans. His resume, especially his foreign policy experience—as U.S. representative to the United Nations and to the Peoples' Republic of China, as head of the CIA and as vice president—becomes his badge of assurance to Americans that he is a safe and reliable choice as president. But it is here that the Iran-*contra* affair and Panama may hurt. Most surveys suggest that barely 10 percent of Americans care deeply at this point about the substance of Iran-*contra*. But as an issue that suggests George Bush was naive, showed bad foreign policy judgment, was left "out of the loop" despite his position as head of the White House Anti-Terrorism Task-force, and/or was not credible in his responses to questions about his role, Iran-*contra* may serve to negate his foreign policy strength. A similar problem emerges from Bush's role as head of the administration's South Florida Drug Task Force and his disclaimers about knowledge of Panamanian General Noriega's involvement in the drug trade.

Iran-*contra* and Noriega, as issues, are less likely to devastate George Bush directly than to crimp his campaign, keeping him on the defensive through persistent press questions, and countering his ability to use his opponent's inexperience and weakness on foreign policy to keep Michael Dukakis off balance.

Bush will certainly try, because Dukakis's lack of involvement in the foreign arena is a serious weakness when matched against Bush's experience, and because what Albert Gore called Dukakis's "naive moralism" could easily reinforce the Democratic Party's weak image in this area. Uneasiness on this score was not limited to Dukakis's nomination rival Gore. Governor Clinton, in late April, suggested four foreign policy areas where Dukakis, based on his campaign statements and positions, might have trouble: opening up the prospect of troop withdrawal from Korea; implying acceptance of a Soviet client state in our hemisphere; a simplistic, legalistic approach to policy towards the *contras;* and "the idea early on that he was against almost all new weapon systems, no matter what the strategic arguments were or what counter moves the Soviets did or did not make." Clinton asserted that Dukakis had firmed up his policies during the campaign, but his comments suggest the concern expressed by many Democrats about Dukakis and foreign policy. On the other hand, Dukakis's ability to settle (informally at least) his party's nomination struggle relatively early has given him time and flexibility to work on his weakness. Veteran Democrat Stuart Eizenstat commented about Dukakis: "One of the things that has to be done between June 7 and the convention is to make it clear that his foreign policy is solidly in the middle and not on the left wing of the party."

Dukakis's foreign policy problems start with being a governor who has not been involved in foreign policy or national security issues. But he also has problems because, as Clinton suggests, his professed or implied issue positions reinforce Democratic Party image shortcomings—the impression of weakness on national security. Walter Mondale's 1984 campaign manager, Robert Beckel, has put it this way:

> The real question stems around the isolationist issue, which is really to what extent and where would Dukakis, and by extension the Democrats, be willing to use United States military

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power to protect U.S. security interests around the world. That's really been the haunting question, and it harkens back to the fallout from the Vietnam War.

The trade and competitiveness issue will be showcased in the Fall campaign by Democrats to counter this weakness: economic nationalism to counter the perception of foreign policy isolationism. Despite the criticism in Democratic ranks of Richard Gephardt's campaign, his underlying theme, which so clearly resonated with many Americans of every political stripe, was that the United States was mad as hell and not going to take abuse and unfairness any more from our trading partners.

Despite Dukakis's pure free trade position early in the primary season, and his willingness to criticize Gephardt harshly on trade, he showed movement on the issue as early as March when he endorsed the Riegle Amendment (a somewhat weaker trade protection amendment offered by Michigan Senator Donald Riegle) before the Michigan caucuses. He went on the offensive in late April and early May, after President Reagan vetoed the congressional trade bill, attacking the President for his insensitivity to American workers by his opposition to a plant closing notification provision, and for his lackadaisical attitude toward the global trade challenge in general. For Democrats, the trade issue offers hopes of getting a weak image erased and of identifying their party with a tougher stance on America's posture toward other countries. It will be pursued vigorously and aggressively, regardless of what happens with the trade deficit, as a broader question of economic nationalism, of preserving America's preeminent role in the world economy.

The Republicans also have image weaknesses on foreign policy. They lose out to the Democrats when it comes to public perceptions of the parties' ability to handle military spending (37 percent favor the Republicans, 42 percent the Democrats) and policy towards South Africa (27 percent to 45 percent). Of these two issues, only military spending has any chance of becoming a factor that changes or motivates voters, given the reduced tensions with the Soviet Union and the publicity given to recent scandals in defense procurement.

IN THIS CAMPAIGN, as in the past, foreign policy will be ever-present. Believing it to be a weakness of Dukakis and a strength of his own, Bush will attempt to make foreign policy inexperience, naivete and weakness the major attack theme of his campaign. Believing that Iran-*contra* negates Bush's strength and challenges his credibility, leadership background and judgment, Dukakis will try to use the scandal to keep the Vice President on the defensive. Issues like Nicaragua, South Africa, and SDI will be employed by the candidates to motivate their partisans, and by groups and activists to force policy concessions from candidates and parties. Themes like economic nationalism and arms control will be applied with a broad brush by the candidates to counter the weaknesses in their party images. Events like the Moscow summit may shape the campaign's course and the candidates' positions.

Just conceivably, there could be more serious change in foreign policy as a result of the election process, with Jesse Jackson's primary campaign bringing about a fundamental redirection of U.S. foreign policy, away from the superpower rivalry and toward a focus on the "emerging political and economic importance of the developing nations." More than likely, though, we will have a campaign, as in 1960, in which foreign policy dominates the rhetoric and figures heavily in the tactics of the campaign, but proves less than pivotal in the final choice of a president—and less than consequential in the foreign policies that follow.

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The Iklé-Wohlstetter Report

Discriminate Deterrence, *the report of the Commission on Integrated Long-Term Strategy, was published in January of this year. It is an important document in terms of its scope, its recommendations, and the standing of those who produced it. It has already stimulated controversy, particularly in Europe. Here, we publish an introductory summary of the report's conclusions, together with the reactions of three leading European commentators.*

1. What the Report Says

Stephen D. Prowse

THE ORIGINS of the Commission on Integrated Long-Term Strategy can be found early on in the second term of the Reagan Administration. At that time, it was evident from the widely expressed views of those in Congress, the administration, and other strategic analysts that there was a need for a clear and coherent statement of current national security strategy and a plan for how that strategy should evolve in the future. The commission's formal terms of reference were thus extremely broad: to consider the state of current strategy and to propose revisions in light of what it considered to be the likely major changes in the future security environment. The import given to such a task was revealed by the quality of commission membership: its thirteen members included Henry Kissinger, Zbigniew Brzezinski, General John Vessey, Samuel P. Huntington, and co-chairmen Fred Iklé and Albert Wohlstetter. The independent, bipartisan commission was supported by four working groups. The main report, entitled *Discriminate Deterrence*, was submitted to President Reagan in January 1988. Before the commission's charter lapses in October, the working groups will publish detailed findings of their own. A number of papers will also be released covering subjects such as military space policy, the systems acquisition process, the research and development budget, and security assistance.

The report reaffirms many of the existing principles of U.S. defense planning that Europeans have relied upon for the last forty years. In contrast to many all across the political spectrum in the U.S. who now call for pulling forces back, the report emphasizes the need to defend America's allies in Europe and elsewhere by deploying U.S. forces forward. The report recognizes the necessity of the U.S. nuclear guarantee, not only against nuclear attacks directed solely at a European ally but also—in contrast to those advocating "no first use"—against overwhelming Soviet conventional attacks against an ally or group of allies, and the need to retain that purpose of U.S. nuclear forces, including those based in Europe.

The report stresses that U.S. (and Euro-

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pean) defense planners should reduce the emphasis they place on the "extreme" contingencies, namely a Soviet nuclear or non-nuclear attack on *all* of Europe or *all* of NATO that necessarily wreaks immense destruction. Focusing on such attacks merely obscures the need for a discriminate, militarily effective Western response. This proposal should not be interpreted as advocating reducing the importance of the defense of Europe in U.S. defense planning in favor of the defense of other parts of the world. The report advocates focusing on the more likely non-apocalyptic scenarios, not the non-European ones. Indeed some of the most important scenarios the report envisions are those concerning limited Soviet attacks on military targets in a single NATO country such as Norway or Turkey. Scenarios of indiscriminate Soviet attacks on all the Western nations at once, though conceivable, are some of the least probable contingencies that we are likely to face in the future. The Soviets have never shown a desire to attack all their enemies at once. And they are likely to continue their peacetime policy of attempting to split the Alliance in wartime by attacking only one or a few allies, leaving the others the incentive to opt out—an incentive that will be all the harder to resist if the West focuses its nuclear deterrent on the threat to bring on the apocalypse rather than actually defeat a Soviet attack.

THE REPORT is clear about the role of conventional and nuclear weapons in the defense of Europe. Our conventional capability to defend against a limited Soviet conventional attack on an ally or group of allies should be increased, thereby raising the nuclear threshold. To this end, conventional forces should be improved primarily with the help of the continuing advances in the military technologies of discrimination and control. And further, NATO policy concerning the use of those conventional forces should include the option of ground force counter-offensives across the NATO-Warsaw Pact border. Should nuclear force be needed to respond to an overwhelming conventional attack or an attack which used nuclear weapons, then this force should be effective and discriminate. This view stems from the conviction that it is impossible to separate the prospect of deterring an attack from the possibility of actually having to fight. We cannot deter an aggressor if he believes we are not willing—as well as able—to fight back and that our armaments are just a bluff. The choice is not, as is usually said, between "war-deterring" and "war-fighting." It is about how most effectively to deter a non-nuclear or nuclear attack. All members of the Alliance would rather deter than defeat an aggression. The U.S. and its allies can deter attack most effectively if they make clear that they are prepared and willing, if deterrence fails, to use conventional and, if necessary, nuclear weapons with a discrimination and control aimed at defeating the attack rather than bringing on the apocalypse. And should deterrence fail in spite of such a policy, it will be in the West's best interests to have the capability to respond in as discriminate and militarily effective a manner as possible. It will always be possible to slip mindlessly towards the apocalypse. But a responsible deterrence policy should try to minimize that risk.

The report considers the role of the European allies in the defense of the West as critical. Since the 1950s, the West's ability to bring selective force to bear to stop aggression at points distant from the U.S. has declined compared to that of the Soviet Union and to that of many potentially hostile and increasingly powerful Third World nations. Our political access to and in many important potential theaters of conflict has diminished; and the qualitative performance of the forces we may have to oppose there has advanced. The commission regards the role of our European allies in reversing this trend as tremendously important and sees a much larger role for Europe in defending its critical interests not only outside national boundaries but also outside alliance boundaries where, as in the Persian Gulf, allied interests clearly coincide with our own. Our allies can aid the common defense of regions such as the Euro-

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pean flanks and the Persian Gulf significantly by committing themselves to the provision of timely access to their air space and bases for U.S. forces attempting to reach the area.

The report welcomes the larger nuclear role that has often been suggested for the British and the French in contributing to the defense of Europe. An expanded nuclear role will require, as in our own case, an effective and discriminate nuclear force capable of defeating a Soviet invasion into allied territory.

The public reception of the report in the U.S., although generally favorable, was mild compared to the impact it made abroad. The report, however, has been very well received by the chairman of the Senate Armed Services Committee, the Department of Defense, and the National Security Council, and some of its recommendations are already being embodied in their work. Abroad, it has been the focus of intense interest and debate in the PRC, where it has already been translated into Chinese, and in Japan.

The report's greatest impact has been in Europe. The initial interpretation was somewhat confused, due partly to a U.S. State Department Press Guidance which reversed the message of the report by suggesting that it recommended making the U.S. and the Soviet Union sanctuaries and making West and East Europe a battleground. An op-ed piece in the *International Herald Tribune* by four of the commissioners seemed to clarify this initial confusion. The Institute for European Defense and Strategic Studies is considering a similar study of British defense posture in light of the recommendations made in *Discriminate Deterrence*. The report has apparently re-opened the debate in Europe on the best way that the U.S. can defend Europe and deter aggression against our common interests. It is to be welcomed just for that.

2. The Wrong Tree

Christoph Bertram

HAD IT NOT been for European outcries, the Report of the Commission on Integrated Long-Term Strategy might not have caused many ripples. Despite its impressive, outstanding membership, the commission would have found it difficult to raise much excitement. In the final year of an outgoing administration such documents usually receive little attention. In this case, that would have been a pity because much of what is said in the report deserves serious discussion.

Yet, although European critics have, by their reaction, rescued the study from relative obscurity, they have also tended to bark up the wrong tree. They have made it seem as if the commission's central recommendation was to decouple American from European security and, by advocating the limited use of nuclear weapons, undermine Alliance deterrence.

As a result, other more important issues raised in the report have fallen by the wayside. Instead of focusing on the long term solutions, the debate so far has been concerned with short-term expediency. In the simmering West European (and particularly West German) discussion of the modernization of NATO's short-range nuclear weapons, an authoritative U.S. study sympathetic to the limited, non-escalatory use of nuclear weapons inevitably had to have an embarrassing effect, not least for the Atlanticist, pro-deterrence camp. The present, as so often, preempted serious thinking about the future.

Yet much of the European protest

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amounts to little more than the dogged attempt to catch a red herring. The report, contrary to the myths created around it, clearly supports America's security involvement in Europe and "the essential pledge that we will use conventional, and if they fail, nuclear weapons, in response to a Soviet attack directed solely at an ally." (p. 65) That is not surprising. After all, the authors are, in Robert Levine's useful categorization, Extenders and not Limiters (see Robert A. Levine, *The Strategic Nuclear Debate*, The RAND Corporation, November 1987). They are willing to accept the risk to the survival of the United States inherent in extending deterrence to Europe. While they want to make sure that that risk is kept in check by the control of escalation, they rightly accept that despite such efforts, "the risk of further escalation would still be there."

Moreover, nowhere in the study is there a word of support for short-range nuclear weapons. On the contrary, the authors go out of their way to advocate stronger reliance on conventional rather than nuclear weapons, and favor the procurement of longer-range over shorter-range delivery vehicles. And another suggestion which has angered European critics, namely that a credible conventional defense must include plans for Western ground forces to mount counter-offensives across the Warsaw Pact border, is so much of a throw-away line, rather than the result of careful study, that Europeans could well have afforded to take it less seriously. In short, there is not much objective foundation for the noisy criticism that the report has received from some of America's allies.

Of course, beneath the excitement of the exchange lies a deeper and more serious difference. The report's authors believe, as most American administrations have since the late 1950s, that the balance of deterrence is delicate rather than robust and that it needs constantly to be propped up: by reducing the vulnerability of vital targets (hence their support for strategic defense); and by avoiding any automaticity of escalation (hence their interest in less-than-all-out options and their emphasis on the need to prevail in limited nuclear conflict).

Most Europeans, on the other hand, believe that deterrence is robust, that there is little need to refine the means of deterrence through a multitude of options, and that to profess a preference for limiting nuclear conflict is to reduce the deterrent effect of nuclear weapons.

This is, however, a difference of outlook which is not only perfectly understandable but also one which has rarely been allowed to divide Europeans and Americans for long in the past. It is understandable that those Americans who continue to favor the U.S. nuclear commitment to NATO (and there are, as we know, others who do not) want to make sure that this does not imply an automatic ladder to Armageddon. This would strain the credibility of deterrence, and it would positively rule out durable support from the American public for such commitments.

Similarly, it is understandable that some Europeans are concerned about the prospect of nuclear war being limited to their part of the world. Those who favor nuclear deterrence (and there are, as we know, others who do not) are convinced that deterrence will work only if the fate of the United States is clearly at stake. Otherwise a war—conventional or nuclear—might become possible once again on a continent that has been spared armed conflict for well over forty years.

YET THESE differences have long been a familiar feature in the Alliance, and over the years enough bridges have been built between them to render them largely harmless, unless there is a determination to exploit them. There is the moral bridge: Along with Americans, Europeans cannot wish that the only option in a major war should be a nuclear holocaust. And there is the strategic bridge: Even those who favor the limited use of nuclear weapons concede that there is no certainty it can be achieved. Indeed, the ability to limit nuclear exchanges in a conflict remains highly doubtful.

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Therefore, European reactions to *Discriminate Deterrence*, while giving visibility to the report, also have concentrated on what is its least serious defect. As a result, the more serious ones have yet to be addressed. As I see it, these are:

1. The report fails to speculate seriously about the future behavior of the Soviet Union. The attempts of the Russian reformers to restructure the economy, the political system, the role of the military, and the foreign policy of the second world power could have a profound impact on international security. That possibility is not even examined; there is only one fleeting reference to the Soviet economy, and this in a report claiming to provide a sense of direction for at least the next two decades!

2. It fails to grasp the obvious fact that the resources for defense are becoming severely limited. It is true that the report addresses budgetary problems. But it does not refer to what may be the scarcest resource of all: men and women to serve in the armed forces. Demographic shrinkage is under way in all industrialized countries; in some, like West Germany, it will make itself felt, with profound implications for the day-to-day strength of the Bundeswehr, in the next three to five years. In the timespan of twenty years, the structure of Western defense is unlikely to be sustainable, if only because of a lack of personnel. While it may be possible for technology to compensate somewhat, it will not be possible to offset the profound impact of demographic change that is already visible today.

3. The report tends to concentrate on the threats of yesterday and today rather than those of tomorrow. After the Soviet undertaking to leave Afghanistan, and the long experience of a protracted, bitter war between Iran and Iraq that has failed to draw the Soviet Union in, it is surprising to see the Gulf region listed at the top of all likely threats. At least as surprising is the total omission of what is perhaps the most serious East-West security threat during the next decade: the instability of Eastern Europe. Among the Soviet Union's European allies, economic stagnation, regime rigidity, the collapse of ideological legitimacy and unwarranted hopes for rapid liberalization combine to form a dangerous, potentially explosive mixture. What if it ignites and cannot be rapidly put out even by massive Soviet military intervention? The security implications for NATO would be infinitely greater than whatever the Soviet Union might do in the Gulf.

4. Finally, there is no notion in the study of how the military competition between East and West might be limited, no attempt to ask and answer that old and still pertinent question: "How much is enough?" Instead, the authors reflect a rather uncritical fascination with the promises of new military technology and a similarly uncritical conviction that these will all favor the United States. But neither of these assumptions is carefully examined, and the ideas put forward in the report on arms control are no more than perfunctory. Yet arms control will remain on the international agenda, put there, if not by governments, then by popular demand. Unless the West has an idea of how to limit military competition, it could get out of hand. And its own military effort will be restricted by the growing unwillingness of our societies to engage in an open-ended military competition.

It is a pity that the European reaction to the least controversial findings of the study have virtually blocked the debate over these much more important issues. The way in which the authors of *Discriminate Deterrence* have addressed them suggests that, contrary to their claim, they have often been too preoccupied with the present to think seriously and imaginatively about the future. In this respect, unfortunately, they have not been very far ahead of most of their European critics.

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3. Why Europe Still Matters

Pierre Lellouche

THE DISCRIMINATE Deterrence Report, coming as it did in the immediate aftermath of the Washington summit and the signing of the INF Treaty, crystallized all the old and new anxieties Europeans have come to have about the fate of America's nuclear commitment to the defense of their continent. To many Europeans, the report read like an *ex-post facto* "strategic" rationale for the withdrawal of the Pershings, and as a blueprint for further American disengagement.

This view, exaggerated as it may have been, was helped by some of the report's main findings and some of its language as well, particularly with respect to nuclear deterrence and European defense. The fact that the report was strongly critical of the Euro-centered strategy of the past, emphasizing instead the growing threat of "out of area" conflicts; its insistence on redefining the rules of nuclear deterrence away from classical views of escalation; and the fact that Europe itself was nowhere to be seen in the authors' assessment of future world power centers—all this seemed to confirm the Europeans' worst nightmares of U.S. disengagement.

A public airing of this kind of reaction occurred last March during the French presidential campaign. Appearing at a major political show, former president Giscard d'Estaing waved the report in front of TV cameras, and detailed at great length the table on page 7, showing GNP projections to the year 2010 for the U.S., the USSR, China, and Japan. His conclusion was that "even to a leading group of America's best foreign policy experts, Europe does not exist."

No wonder then that, given this kind of reaction, the White House felt it necessary to disown the report as the work of "people not associated with Government. . .with no official standing in terms of U.S. policy."[1]

This kind of political theater and rash reaction is probably unavoidable, given the stature of the report's authors and the sensitivity of the topic. Many of the commission's main points, however, are important and require a serious discussion among those responsible for security policy on both sides of the Atlantic.

I, for one, am convinced that the report does represent a shift in the center of gravity—across the entire political spectrum—of the security debate in America, and that we in Europe would be foolish either to ignore it or simply be satisfied with the White House's burial notice or an exchange of op-ed pieces in the *International Herald Tribune*.

Equally superficial would be for us to misread the central point of the commission's work. Even though the timing of the report's publication triggered the usual Pavlovian debate on nuclear doctrine, its most important novelty lies elsewhere: namely, in the shift of U.S. strategic priorities away from Europe and towards different kinds of conflicts in different regions. The recommendations that follow for nuclear deterrence must be understood, therefore, as the logical *consequences* of that shift, not the other way around. Thus, rather than engage the commission's authors in yet another theological debate over the merits of more or less selectivity or "discrimination" in nuclear deterrence, what ought to be discussed with our American friends is where U.S. strategic priorities are likely to lie in the future. In a nutshell: Is Berlin still the front line defense of New York, or is it likely to be in Mexico, Manila, or Kuwait?

Even though the report attempts to define a "grand strategy" for the U.S., it does not answer that question. Nor does it define

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[1]White House Press Report, January 20, 1988.

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the priorities among the types of threat the U.S. is likely to face. To be sure, the reader does get a sense that Europe will be less important to the U.S. and that the Pentagon should stop planning for the apocalypse. But where crucial U.S. interests will lie in the decades ahead and, given more than likely economic constraints, how best to protect them is far less clear.

Let us start with the question of European contingencies versus other kinds of conflict elsewhere—including what the report calls "low intensity conflicts." Here the authors accurately stress the rapid evolution of the world strategic scene: the emergence of potential world military powers such as China and Japan, the accumulation of local conflicts of various types—including in America's own backyard—and the proliferation of modern military technology throughout the Third World. On this, most strategic analysts would agree: The world's purely bipolar system inherited from World War II is gradually giving way to a different, more complex, and less orderly world "system" in which the two superpowers, while remaining clearly the two strongest military powers on earth, will also be confronted by a proliferation of military power, technology, and conflicts over which they will have little, if any, control. The recent escalation of chemical and missile warfare in the Iran-Iraq conflict, and the sale of Chinese MRBMs to Saudi Arabia—a U.S. ally—point in that direction.

TO THIS one must add a fundamental factor which is barely touched upon in the report, namely the demographic transformation of the planet—including of the two superpowers themselves—and what this will entail for the traditional definition of "threats" and security policy as we have known them since 1945. Recent studies conducted at IFRI[2] indicate for instance that Muslim north African countries will have nearly as many (but much younger) inhabitants as Western Europe by 2010. Morocco, which had nine million people in 1950, will have in twenty-five years a conscript army as large as the Bundeswehr.

That, as well as the likely arrival of some fifty million Muslim immigrants in Europe during that same period, is bound to affect profoundly the way Europeans will look at their security. America is not the only country with a backyard problem. Similarly, demography will also alter, perhaps in a dramatic way, the traditional view of the NATO-Warsaw Pact military balance: given the rapid decline of "white" German and Russian populations, and the increase of Muslim populations, we may well see some day a majority of Turks facing a majority of Islamic "Soviet" troops on either side of the Great European divide.

What is less clear, though, is what we should all do about this, and what this entails for U.S. force posture and military commitments for these various "theaters"—Europe included.

The report, for instance, lays great stress on the need for a strong conventional defense in Europe. But how does one achieve that with fewer U.S. troops (because they might be re-deployed elsewhere), but also, given demographic trends, with fewer conscripts available in Germany and in Europe as a whole?

Beyond this, the long term question we ought to ask ourselves—and this includes a country like France which also has important "out of area" commitments—is whether it is still realistic today to plan for "low-intensity" interventions as we have done since the 1950s, given the rapidly changing nature of Third World conflicts.

With the proliferation of high tech weaponry, the absence of a worldwide network of military bases, and the absence of local "gendarmes" to do the "dirty work" for us, it is by no means evident that future Third World wars will be of "low-intensity." If, indeed, *la politique de la cannonière* is definitely behind us, how realistic is it to pretend that superior Western technology, "impressive naval as-

[2] *Ramses Report, 1987–1988* (Paris, ed. Atlas Economica, 1987).

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sets," and local Third World allies (which?) will do the job? Future wars in the Third World are likely to be quite large in fact, requiring a substantial commitment of forces by the intervening outside power, and therefore a strong domestic consensus at home. All of which will in turn depend upon a clear understanding of the hierarchy of vital national interests that ought to be defended. This is precisely where the report is particularly lacking: Are we so sure that, except in the Gulf perhaps, "vital" Western interests will be at stake? Granted the Third World is becoming a more dangerous place militarily. But, with the possible exception of certain oil producing countries and the NICs, is not the so-called "developing world" more and more irrelevant economically? What, then, are those interests that the West ought to defend by getting involved in bloody regional wars?

While rather elliptic on this issue, the report does imply that Third World instability will continue to matter in terms of the global East-West balance. One of the key assumptions here is that the East-West contest will continue to be played out in the Third World, and that as a result, there is no end to containment. But are we so sure of that? It may well be instead that both superpowers, economically exhausted by four decades of this game and unable to control the rules of engagement in many of these areas, will evolve towards a different kind of competition. Already, many of the most violent conflicts in the Third World—notably in the Middle East—appear to be increasingly disconnected from East-West competition. I believe that our collective problem in the West at present, but perhaps also the Soviets' tomorrow, will be to *contain* these conflicts wherever they happen, rather than get involved. Lebanon, the Gulf, and Iran-Iraq all point to that.

If this is true, then one may ask whether the report isn't planning to implement John Foster Dulles's containment policy all over again, but this time without the means. Forgetting, in so doing, the main theater where the East-West contest will clearly continue to center, namely Europe. In a sense the great East-West game might well be coming back to square one: It started in Europe in 1945, expanded to the Third World in the 1950s through the 1970s, and now may be going back to Old Europe once again. But this time in a different guise: that of arms control and Gorbachev's "Common European House." Ten years ago, at the time of the Iranian revolution and of the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, it used to be fashionable to consider that the West was strong in the central front but weak on the periphery. In the future, the reverse may increasingly become true: less direct competition in an increasingly irrelevant Third World, but a far more dangerous evolution of the political-strategic order in Europe brought about in large part by erratic U.S. policies, especially in the nuclear and arms control fields.

THIS LEADS me to touch briefly on the nuclear issue in the report, which generated the most controversy in Europe. I will refrain from quoting again the famous paragraphs of pages 27 and 30 of the report, which gave rise to several critical articles on the European side and to a response by some of the U.S. commissioners.[3]

Briefly stated, the commission's reasoning follows this logical sequence: NATO can "no longer rely on threats of escalation that would ensure its own destruction if implemented." Instead of apocalyptic all-out responses, we must think in terms of a whole array of far more discriminating moves, using modern technologies. The primary purpose of such responses should not be to "use nuclear weapons as a link

[3]See, for example: Michael Howard, Karl Kaiser, and François de Rose, "Deterrence Policy: A European Response," *International Herald Tribune* (February 4, 1988); Pierre Lellouche in *Le Point* (January 25, 1988); Henri Eyraud in *L'Express* (January 22, 1988); Zbigniew Brzezinski, Henry Kissinger, Fred Iklé, and Albert Wohlstetter, " 'Discriminate Deterrence' Would Not Leave Europe Dangling," *International Herald Tribune* (February 24, 1988).

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to a wider and more devastating war, but mainly as an instrument for denying success to the invading forces." In parallel, the report strongly advocates as a key to "a viable strategy for the long haul" a strong conventional defense that would permit "the Alliance to defeat the Soviet Army, or at least fight it to a standstill, without having to reach for nuclear weapons." Having said this, the report stresses that such changes would by no means amount to a non-nuclear strategy: "the Alliance will still want nuclear weapons (including weapons based in Europe)" both to prevent concentration of Soviet troops and to permit a "controlled and effective" nuclear response to Soviet first use of nuclear weapons.

In their later clarification, some of the U.S. commissioners made it clear that they did not advocate a nuclear posture "relying solely on nuclear forces based in Western Europe and aimed at targets in Eastern Europe," but that they envisioned "the discriminate effective use of intercontinental as well as theater based forces against military targets in the Soviet Union and in Eastern Europe" in response to attacks on military targets in the U.S. and in Europe. In addition, the same article considered the notion of a war fought below the nuclear level in Europe as appropriate in case of a limited Soviet attack on one of NATO's exposed flanks.

This reasoning, and the various clarifications that were offered after the report's publication, fall well short however of resolving NATO's classic dilemmas.

Let's start at the beginning. The commission's basic premise is correct: One should avoid basing one's strategy on all-out suicidal threats. This is particularly true of course when one tries to extend one's deterrence to the protection of other countries. But it is also true for one's own self-defense. Indeed this is why, if my historical memory is correct, NATO moved from massive retaliation to flexible response in the 1960s, why the U.S. moved long ago to a counter-force strategy, and why even France gradually moved away in recent years from the massive, all-out response doctrine of the 1960s to something more flexible and, in fact, more "discriminating." With this I have no quarrel. I believe Mr. Wohlstetter and his colleagues are correct in emphasizing discriminate responses. Similarly I take President Mitterrand's sudden new crusade against flexible response in recent months, and his advocacy of the massive retaliation of twenty-five years ago, as definitely a move in the wrong direction.

This being said, the basic problems remain: How far can one push the logic of discrimination? With what weapons? And what is the role then of conventional forces?

Like Molière, my instinct would be to say that the truth is the "juste milieu," somewhere in between the nuclear "minimalists," who believe in using nuclear weapons only in extremis for the purpose of deterring a threat to one's very survival (Mitterrand in France, McNamara and his "existential deterrence" in the U.S., and Egon Bahr in Germany) and the "refiners of discrimination" of the Wohlstetter school.

This is true first in terms of our own public opinion, without whose support there cannot be any serious defense strategy. The commissioners are right in pointing out that a response that would be seen as leading to the destruction of the defender undermines public support. But I have long argued that going too far in the opposite direction carries the same result. Whereas "pure deterrence" as a means of preventing but not fighting a war—"la non guerre" as we call it in France—can be easily "bought" by the public, "discrimination" in the sense of prolonged nuclear exchanges can only scare the people it is supposed to defend. This is a cardinal lesson of the Pershing years in Europe. Too much stress on selective responses in the name of protecting civilians assumes that nuclear war can be controlled and limited, and that is profoundly unacceptable to any democracy. Hence our collective dilemma as democracies: Turning back the clock to the 1950s' massive retaliation hurts the credibility of our strategy, particularly in the face of an adversary who has much selectivity in his arsenal; but too much discrimination, while militarily

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useful, might also terrify our people, and thus destroy the basis of our strategy.

Second, at the purely military level, the commission's main point—as amended by the clarifications published later in the press—still raises a series of unresolved issues.

ASSUMING THAT nuclear weapons—intercontinental, theater, and tactical—stay in the picture, what are in fact these weapons and what is their role? In the aftermath of the INF Treaty and with the prospects of a START Treaty, this is by no means an academic issue. If the commissioners are in favor of discriminate options, then they ought to come down to specific recommendations: less short range tactical arms—which are both vulnerable militarily and politically sensitive—but more long range accurate weapons. Why then did the Reagan Administration remove all the Pershings and what do the commissioners propose in terms of substitutes?

If the "modernization" issue is not tackled in specific terms, if nuclear weapons are to stay only in the "background" as we prepare to fight a conventional war, then, it seems to me, the commission's advocacy of nuclear weapons comes dangerously close to McNamara's own "existential" view of deterrence.

I am aware, of course, that this is not the authors' intention. The post INF "modernization" debate in the Alliance will force us, in any case, to face up to this issue, not just in esoteric doctrinal terms, but in terms of decisions on actual weapon systems. Very few Europeans today—if any—are still under the illusion that the U.S. would commit suicide or precipitate the apocalypse to defend the Old Continent. And Europeans, aware of the gradual shift of the American security debate, are increasingly thinking of long term changes, and sometimes about alternatives to the current security arrangement. While an increasing number of Europeans—of which I am one—envision a future in which European nuclear and conventional forces, pulled together, will provide the bedrock of deterrence in Europe alongside those U.S. forces that remain, there are also many Europeans who are tempted by the denuclearization, neutralization route. They see in U.S. temptations of disengagement and Gorbachev's disarmament rhetoric an "historic chance" for redrawing the European order towards neutrality. This would be a disaster for both Europeans and Americans.

Thus until a "European pillar" is put together—and that will take much time and effort—what we Europeans will continue to need is a sense of serious commitment on the part of the United States to the defense of Western Europe. The zero arms control fad started by Reagan, and the talk of neo-containment on a global scale do not help, to say the least.

4. Sharpening the Question

Laurence Martin

AT LEAST ONE of the co-chairmen of the Iklé-Wohlstetter report has expressed reservations about the title, but its prominent linking of "discriminate" with "deterrence" is one of its most useful contributions to a better strategic debate. Against a major nuclear power, deterrence must be discriminate if it is to be credible and effective; indeed, given the moral and other inhibitions that affected American policy even in the period of monopoly, it may be that all nuclear strategy must be proportionate. Perversely, American strategy has long been bedeviled by an undifferentiated conception of nuclear war as a

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fleeting holocaust and, to make this plausible, potential Soviet aggression has been imagined as all or nothing. A great merit in the report is its emphasis on a "broader range of challenges."

By its very existence, the report also justifies itself. The Western Alliance sorely needs a restatement of strategy at a time when change, often rapid in modern military affairs, is peculiarly so. In particular, in an era when arms control is so widely touted and has so much expected of it, we need an inventory of our strategic needs as a "floor" to tell us what is not negotiable. This clear principle—"a good arms agreement will be consistent with our long-term strategy" (p. 42)—might well have enjoyed stronger emphasis.

The report also has many other valuable features. Its stress on the threats and promises arising from the pace of technology is justified, if not novel. The point is well made that the West is much better placed than its rivals to exploit this technology, but that the benefits will accrue only if the opportunity is seized; so far we have conceded too much by default, arising much more from indecision than from frugality. Within the ambit of technology, the authors are probably right to emphasize the importance of command, control, communication, and intelligence (C^3I) and of methods of achieving sufficient accuracy in long range weapons to permit the substitution of conventional for nuclear weapons in many roles. This is well-linked to the need to have offensive options without altering our defensive posture if it is to be an effective deterrent. As a context for all this, the report takes a usefully geopolitical view, reminds us of trade-offs between distance and cost, and relates this to the steady erosion of the United States' overseas network of bases that is the subconscious, vanishing background for the strategic thinking of many Americans.

There is, of course, a great deal to query or criticize in the report. Salutary though the emphasis on technology is, experience suggests it will deliver fewer solutions than are suggested here, once our own traditional inertias combine with the countermeasures that our foes will set in motion. From a European perspective, however, the worst reactions have concerned the question of the role of nuclear weapons in NATO strategy.

Since 1967 that strategy has been based on the principle of "flexible response" and "deliberate escalation": Initial defense against conventional aggression would be conventional, but if that failed, recourse would be had to nuclear weapons. This would be intended both to affect the course of the battle and to issue a deterrent warning of impending catastrophe. As the weight and reach of Soviet nuclear power has grown, the potential price to be paid by the U.S. for this strategy has ominously altered. The consequent inevitable doubt as to whether the U.S. would pay the price contributes to what the report calls a "fateful ambiguity." In practice, the flexible response has developed against a contradictory background: some have stressed "flexibility" by pursuing ideas of nuclear "war-fighting," to postpone or forestall the moment of catastrophe; others have relished the idea of catastrophe and put their trust in "existential" deterrence, the hope that the mere potential for disaster will prevent any war beginning at all.

Europeans, being probable sufferers in even the more limited of wars on their continent, have usually been tempted to the all-or-nothing side of the argument: for long the French have made it an explicit strategy. In this context the report's insistence that "the Alliance should threaten to use nuclear weapons not as a link to a wider and more devastating war—although the risk of further escalation would still be there—but mainly as an instrument for denying success to the invading Soviet forces," was highly alarming to Europeans, many of whom saw it as a promise to fight a nuclear war in Europe in which the superpowers enjoyed sanctuary. Thus *The Economist* took it to mean that "the Alliance should give up any idea that the main purpose of its nuclear arsenal is to link a Soviet conventional attack in Europe to an all-out nuclear war between the superpowers but be prepared to use it in Europe."[4]

[4]*The Economist*, January 16, 1988, p. 29.

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The authors have since rebutted this interpretation but it is not surprising it arose. Just a few years ago the sensible observation by President Reagan that a nuclear war *might* be limited to Europe aroused a storm. The best remembered observation on the subject by one of the authors, Henry Kissinger, was his 1979 Brussels attack on basing deterrence on self—i.e. U.S.—destructive threats. But above all, the reaction to the report is explained by its coming on the heels of the INF Treaty, which negotiates away the weapons that were painfully installed precisely to allay doubts about the zone of linkage between a European and an intercontinental war. Over it all loomed the President's apparently comprehensive denigration of nuclear weapons at Reykjavik.

WHAT SHOULD Europeans make of all this? It remains to be seen, of course, whether the report actually influences American policy. Quite clearly, however, it reflects some trends already powerful in American policy-making circles. The authors have rebutted the more alarmist European charges and, taken literally, the text vindicates the rebuttal. Thus, in the passage quoted earlier, the restricted use of nuclear weapons is to be "mainly" for war-fighting, not entirely. Moreover the targets are to be not merely "troop concentrations" but "Soviet command centers." There is, however, no explicit reference to targets on Soviet territory and against an overall theme of "discrimination" the alarmist interpretation was not unnatural. Nor was it wholly unwarranted, for discrimination does mean a more specific allocation of costs and risks, which is bound to arouse difficult issues in a coalition.

The report is correct in alluding to the "fateful ambiguity" that has always surrounded this aspect of NATO strategy, but if "fateful" means that the report implies, as it has obviously seemed to some, that the ambiguity is unnecessary and proposes to clear it up by wholly precluding the worst outcomes, then the Alliance is in trouble. For the ambiguity has been highly functional, allowing the various allies to hold together with the intention of resolving the worst dilemmas only when the circumstances have become clear, and deterring the Soviet Union by preserving some credibility even about the more implausible threats.

As the report rightly insists, reliance upon solely catastrophic concepts of nuclear war to deter lays us open to lesser challenges—President Kennedy's old "holocaust or humiliation" dilemma. We must have concepts for the limited use of nuclear weapons if deterrence is to be credible to the Soviet Union and tolerable as a prospect for ourselves. It is not necessary, however, and almost certainly politically impossible, to devise and agree upon precise, unambiguous and unquestionably credible uses: We need merely be capable of executing actions that are not wholly incredible. Credibility does demand limitations, but we do not have to be precise beforehand about what exactly the limitations would be, in as yet unforeseeable circumstances.

A response to the report in the London *Times* warned that the American public may no longer be willing to "risk annihilation" for Europe's security. If this were wholly and literally true, the Alliance would again be in trouble and the Europeans would have to look quickly to their own defenses. For while we must look for strategies that seize every opportunity for preventing a catastrophe, we cannot have deterrence against a major nuclear power without even a *risk* of disaster. In recent years it has become fashionable to point out that defense policies must be reassuring as well as deterrent. But in an armed world of conflict, they cannot be completely reassuring, if reassurance demands total immunity. That can only be bought, if at all, by abandoning independence in foreign policy. We may try to limit our risks but in the last resort we must pose effective threats that we really might implement. That is the essence of discriminate deterrence. The report deserves our gratitude for having sharpened the question. While the report's answers are not perfect, it is not the authors' fault that thinking clearly about such matters is so painful.

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

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Obituary for an Agenda

Mary Tedeschi Eberstadt

ONE OFTEN HEARS that American foreign policy lacks a strategic purpose or "design." The charge issues most often these days from conservative quarters, where the Reagan Administration's pursuit of arms control is seen by many as a "turnaround" that might have been prevented if the President had appointed the proper strategists to high office. Lately, conservative discontent has found its most thoughtful voice in Richard Nixon, whose concern over "the mismatch between our technological skill and our woefully lagging political skill," as he puts it in his recent book, is finding numerous outlets in the mainstream media.

Yet while the need for strategic vision may be most acutely felt on the right, it is scarcely limited to that quarter. Commentary by Democrats and liberals, too, has been rife with anxiety over the larger purposes of American policy. One has only to consider the phenomenal success of Paul Kennedy's *The Rise and Fall of the Great Powers*, an ostensibly academic volume whose tacit denigration of American power has become a staple of contemporary debate. The anxiety over American purpose extends as well to the U.S. Congress, some of whose members are now seeking an annual report by the executive branch on whatever "national strategy" it intends to pursue.

Mary Tedeschi Eberstadt is visiting fellow at *The National Interest*.

It comes as no surprise that two terms of Ronald Reagan should prompt such national soul-searching. His foreign policy, with its uniquely personal stamp, has confounded the President's supporters and critics alike. It is a presidency perhaps best summarized by Samuel P. Huntington, who has identified its common denominator as "a simple moralism that views the world in terms of evils—the Soviet Union, nuclear weapons—whose influence, if it cannot be eliminated entirely, must be greatly reduced." As well, the central drama in East-West relations since 1980—deploying, then agreeing to remove, the INF missiles in Europe—has caused consternation and sometimes confusion on both sides of the Atlantic.

Despite all this, however, the charge that the Reagan Administration has lacked a consistent, long-term strategy is mistaken. In the case of the Soviet Union, at least, American policy under Ronald Reagan has in fact followed a remarkably consistent agenda. Its approach, as outlined chiefly by Reagan's two secretaries of state, began with the recognition that earlier strategies designed against the Soviet threat had become inadequate to the challenges of the 1980s. Containment, according to this argument, had become obsolete. Detente in any of its forms had failed to deliver Soviet restraint, whether in Europe or on the various battlegrounds involving the Brezhnev Doctrine. The solution for the 1980s, the administration's spokesmen argued, was to go beyond containment and detente.

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"Unlike containment," Secretary Shultz told the Senate Foreign Relations Committee in 1983, "our policy begins and ends with the recognition that the Soviet Union is and will remain a global superpower." At the same time, the administration sought to distinguish its own approach from detente: "the Soviet Union," Shultz asserted, "is more likely to be deterred by our actions that make clear the risks their aggression entails than by a delicate web of interdependence." Under Ronald Reagan, therefore, the United States would pursue a third course, one guided by renewed strength at home and by the willingness to negotiate with the Soviets whenever American interests might benefit from it.

On the "strength" side of its formula, the Reagan Administration continued with considerable success the defense build-up started under President Carter. In Europe meanwhile, and in accord with a decision taken by NATO in 1979, the United States spearheaded a lengthy and ultimately successful campaign to install Pershing II missiles as a counter to the Soviet SS-20s. In 1983, amid considerable criticism at home and among the allies, the administration began its exploration of the Strategic Defense Initiative. Elsewhere in foreign policy, the United States made a series of attempts to counter Soviet gains of the late 1970s by seeking to support anti-communist resistance movements in various parts of the developing world. In 1983, the United States invaded the island of Grenada and deposed its communist regime. In 1984, it executed a retaliatory strike against Libya for repeated assaults. Both moves signalled a willingness to use American power, at least in situations where quick results were assured.

ON THE other side—that of negotiation—the Reagan Administration advanced a four-point agenda toward the Soviets, one including arms control, bilateral relations, human rights, and regional conflicts. In keeping with their rejection of detente, officials stressed that each of the agenda's components was to be pursued with equal seriousness. "Arms control," Secretary Shultz observed,

> cannot resolve the ideological and geopolitical conflicts that lead to competitive arming in the first place. By itself it cannot guarantee security, or prevent war, and we should not impose on the fragile process of arms control burdens it cannot carry and expectations it cannot fulfill.

Thus the connection between arms control and regional conflicts, for "the increased stability that we try to build into the superpower relationship can be undone by irresponsible Soviet policies elsewhere." Thus, too, with human rights, an issue on which the administration has claimed Andrei Sakharov as its guide: "A country [that] has no civil liberty, no freedom of information, and no independent process . . . is not just a misfortune for citizens unprotected against tyranny and lawlessness; it is a menace to international security." As for bilateral relations—U.S.-Soviet economic dealings, exchange programs, and "people-to people" contacts—these, too, were a matter of security; such contacts, the administration hoped, would both give the Soviets a stake in the balance of power and reduce the tensions that make arms control itself impossible to sustain.

The four-point negotiating agenda has come to form the core of the administration's approach to the Soviet Union. Public emphasis on the agenda has of course varied. Sometimes, as in the aftermath of events such as the Soviet shootdown of KAL 007, the official commitment to negotiations has all but receded from public view. At other times, as in the course of events beginning with the meeting at Reykjavik and concluding with the INF agreement, the agenda has been more visible. Nevertheless, both in the written record and in the day-to-day conduct of its foreign policy, the Reagan Administration has used this agenda as the cornerstone of its Soviet policy.

Thus, American policy toward the Soviet Union in this decade, far from lacking an overarching vision or plan, has in fact rested on an intricate, even subtle, assessment of the

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leverage available to the United States in its dealings with the Soviet Union. It is an assessment that owes a substantial and unacknowledged debt to the administration of President Nixon. This is particularly true of the linchpin of the four-point agenda, which an earlier generation would have recognized as "linkage." As others have observed, it is a term with two distinct meanings.[1] In the pedestrian sense, of course, linkage is present in any negotiation involving more than one issue. In the United States, it has also acquired a more specific meaning: that of using various diplomatic levers—particularly arms control—in the attempt to encourage Soviet restraint elsewhere in foreign policy. It is this definition that lies at the heart of the Reagan Administration's agenda with the Soviets, and that thus becomes the starting point of any inquiry into the agenda's fate.

There are, of course, substantial differences between the linkage of the Nixon years and that of the 1980s. In the late 1960s, the strategic threat of most concern was the Soviet achievement of nuclear parity; by 1980 it had become the installation of SS-20 missiles aimed at Western Europe. As with their nuclear advances, so too with the Soviets' more conventional gains. For Nixon and Kissinger, the East-West battlelines were drawn in Vietnam and the Middle East; today they extend to Africa, Central America, and Southwest Asia.

As with Nixon and Kissinger, however, the Reagan Administration has assumed that Soviet aggression can be checked through activist American diplomacy across the range of "East-West relations." As in the early 1970s, officials under President Reagan began by advancing arms control as the bait with which to lure the Soviets into other accommodations of interest to the United States. The tactical intent behind the four-point agenda is plain: to use those items to which the Soviets are potentially most vulnerable (human rights and regional conflicts) as leverage over others in which they are presumably most interested (arms control and bilateral relations). Such, at any rate, has been the theory. Its practice is best assessed through a tally of the relative gains made by each side.

LIKE MOST negotiations with the Soviets, those in the 1980s have had their setbacks. Between 1983 and 1985, the agenda lay dormant as the Soviets, who had walked out of arms negotiations in Geneva, remained aloof. Those years were not kind to Moscow. The activist posture of the United States was scarcely lost on a Kremlin racked by the political failures of its own ill-fated and dying leadership. Abroad, the Soviet occupation of Afghanistan continued to incur condemnation from most of the world. Without doubt, however, it was the conjunction of SDI research and the deployment of the Pershing missiles that weighed most heavily on Soviet calculations. In 1985, to the surprise of few within the American administration, the Soviets returned to the bargaining table in Geneva.

The Reagan Administration, meanwhile—in one of those ironic twists that have consistently characterized the Cold War—was thrown increasingly on the defensive following a series of adverse events. The fate of the most visible resistance movement—the Nicaraguan *contras*—was becoming more dubious as the 1980s wore on. Its terrorism policy, too, was in a shambles, led there both by the humiliation of the administration's Iranian initiative and by the widening gap between official rhetoric and the very real refusal to mount systematic reprisals. Other losses of face and momentum were afflicting foreign policy: South Africa, where the administration's opposition to additional economic sanctions failed to prevent their imposition by Congress; the Middle East, where the Iranian fiasco prompted a confusing set of turnarounds in American policy toward the Persian Gulf and the Iran-Iraq war; Western Europe, especially Germany, where General Secretary Gorbachev appeared to many as a

[1] See, for example, Henry Kissinger's discussion in *White House Years* (Boston: Little Brown and Company, 1979), pp. 129–130.

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more vigorous and appealing leader than the President of the United States. It was against this backdrop of frustration and setbacks that American negotiations with the Soviets proceeded again in earnest.

The negotiations over arms control were to be, as Secretary Shultz noted in March 1985, "the most comprehensive and complex of any in history." They included explorations over agreements on strategic arms, intermediate range nuclear forces, and the range of research and technology involving ABM systems.

The most dramatic consequence of these efforts so far, of course, has been the INF accord concluded in December 1987, which now awaits ratification by the Senate. As expected, the Soviets have gained considerably from the agreement. This is particularly true of Gorbachev, who has been allowed to posture as peacemaker despite the continuing carnage in Afghanistan and elsewhere. Of course, the Reagan Administration, too, expected political gains from the INF treaty. The President himself has acquired some distinctly short-term advantages from it, including support from the formerly hostile circles of liberal-left opinion in the United States and Europe. Still, those gains must be weighed against the long-term gains to Moscow that the treaty accomplishes in a single stroke.

The most important of these have to do with Moscow's long-held objectives concerning Western Europe. The INF treaty raises the specter of divorcing the security of the United States from that of its European allies, thus eroding the premise on which NATO is founded. It increases the need for additional conventional Western forces against the more numerous forces of the Warsaw Pact—an imbalance that is, in fact, more difficult for the West to redress, since it is both more expensive and in some respects more contentious politically than even the Pershing IIs. The treaty also increases the pressure on the United States and its allies to regard the Strategic Defense Initiative as one among many items now subject to negotiation. And, of course, the treaty serves the Soviets' interest in arms control *per se*, one which follows, in the words of Eugene V. Rostow, from "the Soviet belief that a nearly mystical faith in arms control has become the opiate of Western opinion in general and American opinion in particular."[2]

Thus, the Soviets have gained handsomely from their return to negotiations over arms. But the returns for their side do not end there. They have accrued as well from the second item on the agenda intended as a carrot to the Soviets, that of "bilateral relations."

IN OFFICIAL rhetoric, "bilateral relations" has become a kind of shorthand for the cultural, political, and scientific exchanges that have once again become a regular feature of U.S.-Soviet relations. Their purpose, from the American side, remains unchanged from the days when President Eisenhower inaugurated the first exchange program to help move the Soviet Union "toward a regime which will abandon predatory policies." In 1979, following the invasion of Afghanistan, many of the exchanges then extant were interrupted or cancelled. Official programs were cancelled altogether, while many groups engaged in private programs followed suit (the National Academy of Sciences, for example, cancelled programs in 1980 to protest the internal exile of Andrei Sakharov).

It is a commonplace that the Soviets gain from these exchanges through industrial and other sorts of espionage; as one American official remarked recently to *Insight* magazine, "We send them 10 wide-eyed Americans and they send us 10 KGB agents." Still, those gains—circumscribed as they are by American security procedures—are minimal compared to the other arrangements subsumed under "bilateral relations" such as trade, fi-

[2]Eugene V. Rostow, "Why the Soviets Want an Arms Control Agreement, and Why They Want it Now," *Commentary*, Vol. 83, No. 2 (February 1987), pp. 19–26.

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nancial credit, and Soviet access to multilateral financial institutions.

Since the summit with Gorbachev in December 1987, the United States has notably edged away from its position against Soviet participation in the International Monetary Fund and the World Bank. In fact, the American stance has been unclear for some time; Deputy Secretary of State John Whitehead announced in March 1987 that the United States "would like to see the day when the Soviet Union becomes a member" of both institutions. The effort to increase Soviet access to credit in the multilateral arena has coincided with official attempts to expand U.S.-Soviet trade. Whitehead has himself eased restrictions on sensitive technology sold to the Eastern bloc; and various multinational corporations are eager for other relaxations to follow.[3]

In this they have found substantial support from American officials who have themselves been spurred, at least in part, by concern over the American trade deficit. Secretary of Commerce C. William Verity has spoken publicly of his hopes that non-agricultural trade with the Soviets might climb from its present level of some one billion dollars "up to four or five billion per year and maybe even higher." With his cooperation, the U.S.-USSR Trade and Economic Council (USTEC) has been exploring ways of expanding economic ties on both sides. The products in question include high technology and industrial machinery, among others; the Soviets themselves (in the person of Abel Aganbegyan, a key economic advisor) have expressed additional interest in biotechnology. (Secretary Verity has also expressed his opposition to the Jackson-Vanik amendment, which links trade levels to the emigration practices of communist countries.)

The Soviet gains from the arms control and bilateral relations components of the agenda have thus been considerable. Indeed, they were expected to be, lest the Soviets lose their stake in negotiations altogether. What, then, of the payoff for the United States from the other two items on the agenda, human rights and regional conflicts? Here, too, the record is clear, though more than a little disheartening.

FOR OBVIOUS reasons, the concern behind Jackson-Vanik—that of increasing the number of individuals who are allowed to leave the Soviet Union—is also a major concern behind American negotiations over "human rights." The fate of human rights within the Soviet Union and its territories is inherently intractable. No American administration can hope realistically to force changes in Soviet law or in the extra-legal repressions imposed by the Soviet state. Emigration provides one of the few means by which the United States can gauge the effects of its pressures on behalf of the Soviet peoples.

The initial results of American pressures over these issues were grim. In October 1986, over a year and a half after the two sides resumed negotiations, Secretary Shultz reported that "for Soviet Jewry, the situation is bleak and deteriorating" (indeed, Jewish emigration that year reached its lowest level in twenty years), "the situation for other religious groups is also deteriorating," "thirty-nine Helsinki monitors remain in Soviet prisons or in labor camps," and "perhaps thousands of other Soviet citizens have been incarcerated—many in psychiatric hospitals and many on trumped-up charges—for trying to exercise what in the West are taken for granted as basic human rights."

Events in 1987 were scarcely more encouraging. Beginning in April, Jewish emigration reached a plateau of 700–900 per month—still well below the number allowed to leave in the "peak" year of 1979. (These numbers must also be weighed against the sum of those Soviet Jews who would leave if they could—"at least 380,000" by the State Department's estimate.) Between February and December 1987, over 200 political pris-

[3]R. Cort Kirkwood, "Inside the Red Trade Lobby," *National Review*, April 29, 1988, pp. 35–40.

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oners were also released, though they were not officially rehabilitated; by the end of the year even that number had become a trickle.

Nor have the Soviets been particularly accommodating over the other issues subsumed under "human rights." Much has been made, especially in the West, of Gorbachev's program for internal reform. It is hard not to become enthusiastic when Soviet leaders show unusual public attentiveness toward the plight of their peoples or hint that the Soviet state might ameliorate its grosser abuses. Yet the evidence for systematic change remains thin. In some cases, in fact, there is evidence of a contrary trend. The repressive potential of Gorbachev's reforms has been little noted in the West, but it remains apparent to those with firsthand experience of the Soviet state. Natan Sharansky, for example, has recently argued, "Gorbachev's reforms are not . . . intended to lead to the democratization of Soviet society or to any true pluralism" and "the new emigration law enacted under Gorbachev is not designed to facilitate emigration but to terminate it."[4]

In this as in many other areas, the Soviets under Gorbachev have proved unusually sensitive to Western perceptions of their policies. Gorbachev himself has recently appeared unusually solicitous of the Orthodox Church, and the official posture toward religion in general is notably less combative than it was even a few years ago. Similarly, the Soviets have taken particular care to release some highly-acclaimed human rights activists, including Natan Sharansky and Yuri Orlov. Yet these token gestures, as Secretary Shultz once noted, "do not represent a fundamental change in the Soviet system or in Soviet human rights policy. Indeed, it seems clear that these limited actions have been carefully calculated to satisfy world opinion at little or no internal cost."

A similar verdict may soon come to haunt the "regional conflicts" portion of the U.S.-Soviet agenda. Here, too, the course of events following the Soviet return to Geneva was bleak indeed. As Michael H. Armacost, Undersecretary for Political Affairs, noted in the fall of 1986, "the bottom line . . . is clear: [Soviet] support for Third World clients remains firm." The same verdict appeared a year later in *Foreign Affairs*, where Francis Fukuyama of the Rand Corporation reported that "under Gorbachev the Soviets have demonstrated a renewed willingness to expend resources and to take tough measures to back up important clients like Angola, Afghanistan, Ethiopia, and Libya."

Nevertheless, the hopes for a new era of Soviet restraint acquired another lease on life near the end of 1987, when the Soviets announced that they would withdraw their troops from Afghanistan within a year. To some American liberals—and not a few conservatives—that announcement has signalled a major change in Soviet policy, perhaps even a repudiation of the Brezhnev Doctrine. The argument for such an exhilarating conclusion remains to be demonstrated. Much less controversial, however, are the internal constraints that have mounted against the Soviets in the course of their occupation. These include the rising economic and military costs imposed by an increasingly well-armed resistance; the difficulty of concealing the extent of Soviet involvement from the Soviet peoples themselves; the ethnic tensions exacerbated by the war among the Soviet Muslim population; and the mounting discontent from disparate peoples inside the empire itself.[5] Whatever else they may dispute, Western analysts are of one mind about the importance of such internal calculations to the Soviet pledge to withdraw their troops.

WHAT NO ONE has argued, however—least of all American officials themselves—is that Soviet withdrawal

[4]Natan Sharansky, "As I See Gorbachev," *Commentary*, Vol. 85, No. 3 (March 1988), pp. 30, 32.

[5]See, for example, Maya Latynski and S. Enders Wimbush, "The Mujahideen and the Russian Empire," *The National Interest*, No. 11 (Spring 1988).

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from Afghanistan would signal a victory for linkage. Indeed, it is widely agreed that the turning point in the war—the mujahideen's acquisition of Stinger missiles late in 1986—arrived quite independently of U.S.-Soviet diplomatic maneuvers. It is not arms control that has driven the Soviets to change their policy toward Afghanistan, but the shift in military balance occasioned by the Stinger missiles. Far from signalling a victory for linkage, the American role in raising the costs of occupation has in fact been a consequence of unilateral initiative alone.

As a consequence of U.S.-Soviet diplomacy, however, that policy has been wavering of late, and with it the fate of Afghanistan itself. The mujahideen's fortunes are now most uncertain—this, largely as a consequence of the political transformation wrought by U.S.-Soviet negotiations over "regional conflicts." Through those negotiations, the Soviets have succeeded—both in official documents signed with the United States and in the circles of American opinion—in establishing the perception that the invasion and occupation were actions that the pacific Gorbachev (and by implication, the Soviet Union of today) would not have committed.

President Reagan himself confirmed this achievement at his summit with Gorbachev last December, where he remarked that Afghanistan was not a problem of the General Secretary's creation. That perception—established largely through U.S.-Soviet talks—has further helped to divide American opinion, official and otherwise, about policy toward the mujahideen. Over the past few months, the question of how and when to end American aid to the resistance has become an open debate. And while its outcome remains in doubt, it is surely disconcerting to note that the "peace agreement" over Afghanistan signed by the United States and the Soviet Union in April 1988 was bitterly denounced by the Afghan resistance leaders themselves.

The other "regional conflict" foremost in the American mind these days is Nicaragua. The war there has indeed been affected by the course of U.S.-Soviet negotiations, to the clear disadvantage of the United States. By no coincidence, the administration's ability to secure aid for the *contras* has declined dramatically as the expectations for arms control have risen. As the President's advisors have found, it is difficult, at best, to justify aid against the Soviet threat to the hemisphere while negotiating with the Soviets over the nuclear threat to the world.

Meanwhile, neither arms control nor the Arias "peace plan" has deterred the Soviets from pursuing their own objectives. Since the plan was adopted in August 1987, Moscow has sent some $200 million in military aid to the Nicaraguan regime as against some $17.5 million in humanitarian aid to the *contras* approved by the U.S. Congress. This discrepancy is only the latest example in a series; throughout the 1980s, American aid in any form has been lapped by Soviet aid many times over. In 1986, the Reagan Administration requested its most expensive aid package of $150 million; that same year, Soviet economic and military aid to Managua exceeded $1 billion.

Yet even these numbers fail to capture the larger collapse of American policy toward pro-Soviet Nicaragua. By 1988, the U.S. position had become so undone that the *contras*, in keeping with the Arias peace plan, found themselves engaged at the "bargaining table" in Managua—a move that effectively puts an anti-communist military victory out of reach. Not that the administration is solely to blame for the present failure of American policy in Nicaragua—far from it. Congress, indeed, is the chief culprit, with its on-again, off-again statesmanship and its relentless suspicion of the executive branch.

Still, it is interesting to ask how different the battle for Nicaragua might look today if arms control had not become the centerpiece of American foreign policy over these last few years. At the very least, liberals and moderates who have seen the administration "come round" on U.S.-Soviet negotiations might have had less reason for skepticism about its seriousness in aiding the Nicaraguan *contras*.

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By engaging the Soviets in its four-point agenda, the administration inadvertently raised the hope that Nicaragua, too, might be susceptible to a "negotiated solution." Thus has the United States found its hands tied over Soviet involvement in a region just south of the American border.

LINKAGE, therefore, has plainly failed to accomplish what the Reagan Administration proposed for it. Its "carrots"—trade, exchanges, arms control initiatives—have been abundant enough, but there is scant evidence to suggest that its "sticks" have either deterred the Soviets or yielded an inch of territory from the Brezhnev doctrine.

This failure has followed directly from the administration's own inability to keep its eagerness for arms control in check. The United States demanded no meaningful Soviet reforms before proffering its ambitious arms proposals. Afghanistan has not been allowed to interfere with U.S.-Soviet diplomacy since President Carter was in office. Nicaragua—which the administration has cited as the most pressing case of Soviet involvement abroad—did not become an ultimatum. Nor can the United States claim meaningful victories in the area of "human rights." Whatever integrity the U.S.-Soviet agenda may have had in theory has been shattered time and again in diplomatic practice. One has only to note that President Reagan announced after the meeting in Reykjavik that "by their [the Soviets'] choice, the subject was arms control." Therein may lie the verdict on the American conduct of negotiations throughout the 1980s. When the INF accord was concluded before any other item on the agenda bore fruit, linkage—in theory, the centerpiece of negotiations—was revealed in practice to be an afterthought to arms control.

It is an altogether depressing denouement, though one unsurprising for those familiar with the extraordinary political weight that arms control has come to assume. The four-point agenda devised for the 1980s presupposes that the United States can credibly claim an equal interest in controlling nuclear arms and in restraining Soviet conduct elsewhere. As many critics have pointed out, however, the justification for arms control itself reduces that claim to incoherence.[6] The purpose of arms control, as reiterated over two decades and most loudly by the Reagan Administration, is nothing less than ensuing "the survival of mankind" itself. It is a justification that demotes all other East-West struggles to merely parochial status. So long as the United States bases its policies toward the USSR on the fear of nuclear holocaust, arms control will reign supreme in its agenda with that "momentum of its own" so aptly described by Henry Kissinger in his memoirs.

It will retain this primacy, moreover, not only for such abstract reasons, but because of the bureaucratic imperatives that follow from them. Over the past two decades, the emphasis on arms control has spawned an enormous bureaucracy unmatched by any other item on the East-West agenda. Only arms control has generated a daunting number of negotiating arenas involving the United States, the Soviet Union, the Warsaw-Pact, NATO, and the United Nations. The sheer number of issues raised in them defies rehearsal, much less explanation. Talks over the past few years alone have included MBFR, or mutual and balanced force reduction; "confidence-building" measures; chemical weapons; INF; strategic arms reductions, or START; nuclear testing and non-proliferation; and whatever transpires at the UN Committee on Disarmament in Geneva.

Within the United States government itself, positions have proliferated to cope with this bureaucratic demand. Only arms control has its own special agency—the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency—in addition to the many bureaus that specialize in its various arcana. And it is arms control that, as a consequence of this bureaucratic weight, is

[6]See, for example, Norman Podhoretz's address to the 1987 meeting of the Committee for the Free World (New York: Orwell Press, 1987).

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the foremost attraction to the most ambitious and talented officers in the Foreign Service. Within the bureaucratic pecking order, as in American policy at large, it is arms control that rules—a fact that guarantees an internal pressure for negotiation out of all proportion to any other policies concerning the Soviet Union.

IN SUCH A situation, it is almost appropriate to object that linkage has not failed because it has never really been tried. The sheer weight of numbers and initiatives, combined with the imperative of pursuing a course judged to prevent nuclear war, would seem to guarantee that no administration can balance arms control against any competing interest. Yet like Marxism, or Christianity, or any other creed that awaits its "pure" incarnation, "linkage"—in the specific sense of using arms control as a check on Soviet behavior—has also had its fair share of opportunities to do its imperfect best. Its record in achieving Soviet "restraint" is now plain enough, if only to the millions who felt the lash of Soviet policy during the Nixon years and the millions more who have come to feel it since.

There is an irony of enormous dimensions in this dismal record. By the 1980s, as the Reagan Administration was pursuing the most ambitious attempt at linkage yet, the very foundations of arms control theory were being assaulted as never before. The idea that "arms races" necessarily lead to war, an intellectual residue of the reigning interpretation of World War I, is an article of faith no longer. With the resurrection of the work of the German historian Fritz Fischer, most notably by Donald Kagan and Patrick Glynn, the historical interpretation on which modern arms control itself is founded has been refuted beyond repair.[7] It is an ironic addendum to the Reagan years that, in pursuit of aims based on discredited academic theories, they have made themselves as irrelevant to the Soviet challenge as the ideas which they invoked to justify their agenda.

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[7]Patrick Glynn, "The Sarajevo Fallacy," *The National Interest*, No. 9 (Fall 1987), pp.3–32. Donald Kagan, "World War I, World War II, World War III," *Commentary*, Vol. 83, No. 3 (March 1987), pp. 21–40.

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The View from London. . .

Michael Legge

THE DEBATE OVER whether the European members of NATO are carrying their fair share of the burden of common defense has a history almost as long as that of the Alliance itself. But current pressures to reduce United States' trade and budget deficits have given new impetus to the old arguments.

While former Defense Secretary Weinberger has said that the Europeans are "generally bearing a fair share of the common defense burden," other voices, in Congress and out, say the Europeans are not doing or paying enough. It is not, of course, the first time that the United States has been faced with the prospect of a declining defense budget. What is new is the emergence of the argument—advanced, for example, by Richard Gephardt and Pat Schroeder—that it is partly as a result of its defense commitments that the United States has built up heavy foreign debts, and that it has lost a degree of economic independence in consequence of its need to borrow from the very nations to which it has made those commitments. There are even those who would claim that this justifies a linkage between defense expenditures and trade protectionist measures, despite the fact that such a linkage would be a destructive way to share the burden of common defense. It would damage, not promote, trade and growth on which defense capacity ultimately rests, and has rested since the Atlantic Alliance was created in 1949.

But to answer the underlying question—whether or not the Europeans are pulling their weight—it is necessary first to look at the origins of what Harland Cleveland called the "trans-Atlantic bargain." Of course, this bargain did not exist in an explicit, contractual sense. The North Atlantic Treaty commits each party to assist "by taking forthwith, individually and in concert with the other parties, such action as it deems necessary, including the use of armed force, to restore and maintain the security of the North Atlantic Area" (Article 5). The nature and degree of assistance that signatories give, whether in peace or in a crisis, is essentially a matter of policy rather than contract.

Nevertheless, from the United States' point of view, the main elements of the deal were implicit from the start in the offer of Marshall aid and, later, when the outline of an Atlantic security system began to emerge. In both cases American assistance was to be conditional on evidence that the Europeans could get their act together; as General Marshall said in his Harvard speech of June 1947, it was not for the Americans "to draw up unilaterally a program designed to place

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Europe on its feet . . . the initiative must come from Europe." And it was not until the 1948 Brussels Treaty, which led to the establishment of the Western European Union (WEU), was ready for signature that the U.S. administration agreed to joint discussions with the British on an Atlantic security system.

But it was in the U.S. administration's dealings with Congress that the nature of the U.S. side of the "trans-Atlantic bargain" was initially defined. As Stanley Sloan has argued, Congress's endorsement of American membership of NATO was based on the tacit understanding that the U.S. contribution would take the form of a nuclear guarantee and sea control, rather than a large-scale commitment of troops to continental Europe, which Secretary of State Dean Acheson had assured the Senate Foreign Relations Committee would not result from treaty ratification.[1]

This formula was, however, rapidly overtaken by the realization that European security and recovery could not be guaranteed without stationing American troops in Europe. This was necessary not only because of the Soviet Union's failure to demobilize (only twelve Western divisions were immediately available on the Central Front, facing about 100 Soviet divisions), but also to permit the re-armament of Western Germany, seen even then as a prerequisite for any coherent West European defense. Congressional endorsement of U.S. forward troop deployments was given (in Senate Resolution 99 of 4 April 1951) on the understanding that this did not invalidate the principle that, as former President Hoover had said, "the prime obligation of defense of Western continental Europe rests upon the nations of Europe."

THE AMERICAN decision to commit troops to continental Europe was accompanied by various grand designs to give substance to what we now call the "European pillar" of the Transatlantic Alliance. One was the setting of force goals, at a meeting in 1952 of NATO ministers in Lisbon, Portugal, which called for the rapid expansion of Western forces from existing levels to just under 100 divisions, about half of which were to be immediately available, the remainder in reserve. Another was the creation of a European Defense Community (EDC), originally proposed in 1950, designed, as the report of the Lisbon Conference put it, to

> fulfill the imperative requirements of military effectiveness; to give the Western world a guarantee against the rebirth of conflicts which [had] divided it in the past; and to give an impetus to the achievement of a closer association on a federal or confederate basis.

But by 1954 it was clear that neither of these designs was achievable in the form envisaged. The EDC was still-born. And European efforts to increase budgets and to lengthen periods of compulsory military service, while they had the effect of doubling the numbers of divisions readily available to the Alliance, fell far short of the levels proposed at Lisbon.

Considerable strides were, however, made during these early years towards meeting the aims of the architects of post-war security, and putting flesh on Europe's side of the "trans-Atlantic bargain." European political and economic cooperation developed in ways which fell short of the confederation envisioned in the EDC. But Europeans progressively acquired the habit of working closely together in a wide range of different fora, including the European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC), the European Economic Community (EEC), and the Atomic Energy Community (EURATOM), in marked contrast to their historically more usual tendency towards feud and fratricide. Similarly, the internal stability of post-war Western Europe, which we now take for granted, was not by any means a foregone conclusion in the wake of a war that had involved whole populations in the war effort, and changed the expectations of whole classes

[1]Stanley R. Sloan, *NATO's Future: Towards a New Transatlantic Bargain* (Washington D.C.: National Defense University Press, 1985), chapter 1.

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concerning the post-war world. These aspirations were met, and stability created, in part through the increased welfare provision that is often the target of critics of European defense efforts.

Over this period, Europe's contribution to collective security was enhanced, both through the incorporation of new members into the framework of Western security, and by increased defense spending. Greece and Turkey had joined NATO in 1951; they were followed in 1954 by the Federal Republic of Germany which, with Italy, also joined the WEU. European NATO countries increased defense spending by over two-fifths between 1955 and 1970, not much less than the increase in the United States' spending during the same period, which was inflated by its involvement in Southeast Asia.

In parallel, developments in the nuclear sphere were compelling the Europeans to assume a greater share of the political and actual burden of the nuclear strategy on which European security was seen to depend. Although American theater nuclear weapons had been deployed in Europe since the early 1950s, they had been an adjunct to, rather than a central element of, NATO strategy. But the achievement of an invulnerable Soviet second-strike strategic capability led to the abandonment of the old "tripwire" strategy and the adoption in 1967 of "flexible response," in which theater nuclear forces occupied a key role in linking conventional defenses to the ultimate U.S. strategic guarantee. As a result, the European members of the Alliance had to accept the risks associated with a strategy that contemplated both the possibility of the first use of nuclear weapons by NATO on European territory, and also the stationing of very much larger numbers of such weapons (reaching a peak of some 7,000 warheads). Moreover, the new strategy also demanded stronger conventional forces, in order to reduce the risk of first use and thus raise the nuclear threshold. Yet this was at a time when France had withdrawn from the Alliance's Integrated Military Structure, and when the United States' defense budget was in the early stages of a sharp decline from the levels it had reached during the war in Indochina. This decline, of some 35 percent, did not begin to be reversed until the late 1970s. On the other hand, the early 1970s saw a reversal of the previous gradual drawdown of the United States' force levels in Europe, which had fallen from over 400,000 in the 1950s to some 300,000 in 1970.

Meanwhile, European defense spending steadily increased throughout the 1970s and 1980s—by about one-third in real terms between 1970 and 1985. The accompanying graph illustrates this pattern, using 1970 as a baseline for demonstrating comparative real growth. (Spain, which joined NATO in 1982, is excluded.) Clearly, this baseline does less justice to the more recent substantial increases in U.S. defense expenditure than one in the mid- or late 1980s; and it has to be seen in the light of the fact that U.S. expenditure in 1970 was nearly double that of its European allies. But the graph serves to illustrate the consistence of European efforts over time. During this period, European per capita spending on defense increased by over 20 percent, compared with a fall of nearly three percent in the United States.

WHERE DO we stand now, some twenty years after the adoption of flexible response, and nearly forty years after the creation of the Alliance? It would be idle to pretend that the Europeans have come, even collectively, to match the amount of money spent by the United States on defense. Nor, in most cases, do the Europeans devote as high a proportion of their GDP to defense as does the United States. These input measures of defense burden-sharing understandably attract the headlines, but they are imperfect in themselves: deterrence is not achieved by dollar expenditure, but by the numbers and quality of trained men, and their military equipment, that it buys. Burdensharing is also, in part, a matter of perception. Different aspects of defense are more burdensome to some than to others. In West Germany, for example, there are over

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U.S. and European Defense Spending: Comparative Real Growth 1970–1987



Constant 1980 prices and exchange rates

5,000 military exercises every year, and nearly 600,000 aircraft sorties, of which over 100,000 are at levels below 100 meters. Yet West Germany is a heavily populated country, with 62 million people in an area no bigger than the state of Oregon. This inevitably intrusive military presence ensures that the environmental impact of defense is a very live issue. For the future, the Germans in particular, with one of the lowest birth-rates in Europe, are likely to find the manpower requirements of defense an additional increasing burden. It is estimated that the manpower available for the German armed forces will have fallen by half between 1983 and 1993, and already the decision has had to be taken to extend the period of compulsory military service in order to maintain existing force-levels beyond 1989.

On the nuclear front, in a number of European countries, governments have had to cope with considerable opposition to their policies, ever since the controversy over enhanced radiation weapons (the so-called "neutron bomb") in 1977, exacerbated by the decision in 1979 to deploy Pershing II and cruise missiles. In addition, Britain and France have sustained the very considerable costs of maintaining and modernizing their independent nuclear forces. Europe's achievement in maintaining and increasing defense expenditures, involving some politically unpopular decisions and given other pressing calls on public purses over the last two decades (including periods of general economic depression—for example, those caused by the oil crises) should not be underestimated.

The real increases in European defense expenditure were not, with some notable exceptions, devoted to expanding the size of European armies. By the early 1970s the proportion of European populations devoted to defense had stabilized at about one in a hundred, a level to which the United States had coincidentally descended by 1975. Similarly, by the mid-1980s mobilizable reserves in European countries stood at some eight for

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every 1,000 people compared with about seven in the United States. On either side of the Atlantic, the major advances were now being made in the amounts of money spent on equipping forces that had already reached their maximum sustainable peace-time levels, and in some cases in expanding and equipping reserve forces. In the ten years to 1986, European nations produced, for Alliance use, half as many tanks and combat/interceptor aircraft again as the United States, and nearly twice the number of major surface warships. The Dutch, for example, were spending over 20 percent of their defense budgets on new equipment in the early 1980s, compared with 13 percent a decade earlier. NATO's military infrastructure spending, 65 percent funded by the Europeans, also showed substantial increases, with $10 billion allocated for the present five-year period, about 55 percent higher in real terms than the previous five-year allocation. Finally, in the early 1980s considerable efforts were made to improve the sustainability of Allied conventional forces, with the Germans, for example, increasing expenditure on ammunition by 38 percent in real terms between 1982 and 1985.

As a result of a decade and a half of increased defense spending, the Europeans have now become the major contributors of combat power in the event of conflict in Europe. This fact is reflected in the United States Defense Department's 1987 assessment of Allied contributions to the common defense, both in terms of the effectiveness of Allied ground forces, expressed in terms of numbers and of the quality and quantity of their equipment, and of the numbers of aircraft in service with Allied forces. The European contribution to the Allied effort in terms of in-place forces has long been recognized since it is, for obvious reasons, easier to identify. Until American reinforcements arrived, it would be for the ninety-plus divisions based in Europe to meet the initial impact of any Warsaw Pact aggression; of these, all but four are European. The statistics here are familiar to most students of the burden-sharing debate: 90 percent of the manpower, 85 percent of the tanks, 95 percent of the artillery, and 80 percent of the combat aircraft currently stationed in Europe are provided by European members of the Alliance. European navies provide 70 percent of the major warships readily available in the event of a conflict. But this is not the full story. In any prolonged conflict also (in which U.S. reinforcement would of course be crucial) the European contribution would be substantial: The mobilizable strength of European forces, nearly seven million, compares with three and a half for the United States. The International Institute for Strategic Studies estimates that European NATO countries in aggregate outstrip the United States in their holdings of all major categories of land-based weapon systems (tanks, armored fighting vehicles, and artillery) and aircraft; while European naval forces, although containing fewer very large vessels (ten small aircraft carriers, for example, to the United States' fifteen), more than match the U.S. Navy in numbers of destroyers, frigates, and attack submarines (*The Military Balance 1987–88*).

These overall figures bear closer examination, for they are the sum of a very disparate range of contributions by individual European allies. Numbers alone cannot give the full picture; quality must also be taken into account. Turkey's main asset has always been manpower: but with a GDP one-hundredth the size of that of the United States, the Turkish government can ill afford sophisticated equipment for its forces. It therefore relies substantially on assistance from its fellow Alliance members, notably the United States but also Germany (most of whose military aid program—amounting to $1.8 billion to date—is for Turkey). The Germans themselves maintain a half-million strong defense force, with over three-quarters of a million more in reserve and operating equipment as sophisticated as any in the Alliance. In addition to this direct contribution to the Alliance, the German government incurs considerable costs in supporting the Berlin garrison; similarly, the market value of land

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and buildings made available, largely rent-free, to Allied forces in West Germany has been calculated at around 22 billion dollars. For its part, Greece maintains peacetime armed forces about 10 percent the size of those of the United States, from a population only 4 percent as big, and spends more on defense in relation to the size of the Greek economy than does the United States. Norway, whose peacetime forces are of a similar size, proportionate to population, as those of its NATO allies, has plans that would involve over one in twenty of its total population in the defense effort in a crisis, compared to the average one in fifty of European nations with compulsory military service, or one in seventy among those (the United States, Canada, Britain, and Luxembourg) with all-volunteer forces.

LOOKED AT objectively, therefore, the European Allies have gone a considerable way towards meeting their part of the original bargain to shoulder the burden of the land and air defense of continental Europe; furthermore, they also contribute substantially to maritime defense. European nations have also borne a share of the burden of sustaining the nuclear element of the existing strategy: although Britain and France are alone among European nations in possessing their own nuclear forces, there are seven European nations that play a part in nuclear deterrence by operating delivery systems equipped with U.S. nuclear warheads under so-called "dual-key" arrangements, including five that have provided bases for the deployment of American INF missiles, which led to the historic arms control agreement signed in December last year.

This account seems hardly to fit with the futures for expenditure that are more commonly quoted, and seem to tell a markedly different story. There are three main reasons for this. In the first place, expenditure figures are themselves liable to distortion. The usual method of comparing defense expenditures, by translating them into dollars at market exchange rates, has the effect of artificially understating non-dollar expenditure when the dollar is strong, as it was in 1985—the year chosen as the basis for comparing defense expenditure in the last (1987) burden-sharing report to Congress.

Second, the cost of European forces is strongly affected not only by the heavy proportion of conscripts in most European armies (European manpower costs on average half that of the all-volunteer American forces) but also in the structure of their forces as a whole. Understandably, nations tend to make the best use of those of their resources that are relatively cheap. In the American case, the emphasis is much more on equipment, in which the services can profit from economies of scale and which coincides with the greater emphasis on force projection capabilities in the U.S. forces' missions; one manifestation of this is that the distribution of service manpower in the United States' forces is fairly even as between naval, ground, and air forces. In Europe, there is a heavy preponderance of ground forces (typically five soldiers for every airman or sailor) which are in general less expensive to maintain in equipment terms. As the old saying has it: Armies equip men, whereas navies and air forces man equipment.

Third, and perhaps most simply: United States defense expenditure provides for the United States' global defense concerns, whereas European defense budgets are almost exclusively devoted to the Alliance's geographical area. On current estimates, the United States spends about 6.6 percent of its GDP on defense. According to the United States Defense Department, some 30 percent of this (or roughly 2 percent of GDP) is directly in support of its Alliance commitments, rising to 60 percent (or 4 percent of GDP) if allowance is made for the total cost of all U.S. NATO-deployed forces and reinforcements, planned over the course of a conflict involving NATO. That said, one must recognize that much of the U.S. expenditure "out-of-area" is devoted to countering the global Soviet threat, which is in the general interest of the Alliance as a whole,

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and some of the European nations also make a significant contribution to this objective.

THE EUROPEAN tendency to concentrate on the Atlantic and Europe is, of course, a product of the scale of the Soviet military presence in Europe and of the progressive withdrawal from colonial commitments, particularly in the case of the British, French, and Portuguese. At the same time, there has been a growing appreciation that Western security interests do not end at the boundaries of the Atlantic Treaty area. NATO itself has no formal or coordinated out-of-area policy, a fact that reflects the original concern of the United States to avoid the risk of becoming embroiled in European colonial affairs, but which persists largely because it would be very difficult to obtain a consensus for a wider commitment. But the Europeans, collectively (under WEU and European Community auspices, for instance) and individually, make a considerable contribution to Western interests outside the NATO area. In the Gulf, British warships successfully patrolled international waters for seven years before the recent escalation of the threat to shipping in the area; and in 1986, the United Kingdom deployed a combined force of over four and a half thousand service personnel to Oman in an exercise designed to test its ability to respond to a crisis anywhere in the world. Although British dependence on Gulf oil is comparatively slight, the United Kingdom would, like the United States, suffer from the impact on the world economy of any prolonged interruption in supplies. In recent months the United Kingdom has expanded its naval presence in the Gulf in the interests of preserving freedom of navigation. Other European nations have done the same: in January 1988 the French, British, Dutch, Belgians, and Italians had a total of twenty-five naval vessels deployed in the Gulf. All of these (with the exception of Belgium) also deployed minesweepers in 1984, when sea-lanes in the Gulf of Suez were threatened by terrorist mines.

Many European countries have, over the years, contributed to international peacekeeping forces world wide. But this has not by any means been Europe's only contribution to stability outside the NATO area. Britain has substantial forces permanently stationed in Cyprus, the Indian ocean, the Far East, Central America, and the south Atlantic. France maintains forces in the Indian and Pacific oceans, the Caribbean and Africa (where French military assistance to the government in Chad in 1987 was instrumental in the defeat of Libyan occupying forces). And the Netherlands and Spain also maintain a military presence out-of-area. Additionally, like the United States, the United Kingdom and France maintain substantial programs of military assistance around the world: in the British case, over 600 servicemen are in training teams or on loan service to countries outside the NATO area, at the time of writing; and over three and a half thousand students from such countries attended military training courses in the United Kingdom last year.

Clearly, the Allies each have different reasons for undertaking these kinds of activities. There is no disguising that their approaches to international security issues may sometimes differ. Not all European nations are able to make an active contribution outside Alliance boundaries, and there are different views on the utility of the military option. But Europe in general can and does contribute to global security and stability in other ways. To take an example outside the defense field, in 1986 (the last year for which comprehensive figures are available) European Alliance members contributed in aggregate half as much foreign aid again as did the United States, but from a smaller combined GDP.

LOOKING TO the future, there is wide-spread agreement on two aspects of the INF Treaty. The first is that the withdrawal of Pershing II missiles and ground-launched cruise missiles (GLCMs), while advantageous in view of the greater number of Soviet systems that are to go, will

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place increased emphasis on remaining theater nuclear systems and on conventional forces. The second is that it would be unrealistic to expect sudden and substantial increases in defense budgets, on either side of the Atlantic. Undoubted weaknesses remain in the Western defensive posture. Nor are there early prospects of relief, either through a slow-down in the Soviet Union's force modernization program or through conventional arms control—although the longer-term prospects for both are more encouraging than they have been for a number of years.

In these circumstances, and in the face of a more sophisticated public relations effort by the Soviet leadership, progress in enhancing security in the military sense will depend to a significant extent on the success enjoyed by the Allies in making full use of the resources invested in defense, in three main areas:

First, targeting known areas of deficiency. The Conventional Defense Initiative (CDI), agreed by NATO ministers in December 1984, identifies areas of deficiency in which special efforts would yield the best return. This is a long-term effort, building on those which preceded it, to improve Allied capabilities through greater sustainability, improved readiness, better training, and the additional funding agreed to for infrastructure projects; and on the Allied force planning procedures, in which individual nations' performances are reviewed annually.

Second, sustained attention to extracting better value for money. This makes few headlines, but British examples show how effective this approach can be: since the late 1970s thousands more British servicemen have been transferred from support functions to front-line units; reserve force availability has been increased by 50,000; and equipment expenditure for every trained regular serviceman has been increased by 25 percent.

Third, increased collaboration in equipment procurement. Collaboration among European nations has received new impetus in the forum of the Independent European Programme Group (IEPG) which has, in the past three years, agreed on thirteen operational staff targets and initiated some twenty collaborative research projects.

A feature of trans-Atlantic relations that is already evident and may be expected to increase for the future, is the emergence of a more distinctive European voice within the Alliance framework, whether in arms control, strategic planning, or equipment collaboration. Thus recent years have seen the revitalization not only of the IEPG but also of the WEU as a forum for discussion of defense and security issues. This seems an inevitable and necessary consequence of a more coherent and cohesive European contribution to security, in which there are, as there have always been, distinctive European perspectives. These efforts to create a European security identity should be seen in the context that the Europeans themselves have established: that they are subordinate to the Atlantic Alliance (a fact reflected in the treaty language of the WEU) and not exclusive of trans-Atlantic cooperation, whether in general security matters or in equipment collaboration.

THIS ESSAY has not attempted to answer the question why the United States should continue to contribute to the defense of Europe. It is, of course, for Americans to decide whether the United States' commitment to the Alliance is primarily for the benefit of Europeans or whether, as Caspar Weinberger has written,

> American forces are in Europe as much to protect [the United States'] interests as to help [its] Allies safeguard their freedom.

If the United States does regard the defense of the Atlantic and Europe as a U.S. interest, it follows that it should support that interest in much the way that it has. European members of NATO no more constitute a superpower now than they did at the end of the last war. As a community, the Europeans increasingly speak with one voice on trade and economic issues; they may come, through organizations such as the WEU, to do so on security issues. But political unity is unlikely for the foreseeable future. Even were this to be achieved, European security, in the

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face of the contiguous threat from a superpower such as the Soviet Union, would still require the United States' commitment to the Alliance.

The former British Foreign Secretary Ernest Bevin used to compare America's position in the wake of World War II with that of Britain at the end of the Napoleonic wars:

> When those wars ended, Britain held about 30 percent of the world's wealth. The United States today holds about 50 percent. Britain for eighteen years after Waterloo practically gave away her exports but this resulted in stability and a hundred years of peace.

The United States nowadays holds about half the proportion of the world's wealth that it did in 1945. But its allies in Europe have come, gradually, to compensate for this relative decline in the United States' power in assuming their fair share of the burden of common security. Only time will tell if American generosity in the post-war years will have the effect that Bevin claimed for nineteenth century Britain.

. . . And from Washington

Richard Perle

THERE IS continuing controversy over the manner in which the burden of Western defense is being shared between the United States and its allies. I can state my view simply: The United States has been bearing a disproportionate share of the burden of defending the alliances in which we participate. And while I believe it is wise for the United States to defend our interests as far forward as possible, our defense effort, from which our allies also derive protection, could be shared, and should be shared, more equitably.

Having said that much, an obvious point needs to be made. One must define the burden to be shared in order to judge whether it is being shared fairly. For the most part our allies have chosen to limit the nature of their commitment to the common defense to countering immediate threats to their security and territorial integrity. Thus they do not consider that they are under any obligation to join with us in the protection of Western interests outside their immediate territory. When these interests are threatened elsewhere—for example in the Gulf—individual allies may or may not join with us, depending on decisions made individually and at the time. But in no case do they consider that the NATO alliance obliges them to do more than protect NATO territory. For this reason the burden of protecting Western interests falls even more disproportionately on the United States than the figures might otherwise suggest.

I have listened on many occasions, at countless speeches and at formal congressional hearings, to a recitation of statistics showing that our NATO allies provide a high

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percentage of the men and equipment that are deployed in defense of the Alliance. And it is certainly true that without the troops, ships, and aircraft that our allies contribute to NATO, an already adverse conventional force balance would be even more lopsided. But that fact in no way relieves our allies of the responsibility for making a defense effort more nearly comparable to our own. Indeed, to say that we benefit from the effort of our allies, and they from ours, is merely to underline the collective nature of our alliance.

In arguing that the United States has been assuming an unfair share of the defense burden, I have in mind more than financial and technical resources. I believe that we assume greater risks in the defense of our allies than they are prepared to assume in our defense *or, in some cases, their own.* I will return to this theme momentarily; but because the most frequent measure of the defense burden is defense investment, let me comment on the question of who is spending what on the collective defense.

There is no set of figures that adequately expresses the various ways in which each of us contributes to the security of the rest. Yet it is difficult to ignore the level of effort that is expressed by the percentage of gross domestic product that the member countries of the alliance allocate for defense. Using figures for 1985, in our case it is 6.9 percent. The figure for the Federal Republic of Germany is 3.2 percent, less than half of ours. Our Canadian ally invested 2.2 percent of their GDP in defense in 1985, less than one-third of what we were spending. And Japan, despite its large and growing wealth, spends barely one percent, a scant one-seventh of our budget. And while I do not accept the notion that the American budget deficit is caused by our defense expenditure, I must say that it is galling to be lectured, as we so frequently are, by those whom we defend about the need to control our budget deficit. Indeed, if we were to reduce our defense effort to, say, the level of the Federal Republic of Germany, (expressed as a percentage of GDP) we could balance the American budget this year. Such a move would gravely imperil our security as well as the security of Germany, and no one concerned about the security of this nation would recommend such a course. But it does help to place in perspective the mounting frustration with which many of us view the superfluity of advice fired in our direction by finance ministers who have reduced the defense ministers of Europe to hapless supplicants.

I will not presume to judge the social and political factors that might explain the reluctance of our allies to fund their defense adequately. Their ordering of priorities is rather like that of many in our own Congress who prefer social to military spending. Allied governments often rule with thin margins or coalition partners who impose their budgetary preferences on ministers who, were they free to do so, might give greater emphasis to defense. Denmark is but one example of a government that lacks an effective majority on the issue of defense, so that the social democratic and left opposition parties dictate the size of the defense budget, overriding the better judgment of the governing parties. Unhappily, something rather like the Danish situation is emerging here as the Democratic-controlled Congress continues to impose its budgetary will on the President's defense budget requests.

I HAVE SEEN enough of the European leadership to know that many prime ministers, ministers of foreign affairs, finance ministers and other political leaders are woefully ignorant of the nature of the military balance between East and West. Compared to their American counterparts they are poorly informed. It seems to be the case that the foreign and finance ministers in a number of allied nations have never had a comprehensive briefing on the status of NATO and Warsaw Pact military forces, of the sort that is routinely made available to members of the American Congress. I can't recall the last time that a NATO foreign ministers meeting was briefed in depth on these military matters. And while NATO

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defense ministers regularly receive such briefings, allied defense ministers often lack influence within their own governments. At meetings of NATO defense ministers one invariably hears a plaintive lament to the effect that things would be different if only more people could see the evidence that has been laid before them. I am quite sure that the defense ministers have their chancellors, presidents, foreign ministers, and finance ministers in mind.

The point of all this is to disagree most emphatically with those who draw one of two wrong conclusions from the apparent indifference of some allied officials toward the Soviet military threat to Europe. One conclusion is that it is we Americans whose perception is impaired, with the result that we exaggerate the weight of Soviet military forces. Another is usually formulated like this: If the Europeans, who are closer to the Soviet Union than we are, don't seem concerned at the Soviet threat, why should we be so troubled? I believe that the answer in both cases is that if allied officials had the same access as their American colleagues to the steady stream of intelligence pointing to the unrelenting build-up of Soviet military power, they would react much as we do: with concern, apprehension, and even money. So it remains an important task of America diplomacy—one at which we have largely failed—to get the facts before the community of allied officials whose knowledge and judgment are crucial to the development of sound policies.

DEFENDING THE community of democratic nations entails more than buying and deploying military forces. And as inadequate as the performance of our allies is with respect to defense spending, the most glaring inequities lie elsewhere.

First, take the matter of sharing the risks of defense. No country allied to the United States has been prepared to take anything approaching the risk we assume in our commitment to use American nuclear weapons to defend other countries. (This may help to explain why there are doubts as to the credibility of that commitment.) Some NATO allies share the nuclear risk by having American nuclear weapons deployed on their territory. But others, like Denmark, Norway, Spain, Iceland, Luxembourg, Portugal, and Canada refuse to accommodate nuclear weapons on their soil. And there is pressure in Germany, which now accepts American nuclear weapons, and among such opposition parties as the British Labour Party, to remove American nuclear weapons. Not even France and Britain, which maintain independent nuclear deterrent forces, have been prepared to extend a nuclear guarantee to other members of the alliance.

Second, consider the American policy of providing security assistance to its poorer allies. While we do not do nearly enough to support such allies as Portugal and Turkey, our allies do practically nothing. It is not as if they cannot afford to extend aid. Great Britain, France, Germany, Denmark, Norway, Italy, and the Netherlands—and, outside NATO, Japan—could all afford to assist Turkey, for example, which urgently needs to equip its sizeable army with modern military equipment. In any alliance in which all burdens were shared fairly there would be a significant flow of aid from the better to the less well off members. In this regard the Japanese case is scandalous. With its vast wealth, to say nothing of its immense trade and currency balances, Japan could, if it wished, comfortably aid Turkey, Portugal, and its friends in the Pacific with substantial funds, equipment and technology. The political and psychological excuses that Japan has sold a succession of American administrations, including this one, for not sharing the defense burden equitably, are little more than a gloss on a policy of chronic freeloading.

Third, there is the matter of restraint in supplying advanced technologies and know-how to the Eastern bloc. Most of our allies would cheerfully sell to the Soviet bloc those advanced technologies that would enable the Soviets to strengthen greatly the effectiveness of their military forces. Indeed, many do

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so—or they at least countenance such transactions by companies under their jurisdiction, by failing to put in place even a minimally effective system of export controls. We have seen recently the extensive damage that can result, in the case of Japanese and Norwegian firms selling the Soviets the means by which to counter our anti-submarine warfare capabilities. And one could recite a long list of examples encompassing optical, radar, deep-submersible, advanced materials, microelectronic, manufacturing, and scientific technologies. At the Coordinating Committee in Paris, which is charged with coordinating the embargo on the sale of sensitive technology to the Warsaw Pact, our allies are an unrelenting source of pressure to relax these restrictions. The Germans, in particular, have shown a remarkable indifference to the military consequences of some sensitive sales to the Soviet Union and they seem eager to do even more in the future.

Fourth, consider the nature of the financial relationship between many of our allies and the Soviet bloc. Western commercial banks have been lending money to the Soviet Union in prodigious amounts. The average monthly lending by European and Japanese banks to the Soviet bloc in 1986 was $2 billion, of which $1.6 billion took the form of untied, general purpose loans, available to the Soviets to finance their military build-up and their subversion abroad. Our Japanese ally currently holds 27 percent of Cuba's $3.7 billion external debt, and Japan, together with other American allies, has been lending significant sums to Vietnam even as Vietnam continues to occupy Cambodia. Japan has emerged as the largest single source of Soviet Bloc credits over the last three years, supplying 40 percent, or nearly $10 billion, in 1986. The Germans, who cannot get their defense budget up to half of ours, are eager to expand their financial relationship with the Soviets with an inevitable expansion of untied lending.

Fifth, there is the problem of what one might call reciprocal sensitivity to the security concerns of other allies. Our allies expect us to share the burden of protecting their interests when they consider that those interests are threatened. We have, over the years, provided logistic support to a number of allies whose overseas interests were threatened. France, Belgium, and the United Kingdom come immediately to mind, but there are others. And where are they when we need help—say, for example, in containing Cuban or Nicaraguan subversion? If they are to be found at all it is often on the side of our adversaries. The EEC collectively and a number of its members individually cannot manage to find much assistance for such allies as Turkey, but they have managed to send aid to the Sandinistas. I don't wish to overstate the point; the record here is mixed. But it is intolerable that allies of the United States, who have seldom found the resources to assist other allies of ours, should actually send aid to our adversaries. They have, as well, largely scorned our effort to contain Castro by limiting trade and financial transactions with his regime. Obviously on such issues as Cuba and Nicaragua there is room for allies to disagree. But I should have thought that in any cohesive alliance there would be a willingness to defer, whenever possible, to the views of the ally most immediately concerned.

Sixth, take the issue of access and overflight rights for American forces and base facilities for our overseas deployments. As the very fine report of the Commission on Integrated Long-Term Strategy, chaired by Fred Iklé and Albert Wohlstetter, has pointed out, the reluctance of our allies to facilitate the movement of American forces could pose critical problems for the effectiveness with which we can project power in support of objectives that are largely shared, at least privately, by many of our allies. France's refusal to permit the overflight of French territory for U.S. forces engaged against Libya is a case in point. And, as the expulsion of the 401st Tactical Fighter Wing from Spain makes clear, some of our allies are not prepared to accommodate even those minimal facilities necessary for the conventional defense of the alliance. Even where we

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are able to secure base facilities, the negotiation of the necessary agreements are becoming rather more like real estate transactions than collaboration among allies.

WHAT SHOULD we do to bring about a more equitable sharing of the burdens of Western security? Much of the answer is implied by the points made above. Actions that actually add to our burdens, like the sale of sensitive advanced technologies and the extension of untied loans, could be halted if our allies would cooperate. Increased assistance to Turkey and Portugal in Europe, and the Philippines and others elsewhere, are well within the means of our major allies. Our allies could act to strengthen the controls on the export of sensitive technology to the Soviet bloc and they could take steps to enforce those controls.

The European economy, like the Japanese, is flourishing. Germany, Italy, the United Kingdom, France, Denmark, Norway, and the Netherlands could all do more to invest in defense, especially in conventional forces, without affecting the well-being of their economies or sacrificing social programs. The American policy of leading by example in the early years of the Reagan Administration when we increased greatly our defense spending has clearly failed. And now we are reducing our own defense investment, which hardly commends a policy of 'follow us.'

Our allies cannot assume, but they can surely share more effectively, the risk associated with NATO's policy of deterring aggression through nuclear threats. They can participate in the plan to improve the nuclear weapons that will remain in Europe after intermediate missiles have been withdrawn, a plan agreed to at Montebello in 1983. And they can improve their conventional forces, so as to diminish the extent to which we rely on the threat to use nuclear weapons in response to aggression carried out by conventional means.

It is well within the capability of our allies to permit greater access for U.S. forces to the bases and facilities on their territory—and to do so in a manner that gives us some confidence, on the basis of which we might plan, that they will be there when we need them.

In much of this Japan is a special case. Japan could easily afford to accelerate implementation of its commitment to defend itself out to 1,000 nautical miles from Japanese territory. It could consummate quickly its planned purchase of AWACS. And while doing so they might consider buying some for our Turkish ally. Turkey's wartime mission of holding the Turkish straits is vital to keeping open the sea lanes of communication through the Gulf and it is thus vital to Japanese security. If they don't understand that in Tokyo, it is time they did. There is no reason why Japan could not devote an additional one per cent of GDP to security assistance to the Western democracies who need help. If there are inhibitions on the growth of Japanese defense spending, then other ways must be found to enable Japan to share the defense burden more fairly. But the Japanese haven't been looking. And neither have we. We have permitted Japan to be defended largely by us and our NATO allies without any serious effort to get the Japanese to find ways to share the defense burden.

We do not and should not coerce our allies. But we can place the issue of burden-sharing on the agenda on every occasion—summits, ministerials, bilaterals, international conferences, and the like. Every conversation, whether it is about trade or politics or exchange rates or maritime or space issues should begin and end with a discussion of burden-sharing. Let's at least insist that our allies share the burden of brooding about burden-sharing.

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Strategy and "Freedom of Navigation"

William R. Hawkins

WHEN THE United States agreed to provide convoy protection for reflagged oil tankers sailing to and from Kuwait in the Persian Gulf, the Reagan Administration emphasized that the Navy was acting in the national interest. These interests were laid out long before the convoy operations began. Secretary of State George Shultz, in his January 27, 1987 testimony before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, listed three reasons why stability in the Persian Gulf was important to the U.S.:

> First, it is critical to the economic health of the West. An interruption in the flow of oil or control of these energy resources by an unfriendly power could have devastating effects on the pattern of world trade and on our economy.
>
> Second, our interests would suffer greatly if Iranian expansionism were to subvert friendly states or otherwise boost anti-American forces in the region.
>
> Third, as part of the strategic crossroads of the Middle East, this area must not come under the domination of a power hostile to the United States and its allies. . . .

Later in his remarks, the Secretary identified the "power hostile" to the United States as the Soviet Union. The charter of three long-haul Soviet tankers by Kuwait played a pivotal role in the American decision to initiate convoys. The Soviet Navy pledged to protect these tankers and it was feared that this would serve as a pretext for an expanded Soviet naval presence in the Gulf. The USSR had already started escorting its own merchant ships in the Gulf after an Iranian warship stopped and searched a Soviet cargo ship in September, 1986. As Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs Richard W. Murphy stated in regard to the Soviet tanker issue the day after the frigate *U.S.S. Stark* was attacked, "We do not want the Soviet Union to obtain a strategic position from which it could threaten vital free world interests in the region." Michael H. Armacost, Undersecretary of State for Political Affairs, told the Senate Foreign Relations Committee in June that "Kuwait and the other Gulf states view the reflagging as a demonstration of long-term ties with the United States—in contrast to a short-term leasing arrangement with the USSR."

Thus the administration has stressed consistently the need to protect the oil supplies controlled by friendly Gulf states (defined usually as the Gulf Cooperative Council [GCC]: Kuwait, Saudi Arabia, Bahrain, Qatar, Oman, and the United Arab Emirates, though Iraq is sometimes added) from the immediate threats posed by Iranian naval and missile attacks, and from the long-term

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threat of increased Soviet influence in the region. And it has tied that protection to the interests of American national security.

A show of strength was also needed to reassure friendly governments that were questioning the coherence and seriousness of American policy in the region, and our staying power, in the wake of the Iran-*contra* scandal. By a mixture of diplomacy, propaganda, and violence, Iran had been trying to convince the Gulf states of the futility of looking to the U.S. for protection. If not only Iraq but also Iraq's supporters in the GCC could be isolated from outside support, Iran would be in a position to force acceptance of its demands. That Washington deployed such a large flotilla (numbering approximately forty warships including aircraft carriers, a battleship, and a Marine amphibious force) to the Gulf suggests that its mission involves more than a mere convoy escort operation. It was sent as a demonstration of power to dispel from the minds of Arab leaders in the Gulf any feeling of isolation or impotence in the face of Teheran's threats.

However, administration statements have also contained, from time to time, references to an American role in the Gulf as "global policeman," acting to protect "regional peace" and "international law" rather than the more concrete interests of itself and its allies. Since these statements usually appear in official texts well after those stressing national security themes, it can be assumed that they are not the principle concerns and that senior policy-makers are not as naive as these statements sometimes make them appear. Yet the fact that these statements are made at all creates problems.

They are dangerous because they can be used by critics to turn the debate over Gulf policy away from its true purpose into areas susceptible to emotional manipulation, in the interest of isolationism and retreat. There is always a temptation to invoke lofty rhetoric in the attempt to win greater popular support. But moving the debate onto such grounds can be very hazardous and all too often results in the administration being hoist with its own petard, by providing critics on the left with an opening when the harsh realities of war and power politics manifest themselves. The administration then must choose between failure and hypocrisy, either route costing more public support than the initial appeal to idealism garnered. It would be far better if official statements served to educate the public to the realities of world politics rather than play to their uninformed emotions.

The Misuse of "Peace"

TWO LINES are of particular concern. The first is the U.S. commitment to "peace and stability" in the Gulf. A report prepared in the regional affairs office of the Bureau of Near East and South Asia Affairs and made public in October 1987 stated:

> [T]he U.S. strategy is to continue a two-track policy—on the diplomatic front to end the war and on the strategic front to protect our interest in the interim while the war rages. We thus center our efforts on the UN Security Council at the same time that we move to deter Iranian pressures on friendly states like Kuwait. Until the war ends, the perpetual instability will continue to present significant opportunities for Soviet advances in the region. With that reality in mind, U.S. policy blends political, strategic, economic, and humanitarian motivations towards our fundamental goal: to end the war.

Peace in the Gulf is in the interest of the United States if it means an end to efforts by Iran and the USSR to expand their respective influences in the region. But this means that peace is (as it always should be) a secondary or supporting factor to the primary goal of protecting American influence in the area. To place peace on an equal, let alone a superior, standing with the protection of U.S. security is to invite trouble. The pursuit of peace for its own sake may conflict with other American interests and be allowed to supersede them if peace has been established as the "fundamental goal" of policy. After all, in

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some circles it is thought that peace is best achieved by an American withdrawal, and that stability is enhanced by the elimination of capitalist business interests. Appeasement may also be seen as the least-cost method of achieving peace. These dangers are increased when the peace process involves the United Nations, an organization that the U.S. does not control.

The administration has also flirted with the dangerous idea of an international peacekeeping patrol for the Gulf. Undersecretary Armacost raised this point with the Senate Foreign Relations Committee:

> Should the situation in the Gulf later demand a broad protective regime to keep the sealanes open, we would expect broad participation and we would do our part. . . . Our preference would be for a Western protective regime, since an international regime would provide an opportunity for the USSR to try to legitimize a long-term military presence in the Gulf.

Even excluding the Soviets and limiting participation to Western states still leaves too broad a "protective regime." A multilateral naval patrol would dilute the effectiveness of the convoy operation as an expression of American power and influence. The U.S. has encouraged its allies to defend their own merchant shipping in the Gulf and to cooperate in tasks such as mine clearing. But we should be very wary of moving beyond such informal arrangements. The only acceptable basis for allied naval cooperation is the existing alliance system. A NATO task force, for example, could be a useful expression of alliance unity. However, any formal regime outside the alliance structure would be at best ambiguous and at worst a sign of alliance failure (which would also be seen as a failure of American leadership).

It would also pose the risk of degenerating into another Beirut-style "peace-keeping" fiasco. American forces (and lives) should only be committed to combat zones where there are definite national interests to protect or advantages to be gained. To paraphrase Bismarck's remark about the Balkans, the role of a disinterested peacekeeper in the Middle East is not worth the bones of a single American Marine. No administration should make that kind of blunder twice.

The Misuse of "Freedom of Navigation"

THE SECOND line is even more disturbing. It is grounded not only in faulty political tactics, but in a fundamental error in strategic thinking. The line is, to use Assistant Secretary Murphy's words, "the importance we attach to the freedom of navigation in international waters." Though most of the official statements that have cited the freedom of navigation argument have placed it in the context of defending oil shipments vital to Western economies, some have elevated this concern to a higher principle. Foremost among them has been President Reagan himself who in a May 29, 1987 statement to the press said that:

> Freedom of navigation is not an empty cliche of international law. It is essential to the health and safety of America and the strength of the alliance.

But is this true? Especially when the President applies it as a general principle, pledging that "The Persian Gulf will remain open to navigation by the nations of the world." Or when Undersecretary Armacost states that freedom of navigation in the Gulf is a "very important interest . . . in line with our worldwide policy of keeping sealanes open." I think not, for while the U.S. clearly has a vital interest in protecting ships that sail under the American flag and that transport cargoes deemed essential to the economy of the United States and its allies, it does not have a vital interest in any general principle of freedom of navigation that might conflict with its own strategic needs to exercise its strength as the world's leading naval power.

This is not a new debate. In the early days of the Republic, the U.S. had a small navy and a large merchant fleet. Free of great power entanglements, it was in a position to profit enormously from "neutral" commerce

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in time of war. Thus the country took the lead in promoting freedom of the seas and the maritime rights of neutrals like itself. However, at the end of the 19th century this view began to change. The creation of a battlefleet and the acquisition of the Philippines started the U.S. on its way to becoming a major naval power capable of exercising command of the seas offensively, as well as defensively, in its own interests.

At the first Hague Conference (1899) the nation's premier strategist, Alfred Thayer Mahan, served as the naval member of the U.S. delegation. He opposed vigorously the State Department's plan to introduce a proposal to increase the rights of neutral merchant ships. Five years earlier in his essay "Possibilities of an Anglo-American Reunion" Mahan had broken with the traditional American position on freedom of the seas, urging that we learn from England who "not only protected her own commerce, but also annihilated that of the enemy; and both conditions—not one alone—were essential to her triumph."[1] Neutral rights were "the dream of weaker sea belligerents in all ages," but the U.S. was no longer to be in that category. He reiterated his position in his book *Seapower in its Relationship to the War of 1812*, where he devoted much of the opening chapter to a defense of British maritime strategy. Though unsuccessful in convincing the civilian members of the American delegation in 1899, he continued to lobby for a change in American policy. In 1904, with plans moving ahead for a Second Hague Conference, Mahan wrote a series of letters to Theodore Roosevelt that by 1907 had convinced the president and Secretary of State John Hay not to make the promotion of neutral rights an issue at the conference. He was supported in his argument by most high ranking naval officers including Admiral Charles Sperry, former president of the Naval War College and future commander of the "Great White Fleet." Mahan also had allies within the State Department: Assistant Secretary Alvey Adee and Solicitor James Brown Scott (who had served on the staff at the 1899 conference). Roosevelt also honored the request from Mahan (who was still on active duty) to take his case to the public in a series of articles. And when it came time to appoint a delegation to The Hague, Roosevelt picked Admiral Sperry to represent the Navy.[2]

THE POSITION a nation takes in regard to such issues must be built on strategic considerations. Today the United States ranks eighth in number of private flagged merchant fleets and sixth in deadweight tonnage. But even these modest rankings overstate the U.S. position, because they translate into only 3 percent of total world merchant tonnage. In contrast, 40 percent of merchant tonnage sails under the "flags of convenience" of three minor countries: Liberia (18 percent), Panama (13 percent), and Greece (9 percent). None of these countries has the means to defend "its" vast shipping on the trade routes of the world. The third largest merchant fleet flies the flag of Japan (10 percent), a nation with a substantial naval escort capability but which is inhibited from using it at any distance from its home islands. Thus even though Japan imports 60 percent of its oil from the Persian Gulf and its tankers have been attacked, it has not provided protection to its shipping.

That the U.S. is in a position to provide protection, when so much of the world's merchant fleet cannot protect itself, is an incentive for ship owners to cooperate with the U.S. in time of danger. The U.S. should not act as a policeman that defends all international shipping against all threats as a free service. Instead, it should trade that service

[1]Reprinted in *The Interest of America in Seapower: Present and Future* (Boston: Little, Brown and Co., 1897), see also *Some Neglected Aspects of War* (Boston: Little, Brown and Co., 1908) for Mahan's later articles on freedom of the seas.

[2]See William E. Livezey, *Mahan on Sea Power* (Norman, OK: University of Oklahoma Press, 1981) for a full treatment of this debate.

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for political compensation, as in fact it is doing in the Gulf today.

The Navy is not acting as a policeman in the Gulf. If the U.S. commitment were truly to freedom of navigation for neutral shipping, then the Navy would be tasked to protect all such shipping against attack, from either Iran or Iraq. However, the Navy was initially given a more specific mission. It was to protect only those ships that placed themselves under the American flag enroute to and from Kuwait, an ally of Iraq. The Navy was not ordered to defend ships sailing independent of the convoys, even when the ships were American owned (but not flagged). Following the April 18, 1988 battles between U.S. and Iranian naval forces, the President amended the rules of engagement to allow the Navy to aid neutral merchant ships sailing independently if they were under attack by Iran. However, this commitment was still a limited one based, as one official put it, on "a random, target-of-opportunity approach designed to throw the Iranians off guard."

Though the U.S. has not only threatened but has actually carried out reprisals against Iran for attacks on shipping, there have been no threats made against Iraq for its attacks on neutral ships. That this tilt against Iran was intended from the start explains why the Iraqi attack on the frigate *Stark* was immediately identified as an accident. Thus, public statements to the contrary, the U.S. is not acting to defend lofty principles of international law. It is defending only specific ships against attacks from a specific adversary, with both friend and foe defined in politico-strategic terms. And this is how it should be.

A COUNTER-ARGUMENT that appears strong at first glance is that since the American economy is becoming more dependent on international trade, and that trade depends primarily on non-U.S. shipping, it would be in the national interest to maintain freedom of navigation for all merchant ships. Unlike Japan, which decided thirty years ago to build its own fleet to carry its growing foreign trade, the U.S. has depended on non-American shipping to carry 96 percent of its trade. Yet this statistic misses the point. What is the nature of the threat to be defended against?

A war against commerce by small states is unlikely to disrupt trade on a scale large enough to pose a threat to the American economy. The *guerre de course* has always appealed to weak powers, but their very weakness has rendered this strategy of naval guerrilla warfare ineffective. Even in the confined waters of the Persian Gulf against unarmed and unescorted tankers, Iran has been unable to attack more than 2 percent of shipping. Iranian operations fit well the description Mahan gave of the typical commerce destroyer of the Anglo-Dutch Wars of three centuries ago: It "can only dash out hurriedly, a short distance from home, and its blows, though painful, cannot be fatal."

Though a stronger effort could be made by a power with a larger arsenal of anti-ship weapons, including missile-armed fast attack boats, frigates, and aircraft, such a force could still be defeated by a first-class modern navy like that of the U.S. (or the Soviet Union, Great Britain, or France). The U.S. has generally confined itself to defending convoys which Iran has been reluctant to attack. But were the U.S. to undertake offensive action to clear the Gulf it could readily sweep the waters of any hostile warcraft and close the bases from which they operate. Even the use of mines and submarines will not aid the weak power much. Such weapons can only maintain the anonymity of the user if they are employed on a very small scale, too small to be decisive. Large scale use would inevitably reveal the identity of the raider-state and subject it to retaliation.

England, in its prime, was far more dependent on shipping than is the U.S. today. It was also faced with stronger potential opposition at sea from a variety of powers. However, it still refused to recognize the right of free navigation by neutrals dealing with the enemy. It could do so as long as it

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was confident that it could win, in the long-run, any confrontation with rival naval powers and then exercise a command of the seas that would protect its trade. The Royal Navy would then be free to deny the use of the oceans to its enemies.

Sea Power and Limited Conflict

THERE IS only one navy that could threaten the U.S. with a loss of sea control, and that is the fleet possessed by the Soviet Union. However, should a clash occur between the superpowers, no one can expect that international law would seriously interfere with the operations of the combatants any more than the law restrained Germany's use of U-boats in the two world wars. The USSR has built a large undersea armada that will undoubtedly be used in an attempt to isolate Western Europe from American reinforcement and critical supplies. The U.S. also has had experience in sweeping enemy commerce from the seas during the Pacific campaign in World War II. The stakes in such a conflict are too high to act in any other manner. This logic was well stated by British Admiral Lord Fisher at the First Hague Conference:

> When I leave the Hague, I go to take command of the Mediterranean Fleet. Suppose that war breaks out and I am expecting to fight a new Trafalgar on the morrow. Some neutral colliers try to steam past me into the enemy's waters. If the enemy gets their coal into their bunkers, it may make all the difference in the coming fight. I tell you that nothing that you, or any power on earth, can say will stop me from sending them to the bottom, if I can in no other way keep their coal out of the enemy's hands; for to-morrow I am to fight the battle that will save or wreck the Empire. If I win, I shall be far too big a man to be affected by protests about neutral colliers; if I lose, I shall go down with my ship into the deep and then protests will affect me still less.[3]

When discussing American strategy it must be kept in mind that it should have an offensive as well as a defensive dimension. Victory depends on being successful in both respects. This is well reflected in the new "maritime strategy" developed by the Navy during the tenure of Secretary of the Navy John F. Lehman, a strategy that emphasizes offensive operations against the Soviet fleet should a war break out between the superpowers. The offensive use of the Navy in limited war has not received the same attention, though it should.

This is not the place, however, to go into any lengthy discussion of what has been wrong with various descriptions of limited war, or the heated debates over what ought to be "limited" in such conflicts, or why limits chosen by American policymakers have so often destroyed effective military operations. Instead, a definition of limited war based on the works of the renowned British naval historian, Sir Julian Corbett, will simply be introduced and used; for despite all that has been written about limited war over the last thirty years, the concept is not new—nor does it seem to have been improved by recent efforts.[4]

Corbett, writing in 1918, drew

> . . . the important distinction between wars with a limited object and wars whose object was unlimited. In the one case we saw the object was merely to gain some particular advantage from the enemy; in the other it is a life and death struggle in which each side tries to crush the other into impotence.

His historical model was the Seven Year's War which, from the British perspective, had a limited object—the domination of North America—rather than the unlimited object of the destruction of France itself. However, within the chosen theater of oper-

[3]For more candid comments on the logic of war see my article "Admiral Fisher, Captain Mahan and Arms Control at The Hague, 1899" *Naval War College Review* (January-February 1986).

[4]*England in the Seven Years War* (London: Longmann, 1907), see also *Some Principles of Maritime Strategy* (London: Longmann, 1918).

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ations, all the military arts were to be employed, particularly seapower, which played the vital role of isolating the colonial theater from reinforcement and support from Europe while allowing England to deploy a superior force and to strike at will. Today's limited wars involve sovereign states and allies of the major powers rather than colonial possessions. But this is far more a political than a military distinction, because the majority of minor powers and all Third World states are no more self-sufficient in war-making capacity than were the old colonies. Indeed, thanks to the increased sophistication of weaponry, most are less independent in a military sense than were the outposts of the old empires.[5] Isolating the theater of war therefore remains a potent element of strategy.

"The only value that the sea has in international relations is as a means of communication between states or parts of states," argued Corbett. Thus

> every problem of naval strategy resolves itself ultimately into a question of attacking or defending maritime communications. It is necessarily so, because command of the sea means nothing but the control of sea communications. . . . When we say that the primary object of our battle fleets must always be the destruction of the enemy, what we really mean is that the primary function of our battle fleets is to seize and prevent the enemy from seizing the main lines of communications.

Mahan had said much the same thing earlier, asking "For what purposes, primarily, do navies exist? Surely not merely to fight one another—to gain what Jomini calls 'the sterile glory' to win. . . ." No, he concludes, it is to gain command of the sealanes. Once the enemy's power is broken at sea, that command is exercised against his commerce. "Blows at commerce are blows at the communications of the state; they intercept his nourishment, they starve its life, they cut the roots of its power, the sinews of war." Mahan asks what the point is of "spending blood and money in fighting, or money in the vain effort of maintaining a fleet which, having nothing to fight, also keeps its hands off such an obvious means of crippling the opponent?"

Both Iran and Iraq know this, which is why both have participated in the "tanker war." As the Iran-Iraq War settled into a contest of attrition, Iraq realized that if Iran was able to equip fully the army it could raise from a population base three times that of Iraq, it could eventually grind out a victory. Iran is dependent on oil revenues to finance the purchase of weapons and spare parts, so it was quite logical for Iraq to strike at Iran's oil terminals and tanker traffic—and for Iran to retaliate in kind. However, Iraqi oil exports no longer flow through the Gulf; they flow through pipelines in Turkey and Saudi Arabia out of Iran's reach. So Iran has targeted the other major source of Iraqi war finance, the subsidies it receives from the Gulf Arab states. Kuwait is the most vulnerable of these states and, in addition, Kuwait allows goods destined for Iraq to be unloaded at a Kuwaiti port. Kuwait's status as a neutral has been compromised. Iran's anti-shipping strategy is not "mad" or "criminal" and it would be counter-productive in the long-run to whip up a crusade against Iran on such grounds. Iran's strategy is understandable; it is just not in the U.S. interest that it be allowed to succeed.

The Tonkin Experience

"NAVAL WARFARE is almost inconceivable" thought Corbett if a victorious fleet were not allowed to use its power to destroy the commerce of its enemies. So obvious was this that Corbett observed, "no one has any experience of such a truncated method of war on which profitable study can be based." But then Corbett did not live to see Vietnam.

The U.S. Navy did not have to fight any decisive fleet actions to win its command of

[5]For useful statistics on arms transfers see Stephanie G. Neuman, *Military Assistance in Recent Wars: The Dominance of the Superpowers* (New York: Basic Books, 1986).

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the seas around Southeast Asia. Its supremacy in the Tonkin Gulf was a given. Yet, the Navy was not permitted to blockade North Vietnam (either actively by intercepting ships or passively by mining harbors), nor were air attacks permitted against merchant ships in Haiphong or other harbors even while they were off-loading war materiel. All ships, even those of the Soviet bloc, were considered innocent neutrals and thus inviolate. So rigid was this limitation that even on those occasions when merchant ships added their own anti-aircraft fire to that of North Vietnamese batteries, no counter-attacks were allowed. This is arguably the greatest single mistake in strategy committed by the U.S. in that war, for it prevented the use of the most effective means available for isolating the theater of war.

As early as 1964, the Joint Chiefs of Staff under General Maxwell Taylor, along with General William Westmoreland and CINCPAC Admiral U.S. Grant Sharp, recommended that closing North Vietnam's harbors by mines should be among the first actions in any campaign against Hanoi. Instead, it was one of the last actions taken—eight years later. During 1965–66, the "Rolling Thunder" bombing campaign flew 203,000 sorties, dropped 161,000 tons of ordnance, spent $1.7 billion in direct operational costs, and suffered the loss of 489 aircraft in a vain effort to cripple Hanoi's ability to support its war against South Vietnam. Meanwhile the most obvious and simple method of disrupting the North's war effort was not only neglected, it was prohibited.[6]

In July 1966 "Rolling Thunder" concentrated on the North's petroleum, oil, and lubricant (POL) supplies. 70 percent of storage capacity was destroyed, but as the DIA reported at the end of the month:

> . . . while we had destroyed a major portion of North Vietnam's storage capacity, she retained enough dispersed capacity *supplemented by imports* . . . to meet her ongoing requirements. The greater invulnerability of dispersed POL meant an ever-mounting U.S. cost in munitions, fuel, aircraft losses and men. By August we were reaching the point at which these costs were prohibitive. (Emphasis added)

Of course, North Vietnam did not produce any of its own POL supplies. Like the other war industries that supported Hanoi's ambitions, POL production all took place outside North Vietnam. All supplies had to be imported, and throughout the war the tankers continued to arrive untouched, sailing right under the guns of the Seventh Fleet. The most powerful navy in the world was prohibited from exercising its power in its most fundamental role. As Corbett had predicted, a fleet that is unable to disrupt commerce at sea is forced to "such barbarous expedients as the bombardment of seaport towns and destructive raids upon the hostile coast." Thus supplies that Washington could not bring itself to order intercepted when in their most vulnerable state—aboard merchant ships in open water—had to be attacked in the face of the most concentrated anti-aircraft defense system in existence, or after they had been dispersed under jungle cover. Or, worst of all, deployed on the battlefield.

The failure of the bombing campaign convinced Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara and then, after the 1968 Tet offensive, President Johnson to de-escalate and work for a negotiated settlement. Thus the blunder of trying to cut North Vietnam's harbors off from the interior rather than cutting them off from the sea led to strategic as well as operational failure. Ineffective interdiction seemed not only to discredit airpower, but the entire war effort.

However, when mining Haiphong and

[6]See U.S.G. Sharp, *Strategy for Defeat* (San Raphael: Presidio Press, 1978); Guenter Lewy, *America in Vietnam* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1978); Wallace J. Thies, *When Governments Collide* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1980); and Peter B. Merseky and Norman Polmar, *The Naval War in Vietnam* (Annapolis: Naval and Aviation Press, 1981).

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other ports was briefly permitted (May-October 1972), no ships entered any of the North's harbors and, despite years of contingency planning by the communists, it proved impossible fully to supply Hanoi by other means. Vice Admiral William P. Mack, then commander of the Seventh Fleet, was to write later "What happened was that all traffic into Vietnam, except across the Chinese border, stopped. Within ten days there was not a missile or shell being fired at us from the beach. The North Vietnamese ran out of ammunition, just as we always said they would."

Not that seapower can win even a limited war by itself. The closing of Hanoi's ports in 1972 was complemented by the use of new "smart bombs" that allowed effective air strikes against the overland supply routes from China. And communist forces still had to be defeated in the field, just as Wolfe had to defeat Montcalm outside Quebec to seal the fate of Canada. The role of sea power is to tip the balance of forces that can be deployed in the theater of war. In theaters located far from the centers of industrial and military strength possessed by the major powers, seapower can be the decisive factor if properly applied. Central America, Africa, and the Pacific are regions that fit this description.

THE U.S. NAVY is a unique strategic asset, second only to the nuclear deterrent as a factor conferring superpower status. And unlike nuclear weapons, which act as a passive restraint and are seen only as weapons of last resort, naval forces are an active element of power projection and are the first called upon in a crisis. Conventional warfare capabilities will increase in importance as nuclear weapons are de-emphasized in the wake of U.S.-Soviet disarmament agreements. American leaders must not only be free, they must feel free to use the Navy to its full effect in limited and regional conflicts. They must understand that the traditional function of a strong fleet is to win and exercise control of the sea. Such control allows the free use of the sea only to itself and friendly nations while denying its use to adversaries. There cannot be any universal "right" to free navigation in a world still torn by war. Thus even in minor operations like the Persian Gulf convoys, care must be taken that naval planning and public statements are based firmly on national interest criteria. For if the wrong precedence are established, or faulty patterns of strategic thinking become ingrained during small-scale actions, they may carry over to cripple large-scale operations with disastrous results.

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The Bird in Moscow's Cage:
Eastern Europe and Perestroik

Janusz Bugajski

WHEN THE exiled Polish philosopher Leszek Kolakowski was asked how he envisaged "democratic communism" he compared the concept to "boiling ice." His sardonic observation may be particularly pertinent to the dilemmas now facing Eastern Europe. The Warsaw Pact states require strong doses of long overdue de-Leninization to cure their acute domestic maladies. Any sustained economic recovery will require major political surgery which could imperil the traditional Leninist principles of central planning and one-party rule. Each communist regime stands poised between the devil of political reform and the deep blue sea of economic regression. A continuing party monopoly over public life, irrespective of the piecemeal restructuring we are now witnessing, will simply aggravate long-term decline and push these countries that much nearer the precipice.

East European leaders are fearful of introducing far-reaching changes that could undermine "democratic centralism" and destabilize the party's "leading role." They are also conscious of previous attempts at structural reform which spurred popular demands for genuine democracy and ended in massive repression—in Hungary (1956), Czechoslovakia (1968) and Poland (1981). Ironically, the question now is: How will Soviet experiments with *perestroika* (economic restructuring) affect the diverse pressures among Moscow's satellites for and against major domestic reform, and how will the governing parties cope with the pressing need for economic resuscitation? The problem can be examined along three distinct dimensions: the aims and effects of Mikhail Gorbachev's policies; the condition and viability of each Soviet bloc economy; and Western prospects for influencing or promoting economic and political change.

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Gorbachev's Priorities

THE KREMLIN'S imperial priorities in Eastern Europe revolve around three key issues: the maintenance of overall Soviet control; the assurance of political stability through communist party rule; and smooth leadership transitions where aging leaders are nearing the end of their tenure. In addition, like all Soviet leaders since Stalin, Gorbachev seeks to bolster the position of loyal cadres most in tune with his policy requirements.

Superimposed on these cardinal concerns is a steady attempt to stimulate economic

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growth and ensure tighter CMEA (COMECON) integration to bolster the Soviet economy. The Kremlin chief has visited each European satrapy during the past two years to appraise local conditions, explain his objectives, and elicit support for his programs. But with a panoply of internal and international concerns, Gorbachev must avoid destabilizing any regime through unrealistic demands and hasty pressures. He is therefore seeking guarantees that local reforms will be closely supervised and not mushroom into menacing social upheavals.

With the exception of Romania, whose discords with the Kremlin date back to the early 1960s, tensions between Moscow and its satellites may not be as profound as some observers have speculated. The more significant strains are internal—between a self-perpetuating *nomenklatura* and a disenfranchised populace. For his part, Gorbachev is clearly more impressed by economic results than by reformist rhetoric, and more reassured by political stability than by foolhardy experimentation. Despite all the rumblings about deep rifts between Moscow and Prague, for example, the Soviets presided over a smooth leadership transition in Czechoslovakia last December when one "dogmatist" (Gustav Husak) was replaced by an equally unimaginative party hack (Milos Jakes).

In an even more striking example of Soviet priorities, Gorbachev and Foreign Minister Eduard Shevardnadze have bestowed fulsome praise on East Germany's economic performance. They have described it as an "inspiration" for the USSR, even though *glasnost* and *perestroika* have been conspicuous by their absence in the GDR. A touch of envy may also be evident in Soviet comparisons between traditional German industriousness and notorious Russian lethargy. During a visit in April 1986 to East Berlin's Institute for Socialist Economic Management, Gorbachev quipped to the assembled party faithful: "Do you know how we translate the DDR [the German acronym for the GDR] in Russian? *Davay, Davay, Rabotat!* [Come on, come on, let's work]."

On the flip side of the ruble, the Bulgarian leadership, hitherto immaculately slavish in its relations with Moscow, has been cautioned by Big Brother for tampering too much with existing bureaucratic arrangements in the spirit of *perestroika*. Instead of unveiling a far-reaching package of reform at the Bulgarian Party conference in January of this year, First Secretary Todor Zhivkov backtracked on previous promises in the light of his "fraternal consultations" in Moscow.

There appears to be no straightforward "conservative-liberal" divide in the bloc. In many respects Gorbachev himself is somewhat of a closet conservative, especially when it comes to sensitive political matters. The Soviet leader has increasingly adopted a circumspect "centrist" position toward liberalization, steering cautiously between the more impatient reformers such as the recently ousted Moscow party chief Boris Yeltsin, and the more obdurate anti-reformers in the Politburo, represented by the likes of Yegor Ligachev. Moreover, Gorbachev has to take full account of the powerful party apparatus from whence he emerged and must beware of suddenly slipping out of history if he falters. Gorbachev is as concerned to reign-in renegade reformers in Eastern Europe as to loosen up rigid ideologues. Conversely, though Soviet bloc heads generally bend with the prevailing Eastern wind, they remain hesitant about domestic restructuring or tighter COMECON integration. They are also wary of sudden reversals in Kremlin policy and, mindful of the Khrushchev debacle, fear overstepping any receding reformist bounds.

East Europe's leaders are striving for a "streamlined communism" in which the least troublesome aspects of "market socialism" are presided over by a leaner economic bureaucracy. But the prospects for success appear slim even for such modest measures. The ossified economies are seriously handicapped by gross inefficiency, technological backwardness, and feeble competitiveness on the world market. Though the Kremlin is eager for a "technological revolution" to transform the "socialist camp" into a global economic

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contender, there are numerous historical precedents to justify extreme suspicion about current reformist proposals. Even aside from the violent liquidation of the Hungarian Revolution, the Prague Spring, and Poland's Solidarity, it would be imprudent to ignore the disappointments of "de-Stalinization" in the 1950s, the blighted hopes of Hungary's "New Economic Mechanism" since the 1960s, and the failures of Aedward Gierek's Polish "technocratization" in the 1970s.

In his recent thought provoking assessment of post-war communist economies, professor Jan Prybyla discusses how all economic changes enacted thus far have been "intra-systemic adjustments" rather than "inter-systemic reforms."[1] These alterations are designed to make the political status quo function more efficiently rather than to replace existing institutional arrangements with marketization and privatization—the basic ingredients of comprehensive reform. As Radio Free Europe analyst Vladimir Sobell puts it, *perestroika* "should be understood not as a quick move to a new Western-like system but as a process of removing piece by piece the most glaring irrationalities rooted in central planning."

The irony in all this is all too apparent, even though Leninist economists avoid spelling it out. Contrary to Marxist evolutionary prescriptions, for progress to occur throughout the communist world, the order of "historical stages" will have to be reversed: rather than socialism inevitably replacing capitalism, capitalism will have to replace what passes for socialism.

The Reformist Balance Sheet

TO PINPOINT the gravity of East Europe's crisis, it is useful to examine briefly the balance sheet of economic performance and reform in the six captive nations. It would be premature to conclude that any East European state is on the verge of catastrophe, or to posit a scenario of imminent crisis. Much depends on how the severity of domestic decline is measured, whether by economic performance, living standards, the degree of repression, or the breadth and frequency of public protest. There is no deterministic relationship between economic crisis and political instability, or between economic stagnation and the pursuit of reform. For instance, while the GDR is considered the most stable and productive state, anti-government protests have flared up there recently. Meanwhile, though Czechoslovakia has experienced mounting economic difficulties through this decade, the transfer of power last December was far from being reformist, and public protests have only recently materialized.

Despite repeated claims of "normalization," Poland remains the most volatile Soviet dominion. Its economy is in a dire predicament with a foreign debt approaching $39 billion, sagging industrial output, poor investment potential, galloping inflation, and rapidly declining living standards. According to figures released recently by Poland's Main Statistical Office, the 2 percent growth in Domestic Net Material Product for 1987 was one third below planned targets and half of the per capita growth registered in 1986. Meanwhile, living standards have fallen below the 1979 level, and inflation now exceeds 50 percent. Warsaw's economic reformers may feel emboldened by Gorbachev but are hamstrung by severe systemic obstruction. The recently announced "second stage" of economic reform differs little from the unimpressive "first stage." It is unlikely to

[1] Jan Prybyla, *Market and Plan Under Socialism: The Bird in the Cage* (Stanford University: Hoover Institution Press, 1987). The sub-title of Prybyla's book is taken from a quotation by a leading Chinese communist economist, whose remarks in the context of Moscow's and Beijing's *perestroika* should be seriously pondered: "Stimulating the economy is to be done within the framework of the state plan. The relationship between the two is like a bird in a cage. A bird should be allowed to fly, but within the framework of the cage. Otherwise it will fly away."

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spur workers' motivation, higher productivity, or public trust in a discredited regime. Indeed, some dissident leaders have characterized the process as a "tragi-farce," in which the government pretends to reform and the population pretends to work.

Although the most visible repressions in Poland have been eased since the lifting of martial law in 1983, the interlocking administrative and police controls preclude any organized counterweight to single-party rule, and exclude all autonomous bodies from decision-making. Gorbachev underscored the point during his appearance at Warsaw's Tenth Party Congress in July 1986. No more Solidarities would be tolerated as the union-government conflict had represented "a struggle for the very existence of socialism in Poland." General Wojciech Jaruzelski was praised for "leading the way out of turmoil" by imposing martial law. The message from Moscow was clear: future clashes must not be repeated so that, in the words of Solidarity leader Lech Walesa, Russian soldiers do not have to "sleep with their boots on," ready if needed to provide speedy "fraternal assistance."

Poland, like Hungary, entered the *glasnost* era well ahead of the USSR. The "legal" Solidarity period (1980–81) witnessed the public exposure of party corruption, bureaucratic incompetence, economic mismanagement, and grave social ills such as pervasive alcoholism, drug addiction, and poverty. Jaruzelski's regime usurped much of Solidarity's criticisms in its own propaganda campaigns against various political scapegoats. Moscow has precious little to teach Warsaw's slick spokesmen, who have spent the past six years trying to convince the world that they have introduced the very democratic measures that they have systematically asphyxiated. Since 1982 Warsaw has dawdled with democratization and attempted various unsuccessful public confidence tricks, such as "new trade unions," "national referendums," "parliamentary elections," and a version of "socialist pluralism" which recently outlawed the newly recreated independent Polish Socialist Party.

Serious conflict could again erupt in Poland if the people perceive "reform" simply as another excuse for raising prices. Since martial law, price increases have been offset by "wage adjustments," especially for workers in large plants with long traditions of protest. The regime now signals its determination to curb inflationary pay demands while limiting its enormous consumer subsidies. But a stringent adherence to such a strategy, in the absence of material incentives and political liberties, could re-ignite public opposition. Drastic 40 percent price rises on food items in February triggered work stoppages, strike alerts, street demonstrations, and police interventions in several industrial towns. On April 1, the consumer costs of gas, electricity, coal, and heating were doubled, despite the ominous results of a recent official opinion poll. To the government's dismay the survey indicated that well over 60 percent of the population anticipates "serious social conflict" during the coming year.

At the time of writing, the new wave of workers' protests has assumed serious proportions in Poland. The strikes in Nowa Huta, Gdansk, and elsewhere came earlier than most observers, including Solidarity's leaders, had expected. They are symptomatic of the depth of public hostility to an intransigent regime, and serve as warnings that the threshold of popular tolerance has reached a new low. Whether the strikes spread throughout Polish industry, or are provisionally resolved through wage concessions or police repressions, without a durable "social contract" between Jaruzelski and independent labor leaders Poland will continue to stagger from one crisis to the next.

AFTER POLAND, Hungary appears to be the best candidate for internal upheaval. Despite Budapest's longer experience with *perestroika* than other Soviet bloc states, the economy continues to slide downhill. Without extensive market-oriented reforms, prospects look decidedly bleak. Observers have described Budapest's policies in recent years as a retreat from real reform. The "economic miracle" has proved to be a

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mirage, dependent on large infusions of Western capital, public docility, and partial privatization in marginal sectors of the economy. In the long haul this has been insufficient to reinvigorate the planning system.

Budapest's net foreign debt is the highest per capita in the bloc, and expected to exceed $9 billion by next year. Debt reservicing payments could swallow up to 90 percent of the country's export earnings. Gorbachev's policies may reinforce the position of Magyar pragmatists, but the regime seems unable to decide whether to accelerate or retard its reforms. While some officials argue that central planning agencies must limit further their interference and allow enterprises to rely on competitive market forces, powerful anti-reformers contend that the country has already strayed too far along the capitalist road.

As financial reserves dwindle, production declines, living standards fall, and social tensions escalate, Janos Kadar's "social contract," which has promised material security in return for political passivity, could rapidly unravel. Party spokesmen have admitted that if Budapest can no longer deliver its side of the bargain, the acquiescence of the working class could disintegrate. Turmoil is likely if sizeable sections of the work-force refuse to swallow the bitter pill of incessant price hikes, increased income tax, and growing unemployment—predicted to reach 200,000 by the end of the decade, or nearly five percent of the working population. News of factory stoppages in recent months has been suppressed by the media, but Hungarian dissidents believe such protests could herald the start of a worker backlash. According to the prominent Hungarian samizdat publication *Beszelo*, "the popularity of General Secretary Kadar is declining even faster than the value of the forint." In mid-January of this year, thousands of leaflets have been distributed by opposition groups in the working class districts of Budapest. These protest the compliant role of official trade unions and call for the formation of independent workers committees which "must support all spontaneous initiatives, all united efforts among workers to safeguard their interests . . . demand the codification of the right to strike and . . . support strikes wherever justified."

Budapest's "reform package," unveiled in July 1987, amounts to a tentative "stabilization program" in which state subsidies for unprofitable enterprises will be reduced and prices raised on most consumer items. The 1988 price increases will be the largest since 1951; consumption levels and living standards are expected to fall by about 3 percent this year. The party bureaucracy opposes any further restrictions on its economic controls, notwithstanding renewed speculations about the separation of state from party functions. Last September, Prime Minister Karoly Grosz announced that austerity measures will force down living standards severely over the next three years. In May 1988, Grosz succeeded Kadar as General Secretary of the Hungarian Communist Party while maintaining his premiership. The move was clearly designed to rejuvenate the reformist platform and halt the country's economic slide. Grosz is likely to adopt a "centrist" position in which the bureaucracy may be trimmed and the parameters of private enterprise extended, but pressures for political pluralism will continue to be curtailed and controlled by the party elite. "Goulash communism" has clearly lost its flavor, and seems no longer appetizing even to Soviet reformers whose hungry eyes have shifted toward East Berlin.

THE GERMAN Democratic Republic shows little enthusiasm for Gorbachev's reforms, and has underlined the evident success of its own economy. Moscow itself has applauded East Berlin's industrial program, rationalization measures, and by communist standards impressive productivity. But the GDR's economic triumphs should not be exaggerated. They have been aided and abetted by markedly favorable trading relations with the Federal Republic. The GDR benefits from duty-free exports, preferential tax treatment, favorably priced raw materials, and large government-guaranteed loans from Bonn.

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Though the grand total of benefits is difficult to estimate in stark financial terms, East Berlin receives in excess of 2.5 billion deutschmarks per year from public and private sources in West Germany in addition to what it receives in easy trading arrangements involving an annual turnover of 16 billion DM. Moscow intends to keep a steady grip on any future inter-German "rapprochement." Erich Honecker's visit to West Germany last September is part of the Kremlin's "Westpolitik," intended to court capitalist favors, garner material assistance, and market various international "peace initiatives." The GDR's "special status" and reliance on West Germany has enabled the country to cope more effectively than other COMECON states with the burden of state control. But even in the "showcase of communism," extensive modernization through broad market reforms is essential if economic growth is to be sustained. In fact, economic growth for 1988 is forecast to fall below the average rate specified in the current five year plan.

East Berlin claims it has little need either for *perestroika* or *glasnost*. Egon Krenz, considered by some to be a possible successor to Honecker, has reaffirmed the GDR's imperviousness to reformist currents. Contrary to commonplace Western suppositions, youth does not signify reformist zeal among communists. Krenz, who is several years younger than Gorbachev, displays little penchant for political experimentation and has spoken out for more rigid ideological controls over German youth. He displays a keen affinity to Ligachev, Gorbachev's vigorous anti-*glasnost* opponent on the Soviet Politburo, who has compared rock music and Western fashions to a virulent strain of "moral AIDS."

In fact, disenchanted young people stand at the forefront of resistance to Honecker's deadweight dictatorship. Brazen street demonstrations were staged close to the Berlin Wall in January 1988, as a growing number of frustrated youths clamor for any glimmer of *glasnost*. Human rights cells have been formed in over a dozen East German cities, while the regime frantically imprisons, exiles, and isolates a burgeoning oppositionist movement sheltered by an increasingly outspoken Evangelical Church.

The impact of the U.S.-Soviet INF agreement on public opinion in Eastern Europe is difficult to gauge. However, the GDR appears to be the key state in this regard, where widespread opposition to the presence of Soviet nuclear weaponry has helped to fuel the budding independent peace movement. The withdrawal of medium range Soviet missiles is unlikely to diffuse this campaign. On the contrary, it may spur demands for further cuts in the Warsaw Pact arsenal and for the removal of Soviet military divisions from East German territory. The GDR regime has in turn sought to capitalize on the current East-West "nuclear thaw" by floating additional proposals for disarmament and "nuclear free zones" in the hope of further softening West German public opinion and in promoting the decoupling of America from its NATO allies.

CZECHOSLOVAKIA faces its own intractable problems as the twentieth anniversary of the Soviet invasion approaches. Its reluctant "transition to reform" will be announced later this year but will not take effect until the next five year plan (1991–1995). Meanwhile, the economy is steadily deteriorating as production targets are seldom met by socialized industry. Prague's Federal Statistical Office estimated in January that about 31 percent of state enterprises in 1987 had failed to achieve their projected output. Moreover, the growth in domestic gross national product barely reached 2 percent last year, compared to planned targets of over 3.4 percent. As in other communist states, the proposed economic streamlining measures are intended to "strengthen socialism" by eliminating wastage without weakening party control. There is precious little to indicate that the reforms will be either rapid or thorough, or that they will be accompanied by political liberalization. Prague is fearful of introducing any market elements and seeks to maximize the output of the existing command model.

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Recent official references in Prague and Moscow to the reformist "Prague Spring" should not be misconstrued. The idea is not to resuscitate decentralization and pluralism, but to serve warnings about the pitfalls of runaway revisionism. Czechoslovakia's neighbors also continue to disparage the 1968 reformist episode. In an interview with a Spanish reporter last February, GDR Politburo member Hermann Axen defiantly asserted "we do not have this term 'Prague Spring' in our vocabulary. For us, socialism is spring." In mid-December 1987, Husak formally retired from the party leadership though retaining his Politburo post. His replacement Jakes is a hardened apparatchik who oversaw the purge of half a million "deviant" communists from the party in the wake of the Soviet invasion. Jakes has been described by Czech dissidents as a man of "absolutely no intellectual stature who owes everything to the party apparatus." The leadership alteration certainly does not inspire confidence in future reform, but Gorbachev appears more concerned to create a circle of dependent subordinates than to unleash serious reformers.

IN ITS Balkan hinterlands, Moscow confronts muddled enthusiasm in Bulgaria and barely veiled resentment in Romania. Even before the rise of Gorbachev, Sofia introduced its own restructuring program, but this has been likened to a rapidly peddled stationary bicycle. A chaotic scramble for "reorganization" has reshuffled the *nomenklatura* and ruffled the feathers of some complacent bureaucrats without actually tackling the economic malaise. Bulgaria's "second phase" of reform consists of changes in prices and taxation amidst promises of greater autonomy for some enterprises. But formidable problems will remain by way of managerial interference, and chronic shortages of technology, skilled labor, and capital investment. The growth rate for Bulgaria's GNP is steadily decreasing each year; for example, total agricultural production dropped in 1987 by 3.8 percent below the 1986 level.

Bulgarian leader Todor Zhivkov, who claims the longest uninterrupted reign in the Warsaw Pact (32 years), suffers from declining health and could be the next casualty among the communist old guard. Though early retirements are highly uncharacteristic for hardened Leninists who have clawed their way to the party summit, Zhivkov may be edged into an honorific position by one of his Politburo oligarchs. Chudomir Aleksandrov looks a likely contender for the job; he is responsible for the economy and has been styled "Bulgaria's Gorbachev" because he consistently excels in public relations exercises.

Romania remains the most reticent toward Moscow's present course. The regime of Nicolae Ceausescu legitimizes itself by an overtly independent posture vis-à-vis Moscow which partially camouflages its severe domestic repression. Anxious about any reforms that could loosen the party dictatorship, Bucharest instead concentrates on a stringent austerity program to keep the economy afloat. As a result, workers' living standards have plummeted in recent years and each winter signals further cuts in food and power supplies. It is now illegal to switch on more than one lightbulb per Romanian household, and heating is practically nonexistent. Local black humor warns people to keep their windows closed in case someone on the outside catches a cold. The economy continues to deteriorate; in the words of one exiled Romanian commenting on the 1987 plan, "the targets which are usually unrealistic to begin with were not met, even according to official statistics, which are usually falsified anyway to make them look better."

Protests against intolerable conditions erupted in the Carpathian city of Brasov last November when 20,000 workers took to the streets and ransacked the party headquarters in search of meat and other "luxury items." Participants were later left to the tender mercies of the dreaded "Securitat" police force. The possibility of more widespread public protests looms over the horizon; even party officials have cautioned that the "cup of

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privation" may overflow during the next round of belt-tightening.

Moscow is inclined to use economic levers to nudge Romania into a closer Soviet orbit, rather than risk provoking instability through blatant political interference. During his trip to the country in May 1987, Gorbachev castigated Ceausescu for nepotism, ineptitude, and failure to "remove bureaucratic barriers" or provide "wide-ranging and open information." Gorbachev's evident distaste for Ceausescu was on display during the latter's televised welcoming speech for his distinguished guest, when the Soviet leader pointedly ceased applauding his ebuliant host well before the "ecstatic" Romanian crowd. Nonetheless, implicit condemnations and behind the scenes pressures have had no visible effect on Bucharest's policies.

Glasnost is a rare commodity in Romania; instead of broadening the range of discussion in the media, Bucharest extols Ceausescu's unswerving allegiance to "scientific socialism." Ceausescu was again venerated by local communist bards on his 70th birthday in January. The populace was reminded of their "secular god" or "Chosen One" for whose birth (a veritable "secular miracle" in itself) "hungry and naked Romanians have been waiting for ages": an apotheosis which is simultaneously hysterical and tragic. Despite his purportedly divine nature, Ceausescu is experiencing health problems, but has groomed an obvious successor—his son Nicu. Though Bucharest obviously seeks dynastic continuity, a post-Ceausescu power struggle cannot be discounted; nor can the possibility that a new Romanian leader may prove more receptive to Kremlin overtures. Rumors have recently surfaced that Gorbachev may have a specific protege in mind, in the shape of Ion Iliescu, who studied with Gorbachev at the Moscow Institute of Energy in the early 1950s, when Iliescu served as secretary of the Union of Romanian Students in the USSR. Iliescu fell from grace in Romania about a decade ago but has reappeared from oblivion as a possible reformer in the Gorbachev mold.

Western Impact

SOVIET BLOC governments are seeking the obvious advantages of capitalist-type democracies—high productivity, technological modernity, and individual motivation—without incurring the "costs" of political pluralism. They confront a growing contradiction between the necessity for economic development and the regressive constraints of the traditional command system, a conflict in its essence between liberty and coercion. East European contradictions require active and skillful exploitation by the West to ensure that these estranged countries will evolve into democratic and sovereign states. Only a steady evolution in this direction will preclude recurring domestic crises that expose the West to improvised and largely ineffectual short-term responses.

There are sound political and strategic reasons for the West to grasp firmly the opportunities now emerging in the East bloc. Prospective internal reforms in the direction of pluralism, diversification, and greater national autonomy are clearly to the West's advantage, particularly if they help to loosen somewhat the Soviet stranglehold over the region. Without such reforms, domestic crises will deepen as economic conditions degenerate. This in turn will increase the chances of political turmoil and major social conflict, threatening Europe with destabilization and aggravating East-West tensions. Active Western involvement from the outset may not insure maximum influence over internal developments, but diplomatic and economic levers could at least assure some input into reformist programs and government decisions. Western inactivity could prove counter-productive; it would preclude all forms of pressure and persuasion, and send the wrong message of indifference both to the oppressed populations of Eastern Europe and to their communist rulers.

The Western allies could pursue four parallel strategies to help sustain the erosion of Europe's antiquated totalitarian systems: encourage reform, pressure Moscow, support

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independent social activism, and exploit economic leverage. Though past experience has shown that a joint Western approach is difficult to sustain, there is enormous room for improvement. Regular consultations and some complementary division of labor vis-à-vis the East could focus on concrete policy instruments such as export controls, stipulations for trade and credits, the coordination of sanctions, and the application of political levers against specific regimes.

EEC governments, which have a high stake in the performance of Soviet bloc economies, are unlikely to oppose a program which links increased cooperation with market-oriented reforms, political decentralization, and long-term internally generated economic development. Each Western state could use its particular strengths and points of contact with East bloc regimes more effectively to help push forward the reform process.

First, the West should provide economic and political support to reform-minded individuals, factions, and programs within each ruling communist party. Such support should be flexible and its continuation should be conditional on verified results. In addition to essential economic reforms, any meaningful political relaxation in these states must involve the legalization of independent occupational and social organizations, guarantees of judicial impartiality, genuine multi-candidate local and regional elections, industrial self-management, and the participation of freely elected intellectual and worker representatives in shaping domestic policies.

The U.S. policy of "differentiation" between Soviet bloc regimes needs to be maintained, but the criteria on which it is based need to be re-evaluated so that actual performance in both the democratic-reformist and national-independent arena is rewarded more accurately. Steps which institutionalize and protect liberalization in various public spheres have to be distinguished clearly from cosmetic palliatives aimed at gaining Western economic assistance. Regional ties between East and West European nations should be fostered to promote internal reform. An assortment of cross-bloc economic, scientific, cultural, and educational exchanges could be enhanced to help democratic ideas and practices permeate societies which have been deprived of free debate and association for over four decades. The consequences of such East-West contacts on domestic conditions will need to be gauged more meticulously to assure that they involve ordinary citizens and are not merely state-controlled charades.

SECOND, the West should motivate Moscow to reconsider the burdens of maintaining an unwilling and increasingly costly empire. Through pressure, persuasion, and example, the Kremlin should be shown the advantages to be gained from tolerating greater local diversity and national autonomy in the bloc—especially in terms of improved economic performance and enhanced social stability. Conversely, the short and long-term economic and political price of forcefully subduing democratic reforms should be specified well in advance of any potential local unrest. A sounder mix of economic restrictions and political penalties could at least increase the perceived costs of a military intervention or an internal crackdown. Early signals of Western reactions to crisis could prove more influential and effective, because they are more likely to be included in Soviet calculations at that stage than after a crisis spins out of control. A united Western front may not be easy to maintain, but at the very least political signals from Western governments should not be contradictory and conflicting. Long-range planning and more frequent high-level consultations could prevent the worst pitfalls of inconsistency, divergence, and perceived weakness in comparison with Soviet bloc "uniformity."

The glaring contradiction between Soviet internal reforms à la *glasnost*, *perestroika*, and "new thinking," and external repression constitutes potentially valuable political capital for the West. Moscow's self-proclaimed sincerity in allowing democratization and

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self-determination throughout the bloc should be raised on summit agendas, openly tested by international tribunals, and the results widely publicized. After all, Soviet domination over Eastern Europe may be less bloody than in Afghanistan, but it is no less pernicious and condemnable. Inter-governmental pressure and international public opinion, which Gorbachev is so studiously cultivating, should be redirected by Western agencies to influence Kremlin behavior without threatening its strategic security concerns. Any renewed detente must be constructed around substantive progress in Soviet bloc reform, as the West has an important economic and political stake in the region's stability and development.

The extent to which Moscow would allow reforms to proceed in Eastern Europe remains a moot point, particularly if such reforms undermine seriously the political structure and erode the distribution of power. However, the limits of Soviet tolerance may become broader than at any time since the death of Stalin. Gorbachev has realized the urgent need for economic improvement throughout the bloc, and there is even a recognition that some political reform will have to accompany economic restructuring if public incentives are to be stimulated and bureaucratic interference curtailed.

The differences between current East-West relations and the 1970s detente period are also self-evident. Communist leaders appear to understand that the West may provide invaluable economic assistance but is unlikely to mount a comprehensive and continuous rescue operation. Moreover, new technology can only be profitably absorbed in Eastern Europe through appropriate structural reforms in administration, management, and participation. In the final reckoning, there is no certainty at what point the balance of economic and political reform will tip over in any state to provoke direct Soviet intervention. The historical record shows that two prohibitions will not be lifted: a unilateral withdrawal from the Warsaw Pact and a disintegration of the ruling communist parties. However, there is a very wide area between immobility and revolution, one in which Moscow must be encouraged to tolerate change.

THE THIRD tactic for promoting change would involve the enlargement of Western support for dissident and oppositionist movements in Eastern Europe, especially with respect to groups actively defending and promoting social, cultural, religious, and political freedoms. This is, of course, easier in countries with sizeable and well organized opposition campaigns, such as Poland and Czechoslovakia. But more tangible diplomatic, economic, political, and humanitarian aid could be channeled to all states to help bolster various forms of independent social activism—among workers, intellectuals, peasants, students, entrepreneurs, and young people. Such support should be overt where possible and covert where necessary. It must involve the freer flow of information and extending the means of communication, including radio and television broadcasts, published material, personal computers, video recorders, and audio equipment. The "battle of ideas" with Leninism needs to be updated and waged on various fronts. Gorbachev's skillful propaganda drive must not be allowed to disarm Western critics or distract the East European masses from acquiring democratic values and viable, practical alternatives to communist rule.

Material assistance to independent scholars, journalists, authors, and other influence-wielders should be increased. This must also include aid for East European emigrés, particularly those who maintain important contacts with independent social forces in their home countries and are well organized to provide tangible support for their compatriots. Selective economic programs enhancing the growth of autonomous private and cooperative economic ventures in the bloc could also be pursued. The example of the recently reactivated "Agricultural Fund" for Poland's private farmers could be replicated and extended to cover budding entrepreneurs in the manufacturing, retailing, and service industries. Though the

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initial economic impact may be marginal, the political implications of an expanding non-state sector stimulated by grassroots initiative should not be underestimated.

The relevant governments should be pressed to expand their reformist agendas and not renege on promises of liberalization once the limelight has dimmed. Definitions of human rights must be broadened, so that the international spotlight is not simply focused on the most glaring and obvious abuses. Such definitions must incorporate the most fundamental political, cultural, religious, economic, and civil liberties, with the aim of nurturing the emergence of democratic political systems. East European regimes oppose any close scrutiny of their human rights record as it undermines the credibility of their existing political arrangements. The West needs to combine a long-term program for supporting the development of democratic institutions with more intense immediate pressures against specific human rights violations, based on the numerous international accords to which the East European states are signatories.

FOURTH, on the economic front there is no valid reason to suppose that a stringent regulation of economic benefits to Eastern Europe will push the region into a tighter Soviet grip—an argument often employed by fainthearted appeasers. The need for Western technology, credits, and trade is paramount in these states. Gorbachev's integrationist plans for the CMEA do not signify economic isolation from the West. On the contrary, Western resources and know-how will be eagerly sought to modernize economies that Moscow cannot rescue but which act as conduits for capitalist technology to the USSR. COMECON difficulties and needs must therefore be properly measured, engaged, and exploited to gain political benefits.

There is an unfortunate Western propensity to assume that simply exporting capital to Leninist states is synonymous with exporting capitalism. But despite the promises of detente in the 1970s, there has been no correspondence between internal reform and the degree of Western economic assistance. The unrestrained pumping of finances into the Eastern bloc has not liberalized communism or enhanced national independence. Likewise, there are no guarantees that future economic generosity will result in internal liberalization or national autonomy. In fact, such benevolence may have the opposite effect. All too often economic rescues and liberal credits have merely allowed Warsaw Pact governments to postpone rather than introduce durable reforms.

The West's "carrot and stick" approach has lacked precision and consistency in the past. The "stick" has not been sufficiently powerful to inflict lasting pain on these regimes, while too many juicy "carrots" have been devoured without any meaningful reciprocal response. The accumulation of a $70 billion debt to the West, and the staggering waste of resources by Soviet bloc rulers, should have convinced Western policy-makers that economic packages without specific reform objectives have little practical value. Sound business sense is called for by the West and must be encouraged in the East. Each communist regime must be shown that only real economic competitiveness will be rewarded with markets, technology and credits. Such competitiveness can in turn only be achieved by extensive institutionalized and irreversible economic and political liberalization.

A leading Western economist, Jan Zielonka, maintains that "any form of future Western assistance to the East must be linked to certain economic reforms on the part of countries receiving Western help [because] unreconstructed centrally planned economies are unstable, unreliable, and inflexible trading partners." Even in purely economic terms, domestic programs in these states must include tax and labor reforms, decentralization of managerial decision-making, and the strengthening of the private sector.

Indeed, there are indications that, compared to the "reckless Seventies," Western

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creditors and companies are increasingly concerned to link aid and trade with proof of structural reform. This has been the case with the World Bank and IMF in their dealings with Warsaw since the lifting of martial law. New loans should be earmarked for specific investments and productive industries once an East European state has displayed growing creditworthiness. Specific reforms could be matched by specific forms of assistance, while conversely, particular benefits should be denied if conditions agreed to are not met. In addition, Western support could also help cushion each society against the transitory socio-economic dislocations brought about by initial steps toward a mixed economy.

EACH EAST European state ultimately faces a choice between retrenchment and reform. Having reached their own Rubicon, the crossing could be perilous, but a retreat would almost certainly prove fatal. The precise configuration of political and economic pressures may differ in each country, but their longer term problems are strikingly similar. Each nation has undergone decades of stifling central planning, arguably advantageous in the postwar period of rapid industrialization, but clearly incongruent with innovation and modernization on the eve of the third millennium.

Underproductivity and structural shortcomings are accentuated by substantial opposition to radical reform among the party-controlled management. As one East German dissident has contended: "The laws of bureaucratic behavior time and again have taken precedence over economic rationality." Workers on the shop floor also fear rationalization plans that could create widespread unemployment and implant stricter production quotas binding wages to actual output and quality. But the remaining fig leaves of Marxism-Leninism—full employment and a leaky social security umbrella—will have to be discarded as part of any rational drive to reduce wastage, increase efficiency, and spur incentive. Paradoxically, however, the acceleration of economic reform could exacerbate simmering social conflicts if economic differentiation is not assuaged by worthwhile political freedoms.

Democratization is therefore an imperative in Leninist states, but it contains inherent perils for the party elites. Even the most pragmatic communist reformers seek to achieve specific economic goals through small-scale concessions without unleashing wholesale individual and collective liberties. Conditions throughout Eastern Europe increasingly resemble a minefield strewn with flowers; the flowers appear most alluring where the cadres most fear to tread.

Only a gradual and peaceful weakening of the Soviet domination over Eastern Europe will promote long-term stability while concurring with Western strategic and political interests. Although Moscow will not voluntarily grant independence to its dominions or enthusiastically advocate political pluralism, a broad middle ground exists between a barely critical acceptance of communist dictatorships and strident campaigns for a swift dissolution of the Soviet empire. The parameters of this *terra incognita* should be explored and tested in the challenging years ahead.

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THE NATIONAL INTEREST

SPECIAL SUPPLEMENT

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Introduction

Stephen Sestanovich

LIKE MUCH THAT Mikhail Gorbachev has done, Soviet policy in the Third World has set Westerners to arguing. Clearly, some changes are underway, but which ones matter most and what, if anything, do they mean?

No Gorbachev initiative seems likely to have greater repercussions—or to occasion more debate—than the failed Soviet war effort in Afghanistan. Soviet troops, after all, slogged through the military mire for most of a decade, but they brought victory no closer; Soviet diplomats cajoled and threatened Pakistan and other states in the region, but they failed to undermine support for the Afghan resistance. When at last the Soviet leadership concluded that withdrawal was necessary to improve East-West relations, they discovered that the U.S. had toughened its terms for a settlement; meanwhile, the Afghan communists learned from the Soviet media that they never had any hope of "building socialism" and so had no serious claim on Moscow's support.

This unhappy experience has to affect the way others see Soviet policy, as well as the Soviets' own view of their prospects. To some, it may mean that the Soviet Union has become a less potent competitor of the United States. Yet if one turns to Soviet policies elsewhere in the Third World, the Gorbachev record can look very different. For every headline about how the "Afghan Legacy Weighs on Soviet Union," there is another describing, say, "Moscow's New Role as Mideast Power Broker." In the past year, while American policymakers debated the wisdom of inserting ships into the Persian Gulf, the Soviets have—with no comparable military commitment—maneuvered effectively among the Gulf states, which include many governments traditionally hostile to Moscow. The Soviet Union may still be an international whipping boy because of Afghanistan, but in the Persian Gulf it parades as a consensus-builder among members of the UN Security Council. Its views and help are respectfully solicited by the United States and other powers; it may even be creating a base from which to edge the U.S. aside in settling the Iran-Iraq war.

These are two contrasting images of Soviet policy—one suggesting the decay and collapse of Brezhnevism, the other showing the energy and skill of Gorbachev's new team. Which one tells us most about where Soviet Third World strategy is heading over the next several years? To address this question, the Center for Strategic and International Studies—with support from the J. Howard Pew Freedom Trust—recently brought together a group of leading academics, journalists, U.S. government officials (both past and present), foreign diplomats, and others. CSIS is grateful to the editors of *The National Interest* for publishing the results of these deliberations in the essays that follow.

The course of Soviet domestic reform since the death of Leonid Brezhnev shows that the real Kremlin battle is being fought not only between old approaches and new, but also between competing new ones. The same is true in foreign policy: While seeing a major break with the past, George Breslauer

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argues that the Soviets' "new thinking" encompasses quite divergent views on East-West relations, on the importance of ideological goals, and so on. It is hardly surprising, then, that current Soviet policies in the Third World are hard to resolve into a single image. The reform struggle has not yet produced a winner. To prevail, the new schools now contending—which are the subject of Graham Fuller's case for optimism—will have to be politically as well as intellectually persuasive.

More than a continuing factional struggle, of course, keeps the Soviet leaders from deciding which of their external goals are too expensive, too controversial, or too risky. They would presumably prefer to avoid such decisions altogether, just as at home they hope that an invigorated economy will—by enlarging the resource pie—enable them to dodge difficulties and divisive choices. Peter Rodman, in his case for skepticism, believes the ongoing "modernization" of Soviet foreign policy under Gorbachev may have a parallel aim: to avoid trade-offs by enlarging Soviet options, and to extract more—not fewer—benefits from dealings with Third World states.

We cannot know how promising such a goal seems to the Politburo. At a minimum, a region-by-region analysis of Moscow's policies reveals that the Soviets have often been able to escape the choices that the Reagan Administration hoped to thrust upon them. As Ilya Prizel shows, they have been able both to establish diplomatic and commercial relations with the democratizing states of Central America *and* to continue their support for the Sandinista regime and the Salvadoran guerrillas. Although the Soviets' radical clients in Africa are supported by large numbers of Cuban troops, Steven David points out that they are not seen as disruptive regional forces in the way that, for example, Vietnam is by its neighbors. Even in Southeast Asia, Paul Wolfowitz argues that because China and Vietnam are likely to remain hostile for a long time to come, it will not be hard for the Soviets to protect their presence in Vietnam after Hanoi's forces withdraw from Cambodia.

MERELY ELUDING American pressures is not a very high standard of success, and all the analyses that follow also testify to the many obstacles confronting Soviet policy. Whether in trying to expand exports to Brazil and Argentina, in trying to choose between Marcos and Aquino, in trying to help Qaddafi in Chad or Mengistu in Eritrea, the Soviets have displayed weaknesses that will be hard to shake. They have an unproductive and unresponsive economy; they often show little feel for other nations' political processes, least of all democratic ones; they are vulnerable to highly motivated insurgencies. Even in the Persian Gulf, Gorbachev may yet discover that deftness alone will not give him a central diplomatic role. He is more likely to find that some of the governments he has courted want to use him to win the attention of the outside power that they think matters most—the United States.

In the concluding essays of this section, Zbigniew Brzezinski and Charles Krauthammer acknowledge the difficulties that Moscow confronts. Yet both argue that Soviet policy in the Third World calls for an active American response. They agree with Paul Wolfowitz that the Soviets are reconsidering their course because they have encountered resistance—and that they should keep encountering it. This is a simple prescription on its face, but with a large potential payoff: A real Soviet retreat from policies that have so inflamed relations between East and West would be a turning point in postwar history. For all their points of agreement, however, Brzezinski and Krauthammer disagree about the policies that might promote such a pullback. They are at odds about how to define the interests at stake and how to win the public's support for defending them. Not surprisingly, then, new Soviet policies in the Third World will depend in part on the course of an American debate about our own policy and purpose—a debate that these essays can help us conduct.

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The Case for Optimism

Graham E. Fuller

IS THERE A NEW Soviet foreign policy? Hopeful expectations of a "new Soviet Union" have abounded for years but have regularly met with sharp disappointment. There have been several periods in the history of Soviet foreign policy when some kind of major change has seemed to be underway: certainly upon Stalin's death, later under Khrushchev, and perhaps during the early years of detente under Brezhnev. Every time we have watched potentially promising initiatives crash to the ground from the sheer weight of Soviet historic practice and the systemic imperatives of rule by a Marxist-Leninist party.

Despite this discouraging historical record, I still believe that we may now in fact be witnessing an evolution of policy that will prove to be a watershed in Soviet history. If so, it will be the most important event in world affairs since World War II.

What follows is an attempt to sketch the outlines of what the new Soviet foreign policy—especially towards the Third World—may be. I offer it without total conviction that such a new policy is in fact irrevocably in place. Present policies could well be only another transient phenomenon, destined to perish as detente did with the stunning series of Soviet advances in the second half of the 1970s. The "new foreign policy," if it really exists, may only last as long as Gorbachev—and force of circumstance could even compel Gorbachev himself to abandon it. Nevertheless, the signs are that such a policy is evolving—even if it will come in fits and starts in the long process of overall Soviet reform.

It would be foolish and naive to declare that hundreds of years of Russian history no longer have any force of continuity, or that a ruling communist party of seventy years' duration can change its character overnight. But it would be equally foolish to credit Marx and Lenin with the invention of a state eternally immutable in its fundamental characteristics. In short, we should be prepared to welcome those encouraging facets of Gorbachev's declarative policy, but remain equally alert to the prospects and implications of failure.

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Toward a Newer Soviet Man?

THE CASE for a new Soviet foreign policy rests upon three basic foundations. The first of these is the demonstrable need for change, stemming from self-declared domestic and external imperatives. The need for a new approach has been the focus of a great deal of Soviet discussion and analysis over the past two years. The USSR now speaks of reducing international tension because of the danger of war and the costs that such tension imposes upon Soviet society and its economic system; of reducing the costly arms race which the Soviet economy can no longer afford; and of closer ties with

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developed nations whose economic and technical know-how is required by the USSR and which will be denied to it under circumstances of tension, conflict, and ideological rivalry.

If we believe that the Soviet Union is as badly off as many Western analysts have long been saying—an analysis now supported by Gorbachev himself—then it should be possible to accept a great deal of the Soviet rationale as a legitimate response to their own systemic crisis. Indeed, from a Western perspective it might be the *only* rational response for the USSR to adopt.

Objective facts about the present world scene shed considerable light on the Soviets' self-declared concern. The 1980s have not been kind to Moscow. The Soviet gamble to deploy medium range missiles in Europe and Asia backfired. Afghanistan has emerged as an extraordinary watershed. A Soviet withdrawal from Afghanistan, now virtually certain, would undermine seriously the claim that Marxism-Leninism is the wave of the future. Indeed, Moscow has found its whole chain of Marxist-Leninist allies in the Third World under a siege of domestic counter-insurgencies and collapsing economies. Socialism as a developmental model has been discredited. Democratic forces have strengthened around the world during the Eighties. And China has made bold new economic progress precisely by jettisoning cherished socialist concepts and embarking upon reform policies based on a free market economy.

In sum, the Soviet internal situation and Moscow's deteriorating position in the "correlation of forces" abroad provide the key to justifying any new foreign policy departures.

The second indication of change in Soviet foreign policy has to do with the domestic reforms underway in the USSR, reforms which make a new foreign policy possible. Gorbachev is perhaps the first Soviet leader to recognize explicitly that a state built upon lies cannot prosper. Enter *glasnost*. The new policy of openness has presented the world with a spectacle of challenging internal debate, growing intellectual ferment, ever bolder forays into the darker recesses of Soviet history, and a still-retreating horizon of ideological no-nos. The Soviet press is now exciting to read. Such openness is nearly unprecedented in Soviet history.

No, we have not reached the millennium. There is much in Soviet society that is disturbing and fundamentally undemocratic. A command economy has yet to be abandoned. Powerful domestic forces fear the implications of change. Communist parties do not have a tradition of giving up power. But the sea change in the character of debate of these issues is stunning. Just talking to Soviet representatives is a completely different experience from what has ever been before. All of this demands to be taken seriously.

If we were simply witnessing new flexibility and imagination in Soviet foreign policy, while life went on as usual back in the gray confines of the Soviet state, then we would be justified in believing that we are simply confronted with much more capable—and dangerous—tactical Soviet skills abroad. But this time, it is decidedly *not* business as usual back in Moscow. Gorbachev has come to define *perestroika* as a revolution. It is precisely this kind of internal revolution in thought and practice that is the indispensable prerequisite for any serious—and believable—change to occur in Moscow's foreign affairs. Only bold Soviet rethinking about the nature of the internal system can persuade us that there are credible grounds for rethinking the foreign policy agenda as well.

But perhaps the most important sign of long-term change can be found in the shifting course of Soviet policy itself—both as it is declared, and as it is practiced.

Words and Deeds

OVER THE last year or so Gorbachev has delivered a number of important policy statements about the new Soviet vision of foreign policy, starting with a demand that the Soviet Foreign Min-

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istry start telling it like it is, rather than how Moscow might like to think it is, abroad. The restructuring of foreign policy is based first and foremost on what Moscow calls its *novoe myshlenie*, or "new thinking."

Just what is new thinking? In the first place, it is not all that new, except perhaps in the top leadership. This suggests that we are probably witnessing a process of evolution rather than just a spasm of trendiness among the leadership. Elements of the new thinking in the foreign policy arena have in fact been present at lower levels of the regime for many years, particularly in the writings of senior academics in the various prestigious foreign policy institutions in Moscow. (One thinks, for example, of the writings of Yevgeniy Primakov, who now plays a major role in the formulation of Gorbachev's new foreign policy thinking.)

I would tentatively identify eleven characteristics as lying at the heart of "new thinking." Some are explicitly articulated by the Soviets themselves; others are more implicit.

Establishing true superpower status. Russian history has left a profound sense of inferiority towards the West. Today, Soviet statesmen and academics increasingly recognize that while an awesome array of missiles undeniably fix the world's attention, they do not automatically confer full superpower status. It is painful to the leadership of the USSR that it is not taken seriously abroad in most non-military arenas. The USSR therefore has turned its attention to seeking acceptance as a global power in the broadest sense of the term. It recognizes that its own system must become credible to the world at large, rather than a travesty of what a superpower should be: a credible culture with a credible press rather than a propaganda mouthpiece; credible contemporary creative arts; a credible economy; credible science and technology in more than the military arena; a credible standard of living including a system of health, transportation, comestibles, and consumer goods on an acceptable Western level; a respected foreign policy that makes a difference on the world scene; a credible set of allies, and admission to the world of nations on an equal, respected footing.

This is not reform for the sake of any new-found liberal values. Rather, it is reform aimed at extremely practical gain: that economic power, an effective civilian technical sector, and ties with other world states might allow the USSR to exert influence across the world as a fully developed superpower.

Interdependence. A corollary of moving into true superpower status is the recognition that the USSR cannot do so in isolation. Gorbachev has spoken for several years about "interdependence"—a concept that works two ways. On the one hand, the Soviets now speak of the inadmissability of war and international conflict because the world is too complicated, too interdependent. On the other hand, the USSR needs close interaction with other states if it has any hope of attaining its own goals of modernization and reconstruction. Hence Moscow's interest in joining Western economic financial institutions such as IMF and GATT. In short, Moscow must be internationally engaged in the fullest sense if it is to attain its self-established goals.

The need to build a network of viable allies. Soviet spokesmen now repeatedly refer to the disastrous state of the economies of many of its allies and Third World clients. Soviet academics have conceded that the Soviet economy and COMECON are largely incapable of offering a viable alternative to Third World states. By the Soviets' own admission, these states must turn to the West for the economic support to build their economies. Here too, the rebuilding of the Soviet economy itself is an imperative if it ever hopes to lead and sustain any kind of distinct grouping of allies. As Dobrynin stated on April 13, 1988 in *Pravda*: "[These economic problems] have been compounded by negative processes in the development of a whole lot of socialist countries, starting with ours. Socialism's powers of attraction have waned as a result."

The need to overcome anti-Sovietism abroad. This self-declared Soviet goal is highly revealing. It suggests that Moscow is well aware that its historical record of behavior has

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created a legacy of suspicion in the world that must be overcome if the USSR is to function effectively in the world.

Gorbachev recognizes that fear of Soviet militarism has provided a key rationale to Western conservative and military thinkers in maintaining the arms race. As he remarked in a speech on November 4, 1987: "I spoke of two particularly dangerous manifestations of capitalist laws: militarization and the unequal exchange with the developing world. However, these are only possible with the aid of appropriate state policy—and this policy enjoys support; *it enjoys support for as long as the fear of the Soviet military threat persists. . . .* Our restructuring is demolishing the fear of the Soviet military threat and militarism loses its political justification." (Emphasis added)

Moreover, the Kremlin is obviously aware of the ideological aggression implicit in its pronouncements over the decades, particularly its assertion that the West is condemned by the laws of history to collapse in favor of the new Soviet order. Moscow now seeks to erase that perception and has clearly stepped away from analysis which suggests that capitalism is doomed. Just a tactic? Probably not, since it is consistent with other changes in Soviet perceptions of the world. And, if the ultimate world victory of socialism is now postponed indefinitely, is it perhaps being written off forever? Soviet new thinking sometimes laps at the edges of even this thought. Major Soviet pronouncements now explicitly acknowledge that capitalism has been able to develop with the times and stave off indefinitely any prospect of a collapse.

The same ideological restraint can be seen in Moscow's pronouncements elsewhere. Rarely are ideologically guilty parties sought out in analyses of world events. When the Soviets assert that a country's policies are causing tension—as in the case of Israeli policy on the West Bank, for example—their disapproval is rarely couched in ideological or systemic terms. Rather, it is represented simply as Soviet disapprobation of a concrete policy. In short, the USSR now avoids ideological assault against almost any party, in order that Soviet long-range intentions be viewed as fundamentally benign.

Getting away from zero-sum thinking. Soviet spokesmen from Gorbachev on down now repeatedly state that developments in the world to the advantage of one superpower need not automatically redound to the disadvantage of the other. Indeed, both superpowers are seen as sharing many common interests.

What is going on here? On the one hand, the Soviets could be lulling the West into thinking that Soviet gains in the world need not automatically be feared. But the West is not terribly likely to buy this reassurance after so many years of experience with Soviet Third World expansionism. On the other hand, the move away from zero sum thinking can equally well serve another more important purpose: to imply that the advance of world communist revolution is no longer relevant in a non zero-sum world.

Afghanistan poses a particularly vivid example. Does a Soviet withdrawal from there represent a set-back in ideological terms? The Soviets can only argue otherwise by rejecting zero-sum thinking. Once the ideological struggle is renounced, ideological setback is eliminated.

Other important litmus tests for Moscow's new thinking will be countries like Iran, where Moscow has a high priority in establishing special ties. How much will Moscow seek unilateral advantage at the cost of cooperation with other international forces? Then there are countries like Panama, where Soviet and Cuban support for Noriega still seems designed to play to regional dissatisfaction with American intervention.

Down and Out in the Third World

WHILE THE USSR uses the term "national reconciliation" to describe the process of departure from Afghanistan, it is much more accurately described as national capitulation to reality. And if the

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Afghanistan "model" for settlement is applied to Cambodia, Angola, Ethiopia, or Nicaragua (as Najibullah, the head of the Afghan Communist Party, declares) then there is even deeper reason for Moscow to convince itself and its clients that the zero-sum game is over. Of course, "national reconciliation" in Nicaragua may well lead to the monopolization of power by the Sandinistas, so we cannot be too smug about the process. But national reconciliation, if truly implemented, will work directly against the entrenchment of Marxist-Leninist parties everywhere. Here is further ground for Moscow's diminished interest in these protracted struggles.

The fate of any one of these client states cannot be viewed in isolation. Their value as allies must be weighed against the broader opportunity costs they impose upon Moscow. The nature and character of these states has not changed. But Moscow's perception of them from Brezhnev to Gorbachev has changed immensely.

More interestingly, the ability of a communist state to stay in power on its own and to pay its own way seems to be developing as a new criterion for partnership in the socialist bloc, especially with a Soviet Union increasingly reluctant to bear the burden—and the embarrassment—of propping up yet more showcases to failure.

The great danger here, of course, is that a Soviet "peace offensive," if systematically pursued, might corrode U.S. alliances as the perception of Soviet threat diminishes. This is worrisome to the West because such alliances are hard to build and one does not lightly dismantle them. And the West has, indeed, grounds to "fear peace" as long as there is doubt about the nature of Soviet intentions. But this dilemma is inherent in any process of confidence building. In the end, the Soviet concept of "national reconciliation" bears very careful watching as an important indicator of Soviet behavior. The Soviets now speak of applying the successful Afghan formula to Cambodia. Afghanistan seems about to establish a bold and very important precedent that cannot be ignored.

New situations require new, non-ideological approaches. Moscow now repeatedly states that the stereotyped thinking of the past has hindered the USSR in seeing reality and has stifled its own flexibility of action. Foreign policy expert Primakov, for example, has stated that analysis based on factors of class is no longer part of Moscow's thinking. While "class factors exist," they are subordinate to broader national interests. Primakov also maintains that the threat of war from the capitalist states has seriously receded and need not drive Moscow's thinking so profoundly.

Gorbachev himself has stated: "Nobody has any ready recipes . . . we are by no means laying claim to a monopoly of the truth. . . . The arrogance of a belief in one's omniscience is akin to fear of one's inability to master new problems; it bears witness to the tenacious habit of rejecting out of hand other points of view. . . . " In short, the USSR can no longer be prisoner of its own Marxist-Leninist ideology. It doesn't work and it sends the wrong message.

This process of de-ideologization will surely not be smooth. Marxist language will probably be cherished on formal state occasions—even by Gorbachev—as de rigueur for quite some time to come. At the same time it seems increasingly clear that the USSR finds these ideological patterns of thought no longer helpful. And whatever Marxism there is in public pronouncements has been gutted and stood on its head, in order to rationalize some very un-Marxist policies.

Reduction of provocative and radical action on the part of the USSR and its clients. The action of radical Third World states has often been capable of directly stymieing the West. Syria, for example, has been the single most effective state in blocking U.S.-sponsored peace plans in the Middle East over the years, by intimidating Jordan and other moderate Arab states that might like to see the Arab–Israeli conflict wind down. Qaddafi has regularly threatened many moderate African states such as Chad, Sudan, Tunisia, and Morocco, and has worked to intimidate them

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away from a pro-Western posture. Vietnam has effectively maintained its grip on Cambodia and Laos, and periodically has threatened Thailand.

But these threats to Western allies and interests have at the same time worked against Moscow's interests in other senses. Syrian belligerence, for example, has consistently served to strengthen the U.S. military commitment to Israel and increased the U.S. military presence in the Middle East. Libya's rogue actions have led the Sixth Fleet into shows of U.S. power in the Mediterranean, including the bombing raid on Tripoli. Iran can take direct credit for having brought a huge U.S. armada into the Persian Gulf for the first time in history and—what is worse from the Soviet point of view—with the public blessing of the normally non-aligned Gulf Arab states. (Of course Iran was not acting at Soviet behest and in no way can be considered a Soviet client; but the results of radical anti-Western action were still congruent with Soviet regional interests.) And the Afghanistan invasion sparked major reaction in the West.

In effect, radical state action as often as not draws the U.S. into power projection exercises which the USSR cannot match and which are often costly to Soviet interests. The Brezhnev Doctrine can be said to have been the progenitor of the Reagan Doctrine. And Soviet writers now suggest that the Brezhnev Doctrine is dead.

In most areas of the Third World, Moscow's client states seem to have tempered the radicalism of their activities. But there are no guarantees that this will continue, especially as many of them are very independent-minded. Still, Moscow's emphasis on peaceful settlement of issues is sending the message to these states to scale back on radical and adventurous activity. Moscow publicly warned Libya in mid-1986 that it should not provide the excuse for imperialism to strike at it. Syria has also been warned about avoiding provocative actions and the futility of armed solutions. The Sandinistas have moved much further than most observers expected in negotiations with the *contras*. Cuba seems more interested in improving its ties with the U.S. In sum, the Soviets can no longer be seen as the automatic patron of provocative radical activity.

In Africa, none of Moscow's main clients—Ethiopia, Mozambique, and Angola—has been strong enough to export revolution successfully in recent years. Although the long-term Ethiopian-Sudan problem continues to fester, and Angola is still a dedicated front-line state against South Africa, Moscow's clients seem mainly intent upon simply establishing central government control over their own territory.

Last, Moscow is moving more and more firmly toward condemnation of terrorism, even in the fight against Israel and "imperialism." I do not wish to downplay the valuable roles states like Syria and Cuba have played in thwarting U.S. policy goals and damaging U.S. interests over the last two decades. But are the gains for Moscow commensurate with the opportunity costs and the deterioration of its relations with the West in other areas? What has Moscow bought for its money in keeping close ties with a large number of Third World states that are hard put even to maintain their own power, much less to develop and expand? If priorities are to shift to accord more closely with Soviet internal needs, these states will play a less useful role, especially as confrontation and zero-sum thinking are de-emphasized.

The need to reduce the global arms race. Gorbachev has also spoken of the fact that the Third World has become a vast arsenal. Does the USSR wish to continue bearing the costs of arming its allies in what are now often losing wars—especially in the Middle East? (Granted that many of the sales are for valued hard currency.) But Gorbachev has publicly warned President Assad of Syria that there is no military solution to the Arab-Israeli conflict and that Syria already has a sufficiency of weapons. This suggests, at the least, that Moscow does not want the sale of arms—and their use by uncontrollable allies—to be the main vehicle of Soviet policy in the Middle East.

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We still await convincing evidence that Soviet arms support to clients has in fact diminished. It seems unlikely that the USSR will abandon arms sales, which are both one of its key sources of global influence and a valuable source of hard currency. The question is not so much *whether* the USSR will continue to sell to Third World clients but the circumstances and political context of those sales. Will arms be delivered primarily to bolster radical allies against neighbors and to checkmate the influence of other more pro-Western states, or will the "logic of the marketplace" be the primary determinant? This will be a critical litmus test for the new policies.

The need for international solutions to international conflict. In the current Soviet view, the UN and other multilateral organizations can play a greater role in settling conflict and regulating tensions, thus lessening the need for superpower intervention.

Historically, the USSR has not favored international solutions to regional problems because those solutions have usually reflected the Western agenda of striving for regional stability. Indeed, the USSR has historically avoided support for most solutions sponsored by the UN or other regional forums.

Times have changed. The USSR has now paid up its UN arrears of $447 million and claims active interest in using this international body as an instrument for the solution of international conflict. This makes sense in the broader context of Gorbachev's thinking.

The use of an international body can serve three purposes. First, it can help burnish the credentials of the USSR as a legitimate player in the international arena, one that honors its international obligations. This may be even more tempting to Moscow at a time when the U.S. itself is not yet prepared to meet all its UN obligations.

Second, the UN could serve to assist the USSR in disengagement from several of its more uncomfortable areas of commitment. It may well have a role to play in facilitating the Soviet withdrawal from Afghanistan, thus lessening any possible sense of debacle. If the Soviets are serious about extending disengagement in the name of national reconciliation, the UN could again serve as a face-saving instrument in places like Angola, Mozambique, Cambodia, and the more serious Arab-Israeli and Persian Gulf conflicts. Would the USSR actually allow the Central American states to impose limitations on the Marxist-Leninist character of the Sandinista regime? Moscow so far has not sought to limit the pressure these regional states have exerted on Managua.

Third, and possibly most important, the use of an international forum to contain or solve certain conflicts will preempt the United States from the unilateral projection of force abroad. "Made in the USA" solutions will then find less room for application—which is just fine for Moscow. Indeed, reduction of tension generally would reduce the need for U.S. intervention.

Implicit in the Soviets' renewed interest in international solutions to conflict situations is a greater emphasis on diplomacy. Here, the USSR now seems to believe that it can give the U.S. a good run for its money. In effect, the USSR is striving to "out-highroad" us on a number of issues on which the United States seemed intent on "keeping the Soviets out." Witness the Soviet diplomatic approach to the Arab-Israeli problem and the Gulf War. The USSR is in the active process of establishing working relations with all parties to these conflicts, while the United States is still without ties to either Iran or the PLO. The use of the international forum by Moscow of course still suggests elements of competition, if not zero-sum thinking, in its attempts to check U.S. initiatives.

The pursuit of diplomatic solutions on an international level also presupposes working within some degree of international consensus. Moscow may well believe that its new approach of reconciliation can bring them closer than the United States to that consensus.

When the international consensus involves many Third World countries, the U.S. will probably be harder pressed than the USSR to accommodate itself to it. Non-U.S. proposals for the settlement of the Arab-Israeli conflict,

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and the Central American crisis are cases in point. Soviet efforts to moderate and unify the PLO are probably viewed as constructive by most of the world, though not by the U.S. Moscow's policy of rapprochement with Iran in the Gulf War is not close to the Arab consensus of the moment, but is not all that distant from some European attitudes. In short, good diplomacy can be the best suit of the "poor superpower" when power projection, deft management of Third World military confrontations, and international economic leverage exceed its grasp.

The USSR should maintain ties with all countries. The USSR has always been somewhat pragmatic about with whom it will do business, but historically it has felt inclined to draw ideological judgments about most countries of the world. And its own close ties with a number of "progressive states" have often hindered ties with the beleaguered neighbors of those states. It is hard to be friends with a Somalia and an Ethiopia, or an Israel and a Syria, at the same time.

Today the USSR claims that it seeks good relations with all states, regardless of ideology. Evidence of this policy is most notable in the Middle East, where Moscow's lack of ties with Israel has been publicly described as "not normal." Today, ties are slowly improving and regular consultation with Israel is already an established fact. Moscow has additionally been courting the Gulf states. *De facto* ties with Saudi Arabia are now far advanced, with visits of senior foreign ministry officials back and forth to both capitals. The Soviet Union has also been pursuing better ties with non-radical states in Latin America and Southeast Asia.

What's in It for Them—And Us

NEW POLICIES are not implemented simply by a wave of the foreign policy wand. The Soviets face a number of serious dilemmas in putting the new thinking into practice. These challenges will test the seriousness of the Soviet commitment. Can a Soviet ruling party actually adopt a whole new syndrome of policies—domestic and foreign—which seem to strike directly at the core ideological justification for the traditional authority of the ruling party? Perhaps it depends on overall leadership perceptions of how costly the old system was. Many Soviet writers are already beginning to talk of defining a new role for the Communist Party.

The second problem is even more difficult. How can Moscow play a new foreign policy game when its strengths would seem still to lie with the old approach? Isn't Moscow going to be a lot worse off on the international scene if it gives up support for radicalism in favor of a more stable world—a world in which the West operates at its greatest advantage?

Historically, Moscow has largely opposed the status quo in the Third World. Conflict provides revolutionary opportunity—a chance to undermine the political and social stability so valued by the West. Granted, the USSR has rarely been the root cause for change, but it has frequently served as a catalyst through military intervention and support at critical moments. It has regularly identified itself with elements for radical change when the opportunity presented itself. Moscow's policies have of course rarely been simplistic or knee-jerk; they have depended upon a calculation of trade-offs and balances of various Soviet interests at any one time.

Finally, Moscow will continue to face the problem of how to deal with international communist parties and radical movements that have long regarded it as a source of moral, ideological, diplomatic, military, and financial support. Leaders like Fidel Castro and Qaddafi have expressed public concern that the USSR may sell them down the river, in the interests of a peaceful resolution of U.S.-Soviet conflict.

Radical revolution may no longer be the gleam in Moscow's eye, but many Third World revolutionaries still hanker after the old rabble-rousing rhetoric. During their visit to Moscow for the 70th anniversary celebra-

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tions they made their customary attacks on "voracious international imperialism"—even while compelled by Moscow to pay at least lip service to an INF agreement of no interest to them whatsoever. And other radical non-communist states of the world who seek support in some struggle against the U.S. will always be casting around for an ally. Will Moscow always be there? Probably not so automatically anymore. Some old-time communist parties may initiate their own *perestroika*, but Moscow may have to abandon other radical left-wing movements in the Third World. The question will then arise of who, if anyone, will shoulder this "radical internationalist obligation" in Moscow's place.

What, finally, can Moscow gain from a radically revised foreign policy? Can the USSR move towards becoming a status quo power itself? The status quo may become more attractive as the future stability of its own radical Third World client regimes becomes more problematic—under destabilizing internal assault, sometimes with a little help from the Reagan Doctrine.

But Moscow goes further. It now claims that it truly seeks equitable peace, for example, in the Arab-Israeli conflict—historically the American Achilles heel in the Middle East. This goal suggests that perhaps Moscow now genuinely does believe that some kind of peaceful settlement, one in which it has participated, is in fact in the USSR's long-term self-interest. If Moscow comes to believe that it no longer profits most from controlled tension in the Middle East, it might help release the U.S. from one of its own worst policy dilemmas by truly working for a peaceful settlement.

WE SHOULD NOT assume that Moscow's version of a peaceful settlement is the one that would necessarily make George Shultz's day. There are a variety of reasonable approaches to a peaceful settlement that are not America's preferred scenario, but still are far from the radical maximalist positions of Moscow's Syrian or PLO allies. It is here that Moscow may seek to dominate, or lead, a new moderate consensus that is a few steps beyond the U.S. approach on a whole variety of issues—particularly in terms of PLO participation. This consensus would draw upon views favored by moderate Arab allies of the U.S. and perhaps the West Europeans.

The U.S. is accustomed to something of a monopoly on moderate approaches to international issues, simply because there have been no rivals of sufficient stature to propose alternative solutions that are moderate, but less in accord with our own preferences. Europe has occasionally attempted to play this role, but with limited enthusiasm and success. There may be room for leadership of a new alternative moderate consensus—one more closely in keeping with Third World moderate aspirations. Is there a viable part of the world political spectrum still open for Moscow here? I suspect there is, particularly if East-West conflict tends to give way to greater emphasis on North-South issues in the decade ahead.

Gorbachev's foreign policy pronouncements of the last year have highlighted Soviet sympathy for Third World developmental dilemmas without invoking "imperialism" or even attaching any specific blame on the West. This may be part of a new "high road" policy at work before our eyes. Can the USSR seek to provide leadership to a new grouping of states, worried about their debts, multinational corporations, commodity prices, or trade barriers? No solution of these issues is possible without the U.S.—but the challenges to U.S. leadership could grow if supported by a more moderate Soviet Union, no longer perceived as a "wrecker" but as a more sympathetic friend of the Third World.

In short, only a sharply and successfully reforming Soviet Union would seem able to pursue these new foreign policy lines. Anything that falls much short of this—a failed reform effort, a recalcitrant bureaucracy, an inflexible and entrenched party—would suggest a return to the old, unconstructive USSR with which we are so familiar.

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If Moscow is serious, and at least partially successful, in restructuring its policies, that restructuring will be to the overall benefit of the West and the world. But it will not be all good news for the U.S.

Under any circumstances, one stark fact must be recognized: Moscow will remain determined to roll back a dominant U.S. military presence around its periphery—in Europe, the Middle East, the Persian Gulf, the Indian Ocean, the Philippines, Korea, and the South Pacific. As a "great power" it views military encirclement as unacceptable. But only a consistent long-term policy of moderation and change of character can help Moscow attain this goal. The world leadership role of the U.S. will meanwhile become more subtly and effectively challenged than it has been at any time since World War II. This will require new strategies and priorities on our own part—and considerably more adroitness. We will be required to face problems of stability and well-being in the Third World, outside the context of the old East-West struggle that has dominated our own policies for the last four decades. The handy East-West litmus test will no longer be of automatic analytical value. But surely we should have confidence in ourselves to rise to this occasion. In this sense, Moscow's "new thinking" and new foreign policy—if it truly comes into being—will present both countries with more interesting and constructive challenges than the forty-year East-West struggle.

Sofia's Choice

The Bulgarian national Party conference, held in Sofia on January 28 and 29, concluded by unanimously adopting a resolution in favor of *perestroika* in Bulgaria, yet the conference itself failed to clarify the nature of this policy, which remains fundamentally unclear to most Bulgarians.

The conference did not pursue either a free discussion of ideas or an open debate on any issue, even though the success of the reform program was said to require initiative and more participation by the Party's rank and file. Proposals for legalizing independent groups and societies, increasing academic freedom, and democratizing the Party were phrased in obscure and ambiguous language or subjected to potentially devastating limitations. Moreover, Bulgarian Party leader Todor Zhivkov's hour-long introductory speech was far more guarded than his speech at the July plenum, where he was strongly critical of Bulgarian society and proposed major economic and political innovations. The speech itself was heavily cut in the published version, omitting its liberal and innovative elements, including Zhivkov's call for an end to monopolies in the economy as well as his promise to allow access to Western satellite television in Bulgaria. . . .

The very mysteriousness of the occasion has probably increased the atmosphere of public mistrust and puzzlement about the nature of Bulgaria's reforms. As one Bulgarian journalist said in an article written before the conference took place (*Pogled*, January 11): "My impression is that the overwhelming majority of people do not know when, why, who, how, or what they should be doing to implement the reform ideas of the July and November [1987] plenums. . . ."

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The Case for Skepticism

Peter W. Rodman

THERE IS A Soviet story about the Moscow Zoo. It seems that one day the Moscow Zoo advertised that it had a lion and a lamb living together in the same cage. People came from miles around to see this miracle, and—sure enough—there they were, a lion and a lamb in the same cage living side-by-side in apparent harmony. Someone asked the zookeeper: "How did you accomplish this amazing thing?" "Not difficult at all," he said. "Of course, we have to put a new lamb in several times a day."

Western analysts, and particularly policymakers, can accordingly be excused if they approach Mikhail Gorbachev's New Model Foreign Policy with caution. True, we have it on his own authority that the new style in Soviet diplomacy goes hand in hand with a more selfless and generous foreign policy. The Soviet Union's love of peace, he declared in his speech on November 2, 1987, is reflected "in the very style of foreign policy diplomatic work, which . . . is free from attempts at winning anything from anyone or cheating anyone." Nevertheless, we may prefer to make our own assessment.

We need, first of all, to be clear about our definitions. How do we define "significant" change? Is it a change in substance, as opposed to style? A change in basic strategy, as opposed to tactics? A big change in strategy or substance, as opposed to a small change?

Under Gorbachev there have been, without question, extensive and even sweeping changes in the practice of Soviet foreign policy:

- We see a new diplomatic vigor and activism, personalized to a high degree in the attractive figure of the new general secretary, but also embodied in a younger generation of Soviet diplomats who seem freed in their discourse from the formulaic straitjacket of their predecessors.
- In arms control, we have seen a bolder Soviet policy of seizing the initiative with dramatic proposals, changing them rapidly, agreeing to on-site inspection, and imaginatively using the removal of missiles as a political weapon as potent as putting them in.
- We see the Soviets establishing relations or improving relations with countries that used to be off-limits (Israel, the Gulf Arabs); we see their foreign minister visiting parts of the world (Latin America, Southeast Asia) where no predecessor had trod.
- We see a more imaginative and intensified effort to woo China, including unilateral troop withdrawals from Mongolia and hints of concessions on border issues.
- We see a more positive approach to some international institutions, such as international economic institutions which they wish to join and world organizations like the UN in which they now display a greater interest.

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- In the dimension of human rights we see, along with some internal easing, a new approach to the issue internationally that embraces it and tries to turn it against us, instead of resisting it.
- We see a new vocabulary—a new rhetoric of "global interdependence" and of "technological and ecological change" that seemingly blurs the lines of ideological struggle. We see a new doctrinal endorsement of political settlements that seems to forswear the zero-sum game approach of an earlier time.

THE BREADTH of change cannot be questioned. But one *can* question its depth and ultimate meaning by the one criterion that counts, namely: Has the Soviet Union become any less an opponent of the West or of the international system or any less formidable an opponent? Let me state at the outset my conclusion that in almost all areas the elements of continuity are more important, by this standard, than the elements of change. I believe the innovations make Soviet foreign policy a tougher challenge for us, but even this should not be overstated. The basic strengths and weaknesses, as well as the basic objectives, of Soviet policy remain.

Our analysis should begin with Europe. For not only does Europe remain the main theater; the Soviet Union's European policy provides perhaps the most striking evidence of the continuity of Soviet objectives amid all the apparent change. Gorbachev's arms control policy shows a new boldness and cleverness in its willingness to make seemingly large military concessions (like SS-20 withdrawals) for high political gains. His diplomacy has shown great sophistication and appeal. Yet his arms control proposals are as tendentious as ever; since January 1986 his determined pursuit of the denuclearization of Europe can have no other purpose but the decades-old Soviet object of weakening the strategic bond between Western Europe and the United States and undercutting NATO's defense policies. Meanwhile, in Eastern Europe, while more scope is permitted for economic experimentation, there has been no basic change in the Soviet insistence on the political and security status quo in the socialist "commonwealth."

Thus, in the "regional conflict" of most fundamental importance, Gorbachev continues a policy of seeking to alter the international system as we know it in a fundamental way, and in the Soviet Union's favor. As long as it pursues such a strategy in Europe, the USSR cannot be regarded as a status quo power. And this is the essential backdrop to any assessment of Soviet behavior in the Third World.

Nor should one read too much into, for example, the Soviet Union's new approach to international organizations and institutions. Its new willingness to pay for UN peacekeeping is not an act of peace-loving generosity; nor is it even just a clever ploy to exploit our congressional problems with UN funding. In a sense it means that Soviet practice is catching up with Soviet theory; like Senator Moynihan, Moscow recognized by the mid-1970s that such institutions are becoming more and more congenial to its policy than to ours and therefore it has a growing stake in them and a growing use for them.

Similarly with the Soviets' new interest in participating in international economic institutions. It would be too much to say that this reflects a Soviet acceptance of the Western-dominated international system, when the Soviet prescriptions for international economic policy still include such things as the New International Economic Order and egging on the debtor countries. Rather, their eagerness to join the present institutions reflects an obvious economic self-interest in an era when they seek technology through trade and other quick fixes for their structural economic stagnation. And perhaps it reflects a new self-confidence in holding their own and in wanting to be a major international player.

In many of the areas I listed, if there is a common thread in the new Soviet approaches, it is the coming of age of a more worldly, cosmopolitan, imaginative, and self-

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assured generation; a throwing off of some bureaucratic inertia and inferiority complexes; a recognition by Soviet leaders of the Soviet Union's own growing power and the entitlements that come with it—all in the service of Moscow's traditional challenge to the international structure.

There is an abundance of evidence for this in the Third World as well.

Contradictions and New Conditions

ONE OF THE often-cited trends in Soviet foreign policy in the Third World in fact antedates Gorbachev. It is the Soviets' doctrinal acceptance of the notion of limits on aid commitments. The Soviets, like ourselves, have faced a resource squeeze and the fact that foreign aid has no constituency and must compete with other needs. And they have been disappointed in many of their Third World commitments—Gorbachev implied this in one section of his November 2 speech—and may wonder what they get for their money.

Even if this were to be reflected in a decline in actual overall aid disbursements—which is not yet evident—I would not find much solace here. For the Soviets still have some clear priorities—which just happen to be priority areas for us—and in those areas they have maintained or even increased their commitment of military and economic resources:

- In Nicaragua, Soviet and Soviet bloc military and economic aid exceeded $1 billion in 1986 and again in 1987.
- In Angola, we see about $1 billion in military equipment alone in 1987, as well as Soviet combat advisors down to the brigade level.
- The Soviets have also indicated substantial increases in aid to Vietnam, even while Vietnam occupies Cambodia.
- Cuba, Afghanistan, Ethiopia, and other closely aligned countries continue to receive large amounts of aid while nonaligned friends receive less and less.

Thus I would not draw too many benign conclusions from what economizing and prioritizing they might be doing in their foreign aid account.

The Nicaraguan and Cuban cases are instructive. Once burned in 1962, and instinctively mindful of our likely hypersensitivity in this region, the Soviets have usually kept their political and diplomatic profile low so as to avoid provoking Washington. Yet the pattern of their evolving relationship with first Cuba and then Nicaragua is the same: to press persistently to the limit of what they can get away with. Their caution is real, but this only means their assertiveness is governed by what risks are posed to them—in the form of effective resistance or sharp response.

After the U.S. Congress cut off military support for the *contras*, Costa Rican President Arias wrote to Gorbachev urging him to follow suit by halting Soviet military supplies to Nicaragua and to the communist insurgencies in Central America. He received a stiff reply (from the Soviet Foreign Ministry) denying that the Soviets were supplying the insurgents and linking a cutoff of aid to Nicaragua to a reciprocal cutoff of U.S. military aid to all allies in the region. President Monroe would turn over in his grave at the thought of putting the United States and the Soviet Union on an equal footing in Central America, treating our long-standing security relationships and Rio Pact commitments as negotiable bilaterally with the Soviets. Thus our Congress's unilateral restraint went unrequited.

If there is a new Soviet philosophy of not taking advantage of anyone, it is apparently not yet being applied here.

ANOTHER TEST, if you will, of a possibly more benign foreign policy is the Middle East. This is an area where some of the most notable new developments in Soviet policy have occurred, first in Arab-Israeli diplomacy and second in the Persian Gulf. In the former case we see new developments in Soviet policy which do not, in my view, add up to a significant change. In the latter case we see a more significant change in

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the Soviet position, which, however, is the result of objective events and not of any particular intellectual innovation.

In Arab-Israeli diplomacy, we clearly see a new Soviet style and an apparent effort to break out of a pattern of decades of hidebound association with the Arab rejectionists. We have seen new overtures to both Israel and the moderate Arabs; the impression of the Soviets' willingness to end the exclusive reliance on Syria and the PLO as their principal clients; and interest in pursuing a dialogue with us on our recent peace initiative.

So far, however, this new approach has its limits. In April 1987, when the "reunified" PLO broke relations with Egypt and abrogated agreements with Jordan after the Palestinian National Council meeting in Algiers, the Soviets defended the PLO. In the first half of 1988, the Soviets actively promoted reconciliation between the PLO and Syria, which could only come at the expense of Jordan or at the cost of a hardening of the Arab negotiating position. They continue to seek an "authoritative" or "plenipotentiary" international conference even though we regard such a notion as completely unworkable.

Much has also been made of Gorbachev's cautionary instruction to Assad in April 1987 about being satisfied with the military equipment Syria had and about the need to avoid war. To me, this simply made explicit what had long been implicit in Soviet policy. The Soviets probably do not want a war, because their clients are the weaker; Arab-Israeli wars typically leave Soviet clients with losses of thousands of lives and vast amounts of military hardware and recriminations about whether the losses were the fault of the supplier or the user and why the Soviets did not intervene directly to help their friends. But if the Soviets do not want a war, it is still unsure whether they see real peace as in their strategic interest, or would risk real political capital to bring peace about.

My assessment has been, and remains, that it is difficult to see how the Soviets can see an Arab-Israeli settlement as in their strategic interest. A peace settlement—if it ever comes about—will come about through Jordan and moderate Palestinians. No other arrangement will work. A solution thus will vindicate moderate Arab policies and pro-Western Arab governments. It will enormously strengthen the American position in the Middle East by allowing mutually beneficial economic and political relations to flourish unclouded by resentments over the long-standing Palestinian problem. It will weaken the blocking position of radicals in the Arab world—who just happen to be the Soviets' traditional and principal clients (Syria, the PLO, Libya).

Why would the Soviets do this for us?

In my view, Soviet policy, for all its efforts to broaden its contacts in the Middle East, is hobbled by these contradictions. When things are calm, it can cultivate Syria, Israel, the PLO, Jordan, and Egypt at the same time. But it will have a hard time sustaining such a policy, given the turbulence of the region. When there are no serious peace negotiations underway which force the Soviets to make precise, hard choices, they can get away with vague formulations, sleight of hand, smooth talk, and weapons sales. But not when the crunch comes.

Much was made of meetings in Paris in July 1985 between Soviet Ambassador Vorontsov and the Israeli ambassador. It was one of those tantalizing contacts whereby the Soviets seem to be striving to undo the blunder they admit they made in June 1967 in severing relations. But I was struck less by the contact than by the content. Vorontsov reportedly expressed great interest in better relations but he kept stressing that the Soviet Union had important commitments to Syria and any negotiating process had to have something in it for Syria. An accurate assessment, perhaps, but it also implied a Soviet policy very much tied down by Syria.

That was three years ago, and we have yet to see the Soviets take the "great leap" of restoring relations with Israel. There have been many contacts with Israeli government officials and Jewish leaders, and some semi-

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diplomatic exchanges of official missions. Perhaps they are trying to inure their Arab friends to the process by doing it gradually—Gorbachev said publicly to Assad that the absence of Soviet relations with Israel "cannot be considered normal." However, the Soviets seem also to be reluctant to pay up front in concessions like normal diplomatic relations or a big increase in emigration when they have no assurance of a significant political payoff in return, such as an international conference which means a real (as opposed to merely symbolic) entree into Middle Eastern diplomacy. For all the consular visits and official-level meetings I am struck by what has *not* happened. I see these Soviet moves as an easy substitute for full diplomatic relations with Israel, not as a precursor, and I hope my Israeli friends don't sell themselves too cheaply.

The Soviets, indeed, still have the ability to manipulate popular hopes in Israel, and this bears watching. Emigration has already started to increase slightly, for various reasons. It reminds me of Soviet policy toward the reunification of Germany: A strategic shift is implausible, but the Soviets can be brilliantly successful in manipulating domestic opinion by tantalizing hints and minor moves.

Nor have the Soviets yet made the "great leap" of embracing Jordan and Jordan's strategy, which ultimately would come at the expense of both the PLO and Syria.

I see the Soviets as still bound by their essential strategic interests, which have not changed, and by their ties to key clients, troublesome to them as those clients may be. They have sought to innovate and to play the field—but not to a point that puts their basic stake at risk. This game can only be played so long before becoming stale, or even counterproductive.

IN THE PERSIAN GULF, something more substantial has indeed happened. But I see it as the product of objective conditions rather than as a brilliant stroke of Soviet diplomacy. I leave aside the Soviets' duplicitous policy toward UN efforts to end the Iran-Iraq war, based on their eagerness to make inroads with Iran. This is a risky business; it is unlikely—although not impossible—that it will pay off for them. But the Soviets already seem to have improved relations with the Gulf Arabs over the past several years. The Amman Arab Summit last November condemned Iran and by clear implication was a rebuke to a Soviet policy that has been tilting toward Iran. However, the fact is that since the Iranian revolution the Gulf Arabs have seen a need for the Soviets as reinsurance against Iran. This is coupled with the usual frustrations with U.S. policy, including the restrictions on our arms sales. These countries still need us too, as the protector of first resort and as insurance against the Soviets. But it was probably inevitable that these conservative pro-Western regimes would lose their shyness about developing relations with the Soviets.

Revelations of our own abortive Iranian escapade may have accelerated the process, but the trend was already established. Oman and the United Arab Emirates showed the way in the fall of 1985; last year saw a Saudi oil minister visit Moscow. Kuwait has had diplomatic relations with Moscow since 1963; it was Kuwait's requests to both the United States and Soviet Union in late 1986 that produced the American decision to reflag Kuwaiti tankers and offer them our protection.

The Gulf crisis and the American response have served to restore weakened American security relations with the Gulf Arabs. Nevertheless, the Soviets too have gained position in this vital part of the Middle East. When the Iran-Iraq war ends, the Soviets will still fulfill this geopolitical need for the Gulf Arabs as long as Iran remains a radical state. An end to the war might perhaps diminish their sense of urgency in looking toward Moscow, but the geopolitical reality would remain. Soviet withdrawal from Afghanistan will remove another barrier to better Soviet relations with the Gulf (and Iran).

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The remedy for us, I suggest, is to look to our own good relations with the Arab Gulf countries. I certainly do *not* recommend competing with the Soviets in making overtures to an Iranian regime that is still hell-bent on a war policy and not likely to shift to a new policy until its old policy is discredited by effective resistance to it.

Problems and Prospects

LET ME CONCLUDE with four points, which take the discussion off in some different directions. What are some of the problems that the new Gorbachev foreign policy in the Third World raises for us, and what are the prospects?

The first concern I want to mention is crisis management. At various times, one's best-laid foreign policy plans are tested in the white heat of a crisis. What does the Gorbachev regime portend in this respect?

If you read some of the accounts of U.S.-Soviet relations in the recent past—telling of some of the Mideast crises of the early 1970s—you will read of a ponderous Soviet decision-making machinery that sometimes seemed to lag behind the pace of events.[1] The United States government at that time was unusually centralized, disciplined, and quick in its decisions; the Soviets seemed to react to our moves. In addition, in those days we had a considerable strategic advantage, superior naval forces in the Mediterranean, and a local ally whose qualitative superiority was bound to prevail. Today, a different strategic and conventional U.S.-Soviet balance and a technologically far more deadly Middle East battlefield will make a new crisis a different kind of beast. There will be a special premium on discipline and coherence in our government—because we can only expect the new generation of Soviet leaders to be more capable, self-assured, and quicker on their toes.

A second concern is the possibility that the Soviets might bring themselves to make more significant concessions to China. Two of the three "obstacles" are Third World conflicts: Afghanistan and Cambodia. I should defer to Paul Wolfowitz on the Cambodian issue, but it is clear the payoff would be enormous for a big Soviet move on that issue which the Chinese treat as the most important "obstacle." The Chinese stress the need for the Soviets to lean on the Vietnamese and hint at great things to follow in Sino-Soviet relations. The Cambodia diplomacy is more fluid now than before, and there may be temptations to compromise, induced by the long stalemate in the war. On the other hand, I have dealt with the (North) Vietnamese, and I don't think the Soviets can easily "deliver" Hanoi to the Chinese, even if they were willing to risk Cam Ranh Bay for the hopes of rapprochement with China.

Bear in mind that the Soviets can make major moves on the third "obstacle," the border issue, unilaterally, and that Afghanistan is already heading toward its climax.

Third, on a more positive note, is the trend that Gorbachev himself expressed concern about in his 70th Anniversary speech. He talked about the "decline of the national liberation movement," which he admitted was a kind of natural "weakening" of the "liberating impulse which operated at the stage of the struggle for political independence." He then paid a limp tribute to regionalism and to the "varied and heterogeneous" factors that shape the policies of developing countries today. He warned comrades "not to fall into pessimism."

What is he talking about? The same trend that Ronald Reagan and George Shultz talk about as the "democratic revolution" and the powerful trend among developing countries to abandon statist economic policies and turn to the West for economic help. He's talking about the obvious bankruptcy of a communist economic model that even communist countries have given up on. He's

[1] See, for example, the chapters on the 1970 Jordan crisis and 1973 Mideast war in Henry Kissinger's *White House Years* and *Years of Upheaval* (Boston: Little Brown and Company, 1979 and 1982).

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talking about the "bourgeois nationalism" that characterizes the countries of Latin America and Southeast Asia where his foreign minister made his pioneering visits this year. If Gorbachev's comrades are "pessimistic" about some of these fundamental trends in the Third World, something must be going right.

Fourth is Afghanistan. I spoke earlier of the Gorbachev policy in the Third World as imaginative but not to the point of taking big risks. Afghanistan is a clear exception.

As late as last December it was easy to fit Afghanistan into the category of "no basic change in Soviet policy." And even for a long period after Gorbachev's important February 8 commitment to withdrawal, Soviet diplomacy laid trap after trap, seeking in various ways to shunt some of the risks of the endgame back onto the mujahideen, Pakistan, and us—for example, by insisting on a cutoff of arms to the mujahideen unreciprocated by a parallel cutoff of arms to Kabul.

By their announcement on February 8, however, the Soviets have undercut much of their own bargaining position. Their commitment to unilateral withdrawal, however hedged, is not hedged enough to make credible any threat to halt the inexorable process of their departure. They have created a new psychological reality in Afghanistan, making the regime, as the President has often said, "a regime whose days are clearly numbered."

The Soviet leadership undoubtedly hopes to minimize its risks, and hardly deserves praise for a selfless act. So far, even at this writing, it has not forsworn all its options for preserving its client. Without doubt it will continue to try to keep a hand in Afghanistan even after troop withdrawal. And the risks it is taking are being taken now because it has no choice—its dilemmas would be worse a year from now. The Soviets have made a rational, self-interested decision to rid themselves of an albatross and undo a decision they now admit was a blunder. Gorbachev will be lionized by many, particularly in Europe.

Nevertheless, all this being said, the Soviet leaders are courting a huge risk of strategic humiliation.

I hesitate to speculate about the consequences of a defeat of such a major investment of prestige, blood, and treasure as the Soviets' Afghan intervention: the impact on the confidence of other Third World clients; on their already turbulent internal nationality problems, even on the restless East Europeans; on Gorbachev's internal position and political-military relations; and on the overall impression of their strategic strength and stamina. We just do not know what impact this would have on specific Soviet policies toward Iran, in the Arab world, and in the Third World generally. It's a wild card in our analysis of the future.

A Lesson to Draw

I WOULD DRAW one overall lesson from this analysis. If the Soviets' tactics have changed, it is because they have learned the futility of their previous tactics. If we wish Soviet strategy to change, we need to lead them to the same recognition of the futility of that strategy.

If they have cut back some of their investment in remote conflicts and made their peace with the maturing phase of the "national liberation movement," it is because objective reality has imposed this. If we wish to see them cut back their mischief-making even further, and devote their efforts to butter at home rather than guns abroad, then we should remain firm in our own regional policies so that they cannot have both and they have to choose. If we keep the cost of aggression high, we encourage the right choices. If they meet no resistance in the regional arena, their need for a breathing space at home will offer no respite for us.

We are very fortunate, then, in that we need not reach any definitive conclusions now about what Gorbachev's policy really represents. Our job is the same in either case. If their basic objectives have not changed, then a policy of firmness is surely the right policy. If, on the other hand, as some believe, this is indeed a new Soviet leadership genuinely interested in "new thinking," then the

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same prescription is clearly indicated: If they are at a historic crossroads in reappraising their foreign policy, then it behooves us to help along this rethinking by demonstrating once and for all the futility of policies of constant encroachment on the international system.

This is our opportunity, and our responsibility. Otherwise, we're just putting a new lamb in the cage, over and over again.

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All Gorbachev's Men

George W. Breslauer

A NUMBER OF IMPORTANT changes have taken place in Soviet Third World policy during the 1980s. Greater attention is being paid, in both theory and practice, to states whose size, geopolitical characteristics, or economic position make them important, even if they are not ideologically sympathetic and do not adopt any version of Leninist institutions (e.g. Brazil, Mexico, Argentina, the states that comprise ASEAN). The emphasis in these cases is on competition for influence by largely non-military means.

In addition, Soviet Third World policy under Gorbachev is placing greater emphasis on the role of international organizations: the United Nations, GATT, IMF, the Multifiber Agreement, and others. In the United Nations, for example, Moscow has agreed to pay its long-standing, but unmet, financial obligations to support UN peacekeeping operations. It has pushed for a multilateral UN force for policing the Persian Gulf, and has announced its intention to funnel more foreign economic assistance through the United Nations. The Soviets also now support upgrading the role of the World Court, and it was their vote that kept South Africa from being expelled from the International Atomic Energy Agency.

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At the same time, the Soviets continue to follow a more radical and exclusionary policy track in the Third World, along which they protect or assist existing allies, by military means if necessary, be those states socialist (Cuba and Vietnam), self-proclaimed quasi-socialist (Angola, Ethiopia, South Yemen, Afghanistan), or non-socialist, but active in their "anti-imperialism" (Syria).

And yet, there have been changes in Soviet policy along this traditional track as well. A withdrawal from Afghanistan is imminent. Oil supplies to Nicaragua have been cut back, severely damaging that country's economy, while the Soviets have been urging the Sandinistas to reach a political settlement with the *contras*. Moscow has sanctioned West European participation in resolving the crisis in Mozambique. Gorbachev has also had harsh words for Syrian and PLO military ambitions in the Middle East and may be brokering a Vietnamese withdrawal from Kampuchea. At the same time, however, the Soviets continue to finance the Angolan and Ethiopian military struggles, have increased their economic assistance to Cuba and Vietnam, and show no signs of reducing military assistance to Syria, Nicaragua, and other client states.

Are we really witnessing something new? The question is justified because, throughout Soviet history, Moscow has alternated between radical and pragmatic emphases in its Third World policy. In the post-Stalin era, that alternation has never involved the *abandonment* of either the radical or the

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pragmatic track, despite shifting emphases. Moreover, throughout the past three decades, the Soviet leadership has fostered the image of a competitive global power, determined and able to compete for influence and allies, among both "socialist" and geopolitically important non-socialist states. Are we then witnessing a familiar breathing spell (*peredyshka*) before a renewed period of radical assertion and exclusionary emphases? Alternatively, are we witnessing a restructuring (*perestroika*) of Soviet Third World policy?

It is too early to give a definitive answer to these questions. A superficial glance at current changes could lead one to the conclusion that what we are witnessing is another *peredyshka*. However, a fuller examination of the nature of current changes does reveal many features that are unprecedented, and that could provide the basis for a more fundamental break with past patterns. Until the Soviets face another period in which the Third World is ripe for large-scale, but low-risk, radical activism, we will not be able to decide conclusively whether Soviet leaders have so restructured their thinking and their political process as to lead them to resist the temptation to exploit such opportunities in familiar ways.

In the meantime it is worth examining the internal context within which Gorbachev's Third World policy is being made, looking particularly at elite learning; elite policy priorities; personnel policy; and institutional influence.

I will do so within the following framework. Soviet Third World policy has for several decades been formulated in an intellectual and political climate that includes at least four different policy orientations: 1) *radical activism*, which seeks exclusive relations with Third World radical forces and regimes, by militarily escalatory means if necessary; 2) *pragmatic activism*, which seeks to build ties with important capitalist states in the Third World, as part of a strategy of "anti-imperialism," but which emphasizes non-escalatory and non-exclusionary instruments of competition; 3) *crisis-prevention*, which places high priority on superpower collaboration geared toward regional conflict mitigation, either to prevent superpower confrontation or to prevent regional conflicts from spoiling superpower relations in other issue-areas (arms control, for example); and 4) *Russia-first*, which places very little intrinsic value on global competition, preferring to concentrate exclusively on domestic problems and border security.[1] These categories may not be mutually exclusive. In particular, it is quite possible to combine pragmatic activism with crisis-prevention. However, for the purpose of analysis, it is useful to begin with this breakdown of *orientations*, and then to explore how different officials might be characterized in terms of it.

My argument is that changes during the 1980s have strengthened the pragmatic activist and crisis-prevention orientations within the leadership, and have fostered a redefinition of the feasibility and mode of pursuing radical activism. A Russia-first orientation has been partially strengthened, but remains, as before, a marginal tendency in Soviet Third World policy, given the near-consensus within the political elite for maintaining the Soviet role as a competitive global power.

Elite Learning

OFFICIAL SOVIET perspectives on the Third World have evolved considerably since the more optimistic days of the early 1970s, largely discrediting the premises that underpin radical activist perspectives. An examination of leaders' speeches, authoritative party literature, debates among academics, and articles in the military press reveal an aggregate shift toward pessimism or sobriety about a number of things: prospects for the ascendancy of, and consolidation of power by, radical regimes; the reliability and controllability of Third World elites who declare themselves "Marxist-Leninist"; the durability of "scientific socialism" in the Third World; the fer-

[1]The term, "Russia-firsters," is Galia Golan's.

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tility of conditions for the emergence of national liberation movements; the efficacy of Soviet military assistance to Third World radical forces; the ability to control escalation in highly competitive Third World situations; and the ability of the Soviet Union to pursue radical activism in the Third World without damaging bilateral relations with the United States.

We also find among Soviet officials a decline in expectations about the affordability of Third World commitments, given Soviet budgetary stringencies and a perception of the grossly inefficient use of Soviet assistance. It is also true that Soviet elites have become more apprehensive about the reliability of doctrines of historical development that did not anticipate either a widespread throwback to religious fundamentalism, or a situation in which most Soviet Third World allies are also economic basket-cases.[2]

Some of these conclusions, or changes in perception, are not entirely new. In 1966–67, Soviet literature on the subject became more pessimistic than Khrushchev had been, following a string of setbacks in the Third World (in Ghana, Mali, Algeria, Indonesia, and elsewhere). Yet that shift did not prevent a resurgence of optimism in the 1970s, in response to a changing opportunity structure. It is, of course, possible that, twice burned, Soviet leaders have finally accepted that which they were reluctant to conclude with finality two decades ago. If so, we should expect to find additional evidence of changes in perspectives that would be less subject to cyclical alternation.

Indeed, we find such evidence in four themes now prominent in Soviet elite perspectives that were not prominent during the *peredyshka* of the 1960s. First is the notion of *global interdependence*, which entails the explicit rejection of exclusionary two-camp thinking about the nature of the international order, and is blatantly pessimistic about the notion that a "socialist international division of labor" will ever supplant a "capitalist international division of labor."[3] A second theme is that of *crisis-prevention*, expressed in a sense of urgency about the need to control regional conflicts, and in a belief that many such conflicts may be negative-sum competitive games, in which both superpowers may lose. A third theme relates to the *nature of politics in the United States*, accepting the reality of linkage in American politics and the consequent Soviet inability to insulate superpower relations on high-priority issues from the vagaries of superpower competition in the Third World. Finally, the fourth theme relates to *development trends* in the Third World itself. In contrast to conclusions drawn in the 1960s, current Soviet doctrine endorses the necessity of selective de-nationalization of industry in many Third World countries (a cornerstone of "socialist" development having been state-sector-led development).

Thus, learning during the past decade (be it individual or "governmental" learning) appears to have resulted in the ascendancy of thinking that is more pessimistic than at any time since Stalin's death about the achievement, at affordable cost and risk, of an anti-imperialist bandwagon in the Third World. It is also pessimistic about the size and character of the pay-off to be had from vigorous competition in those areas. But at the same time it remains optimistic about the ability of the Soviet Union to prevent an anti-Soviet bandwagon, to deny U.S. efforts to exclude the USSR from regional processes, and to benefit, politically and economically, from pragmatic competition.

This is not to say that the top leadership is homogeneous in the lessons it has drawn from the experiences of the 1970s. There is considerable evidence to suggest, for example, that a man like Karen Brutents (now first deputy head of the International Department of the Central Committee) believes in the

[2]See the literature reviewed and cited in my "Ideology and Learning in Soviet Third World Policy," *World Politics* (April 1987).

[3]Elizabeth Valkenier, *The Soviet Union and the Third World: An Economic Bind* (New York: Praeger Publishers, 1983), p. 26.

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feasibility of pursuing an offensive policy of anti-imperialism and the aggravation of contradictions within the capitalist world, even as he emphasizes building ties with important capitalist states in the Third World. Some analysts argue, moreover, that Brutents is joined in these beliefs by Politburo-member Alexander Yakovlev, though ambiguity remains as to whether Yakovlev's earlier writings remain a useful guide to his current thinking.[4] Be that as it may, such pragmatic activism is inclined toward seeking good relations with non-radical forces, as part and parcel of a strategy of anti-imperialism. This orientation is bound to clash at times with the crisis-prevention tendency, about which more below.

Priorities

THERE ARE plenty of reasons for concluding that the Soviet leadership has undertaken a re-evaluation of priorities in response to the growing economic, social, and spiritual crisis of the past decade. It hardly requires much of a leap of faith to take Gorbachev at face-value when he argues that domestic imperatives have forced a re-evaluation of foreign policy priorities. Of course, the Soviet leadership still has autonomous foreign policy goals, based on calculations of national security and self-image; that is not at issue. Rather, the recent subordination of foreign policy to domestic policy requirements means that Soviet leaders have re-evaluated previous definitions of necessary *trade-offs*. Thus, it is not surprising that when Gorbachev spoke to the staff of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, he reiterated the leadership position of the post-Brezhnev era that Soviet Third World policy must be adjusted to the imperative of husbanding Soviet resources.[5]

By focusing on Third World states that are important actors in the international economic order, Soviet leaders may hope to find ways to meet some domestic economic needs without running the risk of antagonizing the United States, subsidizing basket-case economies, or getting involved in militarily escalatory situations. More important, the Soviets may hope to use expanded ties with Third World capitalist states, and with multilateral organizations such as the Multifiber Agreement, to create the leverage required to secure entry into GATT, IMF, the World Bank, and other organizations through which the USSR might gain economic benefits from intercourse with the *developed* capitalist states.

There is, of course, another indirect route through which Soviet Third World policy is expected to serve domestic economic priorities. Soviet reformists need a relatively stable international environment, and a non-inflammatory relationship with the United States. Given their conclusion that radical activism in the 1970s contributed to the decline of American support for detente, Soviet leaders may view a combination of pragmatic activism and crisis-prevention as the basis for a Third World policy conducive to achieving superpower relations that assist their own modernization plans.

In this connection, it is worth noting that the current Soviet leaders see economic modernization taking far longer than their predecessors ever expected. Khrushchev had exaggerated expectations about the speed with which he could reform the economy and "build communism." Brezhnev believed that building communism would take much, much longer, but also acted as if he believed

[4]For more on these men as well as much on the general subject of this article, see Jerry Hough, "Gorbachev's Strategy," *Foreign Affairs* (Fall 1985); Francis Fukuyama, "Patterns of Soviet Third World Policy," *Problems of Communism* (September/October 1987); Galia Golan, *The Soviet Union and National Liberation Movements in the Third World* (Allen & Unwin, forthcoming); Jack Snyder, "The Gorbachev Revolution: A Waning of Soviet Expansionism?," *International Security* (Winter 1987/88).

[5]The speech was eventually published in *Vestnik Ministerstva Inostrannykh Del, SSSR*, August 5, 1987.

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that economic health was possible without a fundamental restructuring of the economy, even with a military build-up. Under Gorbachev, economic reform is defined as a process that will require at least a generation to complete, and the achieving of an affluent society is viewed as several generations away.

If these beliefs continue to inform policy-making, it will be difficult for Soviet leaders to treat the redefinition of foreign-domestic trade-offs as a mere *peredyshka* before the next global offensive. Moreover, to the extent that economic reform comes to entail greater integration into the capitalist international economic order, and to the extent that the Soviet budget continues to be stretched, the conditions for maintaining a pragmatic and non-provocative Third World policy would remain.

Given our ignorance of who thinks what within the Soviet Politburo and Central Committee, it is difficult to say to what extent the subordination of Third World policy to the requirements of higher priorities is a consensual or a highly controversial policy. Yet one can at least conjecture that domestic requirements have become so pressing, and the prospect of a space race so imminent, that even individuals normatively attached to radical activism may have tempered their aspirations. And since current policy is geared neither toward global capitulation nor abdication, the internationalist impulse is not being abandoned. Finally, since the Third World has always been relatively low in the Soviet leadership's foreign policy priorities, those who overplay its importance or take too sectarian an approach may well be isolated.

Personnel Policy

THE SWITCH to a more pragmatic and selectively conciliatory Third World policy was partly a result of learning about the consequences of previous policy. But it was also facilitated by the process of political succession, which resulted in a major generational shift within the leadership. That shift brought into the leadership many individuals who would not necessarily be required to defend decisions they had not made. Whether they also happened to believe that those decisions had been unwise is something about which we know little.

Yet the personnel changes that have taken place within the key sectors responsible for foreign policy formulation are worthy of note, for they strongly suggest a conscious strategy of buttressing recent re-evaluations by replacing advocates of the earlier Third World policy with advocates of the new one.

In the International Department (ID) of the Central Committee, major changes in leadership have taken place. Under the protection of Mikhail Suslov, the department had for decades been an advocate of radical activism in the Third World. It was directed by Boris Ponomarev, a candidate member of the Politburo and an unreconstructed Comintern old-hand. One of Ponomarev's top deputies was R. Ulyanovsky, who had a similar policy orientation. Galia Golan's analysis of the voluminous publications of these two men reveals them to have been radical activists on Third World policy. They have been replaced by Anatoly Dobrynin and Georgi Kornienko, veterans of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, specialists on the United States and Western Europe, and men who have no background of Third World activism. It is difficult to avoid the conclusion that Dobrynin and Kornienko were put in charge of the International Department in order to make it institutionally more receptive to pragmatic policies, and more sensitive to the possible implications of Soviet Third World initiatives for Soviet-American relations. In a similar vein, Karen Brutents, whose writings have always been pragmatic-activist in orientation (though not greatly concerned with crisis prevention), has been promoted to the position of first deputy head of ID.

There may well be a degree of tension within the leadership of ID between the Brutents line and the Dobrynin/Kornienko line, assuming that the former is primarily concerned to advance the cause of pragmatic activism while the latter is primarily con-

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cerned with crisis-prevention. But neither line is consistent with the radical activist program that used to prevail in Ponomarev's day. Their coexistence ensures a continued debate about the scope and stakes of competitive activism, but not a re-evaluation by the leaders of ID of recent thought about the prospects for radicalism in the Third World. It is less clear how a Brutents may relate to the theme of global interdependence, with its implication that zero-sum anti-imperialism may be an atavism.

Within the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, important, though less dramatic, changes have occurred. Foreign Minister Gromyko has been replaced by Eduard Shevardnadze. While that has important implications primarily for the terms of Soviet-American negotiations, especially on arms control, it also has some implications for Third World policy. According to Arkady Shevchenko's account in *Breaking With Moscow* (New York, 1985), Gromyko cared little about the Third World, which increased the relative clout of the International Department in the 1970s. Shevardnadze has already been doing some traveling in the Third World, and his recent visit to Latin America was very much in line with the new pragmatic activism. Shevardnadze visited Brazil, Mexico, and Uruguay in the fall of 1987, discussing prospects for expanding political, economic, and cultural exchange, while publicly proclaiming a Soviet desire to expand such relations without harm to these countries' relations with the United States.

Equally interesting are changes in the ministry at the first deputy and deputy minister levels. A near-total turnover has taken place since Gorbachev came to power. Moreover, and most striking, all the new deputy ministers responsible for Third World regions have backgrounds primarily in American or West European affairs! Thus Iu.M. Vorontsov and V.F. Petrovsky carry the Middle East portfolios, Petrovsky is also responsible for international organizations and non-proliferation issues, and Americanist V.G. Komplektov is now responsible for Latin American and international economic administration. A.L. Adamishin, a West Europeanist, holds the African portfolio, and is additionally responsible for coordination of working groups on regional conflict management. The only holdover from the Brezhnev era, L.F. Ilichev, now has only "secondary responsibilities for Africa."[6]

What is more, some of these individuals have been brought fully into the process of implementing Third World policy. Yuli Vorontsov, for example, appears to have been cast in an almost Kissingerian role, traveling frequently among world capitals and switching quickly among the issues on which he negotiates. It was Vorontsov who visited Teheran several times in 1987, exploiting U.S.-Iranian military tensions to negotiate a series of strategically significant economic deals with the Iranian authorities. Similarly, V.F. Petrovsky travels frequently to the Middle East and the United Nations. It was Petrovsky who wrote Gorbachev's September speech for the General Assembly. The little we know of his personal beliefs suggests that he has long resisted politicization of the International Atomic Energy Agency and the Nuclear Non-Proliferation regime.[7]

The purpose of packing the leadership of the Foreign Ministry with so many Americanists responsible for Third World affairs may well be the same as the purpose of posting Dobrynin and Kornienko to the International Department of the Central Committee: to make those institutions more sensitive to U.S. reactions during the process of formulating Soviet Third World policy. This would serve the cause of both pragmatic activism and crisis-prevention.

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[6]For the current portfolios of the Deputy Ministers, see "USSR Ministry of Foreign Affairs: A Reference Aid," (Washington, D.C.: C.I.A., September 1987); for the backgrounds of these men, see *Diplomaticheskii slovar'* (Moscow 1984). See also Claire Rosenson, "Personnel Changes in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs," *Sovset*, July 8, 1986.

[7]Personal communication from Tobi Gati.

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The cause of pragmatic activism vis-à-vis the international economic order has also been advanced by organizational innovation. Within the Ministry, a Department of International Economic Organizations was created on July 1, 1986. The first head of that department was Ivan Ivanov, formerly a scholar and deputy director of the Institute on the World Economy and International Relations. Ivanov is famous not only for his exceptional talent as an economist specializing in these matters but also for his long and vigorous advocacy of Soviet integration into the capitalist international economic order. A major theme in his advocacy has been that most states in the Third World will have to go through a prolonged stage of capitalist development, during which they will have to increase their dependence on the capitalist international market and even de-nationalize many of their industries. Ivanov is now First Deputy Chairman of the State Commission on Foreign Economic Ties, under the Council of Ministers, which was created in August 1986.[8]

Within the military, and within the Main Political Administration (which has a major role in Third World military assistance), there has also been a great deal of personnel turnover. Ustinov, Sokolov, Yepishev, and Gorshkov have died or been retired, thus ending the grip of the Brezhnev generation, and Brezhnev's cronies, on the leadership of the Defense Ministry. They have been replaced by people like Yazov, Akhromeyev, Gareyev, Volkogonov, Chernavin, and Ogarkov. While we know relatively little about the personal views of these men (with the possible exception of Ogarkov), their recent writings and actions suggest that they are receptive to the calls for "new thinking," are inclined to consider doctrinal innovations (such as "reasonable sufficiency" and "non-provocative defense"), support a home-front emphasis on improving the level of science and technology in the Soviet civilian and military economies, and are inclined to eschew the costs of further developing the Soviet blue-water navy and power-projection capabilities. In the latter connection, it is significant that Admiral Gorshkov, the "father" of the Soviet blue-water navy, was replaced by a man (Chernavin) whose background and presumed preferences lay in the area of nuclear submarines and continental defense.[9]

The sum total of personnel changes reviewed here does not ensure that the current stage of Soviet Third World policy will be more than a *peredyshka*, but it certainly increases the probability that it will endure. Gone are the Stalinist generations of decision-makers who dominated the Politburo for over thirty years after the death of Stalin. Gone too is the domination of the leadership of the International Department by radical-activists. Gone is Gromyko's domination of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. And gone is the Brezhnev generation's domination of the leadership of the Ministry of Defense and Main Political Administration.

To be sure, each of these institutions remains internally divided. Multiple orientations regarding Third World policy—ranging from radical activists, at one extreme, to Russia-firsters at the other—can be found in the contemporary military literature. Presumably, multiple orientations remain within the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the International Department, and the Politburo. The question, however, is "Who's on top?" For in all Soviet institutions the personality of the leader plays a very important role. On this score, it is most significant that the *leadership* within each of these organizations has experienced major turnovers, even if there has been less change at the middle levels. Personnel change has resulted in the ascendancy within the upper levels of these institutions of

[8]For an examination of Ivanov's writings about the Third World, see Elizabeth Valkenier, *The Soviet Union and the Third World.*

[9]For the most penetrating analysis of issues discussed in this paragraph, see Francis Fukuyama, *Soviet Civil-Military Relations and the Power Projection Mission* (Rand Corporation: Santa Monica, April 1987), especially pp. v–viii, 33–35, 42–48, 50–67.

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pragmatic activists and crisis-preventers, and in the relative subordination of radical activists.[10]

Generational change also deepens the case for cognitive learning in one important respect. A feature of the ideological heritage that has long been an impediment to fundamental learning has been the belief that history proceeds, in fits and starts ("two steps forward, one step back"), in the desirable direction. Thus, *peredyshki* have been expected. The Stalin generation of officials dominated Soviet institutions throughout the post-Stalin era. They went through several *peredyshki*, none of which was identical, in the content of lessons learned, to the previous one. However, those lessons generally did not question basic assumptions about the nature of the international order. Generational change opens the question of whether such fundamental learning has now been facilitated to an unprecedented degree.

Institutional Influence

A SHIFT in patterns of institutional influence that reinforces all the tendencies discussed thus far has also taken place. Not only have dominant military orientations changed, but all signs indicate a decrease in the clout of the armed forces as a whole, and of the ID, in the creation (though, as Angola demonstrates, not necessarily in the implementation) of Soviet Third World policy. Marshal Sokolov was unceremoniously retired as minister of defense and replaced by General Yazov, merely a general, and only a candidate member of the Politburo. Most protocol evidence indicates the intentional political subordination of military values and actors under Gorbachev.

As for the International Department, Dobrynin is probably a member of the foreign policy working group within the Politburo, but, unlike his predecessor (Ponomarev), not a candidate member of the Politburo. Such a situation probably reduces (or reflects the reduction of) the institutional influence of the International Department, even though it accords Dobrynin considerable personal influence.

In the case of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, recent changes, if anything, increase its involvement in the formulation of Third World policy, and do so through policy generalists who are both pragmatic activists and sensitive to the connection between Third World policy and East-West relations.

This general trend is further reinforced by an expanded role for Academy of Science think-tanks in providing input on foreign policy. Contacts in Moscow report that "new thinkers" within the institutes are now more involved in the policy process than before, with papers commissioned more frequently by Yakovlev's and Dobrynin's offices. A new unit has also been established within the Ministry of Foreign Affairs for coordinating relations with the Academy. This is taking place at a time when the Soviet knowledge industry on international affairs, however backward by Western standards, is far more fully developed than it was during any previous *peredyshki*, and when the bias in academic literature on the Third World has shifted heavily in directions that discredit the feasibility of radical activist policies.[11] The director of the Institute on the World Economy and International Relations (IMEMO), Yevgenii Primakov, is an advisor to the Politburo, and, in contrast to his predecessors, is both a Third World specialist and a man whose writings suggest a sense of urgency about the need for crisis-prevention.

[10]This generalization may be less true of the military establishment and especially the M.P.A. It seems logical to suppose that Russia-firsters may also be more numerous within certain sectors of the military command than elsewhere.

[11]The best demonstrations of this point are Jerry Hough, *The Struggle for the Third World: Soviet Debates and American Options* (Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution, 1986); and Valkenier, *The Soviet Union and the Third World*.

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Changes in personnel and in institutional access can also be set against the picture of the mid-1970s, as depicted in Harry Gelman's important book, *The Brezhnev Politburo and the Decline of Detente* (Ithaca, 1986). Gelman argued that Brezhnev formulated Third World policy in a political context that forced him to defer to the wishes of a Third World policy working group composed of Ponomarev's ID, the Military, and the Main Political Administration. This led to a de-coupling of Third World policy formulation from the making of the Soviets' American policy, which was managed by the Foreign Ministry. It also led to a situation in which Brezhnev felt the political need, when tempting opportunities arose in the Third World, to demonstrate his revolutionary credentials in the eyes of the radical activists who had become suspicious of his detente policies.

It would appear that Gorbachev does not face a situation analogous to that faced by Brezhnev. The early Brezhnev was much less in control than the early Gorbachev (the Yeltsin affair notwithstanding), and Gorbachev's more-or-less final foreign policy constituency appears to be in place. By ending the earlier division of authority between the Foreign Ministry, and the ID/Military/MPA, Gorbachev has eliminated the domestic political environment that pushed Brezhnev into a radical-activist Third World policy. This could change, of course. Should the opportunity structure in the Third World dramatically change once again, latent ideological priorities and hopes, which transcend institutions, could push to the fore once more, despite institutional influence-patterns. But given the changes in perceptions and priorities that have undermined the perceived feasibility of radical activism, we should not assume that this would be inevitable.

Restructuring?

BUT IF ALL this cannot easily be dismissed as a *peredyshka*, does it amount to a restructuring (*perestroika*)? This question is more difficult to answer, if only because the changes under way, while rooted in the experiences of the past thirty years, are still in the process of formation. They are also controversial, both in their subordination of radical activism, and in the continuing tension among advocates of the three different alternatives to radical activism. Pragmatic activists and crisis-preventers may agree among themselves on many aspects of Third World policy, for they share a commitment to low-risk globalism. But they are likely to disagree, in the face of hard choices, about the level of attention to pay to U.S. sensibilities, about the scope and intensity of competition, and about the trade-offs to make across issue-areas. Each of these groupings, in turn, is bound to collide on many matters with Russia-firsters and with remaining radical activists. Indeed, radical activists who are pessimistic about current prospects may form alliances with the Russia-firsters and create a coalition that criticizes pragmatic activists and crisis preventers for being "non-ideological"—or too conciliatory.

Then, too, the issue is greatly complicated by the continued existence of the radical track in Soviet Third World policy. Like it or not, the Soviet Union has made commitments to allies throughout the world. Many of those allies are in precarious economic, political, and military condition. The cost of defending them may be quite high—economically, militarily, and in terms of Soviet relations with the West. Although pragmatic activists and crisis preventers may agree on the desirability and necessity of maintaining Soviet status as a global power, they are likely to fall out among themselves when faced with hard choices presented by existing commitments along the radical track. What this means is that, given Soviet international entanglements, it will be difficult for the regime to go too far in restructuring its Third World policy. Withdrawal from Afghanistan is difficult enough; withdrawal from Angola, Ethiopia, and Central America, or abandonment of allies in the Middle East, will be doubly difficult.

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According to my definition of "significant change," Soviet Third World policy would have to be marked by two things to qualify as "restructured." First, the continued subordination of *acquisitive* radical activism, even should the international opportunity structure again swing in its favor; and second, a sustained effort to create diplomatic formats and conditions for bilateral and multilateral diplomacy, as well as a softening of Soviet terms in negotiations, geared toward reducing the escalatory potential of regional conflicts in the Third World. Ultimately, one's definition of restructuring is a product of one's definition of "significant change," which itself is often a normative exercise. I can imagine tests of Soviet restructuring that are both more and less demanding than mine. Given the role of ideology, nationalism, and self-image in Soviet politics, the test I propose is already a demanding one.

Would such restructuring leave the Soviet regime with a major identity problem? Would the demands of self-image, and of regime legitimation both at home and within the world communist movement, withstand an indefinite subordination of acquisitive radical activism? I do not know, but I would draw attention to three aspects of Soviet Third World policy that would not be negated by my definition of restructuring: 1) continued global activism as a competitive global power; 2) continued bargaining (not capitulation) on the terms of regional conflict-mitigation; and 3) a continued commitment to defend most existing gains (for example, not to allow the military defeat of the Angolan government). This last point is crucial, for it is located on the radical track. Such *defensive* radical activism could well validate Soviet credentials as a revolutionary state, in the eyes of both domestic and foreign audiences, even as *acquisitive* radical activism is decisively subordinated.

In sum, there is much potential for restructuring in changes already made during the 1980s in the internal setting of Soviet Third World policy. So many factors—learning, priorities, personnel, and institutional influence—differ from the state of affairs that existed at times of previous *peredyshki* that it would be irresponsible simply to dub this a "familiar" cyclical event. At the same time, until we observe Soviet policy during a new wave of Third World radicalism, we shall not know whether circumstances have changed sufficiently to impel the Soviets to resist temptation in the future.

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Afghanistan: Anatomy of a Soviet Failure

Zalmay Khalilzad

FIFTY PERCENT of Moscow's some 115,000 soldiers in Afghanistan should depart by August 15 and the remainder might well be out by the end of this year. If so, it will be one of the most important events of this decade, a strategic defeat for the Soviets with profound and wide-ranging implications.

Afghanistan engages Soviet power and resolve directly and in a country on the Soviet border. A withdrawal will mean reduced Soviet ability to project power to South and Southwest Asia. It will also contain the seeds for the destruction of a range of ideological and doctrinal positions—commitment to other communist revolutions, to the idea of the "march of history," and to the Brezhnev Doctrine. It will raise doubts about Soviet resolve in Eastern Europe and communist Third World countries, leading to greater instability there. Indeed, so high are the potential costs to the Soviets that one cannot be entirely confident about Soviet intentions in Afghanistan until the withdrawal has actually been implemented.

A Soviet withdrawal will also confront the United States with an assortment of opportunities and unusual challenges. To be sure, however, each of these will be more welcome—and potentially more fruitful—than the challenge that was presented to the United States by the Soviet occupation itself. A withdrawal, if it materializes, will clearly alter the East-West balance of power in the free world's favor. Thus, several questions present themselves to American policymakers as they seek to capitalize on the Soviet failure in Afghanistan. How was Moscow brought to this point? What options do the Soviets have now? And what, finally, are the long-term implications of a Soviet withdrawal?

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The Evolution of Soviet Strategy

THE SOVIET invasion of Afghanistan in 1979 took place at a time when the Soviets were in a confident mood. Moscow under Brezhnev had had a string of successes in the Third World: the establishment of pro-Moscow communist regimes in Angola, Ethiopia, Nicaragua, and—following the 1978 coup—in Afghanistan. The Afghan communists, on the other hand, presented problems of their own after obtaining power. They were divided among themselves; they had mismanaged the country; and they were facing increased domestic opposition. As a result, Moscow feared that the Afghan regime might be overthrown or might make a deal with hostile powers, such

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as Pakistan, in order to survive. Both possibilities were intolerable to Moscow at the time.

The Soviets also seemed to believe that their forces could control the situation in short order and that the international costs might be held to a manageable level. The regional environment seemed favorable: Washington's position in the area was weak, and U.S.-Pakistan relations were in turmoil because of the cut-off of U.S. aid to Islamabad. CENTO, a regional security organization consisting of Iran, Pakistan, and Turkey, and with ties to the U.S. and Britain, had disintegrated, while Iran—a former U.S. ally—had become hostile to the West. Washington had shown substantial restraint vis-à-vis Iran even after American diplomats had been taken hostage there. The Soviets probably believed that the U.S. response to its invasion would be similarly restrained. For one thing, Washington had never regarded Afghanistan as very important, as indicated by our muted response to the 1978 communist coup; for another, the two superpowers had just concluded the SALT II agreement, and Moscow might have calculated that Washington would not jeopardize it over Afghanistan.

The Soviets miscalculated both the military and political costs of their decision. On the military level, they were not alone in their error; our own experts on the Soviet Union did no better. They, too, predicted a Soviet victory over the Afghans in a relatively short time. The Soviets, of course, sought to encourage the view that time was on their side, and that resistance to them was futile. Yet this view ignored some salient historical facts. The necessary precondition for successful resistance is, of course, the existence of a population that is willing to pay an extremely high price and to sustain this willingness over a very long term. History alone might have warned the Soviets that the Afghans were such a population.

Moscow's lack of success led to changes in military tactics over the years, a trial-and-error search for approaches that might work. During 1980, believing that the resistance could be defeated easily, the Soviets employed large formations in the countryside in an offensive strategy against their opponents. The resistance, not surprisingly, did not stand in place to fight a conventional war, but instead adopted hit-and-run tactics that frustrated this initial Soviet strategy.

Moscow changed its approach in late 1980. As the resistance gained strength, the Soviet forces took to the defensive; they focused their attention on maintaining control of cities and towns, military facilities, and main transportation arteries—thus leaving the countryside to the mujahideen. The shift was encouraged by two other developments in 1980: major uprisings in several Afghan cities including Kabul; and attacks by the resistance on Afghanistan's lines of communication, especially the roads linking Kabul to the Soviet border. Moscow hoped that the forces controlled by the Karmal regime would pursue the mujahideen into Afghanistan's countryside. In this case, as in others to come, the Soviets fatefully exaggerated the strength of the Afghan communist forces.

Both the Soviet forces and those of the Kabul regime failed to live up to Moscow's expectations. At the end of 1981, the Soviets sent a high-level delegation headed by First Deputy Minister of Defense Sergey Sokolov to Afghanistan. Sokolov seems to have concluded that the number of Soviet forces were inadequate even for Moscow's defensive strategy and recommended that more forces be sent to Afghanistan. Ten thousand additional troops were sent in 1982. To secure the road from Kabul to the Soviet border, the Soviets carried a number of offensives against the Panjsher Valley. It was from this valley that Ahmad Shah Massoud threatened the Salang tunnel—linking Kabul to the Soviet border in the north. Moscow also carried out major offensives against Paghman, near Kabul.

In both Paghman and Panjsher in 1981 and 1982, the Soviets encountered the classic dilemma faced by conventional armies beset

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by a guerrilla force: When the Soviets moved in, the mujahideen retreated to the mountains and then executed their attacks selectively. There is evidence that the Soviets then began to use chemical weapons—incapacitants, lethal chemicals, and perhaps mycotoxin biological weapons—in the hope of flushing out mujahideen from their caves. According to U.S. government estimates, some 3,000 deaths resulted from Soviet use of these agents in 1981 and 1982.

DURING 1983 Moscow began to realize that, short of a massive increase in the number of their forces, a quick victory in Afghanistan was unlikely. The Soviets thus began to develop the elements of a long-term strategy for pacifying Afghanistan. In the hope of dividing the resistance, Kabul offered a ceasefire to some of the mujahideen commanders (such as Massoud) and local autonomy to tribal and ethnic leaders. It began a major socio-economic program aimed at recreating Afghanistan in the Soviet image and containing opposition to the Soviets and the Kabul regime. It encouraged the regime to expand its security apparatus—the armed forces, the secret police (KHAD), and the militia and regular police forces associated with the ministry of interior. Moscow also encouraged the Afghan communist party—the PDPA—to expand.

At the military level, Moscow modified its tactics and relied more heavily on air power to attack civilian targets and thus undermine support for the mujahideen. The decision to go after civilian targets began in 1983 and continued in 1984 and 1985. The result of this policy was devastating for the Afghan people. Some resistance strongholds such as Panjsher, Paghman, Lowgar, and Paktia were depopulated. The number of Afghan refugees increased dramatically. By the end of 1985, some four million Afghans—about one-fourth of the Afghan population—had taken refuge in Pakistan and Iran. Another two million had become internal refugees—moving to Kabul or other areas under Soviet control. Moscow also increased its commitment of special forces to guerrilla-type operations against the mujahideen. To augment the security of major transportation routes and cities, especially Kabul, the Soviets began to build security outposts around Kabul and along major roads.

The result of these changes were mixed, but on balance worked to the disadvantage of the mujahideen. Their inability to defend themselves against Soviet air power and special forces was undermining resistance morale and appeared to be tipping the balance against them. The depopulation of former strongholds made the mujahideen dependent on food supplies from Pakistan or other areas, including some under Soviet control. The need for food and more military supplies for the war also complicated the logistics of the mujahideen and dramatically increased their transportation costs.

Yet although the morale of the resistance was weakened, a victory for the Soviets was not imminent. Moscow continued to lack a war-winning strategy. In fact, its military tactics undermined its Sovietization program. That program sought to convert Afghans into supporters of the communist regime. On the other hand, the massive use of force against Afghans—whose culture emphasizes revenge—only increased their hostility towards the Soviets and the puppet government in Kabul. Meanwhile, Soviet efforts to expand the efficiency of the Afghan communist party and security forces had only limited success. Factionalism within PDPA continued; the army remained largely ineffective; KHAD and the Sarandoy (police forces) improved their efficiency. The mujahideen, in turn, had evolved as well. From unstructured and highly localized groupings, they had become more organized over time and more responsive to changing Soviet tactics.

BY 1985, the Soviets had turned to a new tactic: increase pressure on Pakistan in the hopes of intimidating it into changing its policy toward the Afghan war. The pressure on Pakistan began to escalate towards the end of 1985 and continued

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through 1986. The means used by Moscow against Pakistan were varied. They included military offensives conducted near the Pakistani border and cross-border air attacks on Pakistani territory. The Soviets also appointed General Zaitsev, an important and energetic Soviet military commander who had served in East Germany, to head Moscow's military campaign in Afghanistan. He demonstrated greater initiative in the use of his forces, at times took personal command of combat operations, and had better equipment available to him.

On other fronts, the Soviets increased subversion inside Pakistan, especially among Pakistan's Pashtun and Baluch tribes; threatened Pakistan through diplomatic channels on issues such as the Pakistani nuclear program; and invited anti-Zia Pakistani political leaders to Moscow in the hope of winning friends in Pakistan. Finally, the Soviets encouraged terror bombing attacks in Pakistan's urban areas—organized by the Kabul regime—to encourage opposition to Islamabad's Afghan policy.

In my judgment, 1986 was the turning point in the Afghan war. Soviet efforts to intimidate Pakistan were counterproductive. Rather than weakening Pakistani resolve they increased Pakistan's perception of the threat from the Soviets in Afghanistan. The result was an increase in external support for the mujahideen. But the most crucial change in this period was the provision of U.S. Stinger missiles to the mujahideen for the first time. Press reports indicate that the Stingers, which began to arrive at the end of 1986, have been very effectively used. The spectacular improvement in air defense had many benefits for the mujahideen. It raised their morale dramatically; it allowed more supplies to be brought in; it made the use of the most important Soviet weapon—air power—less effective; and it forced the Soviets to withdraw from some exposed areas. It also allowed some refugees to come back to mujahideen-controlled areas and begin food production.

Overt attacks against Pakistan had another negative effect on Soviet interests: It brought Pakistan closer to the U.S. and increased support in the U.S. Congress for assistance to Pakistan at a time when the Pakistani nuclear program was having a negative effect on Capitol Hill. The United States began considering the sale of early warning systems to Pakistan. The prospects of Pakistani acquisition of such systems were unlikely to be welcomed by India, and New Delhi, in turn, might have pressured Moscow to cease its air attacks against Pakistan.

Seeking A Settlement

BY THE END of 1986 Moscow confronted the following dilemma: It was discouraged about prospects for victory with current resources, and it was unwilling to commit itself to the substantial increase in the number of Soviet forces needed to win. The evolution of Soviet policy since 1986 illustrates how Moscow has moved towards resolving its dilemma by seeking terms for a Soviet withdrawal which would not indicate an open admission of defeat. During the past two years Soviet terms have been changing in the direction of meeting the demands of those opposed to the Soviet presence.

How did Soviet tactics change during the eighteen months before the signing of the Geneva accords? Change occurred at three levels.

The first is the level of declared intent. The Soviets became very energetic in indicating that they wanted to get out of Afghanistan. On more than one occasion, the Soviets indicated that they had made the decision to leave Afghanistan. This shift in emphasis began with Gorbachev's speech to the 27th Communist Party Congress, in which he called the Afghan war a "bleeding wound." Since 1986 the Soviets have also allowed greater critical press discussion of the Afghan war, culminating in press articles during the spring of 1988 that portrayed the war in Afghanistan in very realistic terms and debunked the assumptions that had led to the Soviet decision to invade.

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Second, the Soviets publicly altered their attitude towards the Kabul regime. Moscow increasingly distanced itself from the fate of its clients in Kabul. This shift took place in stages. Immediately after the invasion, the Soviets insisted that the 1978 communist coup was irreversible. They characterized the Kabul government as being on the path of "socialist construction," and insisted that Pakistan and others must accept the legitimacy of the Soviet-sponsored government and negotiate with it. After 1986, the Soviets dropped the claim that the 1978 coup is irreversible.

For much of the immediate post-invasion period, the Soviets did not suggest that the PDPA would be willing to share power with others. Since 1986, public Soviet statements indicate an apparent change. The Soviets became more frank in their public discussion of the difficulties the Kabul regime faces, and admitted that a large percentage of Afghans oppose it. In 1985, Moscow pressed Islamabad to have direct negotiations with Kabul, but abandoned it in 1986. During the same year the Soviets pressed the regime to push for "national reconciliation" and to offer to share power with others. In 1986, Kabul insisted that any coalition be dominated by the PDPA. In 1987, the Soviets began to admit publicly the political legitimacy of the opposition. The Kabul regime offered a ceasefire and a coalition government with the mujahideen. During the same year, the Soviets made their withdrawal conditional on the emergence of such a government. Knowing that a coalition dominated by communists would not be acceptable to the mujahideen, the United States and Pakistan suspected that the coalition proposal was a Soviet ploy to divert attention from the central issue of Soviet troop withdrawal. At the end of 1987, Moscow dropped the linkage between the formation of a coalition government in Kabul and Soviet troop withdrawal—thus implying that the fate of the Kabul regime would not affect Soviet withdrawal plans.

Third, the Soviets advanced troop withdrawal timetables and modalities. The Soviets reduced their withdrawal timetable to nine months. Privately, the Soviets have indicated that in fact withdrawal might be completed before the end of 1988. According to the Geneva accords on Afghanistan, 50 percent of Soviet troops will be out of Afghanistan by August 15. This makes Soviet withdrawal "front-loaded," meaning that most troops and materiel would be withdrawn at the beginning of the period specified.

DURING THE LAST few weeks before the signing of the Geneva accords, the issue of "symmetry"—meaning the dual obligations of those providing assistance to both sides—became central. Initially, the Soviets insisted that they had the right to continue to supply arms to the Kabul regime after the Geneva accords go into effect, while support to the mujahideen must stop as soon as the agreement enters into force. This was unacceptable to the United States and was regarded as inconsistent with the non-interference and non-intervention obligations central to an Afghan agreement.

During Foreign Minister Shevardnadze's visit to Washington in March, the U.S. proposed a moratorium on military assistance to all Afghan factions for the duration of withdrawal and for three months thereafter. The Soviets rejected this type of negative symmetry. Subsequently, Pakistan proposed that we suggest to the Soviets what has been called positive symmetry—that the U.S. will continue to supply military assistance to the Afghan mujahideen as long as the Soviets provide military assistance to the Kabul regime. It was on this basis that the Geneva accords were signed.

A second issue of importance before the signing of the accords was the question of an interim government. At the beginning of 1988, Pakistan made the resolution of this question a condition for signing the accords. It argued that the establishment of an interim government acceptable to the Afghan people, at the time that the Geneva accords went into effect, would have many advantages: It

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would make the implementation of a possible UN-negotiated agreement easier; it would allow orderly Soviet withdrawal; it would create better conditions for the return to Afghanistan of Afghan refugees now in Pakistan; it would help contain bloodshed; and it would be a necessary condition for a significant international reconstruction program for Afghanistan. But the key issue here was whether the Afghans could have agreed among themselves in a timely fashion. The Soviets argued that the resolution of this issue should not delay the completion and implementation of the Geneva accords. Pakistan accepted the Soviet argument. The signing of the agreement was not delayed because of this issue. However, the Soviets, the Kabul regime, and Pakistan agreed that UN negotiator Diego Cordovez in his personal capacity should try to bring about an agreement among Afghans on the shape of a future government in Afghanistan. His efforts are continuing. Whether Cordovez will succeed is unclear. Moscow and the Kabul regime continue to prefer a coalition—dominated, of course, by the PDPA. The mujahideen naturally reject such a coalition and have put forward their own plan for a government dominated by the resistance leaders based in Pakistan. This issue is more likely to be decided on the battlefield in Afghanistan than through negotiations.

Factors Shaping Soviet Decisions

WHY DID the Soviets accept positive symmetry, and more importantly, agree to leave Afghanistan? A combination of factors was responsible, some of them specific to Afghanistan and others much broader. *In Afghanistan, the fundamental fact was that Moscow had been unable to defeat the mujahideen and did not have a war-winning strategy.* Continued Soviet presence at present levels was not going to change this fact. With the commitment of 115,000 troops, Moscow would have continued to confront the prospect of an open-ended conflict.

Besides the military quagmire in Afghanistan itself, there have been three other key variables affecting Soviet decision-making on Afghanistan.

The first of these has been Gorbachev's domestic and international agenda. The evolution in Soviet policy on Afghanistan in the eighteen months prior to the signing of the accords cannot be explained by the military situation in Afghanistan alone. The negative military situation on the ground and broader changes in Soviet strategy under Gorbachev together were responsible for the shift in Soviet policy. Moscow's problems in Afghanistan may have contributed to the broader changes in the Soviet agenda, particularly the Soviet desire to improve their economy. To bring this about, Gorbachev apparently believes his country's relations with the West must improve, and he has allowed greater competitiveness inside the Soviet Union. He has also sought to diversify Soviet contacts internationally, to establish relations with key states on a more pragmatic basis, and to improve the Soviet image at home and in the eyes of the world.

Soviet options in Afghanistan were constrained by these other considerations. More openness at home meant more public criticism of the war. Afghanistan cast a negative shadow on Gorbachev's image and his relations with the West and key Third World states. The war was also an economic and military drain. These factors limited Moscow's willingness to escalate the conflict by, for example, dramatically increasing Soviet forces in Afghanistan. In fact, these factors encouraged the Soviets to seek a withdrawal.

Soviet declarations have been another key variable. Gorbachev's February 8 statements had raised expectations at home and around the world that the Soviet forces were going to leave Afghanistan soon. Moscow had said that the United States and Pakistan would like the Soviets to stay. Withdrawal had been portrayed as defeating American plans. Moscow also had declared that its approach to regional conflicts such as Af-

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ghanistan had changed: It no longer looked at them in a zero-sum fashion. This, too, might have indicated a Soviet desire to reduce the cost of withdrawal from Afghanistan.

It is quite likely that there were groups or forces within the Soviet Union who might have been opposed to withdrawing from Afghanistan, such as conservatives in the armed forces, old party functionaries, or white Russian nationalists. After all, Afghanistan is strategically important to the USSR, and Soviet power and prestige have been engaged there for more than eight years. Though such factions are evidently a distinct minority in the Soviet leadership, they must nevertheless be taken into account. Thus, a third factor affecting Soviet behavior in Geneva is that the agreement signed there offers the Soviets a face-saving way out. This escape hatch is perhaps as important to appearances at home as it is to those abroad.

What Withdrawal Would Mean—for Us

A COMPLETE Soviet withdrawal from Afghanistan would be a watershed event. The Soviet presence was initially feared as an important geostrategic gain; instead it became a significant Soviet vulnerability. Withdrawal marks a major setback for the Soviets, no matter how their internal propaganda tries to cope with it. Following a withdrawal, moreover, Moscow's relative ability to project military power to Southwest Asia would certainly decrease. The overthrow of the communist government in Kabul—which is likely to follow Soviet withdrawal—would likewise be an important ideological setback for Soviet-style Marxism-Leninism.

At the international level, Soviet withdrawal would have paradoxical consequences: a negative effect on Moscow's ties with its clients, but a positive one on its ties with others. Client governments would have less confidence in Soviet commitments. Third World communist parties would become less confident of Soviet support. If the Soviets abandon a communist regime on their border, then those further away—in South Yemen, Ethiopia, Nicaragua, and Angola—are likely to become more suspicious of Moscow's resolve and steadfastness.

Anti-communist movements in communist countries, on the other hand, will be encouraged by Afghanistan. We can expect increased difficulties for communist governments in Eastern Europe and in the Third World. The setback in Afghanistan can only further strengthen those pushing for more openness and reform in these countries. Soviet difficulties with their clients can also serve as opportunities for the U.S., since those disaffected with Moscow may seek to improve relations with the West. If so, they will in turn become more vulnerable than before to Western pressure. There is danger here, as well as opportunity. The Soviets may well make important blunders in the immediate post-Afghanistan period. The most likely mistake is a Soviet overreaction—a demonstration of strength and resolve in support of one of its clients—in order to contain the damage done to the Soviet reputation after Afghanistan. The West must try to anticipate this possibility as well.

At home, a withdrawal from Afghanistan—widely perceived as a quagmire—will be popular, and support for Gorbachev will increase. However, in the future his opponents might blame him for Afghanistan—especially if post-withdrawal developments in Afghanistan go badly for the communists and if Gorbachev faces increased internal opposition because of his failure in other areas.

Of course, a Soviet withdrawal from Afghanistan will not be without benefits to Moscow, some of which can pose as challenges to the United States. On the positive side, it will remove an important irritant in U.S.-Soviet relations and allow for greater cooperation in addressing other regional issues. This is especially so because Soviet withdrawal is taking place as the result of a Geneva agreement—a highly visible arena and one suggestive of other U.S.-Soviet agreements to come.

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Soviet withdrawal from Afghanistan will help Moscow in Europe, China, and in the Islamic world. At present, Afghanistan is one of the three important obstacles to Soviet efforts to improve relations with China. A Soviet withdrawal will make Beijing more open to considering other steps to improve political ties between the two countries, even if its primary obstacle, Cambodia, remains unresolved.

In Europe, withdrawal from Afghanistan will further improve Gorbachev's image. The perception of the threat posed by Moscow will decline. Pressure for decreased defense efforts will mount. Cooperation with the Soviets will increase—especially when it comes to technology and finance. In the Islamic world, Moscow has been seeking to improve relations with the key states in the area regardless of their ideological commitments. The prospects for establishing diplomatic relations between Saudi Arabia and the Soviet Union will improve dramatically with the removal of Soviet forces from Kabul, as will prospects for a friendlier relationship with Iran.

On balance, however, the Soviet failure in Afghanistan is a major setback for Moscow—one which will erode Moscow's relative geostrategic position in Southwest Asia. For the United States this is a very positive development. American power was engaged in bringing about this Soviet failure. American policy on Afghanistan had bipartisan support. To the surprise of many around the world—especially the Soviet Union—a coherent and sustained strategy was followed for some eight years. Afghanistan has shown what an activist, bipartisan, anti-communist American policy can accomplish against heavy odds. That is not the least of its implications for the West, nor the last.

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Latin America: the Long March

Ilya Prizel

WHILE THE LATEST Soviet policies toward arms control, Afghanistan, the Middle East, and the Far East have received a great deal of attention in the West, relatively little attention has been paid to Moscow's "new thinking" vis-à-vis Latin America. Yet it is Latin America that perhaps reveals the greatest theoretical innovations of Moscow's "new thinking." For the first time since the 1920s the Soviets have ceased to analyze Latin America as one undifferentiated mass firmly in the orbit of the United States, but instead as a complex hemisphere with states at different stages of development. Unlike his predecessors, Gorbachev has devised two distinct policies: one aimed mainly at Mexico and the larger states of South America, and the other at Central America.

This change in strategy has developed in response to a series of events in the late 1970s and early 1980s that strengthened considerably the Soviet hand in the hemisphere. By the early 1980s, the prospects for a radical transformation of Latin America appeared bright. The fall of the Nicaraguan dictator Somoza and the apparent acceptance of that event by the Carter Administration convinced Moscow that a fundamental change in the region's "correlation of forces" had taken place, one that warranted a basic re-examination of all previous assumptions.

The Soviet doctrine of "geographic fatalism"—shorthand for Moscow's recognition of the fact that the United States would always be the primary power in the Western hemisphere—ended with the Sandinista victory in Nicaragua. Georgi Arbatov, director of the U.S. and Canada Institute within the Academy of Sciences of the USSR, noted that the United States would not be able to control events in Central America any more than it had in Iran.[1] Arbatov's deputy Zhurkin observed bluntly that the USSR would "not accept the Monroe Doctrine in Central America."[2]

The demise of "geographic fatalism," in turn, led to a more general reassessment of armed struggle in Latin America. Most telling, perhaps, was the rehabilitation of Ernesto "Che" Guevara, who had, until 1979, been treated by the Soviets as a quixotic and misguided figure. The Nicaraguan revolution, as one analyst has put it,

> demolished the previous simplistic understanding of guerrilla actions, confirmed the justice of many of Che Guevara's strategic principles and crystallized his idea of creating a powerful guerrilla movement.[3]

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[1]See Richard Feinberg, "Central America: The View from Moscow," *Washington Quarterly* (Spring 1982), p. 173.

[2]Ibid.

[3]Quoted in Robert S. Leiken, *Soviet Strategy in Latin America* (New York: Praeger, 1982), p. 34.

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The rekindled belief in armed struggle, combined with the new perception that the United States had lost its ability to control events in Central America, were soon reflected in practice. Both the Chilean and the El Salvadoran communist parties reversed their earlier, more conservative lines. By mid-1979, Shafik Handal of the El Salvadoran Communist Party, who in 1979 characterized the Sandinistas as "adventurers" and "nihilists," was saying that "revolution [in Central America] has now become a reality," and that the Salvadoran communists were ready to contribute their fair share to that struggle.[4] Similarly, the Chilean communists, who had continued to advocate *via pacifica* (the peaceful path) despite the military coup of 1973, by 1979 had created the Manuel Rodriguez Front, a military branch committed to a violent struggle with the Pinochet regime.

The euphoria in Moscow directly affected Soviet policy toward El Salvador. Some Soviet analysts viewed President Carter's effort to secure a $75 million loan for Nicaragua as evidence that the U.S. had resigned itself to the inevitability of change in Latin America, and was attempting to curry favor with the emerging revolutionary regimes. As one put it in 1980:

> The upsurge of national liberation and anti-imperialist struggle in Latin America is forcing the U.S. to change its strategy and tactics in that part of the world. An attempt is underway to move from support of reactionary dictatorships toward cooperation with the newly emergent regimes.[5]

As a consequence of such beliefs, Cuba and the USSR decided to assist the "final offensive" launched by the El Salvadoran guerrillas in late 1980. While the evidence that the Soviets provided weapons for the final offensive is circumstantial, it is known that Handal (despite his complaints of Soviet "indecisiveness") did visit Moscow twice in 1980, and then traveled with Central Committee members Kudachkin and Brutents to several socialist countries from which the El Salvadorans obtained 800 tons of U.S.-made weapons.[6] Cuba's Vice President Carlos Rafael Rodriguez admitted that Cuba shipped weapons to El Salvador prior to the "final offensive."[7]

When Prosperity Begins at Home

MIKHAIL GORBACHEV'S election as General Secretary signaled a major shift in Soviet perceptions of the Third World. Unlike his predecessors, Gorbachev did not attempt to use ideological success in the Third World as a substitute for economic performance within the USSR.

From the start, Gorbachev argued that the key determining factor in the global "correlation of forces" lay in the strength of the Soviet economy and its ability to adapt to high technology.

The new emphasis on the USSR's own economic performance has had several profound effects on Soviet policy in the Third World. Karen Brutents, for example—one of the Central Committee's key authorities on the area—has noted that the USSR stands to gain far more from closer ties with non-Marxist Third World countries such as Brazil and Mexico than from economically insignificant countries that might profess a "socialist orientation."[8] Thus, while Soviet aid to Ethi-

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[4]See Shafik Handal, "Tsentral'naia Amerika: Krizis Voenykh Diktatorov," *Latinskaya Amerika* 6 (1979), pp. 23–35.

[5]V. Skliar, *Latinskaya Amerika: Bor'ba Za Nezavisimost' i Sotsyal'nyi Progres* (Moscow: Znanie Press, 1980), p. 60.

[6]Background Paper: Central America (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Departments of State and Defense, May 27, 1983) p. 5, as quoted in Timothy Ashby, *The Bear in the Backyard* (Lexington, Mass.: Lexington Books, 1987), p. 130.

[7]Jonathan Steel, *Soviet Power: The Kremlin's Foreign Policy from Brezhnev to Chernenko* (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1984), p. 222.

[8]Karen Brutents, "Osvobodivshiesiia Strany v

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opia, Angola, Cuba, Nicaragua, and Vietnam has continued at high levels, the USSR has appeared to be reluctant to seek new Third World allies that might well become burdens.

Gorbachev's *perestroika*, with its emphasis on ever-greater Soviet participation in the international division of labor, led Moscow to seek improved political and economic links with those Third World countries that might buy Soviet industrial goods and commodities or sell needed technology to the USSR. This "new thinking" resulted in Soviet overtures toward the ASEAN bloc, Saudi Arabia and the Gulf states, and most dramatically toward Latin America.

Gorbachev's policy toward the major states of Latin America is based on four perceptions. One is that they have reached a level of socio-economic development similar to that of the less-developed capitalist states such as Spain, Ireland, and Portugal. The prospects for radical transformation of such states are, in Moscow's view, neither likely nor particularly desirable. Second, although all the major states of Latin America are dominated by middle-class elites, these are essentially "national bourgeoisies" which are inherently anti-American. This limits the region's diplomatic cooperation with the United States, and affords the USSR a political opening. Third, the larger states of the region possess a level of technological "know-how" which can be useful for Gorbachev's *perestroika*. Given the substantial Western investment in Latin America and the region's nationalist mood, Latin America might well become a back channel for Western technology which the USSR cannot purchase directly from the West. Finally, though there is little hope for a rapid increase in trade between Latin America and the USSR, some Soviet observers nevertheless believe that given the magnitude of Latin America's debt crisis and the resulting hard currency shortages, the region is bound to resort to counter-trade, something at which the USSR is far more adept than the West. Each of these points deserves further analysis.

The recognition that much of Latin America has reached the level of developed or at least semi-developed capitalism dates back to the Brezhnev era. However, this notion gained even greater currency in Moscow in the mid-1980s, as right-wing military regimes were widely replaced by relatively robust bourgeois democracies. The resiliency and relative friendliness of these regimes led one prominent Soviet analyst to conclude that they are the best that the Latin American "toiling masses" can hope for: "In a whole group of (Latin American) countries the toilers, in practice, have to select not between capitalism and socialism, but rather between bourgeois democracy and fascism."[9]

Ironic as it seems, therefore, the USSR and its closely allied communist parties are doing their best to bolster the power of Latin America's bourgeois regimes. In the 1960s, local communists were often the prime force behind the labor unrest that helped bring down several bourgeois democracies; in the 1980s the communist parties of both Brazil and Argentina made major efforts to support the elected governments. Even in violence-prone Colombia, the communists tried seriously to enter the political system as a bona fide party. It should be noted, moreover, that most Latin American regimes view good relations with the USSR as a source of political stability at home. In several countries the local communist parties were willing to exchange their support for some degree of labor and social peace for good diplomatic relations with the USSR.

In fact, the level of Soviet support for the bourgeois regimes in Latin America probably reached the absurd stage when the Soviet ambassador to Mexico, Sergeev, to the dis-

Nachale 80kh Godov," *Kommunist*, No. 3 (1984), p. 109.

[9]Quoted in Jerry Hough, *The Struggle for the Third World: Soviet Debates and American Options* (Washington: Brookings Institution, 1986), p.139.

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may of Mexico's communist party, expressed his "endorsement" of the ruling party's candidate, Salinas—against whom the communists were campaigning.[10]

The USSR's courting of middle-class opinion in Latin America was perhaps best illustrated during Shevardnadze's visit to South America last November. Shevardnadze expressed strong support for Argentine president Alfonsin's economic policy—a point that drew strong protest from that country's socialist party.[11] Similarly, in order to curry favor with the influential Jewish community of South America, Shevardnadze met with Uruguay's Jewish leaders, promising them accelerated Jewish immigration from the USSR and better Soviet attitudes toward Israel. In addition, he invited their leaders to visit the Soviet Union.[12]

The USSR also changed its academic scholarships policy toward Latin America. The number of scholarships granted to Latin American students jumped from 2,900 students in 1980 to nearly 10,000 in 1987, and Soviet recruitment policies have changed as well.[13] If most of the Latin American students who went to study in Moscow in the past had good "leftist" credentials, today most are of middle class origin. In order to sustain the level of student recruitment and to broaden the base of pro-Soviet sentiment among the middle class, the USSR expended considerable effort in negotiating accords with Ecuador, Venezuela, Costa Rica, and other countries, to ensure that the academic credentials earned in the USSR would make these graduates eligible for local licensing and employment in state bureaucracies.

Furthermore, in order to reassure the Latin American bourgeoisie, which has many trade and investment ties to the United States, Gorbachev has stated openly in *Pravda* (April 4, 1987) that while the USSR might seek to improve its relations with Latin America, it has no wish to disturb Latin America's vital links to the United States.

[10] *Notimex*, November 7, 1987.

[11] *Telam*, November 6, 1987.

[12] *FIBIS-Latin America*, November 6, 1987.

[13] Richard C. Schroeder, "Soviet's Latin American Influence," *Congressional Research Reports*, March 6, 1987.

With Their Own Rope?

A SECOND perception shaping Soviet policy has to do with bourgeois anti-American sentiment in Latin America, which the Soviets are seeking to harness to their own political advantage.

Gorbachev's campaign in Latin America is similar to Soviet efforts to exploit neutralist tendencies in Western Europe. For example, the USSR heaps lavish support on the so-called "Group of Six" (Mexico, Argentina, India, Sweden, Greece, and Tanzania) which has led a crusade for nuclear disarmament, with strong opposition to the U.S. Strategic Defense Initiative. Shevardnadze stated that it was the initiatives of Argentina and the rest of the Group of Six that had made the INF accord possible.[14] Similarly, Shevardnadze invited Brazil to become an observer in the Soviet-American disarmament talks.[15] In order to sustain Latin American support in its propaganda war against the United States, the Soviet Union sent delegations to most of Latin America after both the Geneva and the Reykjavik summits. Statements of the eight Latin American presidents who met in Acapulco last November noted that the USSR had informed them about the progress in disarmament talks, and complained that the U.S. continues to ignore Latin America's interests in that area.

In the international arena, Moscow's diplomatic activism has paid off nicely. In order to coordinate Soviet-Latin American positions at the UN, the USSR has established a permanent consultation mechanism with Brazil and Mexico. And—in a move whose long-term consequences are even more serious—Uruguay's President Sanguinetti agreed in March to lead an effort to secure Soviet

[14] *Noticias Argentinas*, November 2, 1987.

[15] *O Estado de Sao Paulo*, September 29, 1987.

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membership in GATT[16] despite the United States' current opposition to Soviet membership.

The Soviet Union's ardent defense of Panama's strongman Noriega is perhaps the most blatant attempt to fortify anti-American tendencies in the hemisphere. Despite Gorbachev's repeated statements that drug abuse is a global problem that does not respect international borders, the Soviet media continues to defend Noriega as a national patriot who faces a challenge from the United States and "reactionary forces under Washington's control." The Soviets claim that the sole reason the U.S. is attempting to oust Noriega is because of his insistence that the U.S. honor its 1977 undertaking to transfer ownership of the Panama Canal.[17] Nor has Radio Moscow hidden its satisfaction with the fact that the Panamanian crisis has led to the consolidation of Latin America's opposition to the United States.[18] The murder and drug smuggling charges levied by the United States against Noriega have yet to be mentioned in the Soviet media.

Other Soviet attempts to exacerbate anti-Americanism were revealed in the USSR's coverage of the British naval exercises off the Falkland Islands in February 1988. According to the Soviet media, these exercises were part of a direct U.S.-NATO plan to militarize and dominate the South Atlantic. The Soviets are also alert to the political explosiveness of the debt problem. Although the USSR has never adopted Castro's calls for a unilateral disavowal of debts, Soviet spokesmen increasingly blame the West for the debt crisis because of its alleged unwillingness to be paid in Latin American products. Finally, Shevardnadze's visit to Mexico, Argentina, Brazil, and Uruguay, along with Soviet hints that Gorbachev himself might visit these countries, signals Soviet willingness to engage the highest circles of diplomacy in the effort to affect Latin America's global orientation.

A THIRD perception behind Gorbachev's initiative toward the region—and perhaps the most important one—is the belief that Latin America could become an important source of technology for the USSR. The success of *perestroika* depends on an "intensive" economic model, relying on a more efficient application of technology, which the USSR has to purchase abroad—perhaps from Latin America. Brazil and Argentina, for example, possess some applied technologies in which the USSR lags. The deepening debt crisis and the chronic shortages of foreign currency that come with it make Latin America a most willing supplier of almost any export item for which a buyer can be found. The examples of the OECD and ASEAN—groups with political constituencies which fear the USSR and thus oppose transfers of technology to Moscow—have no analogue in Latin America. Sales to the USSR are therefore far less controversial politically than they would be elsewhere outside the Soviet orbit. Indeed, Panama (with its remarkably uncontrolled banking and incorporation laws) gives the USSR a local base of operations from which it can carry out sensitive purchases without attracting much attention. In Brazil, poor administrative controls and very lax patent and copyright laws make that country a haven for producers of pirated Western drugs and computer software. The Soviets are already purchasing Peruvian microchips (produced by multinational corporations) and Brazilian computers,[19] and Brazil has offered to export software to the USSR.[20] Such arrangements may become models for the transfer of Western technology to the USSR. The Soviet launching of a Brazilian-made communication satellite, meanwhile, may give the USSR a glance at Western technology.[21]

[16] *Pravda*, March 25, 1988.
[17] *TASS*, March 1, 1988.
[18] *Radio Moscow*, April 4, 1988.
[19] *FIBIS Latin America*, April 13, 1987.
[20] *O Estado de Sao Paul*, September 20, 1987.
[21] *Veija*, November 7, 1987.

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The Soviets are also interested in participating in the *Maquiladora* system, where hundreds of U.S., Japanese, and European firms assemble goods for the U.S. market along the U.S.-Mexican border.[22] Since this region is the world's largest industrial park, participation may also allow the USSR to gain access to needed technology. While Latin America may not be able to supply state-of-the-art technology in all the fields that the Soviet Union may need in order to become a first-rate technological power, the existence of major assembly plants in Latin America for virtually every significant Western company means that the Soviets can gain access to sophisticated technology.

Thus, although there is little hard evidence to substantiate the claim that large amounts of modern technology have flowed from Latin America to the USSR, the circumstantial evidence is convincing.

The final factor shaping Gorbachev's initiatives is trade. The successful promotion of growth in trade between the USSR and Latin America so far appears to have eluded Gorbachev, as it did all his predecessors. In fact, according to Soviet officials Soviet-Latin American trade has declined from 3.2 billion rubles in 1985 to 920 million rubles in 1986.[23] Despite this decline, however, the violent fluctuations of Soviet-Latin American trade caused by sudden Soviet purchases of Latin American grain and by jumps in Latin America's purchases of Soviet oil may be coming to an end. Both sides realize that each will always be a marginal trade partner for the other; both are primary commodity exporters. The great geographic distance makes some trade uneconomic, and Soviet machinery is incompatible with much of Latin America's industry. However, a new pattern of Soviet-Latin American trade appears to be emerging: the exchange of Soviet services for Latin American products; Soviet direct investment in Latin American extractive projects in which the USSR is repaid in kind; and counter-trade, in which the USSR typically improves the infrastructure in exchange for Latin American goods.

The Soviet counter-trade offensive has been most successful in Brazil, where the USSR invested $60 million in a ferro-manganese plant, signed an accord to swap its turbines for Brazilian coffee, and signed cooperation accords under which the USSR and Brazil will jointly build dams and explore for oil in third countries.[24] Isakov, the Soviet ambassador to Brazil who spearheaded his country's effort to expand commercial ties there, said: "I know more businessmen than communists in Brazil."[25]

Soviet efforts to expand trade with Latin America certainly are not limited to Brazil. The USSR has agreed to trade Soviet shipping services for Mexican pipes, and to provide Bolivia with $200 million worth of equipment for hydro-electric projects in exchange for that country's minerals.[26] Similar deals have been arranged with Argentina, trading Soviet work in infrastructure for commodities. And while the counter-trade turnover between the USSR and Latin America remains low, its growth since Gorbachev came to power has been quite impressive, and more such trade is likely in the future. A particularly interesting phenomenon is that Soviet officials from Gorbachev on down rarely fail to stress that *perestroika* will lead to an expansion in Soviet-Latin American trade.

On the whole, Gorbachev's trade offensive has been successful inasmuch as it has diverted potential future growth away from the classic pattern. On that pattern, the USSR used Latin America as a grain supplier of last resort, while Latin America used the USSR as a source of oil when markets were tight. The long term potential for counter-trade appears to be very good given the chronic hard currency shortages in both

[22] *The News* (Mexico City), January 2, 1987.

[23] V. Malevich in *La Republica* (Panama City), January 4, 1987.

[24] *Gazeta Mercantil*, March 25 and April 28, 1987.

[25] *Folha De Sao Paulo*, May 3, 1987.

[26] *Excelsior* (Mexico), April 3, 1987.

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Latin America and the USSR. And when the United States cut the sugar quotas of Costa Rica and the Dominican Republic, in both cases the USSR agreed to purchase some of their sugar at prices well above those prevailing on the world market.[27]

Nicaragua: No "Bleeding Wound"

BY THE TIME Gorbachev came to power in 1985 the USSR faced several challenges in its Central American policy. The Salvadoran final offensive had failed; the U.S.-supported candidate for El Salvador's presidency—Jose Napolean Duarte—was elected; Guatemala ended its long stint of direct military rule and elected a nominally democratic regime; and both Mexico and Venezuela, which in the past had supported the Sandinistas, became far less supportive.

In the United States, despite a continuous and divisive debate, President Reagan managed to secure modest yet significant aid for the *contras*. Finally, in Nicaragua itself, a country on which the Soviets pinned so many hopes in the early 1980s, the situation has continued to deteriorate. The *contras*, which started out as a rag-tag outfit consisting mainly of former Somozista officers, grew into a significant force drawn mainly from peasants resentful of the Sandinistas' policies. Despite large amounts of aid from Western Europe and Latin America, the Nicaraguan economy continued to falter, experiencing hyper-inflation and ever-growing dependence on the USSR. Diplomatically, the Sandinistas were becoming increasingly isolated, losing the support of Costa Rica, Venezuela, Panama, Ecuador, and to a lesser degree even that of Mexico. The successful U.S. intervention in Grenada impressed on the Soviets that the U.S may well be overcoming the "Vietnam syndrome" and indeed was ready to reassert itself forcefully in its traditional sphere of influence. Nicaragua, and with it the USSR, faced either a potential U.S. military intervention or a prospect of a long "low intensity" civil war with the same debilitating results that Angola and Mozambique are experiencing.

Mindful of this gloomy prospect, Gorbachev's policy in Central America is based not on the euphoric expectations of his predecessors, but rather on an effort to find a diplomatic solution which will enable the Marxist regime to survive. Moscow seeks to stabilize the region so that Central America will not become destructive of Gorbachev's efforts to improve relations with the United States, concerns which are central to his foreign policy. Simultaneously, while Gorbachev appears to be very interested in stabilizing the situation in Central America, he is cognizant of the fact that an abrupt change in Soviet policy toward that region will lead to a revival of an acrimonious debate with Fidel Castro over the ideological content of Soviet foreign policy. Although few would argue that Gorbachev's political position at home depends on the good graces of the Cuban leader, it is simplistic to assume that Gorbachev would want to forfeit his ideological credentials.

The USSR under Gorbachev has launched a three-pronged initiative toward Central America. To discourage the United States in Nicaragua, Gorbachev has increased dramatically the level of arms transfers to that country, insuring that any U.S. intervention would be a long and bloody affair rather than a repeat of Grenada. To facilitate a diplomatic solution which would enable the Sandinistas to remain in power, he has launched a diplomatic offensive in Central America, creating closer ties with Costa Rica, Panama, Guatemala, and Honduras. Finally, in order to avoid a schism with Cuba and to protect Gorbachev's ideological credentials at home, the USSR has continued to shun the Duarte regime in El Salvador and maintained its rhetorical support for the El Salvadoran guerrillas.

GORBACHEV'S POLICY toward Nicaragua appears to be built around several premises and assumptions. The USSR is clearly pleased that a "socialist-

[27]Richard S. Schroeder *op. cit.* p.108.

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oriented" state has emerged on the American mainland. The Sandinista regime fulfilled four tasks for the Soviet Union: it proved again the ideological vitality of the USSR; it drew U.S. attention to an arena of secondary importance to the Soviet Union; it strained relations between the U.S. and its European and Latin American allies; and it put pressure on the foreign policy consensus in the United States that had finally begun to heal from Vietnam. Despite all these gains, the cost to the Soviet Union has been relatively small. Aside from oil and grain, almost all Soviet aid to Nicaragua consists of either obsolete weapons or infrastructure projects which do not require hard currency expenditure.

While there was a time, especially after the invasion of Grenada in 1983, that Soviet analysts feared a U.S. intervention, it seems that Moscow now feels confident that the Sandinistas will survive in power. Soviet analysts note that even at the height of his power President Reagan was not able to mobilize the U.S. public in support of his policy toward Nicaragua. Now gravely weakened by the Iran-*contra* scandal and having entered his "lame duck" period, Reagan is unlikely to involve the U.S. directly in Central America. Increasingly, the Soviet media refers to the Nicaraguan revolution as one that "knows how to defend itself." Although few in Moscow now fear a direct U.S. intervention, there is a growing recognition that the *contras* are more than a rag-tag group of Somozista officers financed by Washington. In private conversations, Soviet Latin Americanologists appear to realize that the *contras* are a credible fighting force with a base of support within Nicaragua.

There is a growing concern in Moscow that Nicaragua, much like Angola, Afghanistan, and Mozambique, may become the scene of a protracted low-intensity conflict which will continue to be a drain on the anemic Soviet economy. Moscow has thus pushed Managua to retain its economic links with the capitalist world, and has actively campaigned throughout Latin America for the inclusion of the Sandinistas in regional arrangements. Soviet support for the Guatemala Accord reflected Gorbachev's recognition that the Sandinistas would have to seek some political accommodation with their opponents. Gorbachev has been most impressed in Poland by Jaruzelski's ability to concede judiciously to the opposition without actually giving up political power. The fact that Daniel Ortega was seated next to Jaruzelski during his visit to Moscow in November 1987 may not have been mere coincidence. It should be noted that today's Poland represents the most successful example of a Marxist-Leninist regime's ability to come to terms with hostile political forces without a basic abdication of power. The Soviets may well feel that the Polish model has some utility in Nicaragua.

It is worth remembering that when the USSR sought to modify Castro's "ultra-leftist" policies in the 1960s, it resorted to the "oil weapon," or slowing oil deliveries to Cuba to the point where the Cuban economy was close to a complete collapse. One reason for the USSR's reluctance to continue to meet all of Nicaragua's oil needs was its desire to impress the Stalinists in the Nicaraguan government, such as Tomas Borge and Bayardo Arce, that Soviet willingness to underwrite the civil war is limited.

GORBACHEV'S CURRENT policy toward Nicaragua has drawn mixed reviews from the region. Daniel Ortega, who leads the *tercerista* faction within the FSLN, has always advocated broad cooperation with non-Marxist groups, and enthusiastically endorsed Gorbachev's *perestroika* and *glasnost:*

> We cannot help but rejoice at the inspiring atmosphere of change in the land of the Soviets. We welcome Soviet reconstruction in every way.

The response from Cuba was very different. Fidel Castro lashed out at the Gorbachev idea of *perestroika*, ordering the closure of the open farmers' market in Havana, and increasingly stressed traditional communist purity, moral

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values, and revolutionary fervor to revitalize the sagging Cuban economy. Prior to the last CEMA meeting where Gorbachev's *perestroika* was on the agenda, Castro allegedly said that "if Che Guevara heard that money would become people's main motive, he would be astounded."

On the issue of Central America, the USSR and Cuba again appear to be parting ways. While the USSR praised Nicaragua's efforts to comply with the Arias plan, the Cuban media was actually hostile. When Ortega allowed *La Prensa* to resume publication, Radio Havana retorted that *La Prensa* was a propaganda organ of the U.S. embassy in Managua which would play the same role that the newspaper *El Mercurio* played in Allende's Chile. (Since communist analysts hold that *El Mercurio* was one of the key orchestrators of Allende's downfall, Cuba is clearly less than ecstatic about the current situation in Nicaragua.)

It is interesting to note that while the Cubans continue to refer to the *contras* as "Somozista bandits" with whom the Sandinistas should not negotiate, the Soviet media have started to use the more neutral term for the Nicaraguan guerrillas, referring to them as the *contras*. Furthermore, although President Daniel Ortega vowed never to negotiate with the U.S.-supported guerrillas in Nicaragua, it was during Ortega's visit to Moscow in November of 1987 that he abruptly changed his position and agreed to enter negotiations with the *contras* through the mediation of Cardinal Obando y Bravo. From the beginning of these talks the Soviet Union continued to exert its influence to encourage their continuation. Bayardo Arce, perhaps the most militant member of the Sandinista directorate, visited Moscow on the eve of the start of the talks between the *contras* and the Sandinistas in Sapoa, Nicaragua, and held a meeting with Karen Brutents and Anatoly Dobrynin. In the press release describing the meetings, characterized as being held in "friendship and confidence" (a designation which in Soviet political parlance indicates disagreement), Arce stressed the "struggle of the Nicaraguan people" while Dobrynin stressed the USSR's "support for regional peace efforts."[28] While Soviet leaders were making no effort to conceal their disagreement with Arce, the *contra* leader Adolfo Calero was praised in the pages of *Izvestia* (April 2, 1988) for defying the Reagan Administration and signing the Sapoa accords.

On the whole, the Soviet Union appears to continue to press for Nicaraguan compliance with the Arias plan while at the same time predicting that the peace process will lead to greater divisions within the *contra* movement, which ultimately will result in its weakening and disintegration.[29]

Befriending the "Fascists"

PERHAPS THE GREATEST innovation of Gorbachev's Central American policy is his effort to improve ties with Honduras, Guatemala, Panama, and Costa Rica. Honduras, Guatemala, and Panama spent most of the last forty years under right-wing military regimes, and their current governments, although democratically elected, remain under strong military influence. Traditionally, the Soviets have viewed these countries with contempt, and the USSR still does not have diplomatic relations with most of them. For decades, the Soviet media have depicted these states as fascist puppets of the United States. It was therefore most surprising when the Soviet ambassador to Costa Rica made a "private visit" to Guatemala (the first contact between the two countries since 1954) and met President Cerezo. Since then, the USSR has agreed to purchase Guatemalan cotton and coffee, and has even offered to establish diplomatic relations (an offer that was rebuffed by Guatemala). The USSR nevertheless hosted a Guatemalan parliamentary delegation in August 1987, and the Soviet media continued to praise President Cerezo.

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[28] *TASS*, March 14, 1988.

[29] *Pravda*, April 3, 1988.

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A similar change has occurred in Moscow's attitude toward Honduras. Until very recently, Honduras was treated by the Soviet media as the prototype of a U.S. pseudo-colony, playing "host" to the *contras* and thousands of U.S. troops sent to Central America to intimidate Nicaragua. Although an elected government was installed in Honduras in 1981, the Soviet attitude toward that country did not change until 1987. While President Ascona of Honduras does not receive the same billing as Guatemala's Cerezo, the USSR established trade links with Honduras in May 1987, and in September the Honduran trade minister Panting visited Moscow at the invitation of the USSR.

In the case of Panama, as noted, the USSR has extended strong diplomatic and moral support to General Manuel Noriega. The Soviets continue to insist that Noriega's sole crime was his refusal to turn Panama into a base of operations against Nicaragua and his insistence that the U.S. honor its promise to relinquish the control of the Panama Canal in the year 2000. The USSR's overtures have paid off, with Panama increasingly aligning its foreign policy with that of the USSR, although the two countries still do not have diplomatic relations. Last year Panama finally agreed to meet a long-standing request of the USSR by granting the Soviet national carrier Aeroflot landing rights in Panama City.

Although the USSR has maintained diplomatic relations with Costa Rica since 1970, relations between the two countries have remained cool. Traditionally, Costa Rica has been one of the most pro-American countries in Central America, and indeed Costa Rica's President Monge was one of the most eloquent critics of the Sandinista regime in Nicaragua. The ascent of Gorbachev to power in the USSR and the election of Oscar Arias led to a rapid improvement in Soviet-Costa Rican relations. The USSR appreciated President Arias' opposition to President Reagan's Central American policy. Thus even before the launching of the Arias Plan for peace in Central America, Soviet-Costa Rican relations showed signs of improvement. The USSR generally expanded its purchases of Costa Rican exports, and since 1987 the Soviet Union agreed to purchase all the sugar that Costa Rica could not sell to the U.S. due to the cuts in U.S. sugar import quotas.

There are several possible motives for these overtures. First, the improvement in Moscow's attitude toward Honduras, Guatemala, Costa Rica, and Panama is consistent with Gorbachev's general pattern of attempting to improve relations with states that the USSR eschewed in the past (for example, Israel and Indonesia). Second, since there was never a serious guerrilla challenge in Honduras, and since the Guatemala guerrillas were effectively defeated in the late 1970s, Soviet efforts to alienate these countries were gratuitous and yielded no benefits to the Soviet Union. Third, Soviet hostility toward Guatemala and Honduras merely pushed these countries even more into the orbit of the United States, thus enabling Washington to frustrate Nicaragua's effort to attain political accommodation through the Contadora process. Finally, Gorbachev appears to realize that the recognition of the Sandinistas by the rest of Central America as a legitimate entity is critical for the survival of the Sandinistas in power.

Numerous Soviet analysts have pointed out that the U.S. was able to oust the Arbenz regime in Guatemala (1954) and the Bosch regime in the Dominican Republic (1965) only after those regimes were isolated from the rest of Latin America. In order to avoid the isolation of Nicaragua, Gorbachev has reversed the traditional Soviet policy of opposing Central American integration. Hence the USSR is enthusiastically supporting the establishment of a Central American Parliament, a Central American Common Market, and any other regional organization which would include the current regime in Nicaragua. The USSR was the first outside power to endorse the Guatemala Accord signed in August 1987. The isolation of the Reagan Administration following the signature of the

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accord appears to vindicate Moscow's new policy toward the region. It is doubtful that the Arias plan, which had isolated the U.S. in its policy toward Nicaragua and Central America, would have gained the essential support of Guatemala and Honduras had these regimes continued to feel threatened by the USSR. Furthermore, the Arias Plan was facilitated in part by the Soviet diplomatic initiative and Moscow's pressure on Ortega to negotiate with the *contras*. It is doubtful that the U.S. Congress would have defied the Reagan Administration and cut off the funding to the *contras* had Ortega continued to refuse to negotiate with the rebels.

El Salvador: The Song Remains the Same

IF SOVIET POLICY toward most of Latin America is a reflection of the "new thinking" in the USSR, the case of El Salvador seems to illustrate the French saying that the more things change the more they remain the same. There, the Soviet position has not changed very much since the death of Brezhnev.

Although there is no indication that the USSR is currently involved in any significant weapons transfers to the El Salvadoran guerrillas, Soviet hostility toward the Duarte regime is implacable. Several prominent Soviet analysts appear to believe that an armed struggle in El Salvador is bound to succeed.

Despite the efforts of President Duarte to bring about a democratic change along the lines of recent developments in Guatemala and Honduras, and despite his efforts to comply with the Arias plan, the Soviet media have remained adamant in their hostility to the regime. A recent article in *Sovietskaya Rossiya* described El Salvador as a "vast concentration camp" which was governed by the "anti-popular" regime of the "puppet" Duarte. Given Soviet efforts to improve its links with almost all regimes in Latin America, it is interesting that the USSR has remained so hostile to Duarte. There are several possible explanations for Moscow's policy.

First, the war in El Salvador is indeed a major financial and political drain on the United States, while costing Moscow little more than rhetoric. Second, accommodation with the Duarte regime would inevitably provoke an acrimonious exchange with Cuba at a time when Soviet-Cuban relations are already tense over economic and ideological issues.

Third, given the role of the armed forces in El Salvador's history, Soviet analysts must be aware that if the leftist guerrillas were to abandon their struggle and join the existing political system, their politics would not be like that of the Venezuelan communists, who ceased being guerrillas and became part of the legal opposition. In El Salvador, a repetition of the 1927 Kuomintang massacre of the Chinese communists or of El Salvador's own 1932 *Matanza* is far more likely. Although Soviet leaders in the past have not hesitated to sacrifice local communists when they felt that it served their interests, a massacre of El Salvadoran communists might provide Gorbachev's right-wing opponents with more ammunition to discredit his policies.

Finally, the success of the ultra-rightist ARENA party in the recent parliamentary elections convinced Moscow that El Salvador's drift back to an ultra-right military dictatorship is inevitable. For all these reasons, as well as the continuing Soviet insistence that Marxism-Leninism is the tide of history, the USSR continues to pursue its radical policies in El Salvador.

Monroe's Last Stand?

GORBACHEV'S POLICY toward Latin America has been largely viewed as successful. Latin American leaders now see the USSR as a great power with legitimate interests in the region, which are actually complementary to theirs vis-à-vis the United States. Unlike the recent past, when most Latin American leaders ignored the USSR, today Latin American politicians now travel to Moscow in order to bolster their political standing at home.

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President Arias' public call for a U.S.-Soviet dialogue on Nicaragua is indicative of a widespread acceptance of the USSR as a legitimate power in Latin American affairs. Furthermore, the USSR perceives itself as a power with major interests and responsibilities in the region. Thus, for example, when Costa Rica's President Arias asked the USSR to terminate military aid to Nicaragua following the U.S. Congress' termination of military aid to the *contras*, Gorbachev in his reply note to Arias stated that the USSR was willing to consider an arms embargo to Nicaragua only in exchange for a U.S. embargo—an embargo not only to the *contras*, but to the governments of Honduras and El Salvador as well.[30] The notion that the USSR would attempt to regulate the flow of U.S. military aid to the regimes of Latin America is indeed a new development.

Despite heightened Soviet ambitions in Latin America, the relations between the two continue to improve. In most international fora Latin Americans have more in common with the USSR than with the United States. Although the volume of trade between the USSR and Latin America remains small, it appears to be entering a more stable phase in which mutual dependence will grow. The Soviet cultural presence in Latin America is expanding rapidly. Unlike past Soviet "diplomatic offensives" in other parts of the world (such as the Middle East, black Africa, or the Indian subcontinent), where the USSR was able to expand its political presence only after spending billions of rubles, in the case of Central America such an undertaking has been almost cost-free.

The extent of Soviet penetration in Central America should not be overemphasized. The region will remain for the USSR the region of least importance in economic, political, and geostrategic terms. For Central America, the crucial economic and political arena will remain Washington, with the USSR playing a very marginal role. However, the era in which the USSR was perceived by most Latin Americans as either menacing or irrelevant is over.

[30]AFP April 10, 1988.

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Southeast Asia—Deferring Hard Choices

Paul Wolfowitz

THERE IS CLEARLY something new in Soviet Asian policy, but its shape is far from obvious. The most talked-about sign of a new Soviet policy in the region is Gorbachev's Vladivostok speech of July 1986, which has been hailed as a "benchmark" setting out a "new Soviet agenda for Asia."

There have been other signs as well. A whole series of personnel changes in the Soviet Foreign Ministry—not only Gromyko's replacement by Shevardnadze, but also a new deputy foreign minister for East Asia, Igor Rogachev, and a number of able new ambassadors—have radically altered the tone of Soviet diplomacy in the region from the heavy-handed, bullying style which helped gain them enemies in the past.

Foreign Minister Shevardnadze's visit to Indonesia and Thailand in February 1987 was the first such visit in twenty years. Intensified diplomatic activity by Soviet officials has been reciprocated by trips to Moscow by the prime ministers of Malaysia and Thailand, by the Thai Army chief, and by the foreign ministers of Indonesia and Thailand. The Soviets have offered to help Thailand with its rice exports and Indonesia with satellite launches. And Gorbachev granted an unprecedented interview to an Indonesian journalist, B.M. Diah, in which he announced Soviet acceptance of the proposal to ban all intermediate range missiles, including those in Asia.

Given the stakes, it is understandable if the prospect of a change in Soviet foreign policy is greeted at times with a kind of euphoria. Sometimes it goes to absurd extremes, as when one prominent American commentator on Asian affairs declared that even North Korea "has lost faith in its ability to reunify Korea under Communist rule and is prepared to negotiate peace with South Korea."

The correct reaction to such overblown expectations, however, is not to deny that any change has taken place. Certainly, to speak of Asia, the question is not whether there has been change in Soviet foreign policy, but what the shape and direction of that change are. Given the prominence that the Soviets themselves have given to their Vladivostok speech, and the heightened emphasis on Asia, it is striking how much remains unclear about the direction of "new thinking" in Asia three years after Gorbachev's accession to power and almost two years after his ground-breaking speech.

So far, the response from most Asian countries to the new Soviet approach has been lukewarm. One of the most positive assessments came from Indonesia's then-foreign minister, Mochtar Kusumaatmadja,

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who called Gorbachev's speech "a good beginning, but there is a long way to go." The *Far East Economic Review* reported that Shevardnadze's 1987 visit to Southeast Asia

> disappointed those who had thought that Vladivostok marked a radical departure from Moscow's diplomacy vis-à-vis the Asia-Pacific region. . . . Many ASEAN observers saw in Shevardnadze's tour a familiar but intensified attempt to win over the region without making real strategic concessions or even offering tangible economic benefits.

There is plenty of regional interest in a more constructive Soviet role—for economic as well as political and strategic reasons. But the ASEAN countries have made it clear that Soviet policy in Asia will be judged by deeds rather than words. So far, the deeds present a very mixed picture.

On the plus side, Gorbachev's two most dramatic foreign policy moves to date—the acceptance of "global zero" in the INF negotiations and the agreement to withdraw from Afghanistan—have had significant impact in East Asia, particularly with respect to China. On the other hand, during the period of this diplomatic offensive, the Soviets have also supplied North Korea with MIG–23 aircraft and have broken new ground by using North Korean ports and airspace for their own military forces. Soviet offers to some of the smaller South Pacific countries for fishing rights appear as ill-disguised attempts to gain a strategic foothold. Military tension between Laos and Thailand has increased and Shevardnadze's visit to Bangkok coincided with another Vietnamese incursion into Thailand, leading the official Malaysian news service to question "whether anything has changed at all in Vietnam's relations with its neighbors."

The Meaning of Vladivostok

ON THE WHOLE, Southeast Asia was given relatively little attention in the Vladivostok speech. This fact in itself was noteworthy. Gorbachev's references to the region were modest but generally positive. He mentioned Indonesia (along with the USSR, the United States, India, China, Japan, Vietnam, and Mexico) as among the "major states of the world" occupying the Pacific region. And he mentioned the individual ASEAN countries in a listing of the countries with whom the Soviet Union is "prepared to expand ties," stating that "there is no small amount of positive in the activities of ASEAN and in bilateral ties."

However, the limited attention accorded to Southeast Asia was even more striking in the case of Cambodia. Gorbachev disappointed those who hoped for Soviet pressure on Vietnam to withdraw, instead appearing to endorse Vietnam's line that the situation in Cambodia is "irreversible" by saying that "it is impermissible to try and draw [Kampuchea] back into the tragic past. . . ." Although implying that it is a problem for Vietnam and China to solve, Gorbachev did express Soviet interest in Sino-Vietnamese reconciliation and in improved relations between Vietnam and ASEAN.

The principal preoccupations of the speech—apart from the question of developing the Soviet Far East, which took up fully half—were China and the United States. On China, the speech was remarkable for its unusually non-polemical tone, frequently calling China a "socialist" country and associating it with the Soviet Union as one of the two nuclear powers in the region who have pledged "not to be the first to use nuclear weapons." The one truly new initiative in the speech, the offer of a compromise on the Sino-Soviet river boundary, was aimed directly at China.

Toward the United States, however, Gorbachev displayed decided ambivalence. On the one hand, "the U.S. is a great Pacific power," with "important *economic and political interests* in the region" (emphasis added), without whom it is "impossible to resolve the problem of security and cooperation in the Pacific Ocean in a way that would satisfy all." But these acknowledgements come only after lengthy attacks on "the ruling circles of the

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USA" and "the ruling forces of imperialism" for waging "undeclared wars" on Kampuchea and Afghanistan, "annexing" Micronesia, "interfering" in the Philippines, and attempting to extend "NATO's competence" to the entire world through the formation of "the militarized 'triangle' of Washington, Tokyo, and Seoul."

This last set of themes no doubt motivated the call for a region-wide security conference "in the mold of the Helsinki Conference" to consider Soviet proposals for nuclear free zones; declarations of no first use of nuclear weapons; naval limitations, including prohibitions on "anti-submarine activity in certain zones of the Pacific"; and other "confidence building measures."

The proposal is not unlike Brezhnev's 1969 proposal, but where he had China as his clear target, Gorbachev's principal target seems to be the United States. Indeed, in a later elaboration, Deputy Foreign Minister Mikhail Kapitsa made explicit the Soviet desire to encourage developments like the U.S.-New Zealand rupture.

Cambodia—The Key to the Future

THE CHINESE response to Gorbachev's speech was to call for deeds, not words, specifically for movement on the "three obstacles." And they singled out as the highest priority the one on which Gorbachev had said the least—Cambodia—suggesting, perhaps disingenuously, that this would be the one on which progress would be easiest. Deng Xiaoping has made Vietnamese withdrawal from Cambodia the condition for his visiting Moscow.

From a very different direction, the Indonesians—who welcomed the new Soviet tone rather more warmly—also emphasized that the key test of a new relationship would be progress on the issue of Cambodia. If the Soviets hoped that this problem might be buried with "smile diplomacy" or vague proposals about the "non-use of force"—or simply become "blurred with time," as they have sometimes said in speaking of China's "three obstacles"—these hopes were disappointed.

Did this firmness convince the Soviets that they would have to bring pressure on Vietnam if they wanted better relations with the countries of the region? There were hopes of just such pressure in 1986 when the Soviets publicly criticized Vietnam's wasteful use of Soviet economic assistance, even though no connection to Cambodia was implied. But those hopes were followed by Ligachev's announcement in early 1987 to the Sixth Congress of the Vietnamese party that Soviet aid to Vietnam for the next five-year plan would be doubled.

The subject of Cambodia does seem to have assumed greater prominence in Soviet-Vietnamese discussions. During Nguyen Van Linh's May 1987 visit to Moscow, the Soviet press reported that practically every meeting contained some reference to Cambodia. One can infer that the Vietnamese must be nervous about the increasing level of Sino-Soviet contacts and Soviet efforts to woo ASEAN. They have felt betrayed by their Soviet allies on previous occasions—in 1954 at the Geneva Conference and in 1972 when the Nixon-Brezhnev summit proceeded despite the bombing of Haiphong. But, so far, there is no hard evidence of Soviet pressure for a withdrawal.

Hopes rose again last year when Hun Sen—presumably at Vietnamese direction—requested a meeting with Sihanouk in Paris. But the very format of those talks conformed to Vietnamese insistence that the issue be settled among the "Cambodian parties." The meager results of those discussions, and the continuing Vietnamese refusal to talk to Sihanouk themselves, suggest that nothing fundamental has yet changed.

The Soviets have sought to distance themselves slightly from this Vietnamese inflexibility by implying, via press sources, that they favor talks between Sihanouk and the Vietnamese. In Bangkok, shortly after the Afghanistan agreement was announced, Rogachev said that it contained important parallels for a settlement of Cambodia. On

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the same trip he came out in favor of the Indonesian proposal for a meeting of the parties to the Cambodian conflict in Jakarta—while hedging carefully on the crucial question of Vietnamese participation by referring to the "Ho Chi Minh City formula."

There has also been distance evident between Vietnam and its Soviet patrons in the careful silence that the latter have maintained over the Sino-Vietnamese conflict in the Spratly Islands. But does this constitute the clear evidence of Soviet pressure on Vietnam to withdraw for which the ASEAN countries have been waiting? That seems most unlikely.

The conventional wisdom that says the Soviets would like to reduce both the economic and political burden of supporting Vietnam's war in Cambodia makes sense as far as it goes. But the other side of that "burden" is a Vietnamese dependence that provides the Soviet Union with valuable assets in its military confrontation with China—not only the largest Soviet military facilities outside the Warsaw Pact, but also a battle-hardened army of almost a million men on China's southern border. Vietnam may be a burden for the Soviets, but it is a very valuable burden. Unless the Soviet view of China has been transformed to a degree that seems inconceivable, they would not trade the benefits that derive from their relationship with Vietnam for those that might be expected from a Cambodian settlement.

The Soviets, however, may not believe they face such a stark choice. There is little reason for them to fear that a settlement in Cambodia would reduce Vietnamese dependence significantly. As long as tension continues between Vietnam and China, the Vietnamese will want the security that the Soviet presence provides.

The Soviets, then, probably hope for a Cambodian settlement that reduces their political and economic costs, but they will not risk straining their relationship with Vietnam to get one. They might support a Vietnamese decision to withdraw, but not pressure Vietnam to do so. The Vietnamese themselves, not the Soviets, are likely to be responsible for whatever movement takes place.

That alone is grounds for tempering any optimism about recent developments. If the Vietnamese are indeed pursuing the negotiating track, it does not mean that they have changed their objectives. Negotiation as the pursuit of war by other means is a technique so familiar to them that it is surprising they have not tried it more during this "third Indochina war." They may be doing so now, hoping to divide and confuse their opponents. It would not be the first time they have underestimated the strength and cohesion of the forces opposing them.

On a more hopeful note, it is possible that the Vietnamese will start to see that what is being asked of them is really not as much as they have been telling themselves—that even the Chinese would settle for a genuinely neutral and non-aligned Cambodia rather than insisting on the return of the Khmer Rouge or the indefinite prolongation of the war. So far, the inflexibility of Vietnamese negotiating positions has simply confirmed those who claim that Vietnam will settle for nothing less than the permanent military occupation of Cambodia.

The ASEAN strategy, however, has been premised from the beginning on the belief that Vietnam might accept something less. It seems unlikely that Vietnam anticipated, when it first invaded in 1978, that the resistance in Cambodia would go on for so long, that the burden on Vietnam's economy would be so great or that the cost to its relations with the countries of Southeast Asia and the West would be so high. Those costs are hardly intolerable. They will not force Vietnam to abandon its objectives in Cambodia. But they could eventually persuade Vietnam to settle for something less than its maximum objectives.

Courting ASEAN

SOVIET INTEREST in enhancing their economic relations with the ASEAN countries predates the Vladivostok

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speech and even Gorbachev's accession to power. The October 1984 visit to Moscow by Ali Wardhana, Indonesia's coordinating minister for economic affairs, was hailed by *Izvestia* as the first such visit in twenty years. While the Indonesians were simply looking for new export opportunities in the face of falling crude oil prices, *Izvestia* cited the visit as proof of a "recently evident evolution" in Indonesian foreign policy.

Since the Vladivostok speech, Soviet trade delegations have visited almost all of the ASEAN countries. In October of last year, Soviet observers attended the Pacific Economic Cooperation Conference. Beginning in early 1987, Soviet diplomats and spokesmen began promoting the idea of a regular dialogue between the Soviet Union or Comecon and ASEAN on the model of the existing ASEAN-U.S. or ASEAN-EC dialogues.

From the ASEAN side, there is strong interest in expanding trade with the Soviet Union, as the Thai Foreign Ministry made clear on the occasion of Foreign Minister Siddhi's visit to Moscow:

> Thailand must try to open new markets for its products. . . . Moreover, there has been a considerable change in the economic atmosphere in the Soviet Union. . . . As we know, the Soviet Union wants to develop its eastern area, especially Siberia. There is quite a good chance for Thailand to trade with the eastern part of the Soviet Union.

Economic growth is the number one priority for virtually all of the ASEAN countries. There are no political objections to trade with the communist countries. However, despite the interest on both sides, Soviet trade with the ASEAN countries remains, in the words of a Soviet observer, "limited and unbalanced." While trade with China increased four-fold since 1982, Soviet trade with the ASEAN countries has declined by half during that same period to less than $500 million, only 20 percent of which is exports.

Soviet spokesmen tend to look for ideological and political explanations for such trade problems. In the words of one, the "development of trade between countries with centrally-planned economies and those in which economies are market-oriented is impeded not by some fatal economic incompatibility but by very concrete political actions that cause the emergence of various restrictions, boycotts and embargo."

But the real obstacle to expanded trade is simply that Soviet exports do not compete, in terms of price or quality, with the alternatives available in ASEAN markets. This is what leads to complaints from the Soviets themselves that trade with ASEAN has "become more and more unbalanced." Last year a visitor from the Soviet Ministry of Foreign Trade said that the Soviets would stop all imports of Malaysian commodities if the trade imbalance were not corrected.

This imbalance will not be solved by the planned development of the Soviet Far East. Indeed, the sectors that Gorbachev cites as the most promising for that region's development—fisheries, precious metals, timber, oil, and natural gas—all compete with exports of the ASEAN countries. When Gorbachev calls for joint development with Japan of the Sakhalin oil and gas deposits so that the Soviet Far East can become a large energy exporter, he is talking about competing with Indonesia in its most important oil and gas market. Proposed joint timber and fisheries development would compete with ASEAN countries as well.

If the current efforts at "restructuring" produce a real change in the Soviet economy, and particularly a change in the quality of Soviet products, a real change in Soviet-ASEAN economic relations could result. But those relations will be determined by economic factors, not political ones.

Indeed, the Soviets probably hurt themselves by their attempts to gain political advantages out of economic issues or by suggesting that the purpose of economic cooperation should be to lead to their proposed Asian security conference. As Foreign Minister Mochtar said, in commenting on Soviet allegations that the U.S. and Japan were attempting to turn ASEAN into a mil-

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itary alliance: " . . . that's their view. Perhaps if they conduct any kind of cooperation, it often is directed toward that idea."

An Asian Security Conference?

THE SOVIET proposal for an Asian security conference has aroused little interest so far. The Indonesians have pointed out that the situation in Asia is very different from that in Europe and that Asia does not need a Helsinki-type conference to ratify post-war boundaries. The Chinese, more acidly, have noted that it is difficult for Moscow to win the approval of Japan "for setting up a regional security system that includes as Soviet territory the four islands over which Japan claims sovereignty."

Gorbachev appears to take note of the large difference between Europe and Asia as well as the lukewarm response the conference proposal has so far received. Nevertheless, he devoted a large part of the Vladivostok speech to the proposals the Soviets envision for such a conference, asserting that the "time has long come" to switch such discussions to the "practical plane."

Why do the Soviets focus so persistently on vague and empty proposals that say nothing about the biggest concerns of the region—which are economic—and almost nothing about the major security concerns, like Afghanistan, Cambodia, the Korean peninsula, or the build-up of Soviet forces against China and Japan?

Soviet spokesmen object vigorously to the contention that non-use of force declarations are merely empty. In a sense they are right. These proposals, like other items on the Soviet agenda, are intended to exploit political or military asymmetries to constrain the American military presence in the Pacific. It seems hardly accidental that Gorbachev acknowledged U.S. political and economic interests in the region but not security interests.

Non-use of force declarations would have no constraining effect on the Soviets. But in more open societies they can influence budgets and force postures. The political effect of nuclear free zone proposals is similarly one-sided. The Soviets may be hoping to kindle popular concerns about nuclear weapons similar to those that swept Europe in the early 1980s.

Perhaps they also calculate that such proposals appeal to Chinese desires for an "independent" foreign policy or to the non-aligned posture of some of the ASEAN countries. Yet the very non-alignment of some of the ASEAN countries makes such proposals unappealing. As one Indonesian, for example, has written:

> . . . apart from the many good things in principle that are provided for by the packages of the Helsinki agreements, such a fanciful design operating in the Asia-Pacific region would above all imply some kind of a division of sphere of influence, not to say domination, between the superpowers over the region, despite protestations to the contrary that one can expect by either superpower.

Realistic leaders in the ASEAN countries—and that includes almost all of them—recognize that the United States plays a major balancing role in the region. Even those who are unconcerned about the Soviet military presence nonetheless welcome a substantial American presence as insurance against possible future changes in the role of China or Japan. Singapore's Prime Minister Lee Kuan Yew speaks openly about such fears. Others do so privately.

The Soviets apparently intend to keep coming back with these proposals. They refer to the long time that it took to organize the Helsinki conference, which was convened years after the Soviets first proposed it. Soviet persistence should not be underestimated. And these proposals make more headway elsewhere in the Pacific, particularly in the South Pacific. But in Southeast Asia, at least for now, they are pushing ideas that have little broad appeal and only introduce a competitive and confrontational element that most countries would like to avoid.

The strong domestic anti-communism of the ASEAN governments guarantees an element of reserve in their relations with the

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Soviet Union. It would limit Soviet influence even more were it not for the fact that the ASEAN governments—with the important exception of the Philippines—have successfully defeated internal communist threats.

Nonetheless, it remains an issue, albeit not a large one, even in the case of Indonesia. Although the Indonesian Communist Party, the PKI (which was virtually wiped out in the events of 1965–67), was primarily oriented toward China, some elements of the party remained pro-Soviet. The lingering Soviet ties to those remnants continue to be an irritant, as, for example, when Moscow radio broadcasted a message of congratulation from the PKI to Leonid Brezhnev on his seventy-fifth birthday in 1981. Or, more seriously, in 1986 when the Indonesians executed nine PKI-members who had been held under sentence of death since the communist take-over attempt in the 1960s, Moscow's *New Times* charged that:

> This is the longest campaign of terror ever conducted, within living memory, by the triumphant bourgeoisie against its class enemy. . . . Many participants of the Moscow international conference "The Working Class and the Contemporary World," who represented the communist and workers' parties of many countries, the CPSU included, condemned the continued terror and demanded that the basic human rights and democratic freedoms be respected in Indonesia.

However, as long as the PKI remains an insignificant factor in contemporary Indonesian politics, such disagreements will not be pursued very far by either country. The Philippines, however, presents an entirely different kind of case, the only one in Southeast Asia where the Soviets could confront the serious issue of how far to go in supporting a domestic communist party that has some chance of eventually seizing power.

Moscow and the Philippines

WHILE MARCOS was in power the Soviets stuck with the insignificant but pro-Soviet PKP, ignoring the Maoist-oriented CPP that runs the armed rebellion through its military arm, the New People's Army (NPA). In part this choice was forced on them. Although the Chinese dropped their ties with the CPP in 1975, the party still spouted Maoist rhetoric and attacked the Soviet Union. As the CPP's founder, Jose Maria Sison, wrote to the journalist Ross Munro in 1982:

> I do not believe that the National Democratic Front as a whole has ever approached the Soviet Union for assistance. Nobody wants a bear hug. It can be fatal.

For some time, the Soviet Union had no real chance to support the NPA. Moreover, it was engaged in active courtship of the Marcos government, apparently hoping that Marcos' periodic difficulties with the U.S. might dislodge the U.S. military presence from the Philippines.

This courtship of Marcos continued almost to the very end, accompanied by attacks on the United States which Soviet media accused of aiming at "nothing less than the destabilization of the present government" during the 1986 elections. Soviet media were slightly more circumspect in their coverage of the presidential candidates—saying that "there is basically little difference between the platforms" of the two parties—but with a clear tilt toward Marcos. After Marcos claimed victory, that tilt became more pronounced with TASS reporting a 400,000 vote lead for the incumbent and dismissing opposing claims from NAMFREL by labeling it a group that "openly sympathizes with the opposition."

Indeed, the opposition to Marcos took the Soviets completely by surprise. Soviet ambassador Shabalin was the only foreign envoy to present congratulations to Marcos on his "victory." After Enrile and Ramos announced their open opposition to Marcos, Soviet media characterized them as "mutineers" and "conspirators" and highlighted their contacts with U.S. ambassador Bosworth. According to TASS, "despite the bawled orders and threats coming from

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across the ocean, Marcos refuses to yield to the gross diktat and has voiced his intention to continue the struggle." On Marcos' last day in power, *Pravda* was still characterizing Aquino as "the leader of the Philippine bourgeois opposition who lost the February 7 early presidential elections and has not come to terms with the defeat."

Given that history, it is surprising how quickly the Soviets have established good relations with the new government. Moscow now praises President Aquino for freeing communist prisoners, for permitting public criticism of the bases, and for seeking to improve relations with the Soviet Union. Ambassador Shabalin was recalled. While the Soviet line on President Aquino has become more favorable, attacks on the United States have become even more shrill. One recent Soviet comment accused the U.S. of responsibility for "every right-wing plot" in the Philippines and a 1987 *Pravda* article cited alleged U.S. enmity toward Aquino in answer to its own question of who was responsible for assassination attempts against the President.

The more open Philippine environment gives Moscow more freedom to attack the Philippine-U.S. relationship. It is clear that the Soviets do not want to jeopardize the advantages they derive from good relations with the present government by openly supporting the communist insurgents.

Nevertheless, the situation of the insurgents has changed and presents Moscow with new opportunities, albeit risky ones. The attitude of some key CPP leaders toward the Soviet Union seems to have changed. The attitude toward outside assistance seems to have shifted too, apparently because the increased size of the NPA has strained communist arms supplies and logistics.

Rodolfo Salas, former chairman of the CPP, told *Yomiuri Shimbun* last year that

> during the past three years, various socialist countries and revolutionary organizations have made proposals for providing us with well-intentioned material aid . . . these countries have included the USSR and Vietnam and negotiations are currently in progress through mediators both at home and abroad.

As to whether the CPP would accept such aid, *Yomiuri* quotes Salas as saying:

> What is important is the nature of and conditions for the aid. There is a danger of becoming controlled by the countries providing the aid. In this connection, we must study the aid with great caution. . . . The USSR understands our position and the prospects are good.

The claims by Salas to *Yomiuri* dovetail closely with Ross Munro's report that in 1981 Salas had arranged, contrary to party policy, for a shipment of East European weapons via South Yemen through the PLO. Shortly after this shipment—to the outrage of Sison—the CPP authorized its front organization, the NDF, to issue a new draft program that dropped all attacks on the Soviets.

"The question left hanging," Munro wrote three years ago, "is whether the Soviets are involved in the flow of foreign assistance to the Philippine Communists." He found no hard evidence of a repetition of the 1981 shipment, but he felt there was a strong circumstantial case that Soviet money must be going through "at least a few of the radical and Church organizations funneling money from Europe to the Philippine Communists." Based on both pro- and anti-communist sources in Manila, Munro reported signs of a debate between the International Department of the Central Committee of the CPSU—which favored the PKP but was trying to negotiate a *modus vivendi* between the two Philippine parties—and the "more pragmatic" KGB which had developed close relations with the CPP. "Both sources assume that the KGB is assisting the CPP but they have no proof."

Two years later the story is still the same—"no proof"—but as recently as last October the CPP publication *Ang Bayan* declared "As to foreign support—Soviet or otherwise—we are open and we will welcome any form of disinterested support for so long

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as this serves to advance our struggle." The number of circumstantial reports (as well as wild allegations) has increased enormously, particularly in the Manila press. *Pravda* has felt it necessary to denounce such "frauds" as "fabrications of the U.S. Administration which made lies a tool of its policy."

In fact the U.S. government has made no such allegations, partly because of the question of hard evidence and perhaps, even more, in order not to cloud the issue. The communist insurgency feeds on indigenous causes and is a serious threat, with or without Soviet support.

It is, however, a matter of considerable interest how the Soviets resolve the dilemma they must be facing. A CPP victory would guarantee the removal of U.S. bases, presumably the principal Soviet goal. But unless the Soviets estimate the communist chances of success to be very high, they must be at least as interested in manipulating the democratic process in the Philippines to achieve the same result politically. Openly supporting the communists would jeopardize, and perhaps rule out, this other option.

One solution, of course, is to limit any support for the CPP to types that are covert and fully deniable. Since the CPP's main needs can be met—at least at this stage—by financial support and since there are a plethora of front groups to receive the support, the Soviets can presumably do a lot without risk of embarrassment. However, they could be confronted with a sharper dilemma if the needs of the insurgents—and their chances of success—were to grow substantially.

A Distaste for Choice?

THERE ARE elements of continuity, as well as change, in the "new" Soviet policy in the Pacific. Certainly there are changes of style. But there seem to be important changes of tactics as well.

George Breslauer's framework[1] usefully underlines the fundamental uncertainty concerning Soviet policy for the Third World. The direction and significance of the "new thinking" in Soviet foreign policy will be very different if it reflects the thinking of "pragmatic activists" or of "crisis preventers."

Yet the uncertainty is even more fundamental than a question of which school of thought is most likely to prevail in internal power struggles. It derives also from the uncertainty about the real-world choices that Soviet foreign policy faces.

Without that pressure of external reality, the schools of thought would not have arisen in the first place, for Soviet policymakers would not have to choose. The experience of the last twenty years has apparently demonstrated to some Soviet leaders that they have to choose among the alternatives of supporting radical allies, cultivating the moderate states, building Soviet strength at home, or benefiting from cooperation with the United States. These choices are not made because they are desirable but because they are necessary.

In Asia, the Soviets seem to be trying to create options that will allow them to resolve the conflicts among objectives and avoid the necessity for choice. They have not decided whether to be "radical activists" on Cambodia or pragmatic ones. They seem to hope that Vietnam will opt for pragmatism itself, sparing them the choice. They have not really decided what the framework and goals of economic cooperation with the region will be—and perhaps they will not be able to decide until *perestroika* produces more fundamental change in the Soviet economy. They follow a "pragmatic" line regarding nonruling communist parties in Southeast Asia, without swearing off the option of supporting them if they become stronger. They seem to want a more cooperative relationship with the U.S. in the region, but at the same time they want to reduce U.S. presence and influence.

Any attempt to compare Soviet policy in Southeast Asia with other regions of the Third World must bear in mind the fundamental differences introduced by the China factor. Indeed, one obvious interpretation of

[1]See George W. Breslauer's "All Gorbachev's Men" elsewhere in this issue.

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Gorbachev's Asian policy, including the Vladivostok speech itself, is as an attempt to introduce divisions among those countries that have opposed Soviet "radical activism" during the past two decades—particularly between the United States and China—and to take advantage of the apparent Chinese desire for a "breathing space" to secure a "breathing space" for themselves as well.

The Gorbachev policy in Southeast Asia fits with the idea of seeking a "breathing space" in order to grapple with the fundamental problems of the Soviet economy. But if this is *peredyshka* rather than *perestroika*, there is no reason for fundamental pessimism. Austria owes its independence and neutrality today to a *peredyshka* of the 1950s. If Cambodia can benefit similarly from a Soviet and Vietnamese quest for breathing space today, perhaps the results for it can be just as permanent.

Soviet policies will be determined in considerable measure by the kinds of choices that others present them. The means have shifted—to a greater emphasis on the use of political means to limit their opponents' strength and to divide them. But the preoccupation with military power has not changed, nor has the desire to dominate and divide any possible opponents.

The Chinese, for their part, do not seem to have been misled. A recent article in the *Beijing Review* assesses recent Soviet policy in a remarkably unpolemical way and concludes that this more flexible Soviet policy has "produced little effect" because Moscow's "strategic aims in the region have not changed."

Despite the very different strategic perspective of the ASEAN countries, their views appear to be essentially similar. The Soviets and Vietnamese have consistently underestimated—or even ignored—the depth of their basic commitment to ASEAN unity. They have thought that they might play on the fears that some of them have of China—even at the same time that they court the Chinese—without noticing that the focus of those fears is internal and that none of the ASEAN countries is seeking a confrontation with China. What the ASEAN countries want is stability and economic growth. When the Soviets understand that and are able to participate in it, they will be able to be a Pacific power in a more meaningful, less military sense.

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Africa: Moscow's Dubious Investment

Steven R. David

IT IS IMPOSSIBLE to recall Soviet expansionism in the 1970s without invoking sub-Saharan Africa, where the manner and speed of Soviet achievements were unprecedented. In 1975, some 12,000 Cuban forces armed with substantial quantities of Soviet weapons enabled the pro-Moscow MPLA faction to take power in Angola. Two years later, approximately 16,000 Cuban troops commanded by a Soviet general and armed with massive quantities of Soviet weapons defended an Ethiopian regime from a multiplicity of threats. In Mozambique, the USSR played only a small role in bringing to power the FRELIMO movement, but the new government quickly turned to Moscow for support, eventually establishing a Marxist-Leninist party and concluding a treaty of friendship and cooperation with the USSR. All of these Soviet advances took place in the face of regional and Western indifference. For the African states and Washington, the USSR appeared unstoppable.

Yet the feared Soviet drive in Africa has not materialized. Instead, the USSR has been transformed into a conservative force trying to hold onto the few gains it did achieve. The instruments of Soviet policy that proved so successful in Angola and Ethiopia have not, generally speaking, been attempted elsewhere. Nor have these instruments been employed in other situations in Africa at anywhere near the levels seen during the 1970s.

The gap between fearful expectation and reality raises three fundamental questions. First, why have the Soviets not been able to extend their gains in Africa? Second, how has Gorbachev's policy in Africa reacted to the disappointments of the past decade? Finally, what are the implications for the United States of the Soviets' present position?

The Soviet Investment

WE CAN begin by recognizing that the major reason the USSR has become involved in Africa is because it is there. As a superpower, the Soviet Union has no choice but to play a role in all of the major regions of the world, especially those with an American presence. Moscow's drive to extend its influence in Africa has been fueled, at least in part, by its simultaneous desire to limit the influence of others—particularly the Western powers and the People's Republic of China.

Soviet policies towards Africa have been dominated by a "two track" approach of courting both radical and moderate governments. The beginnings of the two track policy go back to the 1960s, when the USSR

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wooed both radical regimes (Nkrumah's Ghana and Keita's Mali) and such non-radical states as Nigeria, the Ivory Coast, and Senegal. Only twice have the Soviets placed an overriding emphasis on radical states: first under Stalin (when Africa was essentially ignored) and later, from the mid- to late 1970s, under Brezhnev. Even in the seventies, however, strong efforts were also made to attract non-socialist states.

The Soviet Union has employed a variety of instruments designed to preserve and expand its influence in Africa. Economic means, including aid and the didactic use of the Soviet example, predominated in the 1950s and 1960s. Yet while such instruments helped Moscow gain a foothold in some countries, they were never very effective. In part this was due to the limited economic resources at the USSR's disposal. More important, however, economic instruments are simply a poor way of securing influence in Africa. The People's Republic of China, for example, provided twice the economic aid of the Soviet Union to Africa during the 1970s, but gained nowhere near the influence of Moscow. Recognizing the limits of what it can achieve and sustain economically, the USSR is now warning its African clients to proceed slowly down the path of socialism and encouraging them to seek much of their aid and trade from the West.[1]

The most effective instruments employed by the USSR in Africa are those assisting groups to seize and maintain power. Beginning with Egypt in 1955 and continuing with Angola and Ethiopia today, the Soviet ability to deliver large amounts of arms quickly has been unmatched by any other country, including the United States. The Soviet position has been enhanced further by its ability to employ tens of thousands of Cuban troops in support of its clients, an asset that is again unmatched by the West.

Equally important—and less remarked upon—are Soviet instruments designed to protect regimes from internal threats. In the 1960s alone, the USSR suffered setbacks of this kind in Algeria, Ghana, and Mali. In response it has developed security networks to protect friendly governments. These networks provide a "cocoon" of Cuban and East German advisors dedicated to protecting (and sometimes intimidating) friendly African leaders. The Cubans specialize in the creation of special security formations to guard African leaders, while the East Germans have proven particularly adept at organizing and dominating secret police forces. The establishment of vanguard parties further strengthens regimes by placing the military under civilian control and facilitating the suppression of dissidents.

As for groups seeking power, the USSR currently supports the African National Congress (ANC) in South Africa and the South-West African People's Organization (SWAPO) in Namibia. Soviet assistance is not great—probably less than $10 million per year for weapons such as mines and small arms—and the prospects of either group actually coming to power in the foreseeable future are extremely remote. Nevertheless, Soviet backing enhances the credibility of the insurgents while earning Moscow much goodwill throughout Africa and the Third World generally. Moreover, if either group does one day seize power, the USSR will be well positioned to benefit.

Through such instruments Moscow has virtually eliminated the prospect of pro-Soviet African regimes being removed by force. In a region characterized by coups, it is remarkable that no regime afforded Soviet, Cuban, and East German protection has succumbed to one. This record is not lost on African leaders, most of whom face threats to their hold on power. Since the consequences of losing office often include the loss of life, the appeal of a Soviet-sponsored security program to African leaders is obvious. This, in turn, places the Soviets in an excellent position to ensure that their clients act in the USSR's interests.

[1]The most prominent chronicler of Soviet economic pragmatism is Elizabeth Valkenier, *The Soviet Union and the Third World: An Economic Bind*, (New York: Praeger, 1983), especially ch. 3.

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Diminishing Returns

IF THE SOVIETS are so good at keeping their friends in power, why have they not been able to extend their successes of the 1970s? The answer is that as impressive as they were, the Soviet gains of a decade ago came about due to an unusual coincidence of factors that has not been, nor is likely to be, repeated. The collapse of the Portuguese empire leading to the independence of Angola and Mozambique, and the overthrow of Ethiopia's Haile Selassie created situations in which Soviet assistance became critical to friendly regimes. While the USSR skillfully exploited these opportunities, it did not create them. Indeed, if the opportunities had not arisen, it is difficult to see how Moscow could have made the gains it did.

The Soviets also enjoyed unusual political advantages. Despite the scale of its interventions, and the departure they represented, the USSR had few problems justifying its involvement to other African states. In Ethiopia, the Soviet Union acted with the support of the Organization of African Unity to defend a country's borders from an external invasion. In Angola, the lack of a legitimate successor to Portuguese rule allowed Moscow to intervene without provoking African condemnation. To many Africans, South African-backed threats against Soviet-supported groups in Angola and Mozambique further legitimized Moscow's support. In military terms, the situations in Africa were ideal candidates for Soviet involvement. The gains to be had were considerable, while the costs were not so great as to tax Soviet capabilities or raise unacceptable risks.

American objections to Soviet actions were scarcely more pressing than African ones. At the time of the Soviet involvement, the United States found itself mired in a mood of post-Vietnam isolationism. No greater symbol of this mood existed than the 1975 Clark Amendment (since repealed), which prohibited American assistance to Angolan rebels. Even without restrictions of this sort, it is difficult to imagine that the United States would have acted forcefully to stem the spread of Soviet influence. The United States lacked strong ties to Angola and Mozambique, and the enormous hostility of the new Ethiopian regime to Washington doomed efforts to prevent its realignment.

As well as all this, the African opportunities arose at a time when the USSR held high hopes for the eventual "socialist transformation" of Africa. Marxist-Leninist vanguard parties were expected to guide African states to "true" socialism, thus enhancing the global position of the Soviet Union. With the correlation of forces moving in the Soviet Union's favor, Moscow would be able to protect and expand its gains in a manner commensurate with its newly gained power.

When these factors are considered in combination, it is clear why the USSR has not expanded as aggressively in the 1980s as it did in the previous decade. With decolonization largely over, the prospect of many more openings for Soviet involvement has declined. Further, should new opportunities arise, it is unlikely that Soviet intervention would be as easy to justify as it was in the 1970s. African leaders are already expressing unease at Soviet involvement and the continued presence of Soviet and Cuban personnel; additional interventions would certainly increase their resentment. It is by no means clear that the Cubans (who had extensive prior relations in Angola) would participate in additional interventions without Soviet direction. New opportunities might also involve far greater military cost and risk for the Soviets and the Cubans, such as a conflict with the South African military.

The prospects of provoking the United States through an expansionist policy in Africa have also increased. The trauma of Vietnam is far less acute now than it was in the 1970s. The United States has become more sensitive to Soviet gains, in part as a result of the Soviet successes of the past decade. The United States has in fact responded to Soviet involvement in Africa by supplying large amounts of military aid to the Sudan and Somalia, and covert assistance is now flowing

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to the UNITA forces seeking to topple the Angolan regime. In terms of its global interests, Moscow must surely recognize that its gains in Africa were achieved only at the cost of damaging relations with the United States and helping to derail the SALT II treaty. Insofar as detente and arms control are important to the USSR, large-scale military adventures in Africa will be avoided.

Moscow is also disillusioned with the performance of its newfound clients. The Soviets are now openly questioning the optimism and the value of the commitments established during the Brezhnev era.[2] They admit they have made "mistakes" in Africa and that the outlook for some of their clients is "very dim."[3] Despite massive assistance, no African state in the 1980s has received a higher ideological rating from the USSR than "socialist oriented." Increasingly, Soviet writings express skepticism that self-described "Marxist-Leninist" states will ever achieve true socialism. Instead, the Soviets recognize that their clients have turned into economic "basket cases," beset by constant warfare and requiring a seemingly never-ending Soviet commitment to keep them in power.

Soviet Strategy Continued

ONE MIGHT have expected that these various disappointments would have produced a major change in Soviet policy towards Africa. If so, one would be mistaken. Instead of fundamental change, the present Soviet approach consists of a two track policy that is largely consistent with its past approach. On the radical track, Soviet support for its clients remains high and shows no indications of diminishing. The USSR is not allowing the regimes in Angola and Ethiopia to fall despite having already spent approximately $10 billion (mostly in military assistance) to keep them in power and in spite of the ongoing challenges that they are facing. In Angola, the USSR continues to replace military equipment lost to periodic UNITA offenses while helping to maintain a Cuban contingent that has grown to 40,000 troops. In Ethiopia, the USSR maintains strong support for Mengistu in the face of an increasingly successful Eritrean rebellion that has prompted the Ethiopian leader to acknowledge that he lacks control of his own country. Mozambique is a mixed bag, with economic aid for the regime falling far below requests; even so, Moscow is providing enough military support to defend the government against a growing rebellion.

The Soviet Union is also continuing its policy of courting moderate African states. Virtually every African country has received some delegation, offer of modest aid, or cultural exchange agreement from the USSR in the 1980s. Levels of assistance are not high, but the USSR is making it clear that differences in ideological outlook should not stand in the way of good relations. Relations with influential moderate states such as Morocco and Nigeria remain good, and Moscow is reaching out to heretofore ignored pro-Western states such as Zaire.

Nevertheless, the radical track of Soviet policy continues to make sense. The use of proxies and large scale military assistance remain the only effective instruments available to the Soviets. Their use has protected pro-Soviet governments against a myriad of threats and enabled the USSR to remain a factor in Africa. Moscow may be unhappy with the fact that its clients are "basket cases," but at least they are pro-Soviet basket cases.

The emphasis on radical states is all the more important because moderate states will not provide the USSR with the access needed to be in a position to determine the survival of the regime. Since the USSR has little else to offer moderates, its influence with them will likely remain limited. Insofar as the USSR wishes to maintain a presence in Africa consistent with the superpower status it claims, it cannot allow its position with the important radical states to be overturned.

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[2]Francis Fukuyama, *Moscow's Post-Brezhnev Reassessment of the Third World* (Santa Monica: Rand R-3337-AF, February 1986).

[3]*Literaturnaya Gazeta*, October 7, 1987, p. 14.

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At the same time, the USSR has good reasons for intensifying its diplomatic offensive among moderate states. Although the prospects for significant gains are very low, so are the costs and risks. Maintaining ties with virtually every African state (except South Africa) is an important manifestation of the USSR's superpower role, enabling it to have a say in African affairs. Moreover, Moscow can always get lucky. Given the prevalence of coups and personality cults in Africa, there is always the chance that a pro-Soviet leader will emerge. By maintaining a wide range of contacts within moderate states, the USSR both increases the possibility of such a windfall occurring and positions itself to take advantage of any opportunity that offers.

Further, the more influence the USSR maintains among moderate states, the better it can insure its position with its radical clients. A Soviet relationship with Zaire's Mobutu, for example, could diminish tensions between Zaire and Angola—an important consideration, given Angola's precarious security and economic situation. Conversely, increased Soviet influence could also be exploited to heighten the security concerns of its radical clients in a way that would solidify the Soviet position. By backing a threat, the USSR is often in the best position to undermine it as well. Just as Ethiopia's alignment to the USSR came about largely because virtually every threat against Ethiopia had Soviet support, so Soviet-backed threats elsewhere could also be used to extend Moscow's power.

ALL THIS DOES not, of course, rule out the possibility of future policy changes. It may well be that the pessimism and disappointment expressed in current Soviet writing about their policies in Africa will eventually have an impact. Thus far, Soviet commitments to Africa have not really been put to the test as Moscow has been able to maintain its existing commitments without having to change its policies. Circumstances are now emerging in Africa, however, that call for critical Soviet decisions. The outcome of these decisions should tell us a great deal about whether fundamental changes are in prospect.

One such decision is a hypothetical one. The USSR has never met a self-professed, pro-Soviet Marxist-Leninist group to which it would not extend assistance, either to seize power or remain in power. If the Soviet Union were to receive and reject an appeal for help from such a group, that would be a strong indication that Moscow is serious about lessening its commitment to Africa.

In more particular terms, Angola represents one of the best opportunities for the Soviet Union to demonstrate a new moderation. With the help of American negotiating efforts, an outline of a settlement in southern Africa has been reached calling for (among other things) the withdrawal of Cuban troops from Angola, the ending of South African support for UNITA, and independence for Namibia. Historically the Soviets have been resistant to such a settlement, arguing that the departure of the Cubans would leave Angola vulnerable to South African pressure. The Cubans have also been steadfast in their desire to remain in Angola.

In the aftermath of the December 1987 Reagan-Gorbachev summit, American officials claim to detect signs that the USSR is willing to be more helpful in reaching a diplomatic solution. They argue that the major defeat in October 1987 of the MPLA by a combined South African-UNITA force has convinced Moscow that only a massive new commitment by the USSR and Cuba would give the MPLA a chance of defeating the UNITA rebels. Since there is virtually no chance of the Soviets agreeing to a major escalation of their role, a diplomatic solution looks more attractive. On the other hand, U.S. government officials have been arguing this line for years without an appreciable change in Soviet policy. Moscow is left with a very unenviable situation in Angola. Although the USSR may wish to leave, the likely refusal of South Africa to grant independence to Namibia even in exchange for a Cuban withdrawal from Angola makes an honorable ending of the Soviet commitment

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difficult to bring about. If the USSR nevertheless were to end its support for Angola without first securing the independence of Namibia, it would signal a major change in Soviet policy, demonstrating a willingness to abandon a Third World ally even where the costs of maintaining commitments are not very great.

Mozambique represents another opportunity for the USSR to change its course. The Soviet Union has never been enthusiastic about its commitment to Mozambique. That country's horrendous poverty, inability to pay for arms, and proximity to South Africa make it a less attractive client than either Angola or Ethiopia. The USSR has refused Mozambique's request for membership to COMECON, encouraged its economic dealings with the West, raised no objections to Mozambique reaching an accord with South Africa, and refrained from blocking Mozambican security arrangements with other countries (e.g., Britain and Zimbabwe). There are even reports that South Africa is switching sides in Mozambique by withdrawing support from the Renamo rebels. Nevertheless, the USSR remains the chief military supplier to Mozambique, and continues to provide its regime with the relatively large amount of arms it needs to survive in the face of the Renamo threat. A major change in policy would be signalled if the USSR allowed the Mozambican regime to fall (not a likely prospect for the near future) or if it permitted a Sadat-like realignment to the West.

SOUTH AFRICA represents a third test of Soviet policy. Soviet writings have adopted a far more moderate tone than prevailed during the 1970s. The Soviets have publicly adopted the view that radical change is a distant prospect and have counseled those seeking change (such as the ANC) to go slowly, lest they alienate others.[4] They argue against a course that would result in the destruction of the South African economy and explicitly invoke the Mozambique and Angola models (where the flight of the white populations devastated the economies) as an example of what not to do. They are reaching out to white South Africans and black moderates (such as Zulu Chief Buthelizi) with assurances that political negotiations should include every significant element of South African society. There are even reports that Moscow has engaged in secret discussions with the South African government. At the same time, however, the pillars of Soviet policy remain the African National Congress and the South African Communist Party. Significant changes in Soviet policy to look for include an open relationship between the USSR and South Africa, perhaps leading to mutual recognition. Such a move, especially if done in tandem with Soviet recognition of Israel, would mean that Moscow was serious about broadening its Third World contacts to include all the major parties to a dispute.

The most likely outcome of such tests is a continuation of present policy. The Soviet Union may be more cautious in extending support in the future, especially to insignificant countries or groups with little prospect of achieving success. But, current writings notwithstanding, it is difficult to believe they would turn down the opportunity to increase dramatically their influence in Africa, even if increased costs were involved. In South Africa, Soviet support for moderates will almost certainly continue, as it gives them a greater role in a strategically important country. But these ties will never replace the bedrock of radical support upon which Soviet influence depends. An open relationship with South Africa remains a remote possibility, but it would take a lot of convincing to persuade Moscow that the criticism it would receive throughout Africa and the Third World for such a move would be worth any benefits it might achieve.

There is also little prospect for change in Soviet policies towards its radical clients.

[4]See, for example, the interview with Dr. Victor Goncharov, deputy director of the Africa Institute of the USSR Academy of Sciences, in the South African radical magazine, *Work in Progress*, July 1987.

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The conflicts raging in Angola and Mozambique (and, for that matter, Ethiopia) produce few Soviet casualties and the expenditures for military assistance are not great compared to other Soviet commitments in the Third World. The huge demand for economic aid is either left unmet or channelled to Western donors.

The relatively low cost of maintaining a Soviet presence among the radical states is in marked contrast to the price that would have to be paid if the Soviets were forced to depart. Africa is one of the few places where Marxism-Leninism is taken seriously; if the USSR cannot maintain its position there it is difficult to think of where in the Third World it could. At the very least, a Soviet retreat would call into question the "irreversibility" of Marxism-Leninism and would give hope to anti-communist rebels throughout the world. (These costs will increase substantially following a Soviet withdrawal from Afghanistan, and it can be anticipated that Moscow will be determined to demonstrate that its action in Afghanistan does not presage a general geopolitical retreat.)

What We Can—and Can't—Do

IT IS EASY for the United States to be complacent about the present Soviet position in Africa. Moscow's failure to build upon its successes of a decade ago shows no signs of ending under Gorbachev. Instead, the USSR is burdened with disappointing commitments and seemingly never-ending problems. In a region where the United States has no vital interests, it is tempting to ignore the Soviet role in Africa and focus one's attention in areas where Moscow poses a more immediate threat.

To yield to that temptation would be a mistake, for Africa represents perhaps the best opportunity for the United States to roll back Soviet influence; and by reversing Soviet gains in Africa the United States would be in a much better position to help settle some of the continent's most intractable problems. It is, of course, true that most of Africa's difficulties stem from indigenous causes. Nevertheless, the United States could be much more effective if the USSR were not playing an important role in southern Africa or in the Horn. There are also moral justifications for removing Soviet influence from Africa. The Soviet Union did not create famine in Ethiopia or terrible economic conditions in Mozambique and Angola, but its role in these countries, including the urging of centralized economic planning and state controlled agriculture, has made a bad situation many times worse.[5] The removal of the Soviet presence and influence is a necessary condition for real improvement.

A diminished Soviet presence in Africa would also have geopolitical implications. Third World states would be less likely to turn to the USSR for assistance if country after country left the Soviet sphere of influence. Within the Soviet Union, existing doubts about the value of expansion in the Third World would be reinforced, making further military adventures less likely.

Bringing about a Soviet retreat in Africa need not require an American response to Moscow's courting of moderate states. There is very little the United States can or should do to prevent such contacts. Competition for influence with these regimes must essentially be economic in character, and, given the United States' overwhelming superiority in this respect, it has much to gain and little to lose from this type of competition.

The most effective way to limit Soviet influence in Africa is to remove their 1970s gains in Ethiopia, Angola, and Mozambique. This does *not* mean employing the Reagan Doctrine to topple the existing pro-Soviet regimes. Such a course of action is not likely to be effective against the skill with which the Soviet Union protects its clients. Furthermore, if the United States has to cooperate with South Africa to topple pro-Soviet re-

[5]For how the USSR has exacerbated Ethiopia's problems, see Paul B. Henze, "Communism and Ethiopia," *Problems of Communism*, 30, (May/June 1981), pp. 55–74.

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gimes, any gains reached among radical states would almost certainly be dwarfed by losses endured among moderate Africans.

Instead of overthrowing these regimes the United States should modify the Reagan Doctrine to concentrate on *persuading* incumbent pro-Soviet leaders to adopt policies more favorable to American interests. Moscow has already demonstrated that while it will resist strongly the forcible removal of friendly governments, it will accept the decisions of existing regimes to end their pro-Soviet orientation. The major losses of the USSR in the Third World—Egypt, the Sudan, Somalia, Indonesia, and the People's Republic of China—have come about not through changes of regime but changes of mind. The USSR accepted these setbacks because it was unable to prevent them at a reasonable cost, and because they are less damaging to the concept of the irreversibility of Marxism-Leninism. (The Soviets could always claim that the leaders were not true communists.)[6] Equally important, the United States will provoke far less domestic opposition with a policy of persuasion than with one of attempting to overthrow offending regimes.

WEANING pro-Soviet leaders away from Moscow's embrace will not be easy, but neither is it impossible. The leaders of Angola, Mozambique, and Ethiopia are not puppets of Moscow and all have had conflicts with their Soviet patron. It is not inconceivable that they or their successors will see it in their interests to eliminate or restrict severely their pro-Soviet ties. As a first step, American aid and trade with these states is useful in maintaining contact and in demonstrating the potential for increased economic dealings in coping with the problems that they all face. Economic relations, however, are not enough. Pro-Soviet regimes will forego long-term Western gains if their immediate survival depends on Moscow. The United States must therefore also address the security interests of pro-Soviet leaders.

In general, Washington should work to convince pro-Soviet leaders that their security is best met by leaving the USSR's sphere of influence. Where the United States supports insurgents, as in Angola, it should be prepared to modify such assistance in exchange for a genuine lessening of pro-Soviet ties. In addition, the United States can hold out the prospect of moving towards the Angolan position in the settlement talks and doing more to push South Africa to grant independence to Namibia. Increased U.S. efforts to join with other countries in helping Mozambique cope with security threats will lessen Mozambican dependence on the USSR and could help bing about its realignment. In Ethiopia, there is little the United States can do as long as Mengistu remains in power. There is, however, a good deal of dissatisfaction with Mengistu's rule, and the United States should signal potential successors that it will guarantee their security should they seek to end Ethiopia's alignment to the Soviet Union.

It is gratifying that the USSR failed to expand upon its initial successes in Africa. It is encouraging that current Soviet policies are unlikely to achieve any new breakthroughs in the extension of Soviet influence. But the United States should not be satisfied with the status quo. By inducing realignments, the United States has a real opportunity to eliminate the undue influence maintained by the USSR over its African clients.

[6]For a similar point, see Stephen Sestanovich, "The Third World in Soviet Foreign Policy," in Andrzej Korbonski and Francis Fukuyama, eds., *The Soviet Union and the Third World: The Last Three Decades*, (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1967), pp. 14–15.

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Sentiment and Strategy

The Imbalance in America's Third World Policy

Zbigniew Brzezinski

AS THE United States entertains the possibility of a period of decompression in relations with the Soviet Union, it is important to understand the implications of such a policy for the American-Soviet competition in the Third World. It was, after all, the failure to develop a comprehensive and reciprocal detente in the Third World that led to the demise of the detente of the 1970s. Soviet actions first in Southeast Asia, then in southern Africa and the Horn of Africa, and finally in southwest Asia brought into question whether detente truly served the interests of the West. A new detente must therefore be premised on a clear vision of what can be expected from the Soviet Union in the still turbulent and ever-changing Third World and on a clear-headed assessment of U.S. interests and goals regarding the Third World.

Much has been made of the apparently novel nature of Soviet foreign policy in the Third World under the leadership of Mikhail Gorbachev. This policy shows a clear willingness to pursue a two track approach, seeking diplomatic influence with moderate states in addition to providing material support to radical states and to some revolutionary movements.

It would be a mistake to make too much of the difference because, as others have pointed out, such pragmatism has been present in Soviet foreign policy in the Third World at least since the death of Stalin in 1953. Nonetheless, as a brief historical sketch makes clear, there appear to be some significant shifts of emphasis in Soviet foreign policy toward the Third World.

Under Khrushchev, Soviet policy involved a kind of mindless optimism that history was on the side of the Soviet Union. It led in practical terms to what might be called a premature globalism. Apart from Cuba, the gains of the Soviet Union in the Third World under Khrushchev proved ephemeral. For example, Khrushchev attached great strategic and ideological importance to Indonesia, which not long after his fall from power undertook a very significant reversal in its domestic, and therefore also in its external, orientation.

Under Brezhnev, Soviet policy imitated the West's attempt to buy political goodwill in the Third World through economic assistance and military aid. Pursuing a kind of mechanistic expansionism, Moscow also sought to pour in wherever it sensed a vacuum or Western weakness. The most notable examples were Angola, Ethiopia, and, earlier, Egypt—although Egypt, like Indonesia, ended up as a dramatic setback (for reasons

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having more to do with the Egyptian-Israeli conflict than the Soviet connection). Under Andropov and Chernenko, Soviet policy essentially entered a holding pattern: a serious review awaited a new leader.

Since Gorbachev took power in 1985, Soviet policy in the Third World has combined broad retrenchment with greater selectivity in engagement. This has meant focusing Soviet resources on those countries in which a reversal of previous gains is threatened. In such key arenas of conflict—Afghanistan, Angola, Nicaragua—Gorbachev has pursued as assertive, or even more assertive, policies as did his predecessors. During his first three years in office, he escalated dramatically the military activity, not only against the mujahideen, but also against Pakistan. It was only after that option failed to bring decisive victory that Gorbachev vigorously sought a political agreement to facilitate a Soviet withdrawal. In Angola, there is a greater involvement of Soviet advisors in the actual combat between Angolan-Cuban forces and UNITA. In Nicaragua, the level of material support for Managua has not abated, and may have risen.

At the same time, Soviet policy toward other countries has put less reliance on the tangible aspects of statecraft. There has been a decline—relatively speaking—in the use of economic assistance. There seems to be a growing recognition that even military aid does not assure the ideological or political fealty of client states. Certainly their experience with this problem has been a learning process for the Soviets. There has even been *explicit* recognition of the fact that the Soviet model holds little appeal in the Third World. Statements on that subject by leading scholars published in authoritative Soviet journals in the last several months stand in dramatic contrast to what used to be said in these journals some fifteen to twenty years ago. (The admission of the decline, indeed the irrelevance, of the Soviet model constitutes an important Soviet redefinition of their relationship with the Third World, as well as an internal Soviet re-assessment of the broader historical significance of their model. If it is no longer relevant for the Third World, then for whom—if anyone—is it relevant? It can hardly be assumed that it is very relevant for the more advanced countries. This problem raises some tantalizing philosophical and ideological questions.)

Gorbachev has sought to consolidate ties with certain Third World countries deemed to have some special importance. These have included Mexico, for geostrategic reasons; and India and Brazil, also in part for geostrategic reasons but perhaps even more, potentially, for economic and technological ones. In the Middle East, stepped-up Soviet diplomatic activity has skillfully capitalized on what was not the most glorious chapter in the annals of American foreign policy. The ill-fated intervention into Lebanon and the announcement, amid great fanfare, of the Reagan Plan for the Middle East (but without a serious follow-up) did not represent the kind of sustained diplomatic commitment necessary to produce results. In fact, when the Reagan Plan met with initial disapproval in the region, the administration went into six years of diplomatic hibernation. It was roused by the riots in Gaza and the West Bank, but even then launched only another half-hearted diplomatic foray on an issue that requires a sustained offensive. But in terms of advancing the "revolutionary process" through an active Soviet policy, for now Gorbachev appears to have written off much of the Third World as of limited importance in the American-Soviet competition, or even for the Soviet global position writ large.

BEFORE TURNING to the implications for American policy, it is appropriate to undertake a similar capsulated review of changes in the American relationship towards the Third World, particularly as it was affected by American concerns over the American-Soviet relationship.

Under Kennedy and Johnson, U.S. policy also involved a kind of undifferentiated globalism, requiring the United States to fight any foe and bear any burden in order to

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stem the rise of communism. There was remarkably little discrimination—either conceptual or practical—between vital and peripheral areas, and even less calibration of American commitment to American interests. In Cuba, where our interests were extensive and immediate, we relied on 3,000 Cuban refugees to protect them, and we promptly abandoned these people when the going got rough. In Vietnam, where our interests were far more peripheral and certainly geopolitically remote, we engaged in an open-ended escalation leading to the deployment of 550,000 American troops and to 57,000 American fatalities. The disproportion between these two cases is dramatic.

Under Nixon, the United States showed little concern for the Third World as a matter of strategic choice (or priority). The Nixon Administration was preoccupied with the Vietnam War and took strong action in the Indo-Pakistan and the Yom Kippur wars. It also tried to achieve a better calibration of American policy and American interests through the Nixon Doctrine. But beyond that the United States showed a lack of wider concern with developments in the Third World, even in areas that were potential foci of superpower competition, such as southern Africa and Central America. In a sense, the Nixon Administration, preoccupied with U.S.-Soviet detente and rapprochement with China, did not seem to care much about the Third World. Its policy combined moral indifference and big-power calculus.

Under Carter, the United States may have cared both too much about the Third World and too little. There was a sentimental preoccupation with the Third World, personified in the appointment of Andrew Young as ambassador to the United Nations. The desire to rectify our relations with the Third World, particularly in reaction to the Nixon era, led to some important policy initiatives, such as the Panama Canal Treaties. But it also led—quite often, and maybe even predominantly—to a failure to appreciate the strategic dimension involved and its place in the American-Soviet competition. Carter's failure to respond strongly to Soviet actions in the Horn of Africa (a response which was advocated by some of his advisors) set the pattern for U.S. policy until the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan. Social compassion was seen as incompatible with the pursuit of power interests, and the former was given a higher priority than the latter.

That brings me to the policy of the incumbent administration. Although I am more often than not a defender of its policies, I believe that the Reagan Administration's policy towards the Third World has been characterized by an absence of both sentiment and strategy. The former was well personified by the choice of Jeane Kirkpatrick as ambassador to the United Nations, and the latter by the not very evident interest in the Third World of Secretary of State Shultz. There was a conscious move away from dealing with issues of the North-South conflict, typified by the decision not to sign the entire Law of the Seas Convention. In addition, there was no attempt to match U.S. commitments with U.S. interests. In Lebanon, U.S. forces were dispatched in a senseless attempt to create strategic leverage through a token force, which was promptly withdrawn after having been attacked and bled. In Central America, the communist threat of Nicaragua was compared to that of Hitler, yet American policy relied exclusively on proxy forces in a parallel strikingly reminiscent of Kennedy's reaction to the appearance of communism in Cuba.

At the same time, there has been little outward evidence of clear-cut strategic priorities, whether measured by the thrust of U.S. policy or the time committed to an issue by U.S. policymakers. Distribution of foreign aid, for example, has become incredibly skewed, with over half of U.S. assistance going to just two countries, Israel and Egypt. Here the previous administration is as much to blame as this one. Despite the central importance of many Third World economic and strategic issues, the stewardship of our foreign policy has often reflected a greater preoccupation with peripheral affairs.

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GIVEN THE record of our policies and the putative changes in the Soviet approach, it may be that the United States should avoid a too-comprehensive policy for the Third World. We need to approach commitments selectively, and to distinguish between the two components of our policy: sentiment and strategy.

We need to have some degree of sensitivity to the concerns of the Third World because of what we are as a country. We cannot be indifferent to the fundamental problems of these peoples and still remain true to the historical mission that defines us as a nation and binds us as a people. To the extent we can, we should approach these issues on a multilateral basis, for the United States simply does not have the resources to tackle them unilaterally.

As for the strategic component of policy, it requires the United States to make choices. We have to determine—explicitly, deliberately, and with an awareness of the consequences of the decision—what countries and regions are truly important to us. Strategy must be governed by cold calculations of the national interest. The United States must be selective about where it commits its resources beyond the basic requirements dictated by compassion. It should focus its resources on those countries that occupy a key location or have the promise of rising to the status of a secondary world power. To put it brutally but illustratively: If the Soviets want to compete for the Central African Republic, we should let them do so and not let their commitment dictate the direction or level of our own.

To be selective we need to develop a framework for establishing our priorities. This requires us to overcome the fact that the United States does not have a geostrategic tradition in its foreign policy. Moscow clearly does have such a tradition. Domination of the Eurasian landmass is its first, and central, geostrategic objective. In the postwar period, this priority has led Moscow to emphasize the three Eurasian central strategic fronts in the U.S.-Soviet competition (though lately there is the possibility that a fourth front is emerging in Central America). Our policies should in turn make the countries on these fronts our priority.

Our strategic priority list for the developing countries must include the following Third World states: on the first central strategic front, Turkey; on the second central strategic front, South Korea and the Philippines; on the third central strategic front, Afghanistan, Pakistan, Iran, the Gulf Cooperation Council states, and the moderate Arab states; on the emerging fourth central strategic front, El Salvador, Nicaragua, and before too long, Mexico.

The content of U.S. policy toward these countries has to differ on a case-by-case basis depending on need and on the nature of the country's domestic problems. Generally, it has to involve a mixture of military and economic assistance, and we could well be justified in pressing Japan to make a substantial economic contribution to the aforementioned countries as part of Japan's effort—on which we have a right to insist—to enhance international security. (In my judgment, this is a constructive alternative to pressing the Japanese to expand their defense or direct military spending.) Strategic economic assistance by Japan could help us deal more effectively and constructively with the social, as well as political and military, problems of those developing countries that are strategically important to us.

We must cultivate a geostrategic tradition to govern that portion of our policy in the Third World which is related to or focused on the Soviet challenge. The shortcomings of our policies in the past—overcommitment or lack of strategic vision—have stemmed from a failure to take a clear measure of which countries and regions are truly important to the United States and which are peripheral.

FAILURE TO make such distinctions—and to identify strategically relevant goals—makes it harder to mobilize the necessary domestic support for our policies. This administration would have

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stood a better chance of gaining domestic support if it had made the question of Nicaraguan neutrality—the absence of any Soviet-Cuban military presence—the central issue. The American public, after all, was prepared in 1962 to support even war with the Soviet Union to keep Cuba from being a Soviet base. The country was not really prepared to support American intervention to overthrow Castro, and the same is now true of Nicaragua. When Reagan came to power, he had a chance to mount a credible policy designed to pressure Nicaragua and the Soviets into the acceptance of Nicaragua as a neutral state—genuinely neutral by iron-clad guarantees and perhaps if necessary enforced by an American air and sea blockade. (At that time, incidentally, Soviet writings on Nicaragua began to read like obituaries.) We need to match the level of our policy commitment to the level of our interests. We have failed to do that in Cuba, Vietnam, Iran, and are now failing in Nicaragua. If our interests in one area are vital, we must act like a great power in defending them. If our interests are peripheral, we must take measured action and be prepared for the possibility of a reversal. In the case of the Cambodian resistance, for example, those countries in the immediate area should be concerned about the outcome and act to affect it. Similarly, although we may hope that Jonas Savimbi will win in Angola, that hope need not be a major component of our strategy in the Third World. Let South Africa, Zaire, or even Belgium and France act to defend their interests in this region. Often we will find that others have a greater interest in an outcome than we do and will support an active effort even if we do not.

Our policy toward the Third World must accentuate the role of compassionate sentiment but recognize that the larger problems of development and poverty can be tackled effectively only in a multilateral setting. This is particularly important in regard to a problem affecting so many Third World countries, namely that of international debt. The United States cannot respond to the debt issue on the basis of a national policy, even if we had one on this particular question (which we do not). To be effective, any response will require a truly architectural effort with Japan and Western Europe. A joint effort to deal with the international debt problem has to be the point of departure for a policy which not only expresses effective compassion but helps to avert a possible international economic disaster.

Such a wider ranging effort would also permit the United States to focus more directly on a more selective and admittedly more selfish strategy designed to cope with the Soviet challenge. Because this challenge is the heart of our problem, I do not favor including the Soviets in multilateral efforts. Their membership would obscure how little they contribute (they have given almost nothing, for example, to ease the Ethiopian famine, while pouring arms into that country), and enable them to capitalize politically on their alleged participation in the process. If the Soviets are invited into GATT, the World Bank, and IMF, they will be able to reap the benefits without assuming the burdens and to mask themselves as a global do-gooder when in fact they are not.

A final point: I have addressed the question of how the U.S. should respond to Soviet policy in the Third World. U.S. policy is, to some extent, inevitably reactive. What the Soviets do causes us to define an area as strategically significant. If the Soviets had not invaded Afghanistan, it would not be an area into which I would urge us to inject ourselves. Once they did invade, however, then a larger strategic issue was posed.

In general, our policy should not be a mere response to the action of our adversary but should be guided by affirmative strategic objectives. This is where strategy and sentiment need to be integrated into a more comprehensive whole, based on the premise that a more stable and progressively more just global community is most directly in keeping not only with our interests but particularly with our basic values. And that goes beyond the question of the Soviet challenge.

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Regaining the Initiative

Charles Krauthammer

IF THERE HAS been, as Zbigniew Brzezinski calls it, a decompression in the Soviet approach to the Third World, what is the reason? It seems to me that it follows not only from internal developments in the Soviet Union but from American counter-pressure over the last decade—beginning, perhaps unsystematically, with our arming of the mujahideen in Afghanistan and, using that as a model, aiding other guerrilla forces fighting Soviet client states.

When the consensus for containment (what has been referred to as the blind, global containment policy of Eisenhower and Kennedy) collapsed with Vietnam, we were left with no intellectual structure with which to approach the Third World. With the Vietnam experience, it was obvious that there was no domestic support for "bearing any burden" and for opposing Soviet-sponsored insurgencies everywhere in the world. As a result, we stumbled into an alternative: selective containment. We would have to pick and choose our targets, pick and choose the places where we would support existing pro-American governments against Soviet-sponsored guerrillas. El Salvador was the test case of the 1980s.

Selective containment, a purely defensive strategy, is ultimately defeatist. It means what is ours we will defend in certain areas, and what is theirs is theirs. It is, in effect, a ratification of the Brezhnev Doctrine. Hence, the real innovation of the 1980s: the idea that we will challenge existing Soviet assets at our choosing. We have done that now in Afghanistan, Nicaragua, Cambodia, and Angola. This introduces a dynamic element into the policy of containment, which restricted us to holding on to what we had, and then, after Vietnam, doing so only in selected areas of the world. The U.S. has now regained the initiative. It is able to say to the Soviets, "We will not be defending all of our friends everywhere at maximum effort, but only where we have political, strategic, geographical, or economic advantage. However, we are willing to challenge your possessions, your newer acquisitions as well."

This forward element in our policy in the Third World, which has gone under the name of the Reagan Doctrine, has been a significant cause of this decompression of Soviet policy in the Third World. They have to face a more active, dynamic, and resistant America.

The results have been instructive. In several of these wars we are at the point where the Soviet side, or the Soviet client, realizes it cannot win. When you cannot win a major guerrilla war you have lost, because stalemate is draining and ultimately unsustainable. The Soviets seem to understand that in Afghanistan and, to a lesser extent, in Cambodia. (In Nicaragua, the government was put under tremendous strain by the *contras*, but the *contras*' post-Iran loss of congressional support has probably doomed the enterprise.)

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We have seen, therefore, a change in the Soviet strategy in some of these areas. They are looking to withdraw or to compromise or to find some solution that might prevent the installation of an anti-Soviet government (e.g. Afghanistan). There has even been a change in the language that the Soviets use. Whereas in the 1960s and 1970s they spoke the language of national liberation, you do not hear that much now. At the Washington summit, Gorbachev spoke of "the need to respect the wishes of peoples to determine their own future." This declaration not only has a ring of hypocrisy to it, but also a ring of novelty. The Soviets understand that, because the rules of the game have changed, they have a stake both rhetorically and materially in a more stable international order.

Mr. Brzezinski has analyzed American interests cogently and convincingly, but he left out one extremely important element: how to generate domestic support for our policies in the Third World. It would be nice to be able to determine our policies in the abstract, to draw up a list of states and areas of the world in rank order of geopolitical importance. But we live in a democracy, and these policies cannot be carried out without wide domestic support, as we learned to our chagrin in Vietnam and as we are also learning in Nicaragua.

Mr. Brzezinski compares our support for proxy forces in Nicaragua to Kennedy's policy in the Bay of Pigs. I am not sure what the comparison is meant to imply. The alternative to supporting the *contras* is, I suppose, to use American forces, a more direct and possibly more effective way. Perhaps Nicaragua is important enough that it warrants the 82nd airborne. But we have a Congress and a citizenry that have shown many times that, after Vietnam, they are not willing to tolerate that, unless the war is a three-day affair as in Grenada.

An American response to Soviet policy cannot be formulated simply by looking at our geopolitical interests in the abstract. We have to ask what can be done within the constraints of our political system. That is why to speak of only two elements in our approach—strategic and sentimental—is to miss the point. What the geostrategist considers sentiment is, to the electorate and to a large body of our Congress, the moral basis of our foreign policy, and if that element of foreign policy is not addressed, the most sophisticated geopolitical analysis and program will fail. It will be defeated, not abroad but in Congress.

In Nicaragua, therefore, our approach was the best one possible under our domestic conditions. It was only a proxy army that was in the field, but it was an army. It put enormous pressure on the Sandinistas. I am quite pessimistic about the outcome, but if the domestic consensus would not ultimately support proxy involvement, it would hardly have tolerated more direct American involvement. I do not see any other alternative to proxy forces, given the domestic political constraints on direct American involvement in the Third World.

FINALLY, Mr. Brzezinski spoke about the optimism that underlay Khrushchev's foreign policy. The idea that history is on the Soviet side has its American counterpart. There is a deep American pessimism about the possibility of American success in the Third World (again, a post-Vietnam phenomenon). Senator Dodd made a speech in 1982 in response to a national address by President Reagan on aid to El Salvador. Dodd's point was that the U.S. was on the wrong side of history. We were going to be defeated. It was not worth the effort to support an order that ultimately could not survive. There has been a change in that pessimism over this decade. I think that speech would not be made any more by a leading Democrat, least of all regarding El Salvador.

The idea that history may not be running against us is not based on the notion that the Soviet model is no longer relevant to the Third World. I agree that it is not relevant, and it could even be that many in Moscow agree, but a Third World revolutionary

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might not agree, particularly if he looks to the experience of, say, Cuba. Although a fourth-rank power, Cuba has become a world-historical actor, a small Caribbean state with a foreign legion that moves history in other parts of the world. A fairly attractive model, I would think, for revolutionary elites that want to seize power and make history. In comparison, shortfalls in Cuban sugar production do not amount to much.

If there is reason to be optimistic about a change in the tide in the Third World, it is not because the Leninist model no longer applies. It is because a cost is now attached to establishing a regime which allies itself with the Soviet Union, adopts a Leninist model and flaunts its anti-Americanism. The tide will truly turn when this option has become too costly for even the most romantic revolutionary. And that will happen only if American policy in the Third World remains bold and dynamic.

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The View from St. James' Square

Max Beloff

Chatham House, the home of the Royal Institute of International Affairs, is situated in St. James' Square, London. This is a slightly edited version of a talk delivered on the fiftieth anniversary of Lord Beloff's becoming a member of the R.I.I.A.

I HOPE THAT I will not be thought a prey to senile vanity if I approach the subject I wish to discuss by way of an autobiographical detour. To have been a member of any institution for half a century means that one must have joined it at a fairly young age. I was in fact twenty-four and engaged in research on seventeenth century English history when I was elected by Chatham House. Why had I sought election? In a curious way it was the fruit of schoolboy ambition. All schoolboys cherish ambitions with a greater or lesser degree of a likelihood of their being fulfilled. I in the 1920s had decided that I wanted above all things to be foreign secretary. Why, I wonder.

I had travelled quite a bit and possessed my own passport. I would at moments contemplate with awe what was written on the inside of the cover:

> We Joseph Austen Chamberlain, a Member of her Britannic Majesty's Most Honourable Privy Council, a member of Parliament etc. etc. etc. His Majesty's Principal Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, Request and Require in the name of His Majesty all those whom it may concern to allow the bearer to pass freely without let or hindrance and to afford him every assistance and protection of which he may stand in need.

Our current passports give no indication of the name of the holder of the Secretaryship of State, and are in any event, we understand, soon to be replaced by burgundy colored machine-readable Euro-documents. I doubt if there is a schoolboy in the land who feels as I felt about the imagined figure of Austen Chamberlain, with the echoes of Palmerston and *civis Romanus* which the formula evoked.

There was however one cloud to mar this ambition. I sometimes had the feeling that when I eventually attained the office it would be too late, in that all the diplomatic issues that required the attention of the foreign secretary would have been solved and I would be left with nothing to do—except, of course, issuing passports.

Lord Beloff was the Gladstone Professor of Government and Public Administration at Oxford University from 1957 to 1974 and the first Principal of what is now the University of Buckingham. He has written extensively on both American and Soviet foreign policy.

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Now that sounds absurd. But in the years when Geneva was the magnet for so many of the world's statesmen, the years of Locarno and the Kellogg-Briand Pact, it was not as absurd as all that for a schoolboy remote from the realities of international politics. A League of Nations world order seemed quite a real possibility.

When in 1932 I made the shift from schoolboy to undergraduate, the era of hopes of this kind had come to an end. The 1930s were not a good decade. I had given up the idea of becoming foreign secretary to pursue more modest academic goals, but had retained the amateur interest in international affairs in a variety of ways and was eager to learn more; so membership of the R.I.I.A. fitted well into the picture. But in retrospect—and here I approach my theme—joining Chatham House was itself a gesture in the direction of optimism. For it had been the view of its founders, and was the view of those who ran its affairs, that the scholarly study of international problems and the dissemination of information about them would assist in breaking down the barriers of misunderstanding and prejudice that had helped, we believed, to bring the world to the pretty poor pass in which it stood in 1937. It was not the optimism of the 1920s—no one could now believe that the Foreign Office would shortly become a sinecure. Nevertheless, what Chatham House believed it was doing was something only comprehensible in the light of the idea of progress which had dominated European thinking ever since the eighteenth century enlightenment.

Looking back now after fifty years, the innocence with which we all imbibed these beliefs seems almost pathetic. For over these fifty years not only has Chatham House itself much expanded its activities (as have its fellow institutes throughout the world), but the study of international relations has become established in academia on a scale almost unimaginable in 1937. No doubt some of this study has been misplaced. The effort to reduce the infinite complexities of international relations to mathematical formulae proved a waste of time and effort. It purported to be science but lacked the cardinal attribute of science—the ability to predict. But even where our knowledge and understanding of events has been much enhanced, the outcome remains disappointing, in the sense that the world we live in is less settled and more violent than the world of fifty years ago, and the way out of predicaments less obvious than it seemed in the last years of the Wilsonian era.

BEFORE ATTEMPTING to find some alternative way of approaching the problem, I should like to add two points about what might be called the Chatham House contribution, that is to say the impact of the scholarship that has here and elsewhere gone into the study of international affairs.

The first is that its impact has been too largely confined to the same circles as produced the original contributions—scholar talks to scholar. Those who make or execute policy—and I am talking of the Western democracies—seem much less affected than was expected. Such a conclusion has been brought home to me rather forcibly since the advent to power of Mr. Gorbachev, perhaps because my own work for Chatham House some forty years ago was in the Soviet field. Since then other and much better informed students of the subject have proliferated in Britain, the United States, and in Western Europe. More could have been done no doubt, and there has been some neglect of Soviet studies in the last couple of decades. But no one who wants seriously to understand what Mr. Gorbachev appears to be attempting, in order to see what the Western responses should be, can claim either that he has no material by which to guide himself or that the experts seriously disagree with each other. They may of course come up with different conclusions, in which differences of temperament may play some part, but they all agree on the kind of questions that must be asked and on the kind of evidence that would be significant in trying to answer our ques-

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tions. Yet when one looks at the political debate—in Parliament or in Congress—one gets no evidence of any advance in understanding as compared with fifty years ago in the days of Stalin and Litvinov. In consequence of this—or largely a consequence of this—we get the sudden shifts from enthusiasm to alarm and back again, which have been throughout characteristic of the West's reaction to the Bolshevik Revolution of seventy years ago. For some reason or other the gap between informed and uninformed opinion has not been bridged.

My second point is this. When I spoke of the 1930s as the last years of Wilsonian idealism—having been born in the year in which Woodrow Wilson became president of the United States, he provides a handy reference—I was of course well aware that, although the ideas were largely American, the actors on the international stage with which we were concerned were European. Chamberlain, Briand, Stresemann, Hitler, Mussolini, another Chamberlain—these men made our daily diet of news. Russia was on the periphery; the United States of concern only in respect of naval and Far Eastern issues—matters largely for specialists. Today what matters in world affairs are the two countries for which the term "superpowers" has been coined: the USSR and the United States. It is as Tocqueville foresaw.

Now I have never subscribed to the doctrine of convergence. No doubt technology is a very important matter but I have yet to see any evidence that using the same technology in and of itself tends to bring about a convergence between the societies that do so. Printing uses the same basic technologies at any particular period, but that does not mean that, let us say, *War and Peace* and the latest offering of American airport fiction have much in common except being printed books.

But there is one thing that the Soviet Union and the United States do have in common: the remoteness of their people from the external world. The reasons are of course not identical. In the Soviet case a degree of imposed isolation from external influences has always been seen as necessary for the fulfillment of the purposes of the Soviet rulers and one can quite see why. In the United States this mental isolation (which is uneven) is not the product of government action—no government has less control over its country's media—but represents the lack of interest in things outside the United States on the part of most Americans which in turn can be traced to their national experience, the direction taken by their educational institutions, and so forth.

And with each decade this becomes more pronounced. If I may be autobiographical again, my U.S. experience goes back for almost forty years. I was there for three weeks ending just over a month ago. I had occasion on this trip to visit the George Marshall museum and archive—a great career presented and documented with that affection and precision of which Americans are masters. And I could not help reflecting that the Marshall Plan to which this great and modest man gave his name and which he so largely helped to success proved to be at once a beginning and an end. It was the beginning of Western Europe's post-war recovery and painful shift towards economic cooperation. But it was also an end, in the sense that the close cooperation of American, British, and French statesmen and officials made possible by their common cultural background and by experience gained in the fight against a common enemy—the key to the achievements of those years—will never be seen again. To come back to my first point, what is the use of writing books unless those who matter read them? Congressmen, I would venture to suggest, rarely read. . . .

WHEN I became a member of Chatham House it was dominated as it had been from the start by the enigmatic figure of Arnold Toynbee who as well as putting his imprint on the *Annual Survey*—and how much we all lost when that series was discontinued—was working on his *Study of History*, of which the first three

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volumes had already appeared. Toynbee was never a name to conjure with, least of all among professional historians, who felt personally aggrieved by the spectacle of someone who could take so much past experience into his ken and was prepared to rely in large part and inevitably upon the works of his predecessors, instead of believing that nothing true or useful could be said except upon the basis of original documents. Nor was his reputation enhanced by the prophetic and semi-mystical vein that seemed to affect his later volumes, and the more evident impact upon his thinking of his own personal set of biases.

But I still think we have something to learn from Toynbee both in respect of what he actually wrote and because of the general approach out of which his writings arose.

We have to a considerable extent accepted some of the concepts through which Toynbee discussed and analyzed the rise and fall of civilizations: challenge and response; internal and external proletariats; times of troubles. These and others have passed perhaps imperceptibly into our vocabulary. But more important still for our present discussion is the effort, however imperfectly carried out, to get outside the frame of thinking which is the product of our immediate circumstances, and to try to see our own age as it were from the outside—as it might be seen by some future Toynbee.

Now it can be argued that such an effort is inherently incapable of accomplishment, that we are all prisoners of our own time, upbringing and experience. Indeed Toynbee's own occasional excursions into autobiography show that he was well aware of the problem. My only contention is that not to make such an attempt is even more dangerous; there is no other way to escape what at times of rapid change are the obstacles to clarity of thought.

Looking back over the fifty-one years since 1937, what will some future historian pick out as the major events that distinguish our own world today from that one? Of course we cannot know. But let me hazard some guesses. I do not think that the Second World War as such will figure. In many respects it had a less traumatic effect than the First World War—the Great War as we called it. In a sense it could be seen as a replay of the former war—with a global dimension added to its European focus. On the other hand, I am sure that the Holocaust was such an event. For while men and nations had gone to war repeatedly in all history and in particular in modern European history, no advanced nation with a long tradition of civility and culture had ever before handed over its destiny to a regime which had set itself as a goal the extermination of a whole people in circumstances of intolerable barbarity. It was the Holocaust and not the war that cast doubt upon the very foundations of the European enlightenment and of the civilizations to which it was heir. The idea that, in the last resort, nations would continue to be governed by enlightened self-interest, which underpinned the Wilsonian ideal and which was carried forward into the making of the United Nations, received a blow from which it may never recover.

The next candidate for a place in the list is the invention and employment of nuclear weapons. I am prepared to accept its inclusion though not for the usual reasons. I do not think myself that the availability of weapons of mass destruction has altered the role of war in inter-state relations to a greater extent than the invention of gunpowder or the railway or the internal combustion engine or the flying machine. That is not to say that it makes no difference, which would be absurd, but rather that the handling of the problems posed by such weapons to the strategist or the diplomatist can be discussed and debated in terms familiar from the pre-nuclear past. And I speak on this with due humility, as a founder-member of the International Institute for Strategic Studies.

What seems to me more important is the difference which the consequences of our ability to split the atom, whether indeed for war-like or peaceful purposes, has had for our views on the natural sciences. From the time of the scientific revolution of the seventeenth century, science was generally viewed as wholly beneficial, conducing immeasurably

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to man's health, comfort, and survival. Indeed our modern distinction between the natural and the social sciences would have been difficult to grasp in the age of the enlightenment, as was brought home to me when, during my American trip, I made another pilgrimage to Thomas Jefferson's Monticello. Now it is of course true that early doubts were expressed about the unalloyed benefits of scientific progress when transmuted into industrial development. But the blame was usually held to lie not with the advance of scientific knowledge as such, but with the social order in which its effects were felt. The Bolshevik Revolution was a manifestation of that belief: socialism, said Lenin, is the soviets plus electrification. It is also true that the preoccupation with so-called environmental issues has a long nineteenth century prehistory. The Greens have an interesting ancestry which the preoccupation with their anti-nuclear policies may lead one to overlook. And when we observe the salience of pollution and of the damage inflicted by man on nature, it is worth recollecting that the most moving of all literary evocations of such damage was written by a medical practitioner in Tsarist Russia. I refer you to Act III of Chekhov's "Uncle Vanya".

Nevertheless, when all these caveats have been uttered it remains the case that the nuclear issue has given a salience to the problem of man's relations to nature, as against the problems simply of relations between human groups, which for a variety of other reasons as well has probably come to stay. And while one could say that by and large such issues are ones of domestic politics, they are also directly relevant to international affairs, most obviously because some forms of pollution cross state boundaries, but also because the subject is likely to divide the richer from the poorer nations. It could be argued that environmentalism is a bourgeois luxury, one confined to people who can afford to take the long view.

MY FINAL contention is more controversial. I believe that the future historian will see our own time as one of Toynbee's "times of troubles"—eras of confused and often destructive conflict that follow the breakdown of would-be universal empires. In 1937 there was no single political organization which controlled the whole area dominated by European economic and cultural activity. There was nothing equivalent to the Roman Empire. But the dominance of Europe in world politics was a fact. The United States might prefer to play a separate political role; Russia was torn as it had been for centuries between acceptance of European ideas and a native isolationism; Japan had approached the European model with a selectivity arising from its own national self-perception. But Europe remained at the center.

Today we see a very different picture. The reason must be sought in large part in the liquidation of European overseas empires. I do not propose here and now to go into the question of why this has happened except to say that I doubt whether some future Gibbon will take the same view as is offered today by the moguls of the cinema and television; he will not I think regard the process primarily as one of nations rightly struggling to be free. Anyhow, few will doubt that this liquidation provides a third mental barrier between 1937 and 1987.

Some people regard this development in world affairs as beneficial; I regard it as an almost unmitigated disaster. I am not thinking of the material consequences for the metropolitan countries; in some respects all of them, including Britain, may be stronger economically and benefit more from their growing links with each other than they did from their presence overseas. My sadness derives from three different sources.

The first is relatively straightforward, that is to say the losses that the former colonial peoples have sustained and are sustaining in the most precious area of all: human life. I am basically a Hobbesian; nothing compensates for the greater likelihood of a sudden and violent death or death from famine, and if we are to find anywhere lives that are "solitary, poor, nasty, brutish, and short" surely it is in

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the lands once under imperial rule. I do not see how this can be compensated for by the trappings of self-government.

My second reason is that the difficulties of founding a new international order based on the minimum requirements of a rule of law have been vastly increased by the proliferation of nominally sovereign states, many incapable of carrying out even the minimal duties of government. A United Nations of over 150 members is not a viable instrument for promoting peace.

But the third and most important reason for a growing sense of despair is the psychological impact which the retreat from Empire has had upon Europe itself, adding to its sense of guilt about the successive European civil wars that have diminished its moral authority, a temptation to see the world not in its own terms but in those imposed upon it by the so-called Third World countries which it feels the need to propitiate. And this also fits into the Toynbeean scheme of things. In Volume I of the *Study of History*, published in 1934, we read (p. 40):

> When a frontier between a more highly and a less highly civilized society ceases to advance at the more backward society's expense, the balance does not settle down into a stable equilibrium but inclines with the passage of time in the more backward society's favour.

And this is surely what is happening in contemporary Europe, though in ways which Toynbee could hardly have foreseen.

It is a process particularly observable in England with its educational establishment increasingly committed to cutting its links, whether through the teaching of English history or the study of the classical language, with the common European heritage. It means accepting a lowering of the standards demanded in the use of the English language. And one cannot too much emphasize the role of language and the difference between the "tongue that Shakespeare spake" and the unstructured self-expression, free from the rules of grammar, that to some seems adequate for communication. . . . It is perhaps difficult to disentangle here the consequences of democracy as such from those of a too willful acceptance of external influences. And the cultural impact of the imperial retreat is something scarcely yet explored (as is true of cultural proletarianization generally).

Politically the most important effect of the process has been the willingness of our leaders increasingly to accept the doublethink and the distortions of language inherent in the wish to meet the demands made upon us by former colonial possessions as the price of our continued association with them. Each successive Commonwealth summit reveals this truth more clearly. 1937 was a year also remarkable for the publication of the first volume of Sir Keith Hancock's *Survey of British Commonwealth Affairs* which stands with Toynbee's *Study* as Chatham House's principal literary monument. It was continued with magisterial patience and thoroughness in the series of volumes by Nicholas Mansergh. The final volume in the series by the Australian Bruce Miller correctly drops "*British*" from the title and is suitably subtitled *Problems of Expansion and Attrition*. The volume ends with 1969, since when it has been downhill all the way.

It may be that some future historian will argue that it was necessary to keep the Commonwealth in being in order to avoid the feeling of nakedness which might otherwise have overwhelmed the British people when they discovered that both the British Empire and the British Commonwealth were there no longer. But we have paid a high price for maintaining this protective covering. Again, I do not speak of material matters. It is quite right for a humane society to wish to relieve distress beyond its boundaries and some aid no doubt gets through to the right places. I see no reason why we should not give anglophony the same attention as the French give francophony. What worries me is the hypocrisy that seems bound up with these laudable activities—the pretense that the Commonwealth does embody some genuine criteria about human rights, liberal institutions, and the rule of law.

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THE CONDUCT of international affairs has always involved some measure of hypocrisy. Statesmen do not always tell the truth and there may be good reasons for their not doing so. But a price has to be paid. In 1937 those of us who were uneasy about "appeasement" complained that the British and French governments were playing down the departures in Nazi Germany and Fascist Italy from what were regarded as the norms of civilized conduct; we felt that "non-intervention" in Spain was an unhappy way of describing what was going on there. But today such indifference to the truth is not confined to governments or to newspapers acting under their guidance; it seems to afflict the intellectual world at large. And from international relations such departures from linguistic precision and clarity of thought spill over onto the domestic scene so that confusion feeds upon itself.

The ability to conduct government according to constitutional norms at home is a precondition of taking part in the creation of a true world order. But constitutionalism is itself under challenge. I went to the United States this year to take part in celebrating the United States Constitution, once held out as a beacon to less happy lands. I found that it was more like a wake, since the Constitution is in the process of being dismantled partly in the name of currently fashionable abstractions of the kind we are familiar with here, and partly because the demands of behaving in a way which takes full account of the international environment are too much for it. Here also there are signs of constitutional disarray particularly in the threat posed to our constitutional monarchy by its role in the Commonwealth.

I would not presume to look into the future but I would conclude by expressing the view that one of the causes of our bewilderment is the acceleration of the historical process in our own time. As a greater historian than Toynbee has put it:

"*Contrairement à l'eau des fleuves qui bondit au départ et s'assagit vers l'aval, l'eau de l'histoire coule d'abord au ralenti et ne s'accellère qu'en se rapprochant de nous et de notre époque.*"[1]

What then will the view from St. James' Square be in 2037?

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[1] "Unlike the flow of rivers, whose tempo is fastest at the source and then diminishes, the stream of history begins slowly but accelerates rapidly as it approaches us and our epoch."
Fernand Braudel, *L'Identité de la France*, Vol. 2, Part 1 (Paris, 1986), p. 71.

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Big Brother's Little Book

Steven C. Munson

He felt deeply drawn to him, and not solely because he was intrigued by the contrast between O'Brien's urbane manner and his prize-fighter's physique. Much more it was because of a secretly held belief—or perhaps not even a belief, merely a hope—that O'Brien's political orthodoxy was not perfect. Something in his face suggested it irresistibly. And again, perhaps it was not even unorthodoxy that was written in his face, but simply intelligence. But at any rate he had the appearance of being a person that you could talk to, if somehow you could cheat the telescreen and get him alone.

—*George Orwell*, 1984

"IF GORBACHEV was an American, he would be more American than apple pie." This sentiment, expressed by a prominent United States congressman, perhaps more than any other sums up the feeling of *bonhomie* that prevailed during the visit of the General Secretary of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union to the United States last December. Although Congress denied him the privilege of addressing a joint session—an act for which not a few of its members, from both sides of the aisle, felt obliged to apologize—Mr. Gorbachev was in almost all other ways made to feel a welcome and important guest. Politicians, intellectuals, businessmen, journalists, and figures from the entertainment industry met with the Soviet leader and pronounced him, as so many before them had done, tough, charming, and brilliant. In a typical reaction, *Washington Post* columnist Mary McGrory complained that "None of the men who want to be president are in his intellectual league," and wondered why we hadn't produced a Gorbachev of our own. Other observers found in the Soviet Communist Party boss much more than a model for American presidential candidates. *Time* magazine, in the issue announcing its selection of Mr. Gorbachev as Man of the Year for 1987, credited him with helping "to nudge his country and Ronald Reagan's off the path to nuclear destruction," while becoming "a symbol of hope for a new kind of Soviet Union: more open, more concerned with the welfare of its citizens and less with the spread

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of its ideology and system abroad." Historian John Lewis Gaddis suggested that Gorbachev might very well represent the "mellowing" of Soviet Communism envisaged forty years ago by George Kennan when he proposed the strategy of containment.

Mr. Gaddis offered this assessment in a review of the Soviet leader's now-famous book, *Perestroika: New Thinking for Our Country and the World.** At the Soviets' request, the book was brought out in the United States to coincide with the seventieth anniversary of the Bolshevik Revolution, and is (or will be) available in at least seventeen other countries and all major languages. The publisher called it "the book of the year by the statesman of the year," and it has been touted as the most significant statement to date of the Soviet leader's intention to make a better life for his countrymen and peace with the rest of the world. But if Mr. Gorbachev is adept enough to tell many of us what we want to hear ("We are all passengers aboard one ship, the Earth, and we must not allow it to be wrecked"—to take just one example), he is also confident enough to make clear what he and his colleagues are after.

THE FIRST HALF of the book is an account of the origins, meaning, and internal application of *perestroika*, or "restructuring." Mr. Gorbachev tells us that the policy grew out of a gradual recognition that the country had begun "to lose its momentum." "Economic failures," he writes, "became more frequent. . . . A gradual erosion of the ideological and moral values of our people began . . . fewer and fewer demands were made on discipline and responsibility. . . . There emerged a disrespect for the law and encouragement of eyewash and bribery." He emphasizes that *perestroika* was not a sudden inspiration but had been formulated within the communist party leadership before he was elevated to full power. He insists that the Soviet people enthusiastically support restructuring; though justifiably proud of the Soviet Union's accomplishments, they, too, had sensed that something was amiss and perceived the need for change.

Mr. Gorbachev cites the letters he says he has received from all parts of the country as evidence that he and his policies enjoy widespread support, and that he is a responsive leader. The idea that under *perestroika* the Soviet Union is becoming more democratic is one to which he returns again and again. Indeed, for him, restructuring is synonymous with the achievement of full democracy.

Such protestations of a new Soviet attitude have been taken pretty much at face value by the Western press and by a number of prominent Soviet-affairs specialists. In reviewing *Perestroika*, both Robert Legvold, Director of the Harriman Institute of Columbia University, and Gaddis waxed enthusiastic over the Soviet leader's views. According to Legvold, "*Glasnost*, *demokratizatsiya* and *perestroika* are bound together in his mind and in his schemes like bricks and mortar. . . . As he says, after seventy years, 'one mustn't be afraid of one's own people.' " Gaddis insisted that "*perestroika* for Gorbachev is nothing less than a second Russian Revolution, aimed this time at reinvigorating socialism *by linking it to democracy*." [Gaddis's emphasis] Both glossed over the fact that when the Soviet leader talks about democracy, he is not talking about regular competitive elections, freedom of speech, religious tolerance, or any of the other attributes of genuinely democratic countries. But even analysts who have called attention to this distinction nevertheless seem to think that under Gorbachev some sort of informal democratic process is already at work. Thus Thane Gustafson of Georgetown University asserts in *The New Republic* that, "In the long run, the success of Gorbachev's program depends on whether the Soviet population will support it."

While encouraging us to accept this idea, Mr. Gorbachev makes no bones about the fact that the true goal of his program is the fulfillment of the Marxist-Leninist dream:

*New York: Harper & Row, 1987, 254 pp., $19.95.

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> Marx, Engels and Lenin, who theoretically substantiated the principles on which the concept of socialism is founded, did not seek to give a detailed picture of the future society. And this is in general impossible to do. This picture acquired its outlines and is still in the making as a result of the revolutionary creative work of all the socialist states.

Mr. Gorbachev dismisses those in the West who say that the Soviet Union has finally admitted the failure of its system and is now on the verge of abandoning it. He stresses that *perestroika*, far from being a repudiation of the Bolshevik Revolution, represents the latest stage of progressive development towards perfect communism:

> No matter what the opponents of communism think, communism originated and exists in the interest of man and his freedom, in order to defend his genuine rights and justice on earth. Communism has a tremendous potential for humanitarianism. That is why our shared world outlook, and the ideas, assessments, considerations and mutual benevolent criticism, which we exchange with our friends in spirit, are indispensable. They help to develop a new way of thinking. . . .

This is, of course, fully in line with what every Soviet leader has said about his policies ever since the first five-year plan was announced. But while he avidly propounds the goal of his predecessors, Mr. Gorbachev also assures us that, whatever differences may exist between our two societies, we have a lot in common. The Soviet people want to spend less on weapons and more on social needs, they want to feel proud of their scientific and cultural achievements, and they want to be respected by others. Is it not the same for Americans? Sprinkling his discussion with familiar words and phrases ("feedback," "melting pot," etc.), Mr. Gorbachev conveys the message that there is a fundamental identity of aspirations and interests between the people of the Soviet Union and the people of the United States. Nowhere is this identity more evident, in his view, than on the issue of nuclear war.

Here again Mr. Gorbachev has been taken at his word and commended for his sincerity. *New York Times* reviewer Christopher Lehman-Haupt, complaining that the "author seems wedded to a line of reasoning that holds that a condition and its opposite can be true at the same time," laments that "Such double-talk . . . undermines the reasonableness of Mr. Gorbachev's text, and makes one doubt him even when he seems sincere, as he does most eloquently whenever he writes about the barrenness of nuclear diplomacy and the need for the superpowers to give up nuclear arms."[1] Legvold, remarking that the Soviet leader still has "the biases of his world view," nonetheless claims that "his angle on reality does not prevent him from recognizing the futility of nuclear war and the dangers of manipulating the threat of war for political gain."

IN TRUTH, Mr. Gorbachev is engaged in just this sort of manipulation, in *Perestroika* and elsewhere. He himself admits as much when he says that his government is "vigorously seeking to translate this new thinking into action, primarily in the field of disarmament." But he also reminds his readers that "the Soviet Union has long been working for peace." Indeed, when he outlines what *perestroika* means in the inter-

[1] "To know and not to know, to be conscious of complete truthfulness while telling carefully constructed lies, to hold simultaneously two opinions which cancelled out, knowing them to be contradictory and believing in both of them, to use logic against logic, to repudiate morality while laying claim to it, to believe that democracy was impossible and that the Party was the guardian of democracy, to forget, whatever it was necessary to forget, then to draw it back into memory again at the moment when it was needed. . . . Even to understand the word 'doublethink' involved the use of doublethink." Thus did Orwell describe the thought process that Mr. Lehman-Haupt finds "the most perplexing quality of *Perestroika*."

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national arena, the author makes it clear that Soviet objectives have not changed. In Central America, the Middle East, and southern Africa, he says, the Soviet Union will continue to support revolutionary and terrorist movements resisting Western imperialism.[2] The Soviet Union will also continue to demand a new world economic order to undo the misery caused by decades of colonial exploitation. As for the U.S., "We openly say," announces Mr. Gorbachev, "that we reject the hegemony-seeking aspirations and global claims of the United States." The U.S. can no longer work its will upon the people of the world, he says, and should cease trying to do so. Military power in particular, he writes, has become a useless instrument for the pursuit of national aims.

Although Legvold and others have heralded this idea as the centerpiece of Mr. Gorbachev's "new thinking," the Soviet leader makes it clear in his discussion of Afghanistan, and of the various "crises" that have occurred over the years in Eastern Europe, that the Soviet Union continues to reserve the right to intervene militarily to prevent any possible rollback of communist gains. About Afghanistan he writes, with characteristic brazenness, that "as soon as progressive changes were chartered, imperialist quarters began to pressure Afghanistan from without. . . . Its leaders asked the Soviet Union for help. They addressed us eleven times before we assented to introduce a limited military contingent. . . . "

Plainly, in the Soviet view, it is only American military power that must be curtailed, and Mr. Gorbachev bitterly complains against signs of our refusal to accept this "new reality." Nowhere is our failure to adjust more evident, he writes, than in Europe, a continent which the United States, through the NATO alliance, has "harnessed to the chariot of war." Fortunately, he says, many Europeans have come to see the danger of a close collaboration with the United States and are doing their utmost to promote the cause of peace. The Soviet Union, of course, is doing its utmost as well. In fact, the only real obstacle to disarmament is the United States government. In Mr. Gorbachev's view, Washington's policies are dictated by a "military-industrial complex" whose insatiable thirst for profits fuels the arms race and requires us to accept an "enemy image" of the Soviet Union:

> We see how strong the positions of the aggressive and militarist part of the ruling class are in the leading capitalist countries. Their main support comes from the powerful military-industrial complex whose interests are rooted in the very nature of the capitalist system and which extracts huge profits from arms production at the tax-payers' expense. And to make the people believe that all that money is not being spent in vain, they must be convinced of the existence of an "external enemy" which wishes to encroach upon their wellbeing and "national interests" in general.

If the danger of a nuclear holocaust is to recede, he concludes, America, too, must undergo a "restructuring" and give up the idea that the Soviet Union represents a threat.

Many commentators have found themselves in complete agreement with Mr. Gorbachev on this point, expressing with varying degrees of explicitness the idea that the United States is in just as much need of *perestroika* as the Soviet Union, if not more. As Legvold sees it, Mr. Gorbachev "is up to

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[2] "Revolution and liberation movements . . . arise when poverty and oppression of the masses become intolerable. . . . If terrorism is to be uprooted, it is imperative to eliminate the reasons that engender conflicts and terrorism. . . . In the Middle East . . . Moscow . . . invariably comes out in defense of the sovereign rights of the . . . Arab people of Palestine. . . . Our country has always acted . . . in support of the national liberation struggle of African nations. . . . We also proceed from the same general principles in our relations with Latin American countries. . . ."

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something enormously important within his own land, and, if we will hear him out, we may begin to understand what drives him, and what is in it for us." Charles William Maynes, editor of *Foreign Policy*, worries that, "If Gorbachev is hypocritically bold while the West is disappointingly cautious, the Soviet Union will gain a cheap victory according to the old rules of the great power game, and the West will never find out if it is possible to develop new rules for a new game." *Time* magazine declares that "If there is a lesson in the 56-year education of Mikhail Sergeyevich Gorbachev, it is that a new, unfamiliar kind of leader has risen in the Soviet Union, and that the old rules of dealing with that long-suffering land are suddenly outdated. For the West, the education is just beginning." And Gaddis asks:

> But are we ourselves ready for a Soviet "mellowing," should that prove to be what is taking place? . . . Not the least value of this important book could be the way it might force us to look more critically at ourselves. . . . A little *perestroika* of our own may be required.

WHILE THESE commentators have followed Mr. Gorbachev in placing the burden of responsibility for U.S.-Soviet conflict on American shoulders, others have tried to slough off the Soviet leader's menacing-sounding analysis as "cartoon-like" and "strange." Cartoon-like as it is, however, that analysis is hardly strange. For who among us has not heard that the real threat comes from the U.S. military-industrial complex? That Western affluence causes Third World poverty? That we shouldn't tell other countries what to do? Who does not, moreover, hear daily that Americans are just like Russians? That we must learn to live with one another? That if we don't, we risk impoverishing and destroying the world?

Thoughtful readers of this book will sense that they are on familiar territory. Shorn of the stilted syntax and Marxist-Leninist jargon, Mr. Gorbachev's ideas about the U.S. have been, for the past twenty years, standard fare in American magazines and newspapers, on television talk shows, in best-selling and critically acclaimed books, in think tanks, in government offices, in the committee rooms of Congress, in the classrooms of universities and high schools, wherever, in short, political discussion takes place. These ideas have also, of course, been at the heart of Soviet propaganda for just as long, if not longer.

But the author of *Perestroika* has a good deal more in common with his predecessors than certain ideas about the U.S. Like Lenin, he believes that a little free enterprise can't hurt Soviet Communism; like Stalin, he thinks the forced collectivization of agriculture and the Nazi-Soviet pact were good ideas; like Khrushchev, he champions "openness" (*glasnost*) and self-criticism, and says that someday socialism will outpace capitalism[3]; like Brezhnev, he wants to disarm the U.S. and separate it from Western Europe. Like all of them, he seeks to "normalize the international situation," which has always meant make the world safe for Soviet domination.

Unlike all of them, as we have been told again and again for the past three years by his admirers and well-wishers, the good-natured, hand-shaking Mr. Gorbachev behaves like a "Western-style politician." In this resemblance, they claim to find a basis for the belief that he is different, that in reality he is one of us. Yet in substance, Mr. Gorbachev cannot honestly be said to differ in any essential respect from the men who have come and gone before him. His vaunted "new thinking" is neither very new nor very thoughtful. In fact, it is nothing more than the latest version of the Party line, now echoing and re-echoing everywhere.

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[3]In May, it was announced that the Soviet monthly *Novy Mir* would publish George Orwell's *1984*. Although this latest gesture, like so much else under *glasnost*, is intended for Western audiences, it will be interesting to see its effect in the Soviet Union.

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SOME PEOPLE ONLY WRITE ABOUT THE NEWS.

OUR AUTHORS MAKE IT.

We need to promote an understanding of the common nature of our interests and recognition of the fact that we will either keep our freedom together or lose it together.

Helmut Kohl
Exclusive to the *Harvard International Review*
December 1986



The real choice is between strategic defense . . . or a perpetuation of our total vulnerability to any attacking missiles—whether launched by accident or by design.

Caspar Weinberger
Exclusive to the *HIR*
February 1985

The key to peace [in the Middle East] is still the United States. We are the only nation that has any substantial influence with Israel, and we are the only nation that can be trusted by a broad range of Arab leaders.

Jimmy Carter
Exclusive to the *HIR*
March 1984

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Broadway's Walk in the Woods

John Podhoretz

WE KNOW, because we are constantly told so, that arms control is considered a matter of the gravest importance by the American electorate. We also know, because we read newspapers and magazines and watch public television, that the progress of arms control talks is of consuming interest to America's intellectual elite and policy junkies. But it is also equally true that when most Americans, even elite Americans, see or read the words "arms control," it is all they can do to stifle a large yawn.

That is understandable, since arms control is, hands down, the most boring major issue in the world today. Its particulars are inaccessible to all but the academics and staffers and negotiators whose profession it is to think about these matters.

As a concept, of course, arms control has great potency, centering as it does on the idea that the world can rid itself of apocalyptic danger by means of sweet reason. No other foreign-policy notion is as faithfully accepted by Americans. But Americans are uninterested in the specifics of arms control, and for good reason. Media efforts to portray the process are inevitably off-putting: either they are loaded down with the gnostic jargon and diplomatic indirection of the arms controllers or they try foolishly to inject drama into a fundamentally anti-dramatic business. The problem is that the negotiations proceed at a pace so slow (if they proceed at all) that they simply cannot engage popular attention.

That lack of drama is the reason why arms control has been largely ignored by American creative artists. There is little development, and therefore little excitement, to the process. Of course, the subject of most arms-control discussions—the demonic creature that used to be known simply as The Bomb—has been one of the more popular dramatic conceits of the last four decades. Movies like "Fail-Safe," "Doctor Strangelove," and "War Games" have taken a gimmicky advantage of Herman Kahn-style nuclear gaming, and no cliché has been more thoroughly bandied about, in books and movies and on television, than the one about how "we are all living under the shadow of The Bomb."

It is usually only when outside politics intrudes (most recently, the Moscow summit date) that the negotiations achieve the appearance of high drama. The media get immediately into gear and start cranking out the clichés. The negotiators must race the clock to reach the summit, we are told, must iron out those kinks, must get it done. At most other times, the negotiators are forgotten, the nego-

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tiations as well—who recalls that the Mutual Balanced Force Reduction talks are still continuing in Vienna fifteen years after they first were convened? (Indeed, the MBFR talks might be the grist for a savage historical novel or a Melville-style tragic story—"Bartleby the Scrivener Goes to Vienna.")

ALL OF THIS has conspired to keep arms control out of the dramatic spotlight. That makes the new Broadway play *A Walk in the Woods* a genuine first, a highly commercial theatrical work dedicated to the subject of arms control negotiations.

What is all the more surprising is that its author should be an American, Lee Blessing. For although there is a strong tradition of political theater in Britain and West Germany, where plays about foreign policy are frequently performed, the number of noteworthy American plays about world events can be counted on two hands and perhaps one foot. Following the lead of master American dramatist Eugene O'Neill, American playwrights have usually been interested in cathartic emotions, not ideas. The level of serious ideological discourse in American theater can be measured by the fact that the nation's best-known political play is Arthur Miller's *The Crucible*, a portrait of the Salem witch-trials with supposedly ominous parallels to the McCarthy era.

A Walk in the Woods opened in February, to mostly rapturous reviews. *The New York Post* and *The New York Daily News* both called it the best new American play of the season. William A. Henry III of *Time* magazine agreed, dubbing it "a work of passion and power with the ring of political truth." David Richards of *The Washington Post* journeyed up to New York to give the play "a handshake and a warm clap on the back." Even the ill-tempered John Simon of *New York* magazine found much to praise: "*A Walk in the Woods* is a political play pondering the problem of survival—pointedly, poignantly, wittily, unponderously." The nation's most powerful theater critic, Frank Rich of *The New York Times*, was immune to the play's charms, and his less-than-positive review probably cost Lee Blessing a Pulitzer prize. Still, Rich's notice was not so negative that it damaged the play's chances of surviving in the difficult financial atmosphere of Broadway. In fact, *A Walk in the Woods* has established itself as one of the prestigious Broadway productions of the decade.

Blessing's title is taken from the 1982 incident in which negotiators Paul Nitze and Yuli Kvitsinsky left the precincts of their Geneva bargaining table, at which they were discussing intermediate-range nuclear weapons in Europe, to take a daytrip to the Jura mountains. On that outing, the two men came up with a complicated and creative arms-control plan that would substantially reduce the size of the U.S. Pershing II and ground launched cruise missile deployment in exchange for a Soviet pullback of SS-20s.

Nitze came up with an even more creative way of selling it to both governments; the plan, as Strobe Talbott says in *Deadly Gambits*, was considered "not an offer or a proposal by either government." Rather, it was a negotiating position that could easily be forsworn by both sides—or, Nitze thought, acceptable to both sides since neither had to fear that the other side could claim all the credit for it or have to take all the blame for it either. It was a clever scheme, but, unfortunately for Nitze, the plan was finally ruled unacceptable by his government and the Soviets—no matter that nobody proposed it.

A Walk in the Woods is not a documentary recreation of that event. Rather, it is a two-character play set in the woods outside Geneva that takes place over the course of a year. During that year, Soviet negotiator Andrei Botvinnik and American negotiator John Honeyman take four walks through the woods in an effort to escape the aridity of the bargaining table and find more hospitable ground to forge an agreement. The plot, such as it is, is actually advanced offstage, between the scenes, when the U.S. and Soviet governments react to the various proposals and ideas the two men set forth.

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THIS HARDLY SEEMS like material for a successful Broadway show. But Blessing wins his audience's heart with an inspired playwrighting decision: he makes the two negotiators the Oscar Madison and Felix Unger of conflict resolution, a Neil Simon-like odd couple. One is humorless, the other possessed of great wit. One is a country-and-western music enthusiast, the other an amateur botanist. One is old, the other young. They have nothing in common, and yet must find common ground on which to work.

Blessing makes Andrew Botvinnik the aged, witty, fun-loving, pop-culture maven, clearly basing his characterization not on the notoriously stiff Kvitsinsky but on the famously seductive former Soviet Ambassador to Washington, Anatoly Dobrinin. The American, John Honeyman, is the young, humorless pedant who serves as straight man and slow-burning foil—a Margaret Dumont to a Soviet Groucho. (Honeyman, of course, has nothing in common with Paul Nitze, now eighty-one and far from humorless.)

Blessing plays against audience expectations by having his Soviet official invoke the name of George Herman Ruth—"Ah, Babe Ruth! The Sultan of Swat!"—while swinging an imaginary baseball bat, or discussing the merits of Willie Nelson songs. "Do you know what I am dying to hear an American talk about?" he tells Honeyman. "Mickey Mouse. Cowboys. How to make a banjo."

Botvinnik gets all the good lines—"formality is simply anger with its hair combed," he says at one point—and all the jokes. He delivers Blessing's best speech, a comic denunciation of the beauty of Switzerland: "Switzerland has two things only: mountains and peace. Thousands of mountains, centuries of peace. Peaceful trees, peaceful lakes, peaceful people. You can't invade it—too many mountains. Besides, there's nothing here. So, what does mankind use Switzerland for? Peace conferences."

Honeyman does not have the capacity to joust with Botvinnik—he is so repressed that when Botvinnik asks him to say something frivolous, the only thing he can come up with is that he hates brown suits. He is also philosophically opposed to joking. "It is literally wasting the world's time," he says, "for us to be anything but deadly serious with each other." At the beginning of the play he has just arrived to lead the American delegation in Geneva, and has brought with him a proposal he thinks is a breakthrough. Botvinnik, who has been in Geneva for years and has seen American negotiators and breakthroughs come and go, greets the news with amusement: "Wonderful! Welcome!" he trills. "A new man with a new plan!"

WE ARE NEVER told the specifics of Honeyman's new plan. Indeed, specifics are not at issue in *A Walk in the Woods*. We never learn what the two men are actually doing in Geneva, what exact subject they are talking about except the nuclear threat in general. We know only that they are talking.

Blessing has done his homework; his characters use all the right terminology, and as a result Broadway audiences are hearing acronyms like SLBM and SLCM for the first time. But the jargon is used only for effect, for verisimilitude. That makes *A Walk in the Woods* a rather unusual species of political play; if George Bernard Shaw or someone of his ilk had written *A Walk in the Woods*, Honeyman and Botvinnik would engage each other in a complicated thirty-minute debate about the differing response times between the two kinds of missiles.

But in Blessing's view, the terms are themselves morally obfuscatory, a means of deflecting attention from the more pressing issue of total human destruction by the awesome force of The Bomb. Botvinnik is made weary by all the terminology. "I hear certain words," he says, as the treacly incidental music swells behind him—a clear sign from director Des MacAnuff that Botvinnik is about to speak a great truth. "Words like 'detente,' 'human rights,' 'Star Wars,' 'Cen-

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tral America,' 'readiness,' 'early warning,' and I feel like I am falling away from the Earth. I can see the Earth—the entire planet, like I am a cosmonaut. And it is falling away from me. We are both simply receding into the dark. Sometimes I spend entire conversations in this kind of darkness, while I am hearing words like 'summit,' 'test ban,' 'emigration,' 'strategic objectives.' It is almost as though the words are printed on the dark walls all around me. And the earth is like a fingertip, it is so far away."

Honeyman does not argue with Botvinnik. He has come only to make an agreement. "I'm an extremely effective negotiator," he tells Botvinnik. "That doesn't mean I say no well. It means I say yes well. . . . When I negotiate, I find an agreement." Botvinnik is drawn to Honeyman because, he admits much later in the play, he once also believed in the process. He has learned, however, that "no government has ever been rational, even about conventional weapons . . . I have been here for years! I've seen how it works!"

IN THE UNIVERSE of *A Walk in the Woods,* there is no apparent difference between the two governments or societies—except, perhaps, that the American proclivity to stage elections is often an obstacle to arms-control negotiations.

Here are the ways Botvinnik describes the two countries:

> "Aren't you embarrassed to be an American? . . . I am. To be Russian, I mean."
>
> "Look at us: Americans and Russians. The world's great powers—the world's great fools."
>
> "Your political process exploits itself. So does ours."
>
> "We have hawks and doves, just like you."
>
> "If the Russians and not the English had come to America, what would they have done? . . . They would have killed all the Indians and taken all the land. See? No difference. Americans and Russians are just the same."
>
> "Common Americans and Russians share a . . . delusion: that they are peace-loving people."

"This is profoundly cynical," Honeyman objects, but he does not dispute Botvinnik's assertions.[1] Indeed, he seems to share Botvinnik's basic view of the relations between the United States and the Soviet Union, albeit from a more ingenuous perspective. If the two nations could reach an agreement, he avers at one point, "the rest of the world . . . would say, 'At last—two maniacs have had a moment of sanity.' " There is, he believes, only one way the world can be saved, and that is "recognition. We look across the table, and we see ourselves."

In other words, all that matters is arms control. The United States and the Soviet Union must not only come to a *modus vivendi,* but must become friends as well. The fate of the world depends upon it. "If we fail now," Honeyman says, "history itself will disappear. Time will stop." Botvinnik dismisses him as an idealist, but Honeyman insists that "idealism is no longer a choice for mankind. It's a necessity."

Blessing clearly intends the developing friendship between his odd couple to be a microcosmic image of the ideal U.S.-Soviet relationship. At the end of the first act, Honeyman convinces Botvinnik to champion the new American proposal in the Kremlin. Botvinnik asks why he should, when it might be dangerous for him to do so. "For the sake of peace," Honeyman replies. Botvinnik asks what kind of peace—"Peace where you dominate? Peace where we dominate?" Honeyman pauses and answers, "Peace where we share."

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[1]Honeyman's only stated complaint is that the Soviets used their 20 million World War II dead to manipulate people. Later, however, Botvinnik reveals that he was in Leningrad during the war and had to catch rats with his bare hands for food—"but that's the war and you do not wish me to mention the war, so I am sorry and I shut up, yes?" The significant pause after this little speech makes it clear that Honeyman was not being compassionate enough about Soviet suffering and that nation's consequent neurotic compulsion to defend itself.

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In a moral and political landscape in which a communist dictatorship and a Western democracy have no really substantive differences to divide them—not "human rights," not "emigration"[2]—there is no earthly reason why the two governments could not find an easy way to agree about ridding themselves of their destructive power. And yet they cannot agree.

All previous agreements, Botvinnik says, have merely mandated new arms races. Arms manufacturers propose weapon systems faster than negotiators can agree on what to do about old ones. Since there is no rational basis for such behavior, in Blessing's rendering, the only explanation for it is that both the leaders and the people have learned to stop worrying and love The Bomb. "Ask the man on the street," Botvinnik says. "Ask him, 'Would you like to get rid of all the American and Soviet nuclear weapons right now?' He will say no."

Honeyman understands this. He once visited ICBM sites in North Dakota, at the geographical center of the continent of North America. "We had put all these missiles there . . . in the center. In an emptiness. In our emptiness. And I liked it. It filled something up. I wanted there to be more missiles. . . . But I *thought* about it. I thought about it until I knew I could not afford that feeling. Ever again, in my life."

The inescapable conclusion that Honeyman seems unwilling to draw is that the United States and the Soviet Union really do not want to share an unarmed peace because the possession of nuclear missiles is too intoxicating to give up. "We are too used to dominating," Botvinnik says. "The most exciting thing in the world is to know we can destroy the world."

INDEED, THE ATTITUDES of the leadership of both countries during the course of the play bear Botvinnik out—especially the behavior of the President of the United States. Two years before the action of the play begins, the Soviets issued a proposal which we are told was "just as good" as the new American proposal. It was rejected by the United States. "There were significant problems with that plan," Honeyman explains. "Yes," Botvinnik counters. "It was ours." The United States could not allow the Soviets such a coup.

Later, despite Botvinnik's support, the Soviets reject the new American proposal, even though the Soviet leadership thought it a good one. Why? Because the American president went public with it in an effort to help his re-election campaign. "In one speech," Botvinnik complains, "he destroys all the work we have done." (Botvinnik is only saying I told you so; he had warned Honeyman that the Soviets would reject the proposal if the president were to go public, which only adds to American culpability.)

But if Soviet and American leaders alike believe in his plan, Honeyman reasons, there must be some way to get it accepted. Honeyman hits upon a Nitze-like scheme to offer it again secretly, with a different name and with "a few insignificant points altered to save face for both countries." He convinces Botvinnik to conspire with him; it will be "anyone's proposal. . . . Nobody's proposal. . . . Just something that's there for both sides to examine. Privately."

As always, the wise Botvinnik knows what will happen—the Soviets will accept this time, but the president will reject it. In the final scene of the play, a depressed Honeyman tells Botvinnik that the president "looked me straight in the eye and said, 'Don't try so hard.' " His idealism has been shattered.

In the end, both men suffer because of their conscientious effort to bring some sanity to the U.S.-Soviet relationship. Botvinnik, having been stirred to fight for the latest proposal by Honeyman's call to disarm, is informed that his time in Geneva has come to an end. "I have served for many years here by doing absolutely nothing," he says. "Now it is time for a new man to come and do

[2]*In the typescript of the play, both words appear inside quotation marks.*

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absolutely nothing. In this way we achieve continuity of results." Honeyman is devastated by the news; he is losing his only friend. Now he and only he will know the real truth about U.S.-Soviet relations. Still, he refuses to renounce his hope. "The talks will go on for hundreds of years," Botvinnik says. "If we are lucky." The play ends with the two men sitting on a bench in the woods, saying nothing, but sharing.

BLESSING HAS TAKEN his despairing vision of the fate of the earth from Jonathan Schell's book of that name and Thomas Power's *Thinking About the Next War*, both of which were written during the U.S. efforts to deploy the Euromissiles. Schell and Powers both suggested that the intransigence of the United States, coupled with the dinosaur-like attitudes of the Kremlin, made agreements impossible and some form of nuclear conflict practically inevitable.

Now, of course, the Senate has approved an INF treaty that will, we are promised, rid the world of Euromissiles forever. The pessimism of Schell and Powers has dropped down the memory hole. Those who argued that nuclear war was probably inevitable are now faced with the great irony that their radical idea of the necessity of abolishing all nuclear weapons has been adopted by none other than the "we-begin-bombing-in-five-minutes" man himself, Ronald Reagan.

This gives *A Walk in the Woods* a strangely dated aspect; it is as though Blessing has not read the newspapers in a year. In some ways, the play is like a nostalgic journey into the recent past. The very fact that the U.S. and USSR have become buddies certainly makes the play more palatable for a Broadway audience, which might otherwise find it too discomfiting. That fact, along with Blessing's genuine wit and undeniable gifts as a craftsman, is responsible for the play's favorable reception (not to mention that most theater critics probably don't read the front sections of their newspapers either).

In some respects, however, Blessing is well ahead of the curve, and is presenting ideas that may gain popular currency in the months and years to come. A few years ago, Jeane Kirkpatrick and Charles Krauthammer, among others, began using the term "moral equivalence" to describe a parallel that is often drawn between the international behavior of the United States and the Soviet Union. Key examples of moral equivalence were the comparison of the U.S. role in El Salvador to the Soviet role in Afghanistan, and the supposed similarities in behavior of the CIA and KGB.

Blessing introduces a more ominous parallel, one that might be called "spiritual equivalence." The theme of his play is that the United States and the Soviet Union are spiritually equivalent—that the two nations share identical views of the uses of power and are motivated by the same irrational animalistic desire to control or destroy what cannot be controlled.

THIS ATTITUDE represents a new twist in the history of liberal posturing about the so-called "superpower rivalry" (a phrase that is itself a prime example of moral equivalence).

And there is more that is new here. Blessing's decision to make a high-ranking Soviet official the hero and voice of wisdom in his play is a rather disturbing innovation. Despite the ecstatic press coverage accorded Mikhail Gorbachev, it is more than a little startling to see a Soviet bureaucrat made the repository of virtue and wisdom in our time.

It is one thing, in this era of renewed detente, to have Phil Donahue trying to prove to us time and again that Soviet people are just like American people. That sort of sentimentality is to be expected, even though we might suspect that the "ordinary" Soviet citizens Donahue interviews are hand-picked by the government. But it is quite another to make the Soviet negotiator in Geneva a hero among men without even making him acknowledge that, perhaps, his government is a bit harsh on its people. All we know about Botvinnik's attitude toward Soviet repression is that whenever he hears the word "human rights" he feels like a cosmonaut drifting in space.

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This exculpation of a prominent communist party member takes detente-style thinking to an unimaginable height, one at which those who represent the interests of Soviet dictators are excused from bearing responsibility for anything bad that happens inside the Soviet Union. One person who certainly appreciated the portrayal of Botvinnik was Victor A. Zvezdin, the Soviet deputy representative to the United Nations. In a letter to the play's press agent, Zvezdin wrote: "I think it was the first time I saw an unbiased and non-distorted image of a Soviet man, particularly of a Soviet diplomat, in an American play or movie." (See box)

American playwrights have long believed that their role in life is to provoke the haute bourgeois audience that attends American theater out of that audience's supposed self-absorption and self-gratulation. *A Walk in the Woods* is certainly provocative. The problem is that the thoughts it provokes are governed by Blessing's emotional ambivalence about governments and ideologies.

That is all the more disturbing because Blessing is clearly not a serious thinker; there are no real arguments in his play. He is unable to engage his characters and his audience in substantive discussions about the

A Dramatic Critic

The following is a letter sent to Jeffrey Richards, the press agent for A Walk in the Woods.

March 1, 1988

Dear Mr. Richards,

Thank you very much for your invitation to the opening night of a new American play, *A Walk in the Woods*. I really enjoyed the performance, and I think that actors Sam Waterston and Robert Prosky were brilliant. It is definitely a very important development that the theme of nuclear disarmament has made its first step on Broadway, and I believe that this step goes along with the aspirations of Soviet and American peoples to build a safe world and live in peace and friendship. Without any doubt, there is a lot of godsends and rational kernels both in the substance of the play and in its production as well. Besides, to tell you the truth, I think it was the first time I saw an unbiased and non-distorted image of a Soviet man, in particular of a Soviet diplomat, in an American play or movie.

At the same time, unfortunately, there were misinterpretations and sometimes even of a rather cynical character, of a Soviet position on the question of nuclear disarmament. But that is certainly a result of many years of distorted presentation by American media of Soviet policy. I believe that today one will hardly find a person in the world who seriously hesitates that the USSR, not only in words, but in deeds as well, fights for general disarmament and elimination of the threat of a nuclear catastrophe.

Anyway, I think that *A Walk in the Woods* is a definite success. Thank you once again for your kind invitation to spend a wonderful evening.

Yours truly,

Victor A. Zvezdin
Deputy Representative of the USSR to the United Nations

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menace of nuclear weapons. His characters, the cynical sophisticate and the humorless idealist, do not think or believe; they pose. So too does Blessing. As the author of a purported "political play," he has had to rend ideas for the occasion.

Inadvertently, by borrowing the theoretical structure of *A Walk in the Woods* from the far left, Blessing reveals how radical a turn the debate over nuclear weapons has taken in the past seven years. There is little middle ground between abolition and eventual war. What Blessing fails to reflect, in his otherwise unerring reflection of arms-control fashion, is that the president of the United States mostly agrees with him.

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Things I Learned as a Diplomat

Kenneth Adelman

WE FACED A WORLD in opposition to our position. Early in the Reagan Administration, the U.S. stood alone when voting "no" on international regulation over infant formula. Diplomats from other nations refused to join us, though many confided in me privately that they knew we were right. Initially, I was peeved to hear their empty explanations. But I regained my composure when realizing that these diplomats were merely bowing before today's Third World fetishes which form part of the New International Economic Order.

Soon thereafter, another misguided United Nations activity started to gain momentum: the call for "global negotiations." This was to be a mega-negotiation with 150-plus states wheeling and dealing on everything from disarmament to farm prices to oil supplies, and lots more as well. But in this case, we, the United States representatives, decided to grin and bear it. We did nothing to fight this effort, even though it too would have harmed our interests and stymied free-market economic growth.

Why our opposite approaches to these two situations? Why did we stand alone to assault one cockamamie UN notion and go along with another? Sure, there were some good reasons. Regulating infant formula would lead to international control over pharmaceuticals and other substances. "Global negotiations" seemed destined to be just another UN gabfest for the disgruntled to let off steam, an effort so heavy as inevitably to fall of its own weight. Still, we chose our approaches in 1981 and 1982 by feel rather than logic. I can't recall ever debating the matter with our leader, Ambassador Jeane Kirkpatrick, but all of us knew we were right.

I can now see that this was my initiation rite into diplomacy. I then started to learn and adopt the ways of this seemingly mysterious craft. Diplomacy is more a matter of art than science. The most profound truths of the field go unspoken. Here are the most important six Unspoken Truths I have uncovered.

First: *let another nation do it*. When it comes to doing something unpleasant, however necessary, diplomats always look for someone else to do the dirty work. Most times for the democracies, that responsibility falls upon the United States. That was the case with the infant formula controversy and so many other issues.

In 1982, I accompanied former secretary of defense Donald H. Rumsfeld on a presidential mission. President Reagan had asked us to tell key Allied leaders how the Law of

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the Sea Treaty would jeopardize freedom and economic prosperity. During our 34,000 mile whirlwind journey, a top diplomat in a major European country readily conceded all our arguments. "Sure," he told us, "the Treaty is an absurd move by Third World countries bent on global socialism. But we'll still vote for it." Why? Because their "yes" vote would engender the goodwill of many developing countries without risking anything. Happily for him, the United States would take the heat. Our opposition would kill the project. And it did. From the halls of deeply-in-debt Montezuma to the shores of terrorist-sponsoring Tripoli, America fights most of the free world's battles. Foreign diplomats know this Unspoken Truth well. And American officials usually accept it congenially, only occasionally grudgingly, as part of our role as leader of free states.

Second: *avoid specifics*. Diplomats wisely learn that specifics incur obligations, whereas lofty generalities do not. And in foreign affairs, binding obligations are avoided like the plague. Hence diplomats instinctively follow the wisdom of Lord Northcliffe and "never lose [their] sense of the superficial."

Foreign policy officials are paid to keep their country out of trouble, which is, after all, their mission. This generally means keeping their country out of other countries' troubles. No wonder then that a British foreign service officer in 1804 told his boss, Lord Harrowby, to respond to a pleading diplomat from another country in "neutral, unmeaning civilities." Diplomats still speak that way. They still speak in strange tongues, if not in forked tongues. At times diplomats shave the truth. At other times, they just plain distort it. On occasions at the United Nations, I found top diplomats telling me something they must have known was false, and I usually knew it to be false as well. During a secret UN Security Council vote on a nominee for a justice on the International Court of Justice, I had seven ambassadors rush up to me after the vote, each one claiming he had supported our favorite candidate. The Council president then announced the results: three "yes" votes. I knew very well that mine was one of them!

Third: *mask the pursuit of self-interest*. Diplomats proclaim universal homilies but practice national self-interest. And they should. Adam Smith demonstrated long ago how individual pursuit of self-interest leads to the general good of society. So it is known, but never said, in foreign affairs as well. Diplomats around the world push for more arms control, for instance, as long as it is not their own country's arms which will be controlled. The British, French, and Chinese have, as their highest national priority, to keep their own nuclear forces out of any arms talks. They refuse to even negotiate over such forces, let alone agree to reduce them. Nonetheless, they constantly urge more nuclear arms cuts by the United States and the Soviet Union.

Fourth: *inside knowledge can be incomplete*. The inside scoop is occasionally no better than the outside news which appears on the front page of the morning paper. Scholars normally have loads of material at hand when making their judgments. Policy-makers generally do not when making their decisions.

I sat with the President before heading off to the 1986 snappy summit at Reykjavik, for example. We heard reports from those inside and outside of government that this was to be nothing more than a meeting to set up a real summit. None of us could have imagined that Soviet leader Mikhail Gorbachev wanted to wheel and deal on nuclear arms. But that's precisely what happened during that tumultuous weekend. Perhaps we were tricked by Gorbachev, but I doubt it. The Soviet leaders themselves seemed undecided at the outset how the meeting would unfold. Somehow or other, the sessions took on an amazing momentum of their own.

Fifth: *too much deliberation leads to paralysis or ineffectiveness*. As an international situation becomes clearer, the opportunities to effect its outcome become narrower. The diplomat's room for maneuver is widest—and his actions can be most effective—in fast-moving

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situations. This point is nicely illustrated in the Chinese word for crisis, made up of the two characters for danger and opportunity.

The American military intervention in Grenada was criticized by those who claimed that our medical students were not in danger. Had that danger been clarified, had the Marxists rulers of Grenada surrounded the school and held the students at gunpoint, U.S. officials would have faced a far worse predicament. Our rescue operation, of both the students and that Caribbean country itself, would have been far more dicey and costly. Student lives would inevitably have been lost. American military casualties would inevitably have been higher.

Henry Kissinger applies the same lesson to World War II. When the Nazis illegally reoccupied the Rhineland in 1936, one French division handily could have stopped them. Hitler might well have been ousted from power or at least stripped of his absolute power. The world might still be arguing whether Hitler was a misunderstood nationalist or a maniac bent on world domination, Kissinger admits. But at least the world would have been spared its most terrible carnage in history, with some fifty million deaths.

Sixth: *there are no ultimate solutions to international problems*. No Middle East peace process can completely eradicate the strife which has plagued that region since the turbulent days of Jesus, and even before. No political, diplomatic, or even military action will end racial strife in southern Africa for all time. No UN vote will insure individual liberty or national sovereignty. No amount of American aid can bring prosperity in the underdeveloped world. And no arms control treaty will usher in peace on earth, or even provide an ultimate solution to our main security concerns.

Diplomats give high-sounding speeches pretending to have "the answer" to the great problems they face. But deep down they know better, or at least they should. For there are no all-time cures for these long-time maladies. French president Charles de Gaulle rightly observed that diplomacy cannot solve problems, only alleviate them. Life is one big process. History, as Arnold Toynbee once quipped, "is one damned thing after another." That historical process can be helped or hurt by specific diplomatic actions, but these darn problems keep popping up.

The best diplomats refuse to skirt a situation because it appears too complex. Rather, the true professional will tackle the situation with gusto, realizing that his gains may then seem scant. As the former British Secretary of State, Lord Salisbury, said: "There is nothing dramatic in the success of a diplomat. His victories are made up of a series of microscopic advantages." Still, such "microscopic advantages" may accumulate and somehow contribute to a long-term process of making the future safer and freer than our world. And that, after all, is what diplomacy is all about.

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The State of Denmark

William McCord

DENMARK, the fairytale land of Hans Christian Andersen, recently emerged in the international news when its social democrats proposed a ban on ships carrying nuclear weapons from entering Danish ports. This initiative, slightly vaguer than New Zealand's, triggered a general election in normally stolid Denmark and a sharp reaction from NATO allies. The British cancelled joint maneuvers designed to plan for the reinforcement of Denmark in case of invasion, and Danish conservatives (as well as George Shultz and Lord Carrington) warned that the prohibition could mean the forced withdrawal of Denmark from the NATO coalition. Since Denmark juts out into the Baltic Sea, blocking the exit of Soviet ships and submarines into the North Sea and the Atlantic, this small land has unusual strategic importance for Russia, Germany, and Great Britain.

The Danes have long exhibited a Hamlet-like ambivalence about armaments and war. A famous Danish cartoon portrays a placid burgher peering into a pond. The mirror reflection of a fierce Viking grimaces back at him. Christian IV, the benevolent founder of the Danish welfare state, also led the nation into its last catastrophic war with Sweden.

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In World War II, within a matter of hours, the Danish army collapsed when faced with the Nazi invasion. Yet the Danish resistance, far more than the French or Dutch, fought back heroically against the Germans. By hiding them or transporting them to Sweden, the Danes saved the great majority of Jews while Vichy France shipped its own citizens off to Dachau. At a critical point in the war, Danish resistance fighters called in an RAF bombing attack on Gestapo headquarters in the middle of Copenhagen. The bombs destroyed the Nazis but also killed the residents of an orphanage and the radio-guiders themselves. No one can accuse the Danes of cowardice.

Today, as a member of NATO, the Danes shelter under a "nuclear umbrella" and require conscription of their youth. Nonetheless, all Danes abhor the prospects of nuclear war, many believe that nuclear weapons do not deter, and Denmark long ago declared itself a nuclear free zone in peacetime. Until recently, these two aspects of its policy were reconciled by not raising the question of whether the visiting ships of allies were nuclear armed (a policy also followed by Japan). It is this convenient arrangement that has now been put in jeopardy.

Contemporary Denmark is an essentially pacific nation, both internally and internationally. I well remember watching the Danish army, replete with tanks and artillery, practicing in Jutland. In the middle of a fake war, a little ice-cream van, its bell clanging, drove onto the battlefield. The combatants

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immediately stopped their exercise and gathered around the truck, eagerly chomping on ice cream cones. Modern Danes prefer ice cream and a prosperous welfare state to the swords and poverty of their Viking ancestors.

"WE BELONG to a victorious generation," Thomas Nielson, former head of the Danish Federation of Labor, says. "What we didn't even dare to hope for has happened. . . . The fight for the daily bread is over. Now the question is one of distributing prosperity."

Since Marquis Childs first proclaimed Sweden an ideal "middle way" between capitalism and socialism, most foreigners have agreed that Scandinavia's panoply of social services represents a close approximation to utopia. In a study comparing 124 countries in 1984, University of Pennsylvania's Richard Estes credited Denmark with providing the highest level of social, economic, and political welfare in the world. Similarly, in Clark Kerr's measures of the physical quality of life in various nations, Denmark scored an extraordinary 96. (The other Scandinavian nations were also at the very top with virtually identical scores: Sweden 97, Norway 96, Iceland 96.)

Moreover, the Danes do not hesitate to share their wealth with the rest of the world. The nation contributes approximately $700 million annually to the Third World. This represents 0.89 percent of the GNP and comes close to the goal set by the Brandt and Pearson reports. For twenty years, aid has been funneled to India and Bangladesh, Tanzania and Kenya. More recently, the Danes have mounted ambitious projects in Mozambique, Zambia, Uganda, and the Sudan, as well as contributing substantially to the relief of famine in sub-Saharan Africa. More than any other nation in the world (with the possible exceptions of the Netherlands and Sweden), Denmark has tried to alleviate the suffering, illiteracy, and hunger of developing countries.

Yet, appalled by a youth "rebellion," the nation's inability to reproduce itself, the world's highest tax rate, and an erosion in public spirit and traditional social networks, many Danes fear that their generous society may not survive its current time of economic troubles. Danes like journalist Henrik Stangerup are fully aware that "we are experiencing today in Scandinavia one of the most important experiments in history."

The Danish experiment began long ago in the sixteenth century with Christian IV who believed that "all men should take some joy in their brief passage between the limbos of unknown worlds." Christian built the world's first stock exchange to insure that Denmark would have vigorous industries, but this buoyant monarch also created homes for pensioned sailors, dormitories for penniless students, delightful parks for his people's pleasure, and the world's first daily newspaper (*Berlingske Tidende*) for their enlightenment.

In the eighteenth century, the Reventlow land reforms freed the peasantry from serfdom; they proved natural and powerful allies to Enlightenment thinkers who sought to construct a liberal society. Soon, Denmark out-distanced the rest of Europe in applying humanitarian principles to everyone.

In 1798, she was the first among all nations in abolishing the slave trade. In 1814, she was the first to provide free and compulsory education. In the 1850s, inspired by Bishop N.F.S. Grundtvig, Denmark launched folk schools for adult education and the cooperative movement. In the 1870s, the Danes established the first homes for old people and the first hospitals open to all. In the 1880s, the country provided the world's first health insurance scheme for everyone.

The Danes built this vestigial welfare state in a barren, sandy land devoid of resources, and they did so without violence: not a single person lost his head to the guillotine during this far-reaching social transformation.

Why did Denmark, once the land of glowering Vikings, take the lead in creating a more humane society?

Perhaps the single most important reason

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is that Danish leaders from Christian IV and Count Reventlow down to contemporaries such as Thomas Nielson (a social democrat) and Paul Schulter (the first conservative prime minister since 1901) all accept the ancient concept of *rettferd*—roughly translated as equity. *Rettferd* implies that everyone should recognize the basic human needs of all; no man should enjoy undue privilege over another. The idea of *rettferd* is no new invention of either liberalism or socialism; its roots lie deeply buried in mystic Nordic culture. In a remarkably homogeneous country where political realities have always required minority parties to form coalitions with other groupings, the concept promotes compromise and evokes reverence—although many fear that contemporary forces diminish its potency.

By 1930, the idea of *rettferd* had become manifest in today's full-scale welfare state. Scandinavian intellectuals—Ernest Wigfoss, Knut Wicksell, and later, Gunnar Myrdal—anticipated Keynes by arguing that deficit government spending during a depression would stimulate economic growth. They agreed with R.H. Tawney in embracing the idea that the state's planned re-allocation of income leads to greater individual liberty. In 1941, the English Archbishop William Temple first used the words "welfare state" to describe a government concerned with the needs of all citizens, and contrasted it to the "power state" created by Hitler.

By the 1980s, 90 percent of Danes live at roughly the same very high level of affluence, medical care costs almost nothing, education from a *creche* through a university doctorate is free, the government provides lovely cottages for the aged, free holidays for workers, and extensive protections for the unemployed. All Danes count on the services of *Falck*, originally a rescue and salvage agency. Today, this extraordinary organization helps people out of any disagreeable situation by providing a fourth for bridge, a locksmith if a key is lost, or veterinary care for a bird with an injured wing. In essence, Denmark has eliminated the most obvious sources of suffering or, indeed, of even minor inconvenience.

THIS EXTRAORDINARY expansion of government services has not led, as Friedrich Hayek once feared, along "the road to serfdom." Gosta Rehn's surveys show that Danes believe they have more personal freedom in work than in the past. Erick Allardt reports that 79 percent of people feel able to influence public decisions that affect them personally, and economist Eric Schmidt notes that "No country in Europe has a smaller amount of nationalized and socialized industry than Denmark, and no similar stage of liberalism. There is less control of private undertakings here than in the United States."

The "almost complete paternalism" of the welfare society has not, as President Eisenhower once commented (presumably about Sweden), created a bored, lazy, easily frustrated people with little to struggle for.

The usual measures of social malaise have remained more or less steady over the last century. Danes have the same per capita rate of violent crime as in 1907—twenty times less than Americans. Alcoholism, a traditional Danish problem, has actually declined since welfare legislation was introduced. Workers remain as productive as ever. Suicide, a notorious Danish phenomenon, stays at a high level but has decreased since the 1880s. Divorce has increased to about the same level as Eastern Europe, but it is still much lower than in America. Thus, as Samuel Rachlin notes, "loneliness and depressions are ills the famed welfare state cannot make up for."

There are, however, more serious, indeed grave, challenges to the Danish system which may irrevocably change it. The severity of these problems has led economist Ralf Dahrendorf to predict "the end of the social democratic century."

The sheer economic burden of social services may now well exceed Denmark's ability to sustain it. In the 1930s, expenses for welfare constituted 8 percent of the state's budget while today they consume 45 to 50 percent. By 1986, the interest paid on public debt alone amounted to twice the income

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provided by actual pensions or ten times the expenditures for public benefits. This means that, in the words of Bent Anderson, Denmark is approaching the point where income "transferred from the *poor* to the *rich* will more than surpass the transfer from the rich to the poor."

The current level of taxation leaves little room for maneuver: Danes pay an amount in taxes equal to 51 percent of their gross national product while Americans, with huge spending on defense, expend 29 percent. Moreover, the base of tax payers is shrinking. Two-thirds of newcomers in the economy—many of them ex-housewives—disproportionately enter the expanding network of social services rather than engage in directly productive activities.

Even as the tax burden becomes unbearable, the demand for even more social services is unquenchable. Between 1960 and 1981, because of rising divorce and the lure of independent careers, the number of full-time housewives declined by three-quarters. As a result, professional "home helpers," originally charged with the sole task of preparing meals for old people, quadrupled. Institutions for the care of children went up six-fold. Single people living in institutions also increased six-fold.

In a society where about one-third of voters are pensioners and another one-quarter provide public services, any cutback in the welfare system threatens to create a severe political backlash. Yet the already enormous public debt requires restructuring and it will simply continue to grow unless services are reduced.

While the welfare system expands and maintains internal buying power—aggravating balance of payments problems—the export-oriented Danish economy stagnates. Unemployment stands at 8 percent of the announced work force while low-paid "guest workers" take the least desirable jobs.

Many, if not most, Danes (as individuals) are unwilling to pay the price. Tax evasion among all classes has become an extremely popular option—indeed, the public often hails tax dodgers as "Robin Hoods." As Anderson records, "In the conflict between evaders and authorities, it is the evaders who get the popular support; the exploited hail the exploiter."

A related problem is that Danes are failing to reproduce themselves. In the 1980s, Danes have a reproduction rate of 70 percent. Such a shrinkage in fertility means that the base of young productive workers necessarily decreases and that today's younger generation, when it grows older, will have to satisfy itself with fewer services—unless, of course, robots take over the functions of human beings.

According to a number of studies, a further aspect of the crisis facing Denmark is that the youth have become more "privatized" since the 1960s—more interested in their subjective experiences, more distrustful of the state apparatus, more concerned with the "deeper meaning of life." Critics argue that the young are creating a selfish society where there is less concern with responsibility to others.

This "new subjectivism," as some call it, draws economic sustenance from the welfare-oriented society. As one example: Children of eighteen may immediately draw full welfare benefits from the state for three years until they find the job perfectly suited to their talents.

The new spirit of youth sometimes erupts into open rebellion of a mild sort. In 1971, for example, unemployed Danish youths established an anarchist "nation," the "Free State of Christiana," in the heart of Copenhagen. The squatters took over former army barracks and proclaimed four basic principles—no drugs, no violence, no weapons, no cars. Aside from these laws, the "free state" tolerated any form of youthful behavior.

By the 1980s, the anarchist dreams of the founders are in tatters: Hard drug addiction, alcoholism, violence, and racism are prominent features of the "free state." Teenage toughs paint slogans like "White Power" and "K.K.K." on Christiana's buildings and occa-

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sionally attack some of Denmark's 35,000 "guest workers."

In an open-air drug market called "Pushers' Street," some 200 teenage hawkers chop up bricks of Moroccan hashish. Many of the 1000 residents are "double-dippers" who collect unemployment benefits while pocketing income from local enterprises.

Defenders of the "free state," such as Ed Thomasson, regard the youthful enclave as a place where dropouts and misfits find acceptance in a special atmosphere of tolerance: "Whenever someone asks whether Denmark can afford this haven of non-conformists, there will be a counter question: Can Denmark afford not to have it?"

Nonetheless, observers argue that the Danish police use Christiana as a "social garbage can" where drug trafficking can be contained. Critics regard the "free state" as a national disgrace and a symbol of a deeper erosion in Denmark's public spirit.

THE DECLINE in the *rettferd* ethic, the core of Denmark's crisis, has twin roots.

First, informal social networks, particularly the family and the church, are losing their importance. Increasingly, the Danes require the state to perform services—child care, ministering to the aged, the raising of young adults—originally attended to by family members or church ministrations. Most Danes agree that the anonymous state was not originally prepared to assume these tasks and cannot now finance them.

Second, as illustrated most commonly in tax evasion, the average citizen participates in an underground economy, flouts the bureaucracy, and exploits public services beyond their capacity. While elected authorities criticize this tendency as evincing a lack of public spirit, many citizens consider any attempt to restrict services as an infringement of their basic rights.

Thus, in certain significant ways, the survival of the welfare system requires what some economists deem as "irrational" behavior: that is, a conscious willingness by the individual to avoid exploitation of the system and eschew personal gain in order to insure the greatest welfare for all. Yet, as the influence of informal social networks wanes, the motivation for such altruism also declines. The young glorify subjective pleasure rather than social responsibility.

"The result," as Arne Ruth points out, "is a further erosion of the public spirit indispensable to the system. The universal demand for security remains, but the willingness to pay the personal price necessary to guarantee it diminishes."

If it can be done at all, the resolution of these dilemmas requires hard and unpopular political choices. All of Denmark's sixteen political parties offer their own solutions. Fortunately, they are not necessarily contradictory and a new set of pragmatic compromises may emerge.

The conservatives stress the case for privatization of some services, more flexibility in the Danish tax system and stricter measures for counteracting tax evasion. They demand, too, that certain of the more absurd welfare provisions—such as giving parents an extra laundry allowance if they have a bed-wetting child—should simply be abolished.

Many social democrats advocate policies that would encourage a restoration of the link between rights and duties. In Denmark, all benefits are "free" and universal, a measure originally designed to protect people from the stigma of being welfare recipients. Such a system means that a few enormously wealthy people who have no real need may collect the same benefits as the genuinely deprived, handicapped, or unfairly treated. Under new proposals, a clear connection would be established between contributions, income, and eligibility for services.

Some parties to the left advocate decentralizing the entire system and putting finances under the control of locally elected authorities. "Only in this way," one anarchist told me, "can we erase the anonymity of the system. If both giver and receiver belong to the same town council, informal social controls will operate. If, let us say, the local

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authorities in the 'free state' had full direction of their commune, we could have genuine mutual assistance—as well as control over the 'double-dippers' and the drug pushers."

However it will be done, the spiraling costs of the Danish system must be pared. This need not necessarily entail, in my opinion, "the end of the social democratic century." Denmark may well continue as a "society without victims." But it must also eliminate its "double-dippers," trim the number of insouciant teenagers on welfare, reduce pensions to the wealthy, and ensnare tax evaders—demanding political tasks in a society where individual gratification takes precedence over the public good.

The required economies—or the anarchy that will result if they are not introduced—will inevitably mean an end to what Raymond Aron described as "*la societe de jouissance*."

The New Zealand Connection

New Zealand gave the Danish peace movement a specific agenda for action—opposition to port calls, adoption of nuclear-free resolutions by local city councils, etc. The Soviet Union did not fail to contrast Denmark unfavorably with New Zealand at the time of the visit of the USS *Iowa* to Denmark in 1985. . . .

Officials and politicians in Denmark have also noted the severity of the United States' reaction to New Zealand's policy. In that sense the American objective of demonstrating the costs of unilateralism in opposition to American wishes in an alliance has been more successful than the New Zealand hope of showing the anti-nuclear way to an applauding world.

At the same time, there is widespread skepticism that the United States could retaliate against Denmark in the same manner as it has against New Zealand. Denmark is more important militarily and politically to the United States, Britain, Germany and Norway than is New Zealand. Not only is the American reaction not easily exportable; in addition, Denmark's membership in the European Community severely restricts the scope of American economic retaliation. The sentiment rather is that the New Zealand events demonstrate United States determination to make sure that sinning allies do not escape retribution; the exact costs will be worked out to suit each individual example. . . .

It remains to be seen whether New Zealand's actions will have a long-term effect or not. The initial impact on the Danish policy community was to demonstrate that it is possible for a small partner in an alliance to launch independent initiatives: the parameters of an alliance are not immutable. . . . If and when the political constellation changes in Denmark/Scandinavia/NATO, then the legacy of events in the South Pacific may be felt with the establishment of a Nordic nuclear weapon free zone, or a Danish withdrawal from NATO's Nuclear Planning Group, or a Danish dissociation from NATO's first use policy.

Dr. Ramesh Thakur of the University of Otago, in *New Zealand International Review*, May-June 1987, after a visit to Scandinavia.

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Lost in Translation

Russell Seitz

THE SENSE OF delicacy that led to the transformation of the Office of the Secretary of War into the Department of Defense following the defeat of the Axis has not lately been rewarded. Open warfare is being waged against the very concept of strategic defense. Nowhere is this polemical mayhem more in evidence than in the manner in which the reports and assessments of various scientific bodies and the congressional Office of Technology Assessment (OTA) have been set forth for the public and the media. Uniformly these releases pronounce upon the unreliability of undefined and unwritten software and the impossibility of building the requisite hardware. Just as uniformly, by the time they are released, events have proven their conclusions wrong and their summaries obsolete. Nobody seems to notice. Why?

The opponents of SDI have made an empirical discovery, or rediscovery, which has led to the repeated confusion of authority and evidence by the media. They have detected a pattern of response on the part of journalists confronted with the choice between an inch-thick body of technical prose and a slender press release. The response is numbingly uniform: listen to what the sponsoring body has to say, read the press release, and ask the Pentagon to comment about the (unread) report. Since, unlike the journalists, the D.O.D. technical spokesman has not read the press release and has focused on the report's substance and subjunctive disclaimers, a bland tribute to the authors for their lengthy labors is the customary response. Some time later when the headlines appear, the D.O.D. will, with some bewilderment, realize that, once again, they've been had.

The technology of erecting assault bridges athwart the gap between the two cultures has grown in sophistication. And as the art of the press conference has supplanted the norms of peer review in technical discourse, the layman's vision of where SDI stands has grown steadily dimmer. This is a source of great satisfaction to those who organize the press conferences and some agony to those who struggle to conduct the underlying analysis.

An informational paradox is at the heart of the problem. The intelligibility of such documents as the American Physical Society's study of directed energy weapons (or the OTA study of SDI) is inversely proportional to the quantity of objective data considered. When eighteen astute and senior scientists, together with a cohort of consultants and researchers, labor to generate a 400-page trans-disciplinary survey of the whole of high technology and hard science, they can produce a pretty indigestible product from a journalistic point of view. And so they did.

To a readership that blanches at the thought of reading *Scientific American* cover to cover, 95 percent of the paper that appears weekly in *Science* might as well be written in cuneiform. Likewise, to the average science

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writer, *Reviews of Modern Physics* is simply and utterly unintelligible. So enter the translators.

Among the first to step forth and read the entrails of these nominally high-level reports and studies are the spokesmen for the Union of Concerned Scientists (UCS) and other activist groups within (or, in some cases, marginal to) the scientific community. Often they can boast of having a member or two amongst the co-authors themselves. The spokesman is inevitably justified as representing a non-partisan body of public-spirited scholars and technocrats. Really? I invite the reader to repeat an unintentional experiment. It will cost you twenty dollars. Just subscribe, as I did, to the quarterly news-sheet of the UCS. Along with the first issue of *Nucleus* I received four mailings bearing the salutation "Dear Fellow Democrats," together with pleas for funds from Mike Dukakis, George McGovern, Common Cause, Greenpeace, and sundry friends of Nicaragua. At the extreme right of the spectrum of junk mail generated by my *Nucleus* subscription are the sendings of the Sierra Club.

So far has the erosion of the barriers to political infiltration and partisan abuse of the scientific process extended that I begin to wonder why anyone bothers to write such studies at all. Designed to inform, they languish unread. Produced at a cost of tens of man-years and hundreds of thousands of dollars each, their informational content simply evaporates in the process of their being publicized. They are instantly supplanted by a single sheet of paper and a few sound bites. A boiled-down residue whose political currency is proportional to the debasement of hard science the translators have achieved.

HOW DO SCIENTISTS respond to such gamesmanship? When it comes to technical controversy today, I give the final word to Freeman Dyson. He bears rueful witness to the state of the art:

> As a scientist I want to rip the theory of nuclear winter apart, but as a human being I want to believe it. This is one of the rare instances of a genuine conflict between the demands of science and the demands of humanity. As a scientist, I judge the nuclear winter theory to be a sloppy piece of work, full of gaps and unjustified assumptions. As a human being, I hope fervently that it is right. Here is a real and uncomfortable dilemma. What does a scientist do when science and humanity pull in opposite directions?
>
> There are three possible responses to the dilemma. One is to say, I am a scientist second and a human being first, so I will forget my scientific misgivings and jump onto the nuclear winter bandwagon. I do not blame those of my scientific colleagues who have taken this course. Survival is after all more important than technical accuracy. The second response is to say with the poet Robinson Jeffers: 'To seek the truth is better than good works, better than survival, Holier than innocence and higher than love' and since I am a scientist dedicated to truth, I will criticize nuclear winter as harshly as I would criticize any other half-baked scientific theory.
>
> Few of my scientific colleagues have had the courage to make this second response. I do not blame those who have muffled their criticisms. Nobody wants to be put publicly in the position of saying that, after all, nuclear war may not be so bad. It is difficult to criticize nuclear winter publicly without giving an appearance of moral insensitivity. The majority of scientists who have doubts about nuclear winter keep their doubts private. This is the third response to the dilemma, to say, it will not do us any good in the long run to believe a wrong theory, but it will not do us any good in the short run to attack it publicly, so let us keep silent and reserve judgment until the facts become clear. I myself have chosen the third response. It is an unheroic compromise, but I prefer it to either of the simple alternatives. The dilemma is similar to the dilemmas which occur frequently in personal and family life, when the demands of honesty and of friendship pull in opposite directions. It is good to be honest but it is often better to remain silent.[1]

Yet silence gives consent. Dyson's copacetic indifference to tactics about which he has doubts prolonged the misleading of the

[1]Freeman Dyson, *Infinite in All Directions*, (New York: Harper & Row, 1988), pp. 259–60.

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public concerning the environmental consequences of nuclear war. And today, likewise, those opponents of SDI, whose praxis is to declaim the physical impossibility of what the engineers nonetheless persist in demonstrating, above all mislead themselves about the risks they run. The credulity of the electorate is finite, and all too many technical and environmental controversies demands its attention. It remains to be seen if science can sustain its credibility on the greenhouse effect and ozone depletion, even as those within it with a Luddite aversion to SDI strive to fool all of the people some of the time.

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Detente: The Old and The New

Robert W. Tucker

WE ARE NOW well into the initial stages of a new detente with the Soviet Union. The origins of the new detente may be traced to the Reykjavik summit of October 1986. It was at Reykjavik that a startled world was informed that the leaders of the two superpowers had put forth far-reaching proposals for the reduction of nuclear arms. Although barren of immediate result, the summit meeting laid the basis for the subsequent agreement on banishing intermediate-range nuclear forces and set out the elements of a further agreement on reducing strategic nuclear forces. Nor has the foundation for a new detente been limited to arms control. Of almost equal significance has been the change in the manner in which the Soviet and American governments have dealt with each other in the past year or so. The tonal quality of the relationship has undergone what amounts to a virtual transformation when compared with only three or four years ago. Yesterday civility was the exception; today it is becoming the norm.

These measures alone would provide sufficient grounds for believing that a new detente is in the making. To them must be added, however, the decision of the Soviet government to withdraw its forces from Afghanistan by early 1989. The significance of that decision, assuming it will be implemented, is bound to prove considerable. The invasion of Afghanistan in late 1979 marked a formal end of the old detente and inaugurated a new period of tension in Soviet-American relations. Throughout the 1980s, Afghanistan has been held up as the principal example of the immoderate and expansionist character of Soviet policy. Now that example is to disappear. And even though this decision was motivated in the first instance by the fact that the war was going badly for Moscow and showed little promise of improving, it is also clear that it was taken with an eye to Soviet-American relations.

In withdrawing from Afghanistan, the Soviet Union has accepted defeat there just as surely as the United States accepted defeat in withdrawing from Vietnam. For there is no apparent way the Soviet supported government in Kabul can maintain itself in the absence of this direct support. Moscow must appreciate this, just as it must appreciate that were it to intervene again to save this government it would surely jeopardize most other efforts made to date for a changed relationship with the United States.

Despite the evidence that we are pres-

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ently moving toward a new detente, the term itself has been but infrequently employed by observers and not at all by the administration. This is hardly surprising. "Detente" has become almost as distasteful a term to many on the right as "appeasement" once was to the left. Indeed, the opponents of detente in the 1970s and early 1980s—among whom there was no more devoted a champion than Ronald Reagan—virtually insisted on making the term synonymous with appeasement. This is perhaps why one of the great authorities on the subject, former president Nixon, has written in his recently published book *1999: Victory Without War*: "Detente has lost its meaning. For the superhawks, it is institutionalized surrender. For the superdoves, it is institutionalized brotherhood." Mr. Nixon considers detente, along with containment, as belonging to the "failed policies of the past." At the same time, he is still at pains to defend his version—which he terms "hard headed detente"—against familiar criticism. The detente of the early 1970s failed, Mr. Nixon writes, because Congress took away both the carrot and the stick with which policy had to be implemented. In so doing, it presumably undercut both halves of the policy. Moreover, detente failed because more than a few in positions of leadership "assumed that an end to the open hostility of the Cold War meant an end to superpower conflict in general. The Soviet Union took advantage of this naiveté to embark on a global drive for imperial conquest."

These reasons, the former president concludes, not only explain the failure of detente, they also explain why we ought not to try it a second time. Does this not confuse word and act, symbol and reality? Even if Mr. Nixon's account of this earlier failure is accepted without question, it need only mean that we should learn something from our mistakes of the 1970s. But those mistakes are not inseparable from any and all detentes. Surely it ought not to prove too difficult to recognize that there are detente policies and detente policies, some ill conceived and badly executed and some well conceived and effectively executed. Indeed, Mr. Nixon's favored policy prescription for what he terms "real peace" is based on a diplomatic design that evidently has a critical measure of detente built into it. Could it be otherwise? Could any policy that aims at a substantial relaxation of Soviet-American tensions, even while recognizing the inevitability of a continuing competition that must be faced and managed, not but be in large measure a policy of detente?

THESE CONSIDERATIONS tell us nothing about the prospects of a new detente. Whether it must suffer a fate similar to the old will depend, in the first instance, on the nature of the circumstances attending the new. That the present circumstances are more favorable than those marking the earlier detente should be apparent. From the American vantage point, the earlier venture could hardly have been concluded in less auspicious circumstances. The Nixon-Kissinger detente was undertaken in a period of grave national doubt and uncertainty, not only about the nation's purposes in the world but about its power as well. It was entered into at a time when the dark shadows cast by a disastrous war in Vietnam seemed to make imperative a policy of cutting back, if not on our role and interests in the world then on the means which we would henceforth employ to vindicate them. Detente was intended to serve as the new version of containment. It reflected the conviction that a growing Soviet power, when taken together with a mounting reluctance at home to support a policy of global engagement, meant that American interests would have to be preserved through less taxing means than those employed in the past.

By contrast, from the Soviet vantage point the new relationship was entered into in circumstances that appeared quite promising. Detente was marked by the achievement of parity in strategic arms and by an impressive build-up in conventional arms as well. In Moscow's eyes the "correlation of forces" had changed in favor of the Soviet Union. True,

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the build-up had been made at considerable cost to the domestic economy. But the full price that eventually would have to be paid was not yet apparent. Besides, the Soviet leaders assumed that detente would bring them needed Western—particularly American—technology and capital to spur greater economic growth. The early 1970s were years of high expectation for the Soviet leadership. Enjoying new status as a result of a massive build-up in strategic and conventional arms, and confronted by an adversary deeply shaken by a divisive and stalemated war, the USSR entered upon detente confident over its improving prospects in the Third World and, for that matter, in Western Europe as well.

The circumstances attending the new detente bear little resemblance to the old. This is most strikingly apparent when considering the Soviet position. A desire for detente today is prompted in the first instance by the conviction that far-reaching internal economic reform is indispensable if the Soviet Union is to maintain anything near to its present great power status. Yesterday, the imperatives of an expansionist foreign policy could and did assert their primacy over domestic economic policy. Today, there are growing indications that this order will be reversed. For the present leadership, the imperatives of domestic policy have increasingly subordinated the goals of foreign policy. To the extent this order is maintained, it must imply a substantial reduction in defense expenditures and, more generally, a diminution of efforts to expand Soviet influence in the world. It is clear that if the effort at economic reform is to hold out even the promise of partial success, it will require the bulk of the leadership's time and energies. And since it is a vast and forbidding undertaking, the period it will require for completion will be long.

The American position, compared to what it was in the early 1970s, has markedly improved. Improved if only because of the disappearance of the corrosive divisions, doubts and uncertainties that characterized these years. Compared with the traumatic effects of Vietnam, the debates in recent years over foreign policy and the American role in the world appear as modest affairs. Still more important, the fears that arose at the close of the past decade—that the overall military balance had moved in a manner increasingly favorable to the Soviet Union, that the power and position of the West in the Persian Gulf had dangerously declined while its dependence on the oil of the Gulf had steadily risen, and that the vulnerability of this position was laid bare by the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in December 1979—have either disappeared or been sharply attenuated.

At the same time, an improvement in the circumstances of the American position has not left this country indifferent, let alone hostile, to detente. From all indications, the public and its elites are as receptive to detente as they were in the early 1970s. In part, this receptivity today responds to the same cause as it did yesterday. The deep desire in this country for an improved and easier relationship with the Soviet Union may be taken as a given, one that rises to the surface of political life with only modest encouragement by government. In part, however, the present receptivity to detente is the result of pressures for cutting back substantially on defense spending as a partial solution, at least, of persistently large budget deficits. These pressures can only be expected to grow stronger, given moderate behavior on the part of the Soviet Union. Despite the role the United States has played since World War II, and will doubtless continue to play for some time to come, the tradition of subordinating foreign policy to considerations of domestic welfare has not been abandoned. It is still the case that this "normal" order can be reversed only when it can be persuasively shown that vital security interests are clearly endangered. Such was the case at the beginning of the 1980s. But the consensus on increased defense spending that was the result has now been displaced by a consensus on the need to reduce the budget deficit largely by cutting defense. A new detente provides the justifi-

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cation for doing so.

Thus for both parties the prospect of a new detente holds out considerable appeal. This is of course no guarantee that a new detente will fare much better than the old. Whether it does so or not will largely depend on what the parties hope and expect to get from the relationship and how these hopes and expectations affect their behavior. The old detente was attended by illusions on both sides and this alone probably doomed it. On the Soviet side it was believed that with the recognition of parity in strategic capabilities would also go American recognition of a more active and assertive Soviet policy in the developing world. At the same time, Moscow apparently believed that an expanding Soviet role and influence would not seriously affect American willingness to make substantial transfers of capital and technology to the USSR. And as if these expectations were not enough, the Soviet government persisted in viewing as compatible detente and its continuing arms effort—an effort that appeared increasingly threatening to American and Western leaders.

On the American side, it was thought that the Soviets would somehow be satisfied with having achieved a rough parity in strategic arms and that they would not attempt to improve markedly upon this position. It was also thought that Moscow would be willing to intervene with North Vietnam on behalf of a compromise settlement of the war. Finally, the American architects of detente entertained the expectation that in return for American recognition of the Soviet Union as a strategic equal, Moscow would accept in principle American-inspired rules of superpower competition and that these rules would be enforced, when necessary, by a combination of positive incentives, primarily economic in character, and the threat to employ American power against serious departures.

Not surprisingly, the hopes and expectations nourished on both sides met with disappointment. There was no more reason for the Soviets to think that we would stand passively by while they expanded their influence aggressively and continued their arms build-up than there was for the Americans to believe that the Soviets would be satisfied with what was little more than an honorific equality complemented by modest economic inducements. Without question, historical accident—above all, Watergate—also played havoc with the old detente. Still, it is difficult to avoid the conclusion that its unhappy fate resulted in the main from the unfavorable circumstances in which it was concluded and the illusions harbored by the two parties.

A NEW DETENTE should benefit from the experience with the old as well as from different, and more favorable, circumstances. Illusions will no doubt persist. Assuming, however, that at least something is learned from experience, they should be fewer and less breathtaking. But it is, to repeat, the change in the positions, or circumstances, of the parties that is likely to prove critical. This is particularly true of the Soviet Union. Intent on pursuing an "offensive" detente in the 1970s, its position today is such that it cannot realistically afford to attempt a repetition of the earlier gamble—one that largely resulted, after all, in failure. Instead, that position points to the pursuit of detente which is likely to be defensive in all but name.

There is every reason to assume that, for better or worse, the principal force behind a new detente will be arms control. But arms control alone can no more sustain a new detente than it did the old. If unattended by sufficient restraint in pursuit of the traditional objects of great power competition, any detente must founder. The old one broke down in the periphery of Soviet-American competition, the Third World, rather than at the center. If a new detente should suffer the same fate, however, it is more likely to do so in Europe rather than the Third World. This is not because opportunities for Soviet exploitation will no longer arise in the Third World but because such opportunities as may arise will prove less tempting to the Soviet Union than they did in the 1970s. They will prove

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less tempting because the Soviet record there, taken overall, has been quite poor while the costs have been quite high. The game might nevertheless still be worth the candle if Moscow's economic position were less straitened. Given the economic choices it must now make, though, the temptations held out by instabilities in the developing world cannot but lose much of their former appeal.

Europe is another matter. There the issue is not choice but necessity, for the Soviet Union can no more jeopardize its essential position in Eastern Europe than the United States can jeopardize its position in Western Europe. Yet a detente in present circumstances raises this danger for both superpowers. In Eastern Europe, the kinds of political and economic changes detente must encourage cannot but give rise to at least a measure of instability. How much change can be attempted without risking the kind of instability that Moscow will see as an intolerable threat to its position? In Western Europe, the corrosive effects on NATO of an emerging detente are already apparent. Particularly in West Germany, the INF agreement has led to further doubts about the credibility of the American nuclear guarantee, the rock on which the Atlantic Alliance has always rested. Not surprisingly, those doubts in turn have led to rising pressures in Germany for the removal of tactical nuclear weapons as well. For the retention of tactical nuclear weapons in the context of a withdrawal of intermediate nuclear forces must evoke for many the specter of a war that is confined to Germany and fought with nuclear weapons. The danger arises that, in order to escape this fate, Germany will be increasingly tempted to opt for a neutralist (and denuclearized) position.

It would be folly to dismiss either of these prospects. An imminent threat of either materializing would not only put a quick end to any detente but provoke a grave crisis in superpower relations. Still, if a new detente is to be pursued, there is no escape from taking risks. Moreover, there are substantial risks in the attempt to stand still. In Eastern Europe, the deterioration of bloc economies is such that, if allowed to go unchecked, it will eventually insure serious instability. There is no apparent reason for believing that the threat of Soviet intervention will arise only as a consequence of instability resulting from reform measures that are encouraged and supported by the West. Nor is it apparent that the removal of intermediate nuclear forces must result in a grave crisis in the Alliance. The removal of the missiles has marginally increased the doubts West Germany already entertained. That is surely serious enough but it is not a crisis of confidence.

A detente is not an entente; it is not an end of differences and of rivalry. Even so, if it is to hold out the promise of durability, a detente must be something more than simply the relaxation of tensions. Unless it is to prove a very precarious structure, it must be based on some kind of shared sense of legitimacy, modest though it may be. The old detente did not enjoy this. According to its architects, the basis for that detente was largely the desire to avoid war—or the serious threat of war. This must of course also be part of the basis for a new detente. But it is clear that by itself the desire to prevent war is insufficient for an effective and lasting detente. There must be a common understanding of what constitutes the permitted means and limits of change in the international system. The old detente never approached such an understanding. Whether a new one will do so remains to be seen. Despite the "new thinking" in Moscow, we are still a long way from achieving this end.

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